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
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CORRESPONDENCE,

DESPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS,

OF

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

SECOND MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

EDITED BY

HIS BROTHER,

CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY,

G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., ETC.

THIRD SERIES.

MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.—VOL. III.

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1853.

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LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

LORD CASTLEREAGH.

1815 CONTINUED.

PEACE OF PARIS.

The Right Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, September 4, 1815.

Dear Castlereagh—Your despatch No. 38, touching upon several points adverted to in my last letter, and relating entirely to financial subjects, which, though of less immediate urgency and importance than the great political questions discussed in your other recent despatches, are very necessary to be clearly understood, I shall state my doubts upon some points which appear to me to be connected with our former correspondence, or seem to require some further explanation.

1st. As to the Danish subsidy. Hoping that the signature of peace is near at hand, I do not suppose that, in point of expense, there could be any very important difference between the continued employment of the Danish troops under the terms of the treaty, and an amicable arrangement with Denmark for the immediate discontinuance of their services. But it appeared to me that their advance would be a heavy and useless charge on the north of Germany, and some expense to Denmark herself; and that to pay the subsidy, if they con-

tinued in or near their own frontiers, could neither be easily justified to Parliament, nor very consistent with the general principles of our arrangement with the Allies. I doubt, indeed, whether that arrangement has yet been so distinctly settled as it ought to be, and with as little delay as possible, to prevent future misunderstandings; but I take the outline of it, as explained by you, to be this:

We are bound by the Treaty of Vienna to bring 150,000 men into the field, or to pay for any deficiency at the rate of £20 for each foot-soldier, and £30 for each horseman. Supposing we have 70,000 men in the field as our proper contingent, including British, Belgians, Hanoverians, (beyond the contingent of Hanover) and the corps in Genoa and the south of France, we shall have 80,000 men to account for, amounting, in the proportion of one horseman to four soldiers, to about £1,800,000. It was, however, understood as more generally advantageous to the common cause, that, instead of giving this sum to the greater Powers, to whom, under the letter of the Treaty, it would appear to be due, or of attempting to make up our quota by offering it to any minor Powers who might be willing to lend us the exact number of troops required, we should assist the smaller Powers to bring forward the greatest force they might be able to raise, by dividing it amongst them, at the rate of £11 2*s*. a man, being the rate of subsidy received by the great Powers for their contingents.

If, in this manner, we distribute as large a sum as the compensation for our deficiency of force, I conceive we shall have fully executed the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna; and if, in carrying this plan into effect, we have inadvertently contracted engagements with the minor Powers to an extent exceeding the amount of our deficiency, I think we should be at liberty (as far as respects the Treaty of Vienna) to enter into arrangements with any of those minor Powers for dispensing with the service of their troops, and discontinuing the

stipulated payments. An amicable arrangement of this kind was what I suggested with Denmark, on grounds both of economy and convenience, supposing, as I think I have reason to do, that, without the Danish troops, our contingent made up as above described will be over complete; and, with respect to Denmark herself, I thought such an arrangement might be more desirable than the actual employment of the troops, and had therefore spoken to the Danish Minister on the subject, to prepare his Court for such a proposition. But, as I before said, I hope the difference, in point of expense, will not be great, and I agree with you that such an arrangement could only be made with the consent of the party with whom we had contracted.

I should observe, that we have no means in this country of knowing the amount of the force we have actually furnished, (except the British) and that it is very material that you should, with the Duke of Wellington's assistance, procure the most accurate documents you can obtain on that subject, both for the information of the Government here, and as materials for any discussion with the Allies into which you may have to enter; and if there can be any doubt as to the construction of the Treaty, it should be cleared up as soon as possible.

Upon these principles, I think we loosely estimated, before you left England, the expense of the British army in Belgium at £350,000 a month, and the subsidiary troops at £150,000, making together £500,000. The actual expense of the British army in July was above £400,000, and is estimated for August at £250,000; and on the subject of the subsidiary force, our information is very incomplete, and I understand that some of the treaties are not even yet signed.

The question respecting the expense of the guardianship of Bonaparte is one of secondary, but not inconsiderable, importance, as we do not estimate it at less than £100,000 a-year, which, in a peace establishment, makes a very perceptible difference. Independently of its amount, Lord Liver-

pool thought that it was desirable, for political reasons, to engage the Allies, if practicable, to share it with us in some degree. I certainly feel the weight of the reasons you have assigned against such a proposition, but I do not see any reason why France should not be called upon for a part, if not to the extent of the sum which she had engaged to pay under the Treaty of Fontainebleau, at least to that of the £40,000 a-year, which the East India Company are bound to pay to France as a compensation for some commercial privileges enjoyed by her factories in India, and which sum might, in such a case, be appropriated to the St. Helena establishment, in aid of the expenses of Government.

As to the contribution to be charged upon France, it is certainly a circumstance equally singular and pleasing that an account should exist. At the same time, it is one with respect to which it is peculiarly important that no question should be left unsettled, and there are several which naturally occur in reading your despatch.

In the first place, it is intended that this contribution (say 600,000,000 livres) is to include the expense of the maintenance of the Allied forces to be stationed for a certain term of years in France. If it does, which seems probable, as the requisitions already raised are understood to be included, I apprehend it will not be sufficient for that immediate object, much less leave any surplus for fortifications or other purposes; for an army of 100,000 men will not cost less than 100,000,000 livres a-year, exclusive of the extraordinary expense of British troops. The whole would, therefore, be exhausted in six years, instead of seven or ten, which were in contemplation. On the other hand, if this charge is to be in addition to the contribution, it will be difficult for France, unless her credit improves, to raise the amount; and unless the total charge is fixed at some ascertained sum, it will be a certain source of dispute and irritation. I am not clear upon what grounds you consider the Hanoverians as having a claim upon this fund distinct

from other foreign troops forming part of the British contingent, as I understand the Dutch, Belgians, and Brunswickers, to be; but whatever arrangement may be made with them, it is very essential that it should be clear and distinct, for, from all I hear, there are no people more exacting or difficult to deal with.

The other claim upon this contribution, which you seem to apprehend, is that of the British creditors on the French Government; but in this I cannot see any great difficulty. The great majority of them are stockholders in the French Funds, and all they can claim is to be replaced on the great Bork, in common with other creditors. The amount of their dividends cannot exceed £100,000 to £150,000 a-year, which cannot form any very important addition to the French National Debt. With regard to the few other creditors, they ought also to be very well satisfied with a fair compensation in French 5 per Cents. In neither case do I think that this Government could, with any propriety, take the charge upon itself, either directly or by appropriating the French contribution. All that the creditors can ask of us is to stipulate for the award of the Article of the Treaty of Vienna in their favour.

The constant hurry in which you have lived since you left England may have prevented you from attending to circumstances of that kind, but you must otherwise be struck with the low price of our Funds, and some other indications of pecuniary embarrassment. Something of this kind you must have observed before you left England, and it has certainly increased since. From the diminution of our expenses, and the large provision made for the service of the year, Government has not been, and I hope will not be, under any difficulty, (though if we had had to provide for payments equal to those of last year, I scarcely know how it could have been effected) but the embarrassment and distress of individuals are great. The primary cause seems to be the low price of agricultural

produce, which has materially affected the landed interest and most branches of the internal trade. It has also checked the circulation of the country banks, amongst which there have been several failures and a general distrust, which have aggravated the difficulties of all the other parties concerned.

The diminution of the circulation of the country banks, in consequence of their own alarms and the distrust of the people, and which is loosely, but not improbably, calculated at one-third, has rendered a large supply from the Bank of England necessary to support the ordinary course of business, and an opinion prevails that the Bank has contributed to the present mischief by refusing the necessary accommodation. I think the Bank directors have been frightened by the motions in the House of Commons, and are disposed to act on too cautious a system; but I have reason to believe that the charge of their withholding accommodation from the public at present is unfounded. They are more disposed to press inconveniently on the Government for the repayment of their advances on Exchequer Bills. We have been able to satisfy their applications to a very considerable extent; and if these repayments are employed by the Bank in giving additional assistance to trade, it is perhaps the only safe and unexceptionable way in which Government can interfere to give relief in cases of this kind. There can be no doubt that the evil has been greatly increased, though not originally produced, by the heavy demands our loans have made on the money market, and it is very material we should be able to avoid a similar pressure for some time to come; for the mischief is in its nature likely to be of some duration, and to admit only of a gradual cure by the general settling down of the prices of other articles in proportion to those of the produce of the soil. The first step must be the reduction of the price of labour, which is already taking place to a considerable extent.

Amidst the difficulties which affect our internal trade, considerable relief has been afforded to our manufacturers by the

flourishing state of foreign commerce. The exports to Europe have, indeed, as far as the accounts are made up, fallen short of those of last year, but I believe they have been fully made up by the opening of the American market. When I can get any accounts on this subject worth your notice, I will send them to you. Our revenue continues productive, even in those branches which most depend upon internal consumption. There are, however, symptoms of delay and difficulty of payment, though not of actual diminution, in the Assexed Taxes and Property Tax, and the failure of the country banks has rendered it necessary to issue an unusual number of extents against collectors and receivers of revenue. The harvest, though affected by a partial blight, is, upon the whole, believed to be a good one, and shipments of grain are making in the Thames for export to the Mediterranean.

Believe me ever, &c., N. VANSITTART.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, September 6, 1815.

Sir—Mr. Bagot's departure for the United States having been delayed by circumstances which have been satisfactorily explained to the American Minister in this country, I have received the Prince Regent's commands to transmit to you his Royal Highness's ratification, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, of a Convention concluded at London on the 3rd of July, for regulating the commercial relations between the two countries; and I have to desire that you will exchange the same against a similar copy ratified by the President of the United States. You will also receive herewith the form of a certificate to be signed jointly by you and the American Secretary of State, on the exchange of the ratifications, which you will return to this Office, bearing date the day on which the exchange took place.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, September 6, 1815.

Sir—The person of General Napoleon Bonaparte having been placed at the disposal of his Majesty's Government, it has been determined, in conjunction with the Allied Sovereigns, to assign the island of St. Helena for his future residence, and to adopt such measures as may be necessary for his security in that island. I have therefore to signify to you his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's commands that, in representing these circumstances to the Government of the United States, you will point out to them the necessity which exists for a restrictive system being established with respect to the intercourse of all ships and vessels, British as well as foreign, with the exception of the ships belonging to the East India Company, with the island of St. Helena; and that, on your notifying to the American Secretary of State, in a note, that you are ready to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce lately concluded between the two countries, you will transmit to him a declaration in the form of the enclosed Draft, explanatory of the intentions of his Majesty's Government, in as far as regards the intercourse of ships belonging to the United States with the island of St. Helena.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, September 6, 1815.

Sir—I have the honour to enclose a copy of a Circular Note, dated the 26th ultimo, by which the foreign Ministers resident here were informed of the resolution taken with respect to the confinement of Bonaparte at St. Helena, and the exclusion, in consequence of that measure, of all vessels from communication with that island. The obstruction which this would bring to the execution of one of the Articles of the late Commercial Treaty signed with America, induced the Earl of Liverpool to

explain to Mr. Adams, in a conference held with that gentleman previously to the above communication to the foreign Ministers, the necessity which the present circumstances of the world had imposed on this country of so rigorous a proceeding against the navigation of foreigners to and from that island. Mr. Adams, although lamenting the measure, seemed to look upon it as of little consequence, as far as his Government was concerned. It was, therefore, not without considerable surprise that the Note, of which the enclosed is a copy, was received by this Government, in reply to the Circular addressed to Mr. Adams.

Although it is not presumed that the American Government will on this occasion assume the tone of their Minister here, inasmuch as the Treaty in its present state is not binding on them, it may not be premature to remind you, should they, contrary to expectation, refuse to exchange the ratifications on the plea of our not fulfilling our engagements, that the American Government itself has, in more than one instance, furnished a precedent for a similar proceeding in the interval between the signature and the ratification of former treaties concluded by the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments.

It may also not be immaterial to add, that the intercourse with St. Helena must be comparatively of little importance, so long as the Cape of Good Hope is open; and that, in the negociation which took place for the Commercial Treaty, the intercourse with India was liberally conceded to the United States, without any equivalent whatever.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, September 7, 1815.

Sir—Your several despatches, to No. 25 inclusive, have been received, and laid before the Prince Regent. The necessity of immediately despatching this messenger with my

preceding numbers prevents my replying to the various topics which your more recent communications embrace. I shall, therefore, confine myself to convey to you the sentiments of his Majesty's Government on the one requiring the most immediate explanation with the Government of the United States, namely, the Fisheries, premising the instructions I have to give you on the subject with informing you that the line which you have taken in the discussion on that point, as explained in your No. 24, has met with the approbation of his Majesty's Government.

You will take an early opportunity of assuring Mr. Monroe that as, on the one hand, the British Government cannot acknowledge the right of the United States to use the British territory for purposes connected with the Fishery; and that the fishing-vessels will be excluded from the bays, harbours, rivers, creeks, and inlets, of all his Majesty's possessions—so, on the other hand, the British Government does not pretend to interfere in the Fishery in which the subjects of the United States may be engaged, either on the grand Bank of Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or other places in the sea, without the jurisdiction of the maritime league from the coasts under the dominion of Great Britain.

Upon these principles, therefore, the case against which the American Government has remonstrated, if well founded, was not authorized by his Majesty's Government.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Note.

[*Addressed apparently by Count Nesselrode to Lord Castlereagh.*]

Paris, le 7 Septembre, 1815.

La Note remise le 3 Septembre à la Conférence des quatre Cabinets par son Excellence Monsieur le Vicomte de Castlereagh a été portée à la connoissance de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies. Sa Majesté Impériale y a vu avec la plus vive satisfaction, que Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent

partage les opinions que Sa Majesté a fait connoître à ses augustes Alliés relativement aux principes qu'il semble juste d'adopter, tant pour pacifier la France que pour assurer le repos de l'Europe entière. Le double résultat ne sauroit être atteint qu'en conservant dans les negociations actuelles la même pureté d'intention, le même désintéressement, le même esprit de moderation, qui ont constitué jusqu'ici la force irrésistible de la ligue Européenne, et qui ont si puissamment contribue à ses succès.

Le maintien de cet accord, qui identifie les intérêts politiques des grandes puissances à un intérêt général, est trop nécessaire, dans les circonstances actuelles, à l'affermissement de l'independance des nations et à leur bonheur véritable, pour que sa Majesté ne le préfère à toute autre combinaison tendante à favoriser dans des dimensions retrécies des intérêts particuliers et momentanés.

C'est conformément à ces principes et dans la conviction la plus intime que tout système de pacification avec la France, fondé sur de bases différentes ne sauroit être adopté par les Souverains alliés sans en courir une résponsabilité trop grave aux yeux de l'Europe et de la postérite, que l'Empereur a jugé convenable de se prononcer irrévocablement pour le système des garanties temporaires.

Sa Majesté Impériale est d'autant plus portée à considérer les principes de négociation inhérens à ce système comme les seuls qu'on puisse suivre avec l'espoir d'un prompt succès, et d'une utilité réelle, qu'ils ne semblent point exclure les modifications les plus propres à satisfaire toutes les convenances à l'égard des Puissances alliées.

La Note Britannique annonce suffisamment la possibilité de quelques arrangemens territoriaux compatibles avec le système des garanties temporaires, et indique également d'après des proportions équitables les avantages pécuniaires qui doivent être reservés à la Prusse en raison des sacrifices majeurs que cette Puissance a portée au bien général.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur pénétré de la convenance comme de la justice des principes mis en avant pour les arrangemens proposé dans la Note de son Excellence le Vicomte de Castlereagh a enjoint au soussigné d'y adhérer pleinement et sans restriction quelconque. En manifestant des vues aussi conciliatoires, Sa Majesté Impériale espère que les suffrages de ses augustes Alliés se rallieront au système appuyé de l'assentiment du Gouvernement Britannique. Dans cette persuasion l'Empereur désire que les Plénipotentiaires respectifs s'appliquent à donner à la négociation un développement final dans le plus court delai possible, et dans les formes les plus propres à obtenir ce but, sans que la confection d'un acte définitif puisse exiger des discussions ultérieures.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, September 11, 1815.

My dear Lord—In addition to what I have stated in my despatch and note on the subject of the works in the Louvre, I think it right to mention that Mr. Hamilton, who is intimate with Canova, the celebrated artist, expressly sent here by the Pope, with a letter to the King, to reclaim what was taken from Rome, distinctly ascertained from him that the Pope, if successful, neither could nor would, as Pope, sell any of the *chefs-d'œuvres* that belonged to the See, and in which he has, in fact, only a life interest.

The French, when they plundered the Vatican, ignorantly brought away some works of little or no value. These Canova has authority either to cede to the King, or to sell, to facilitate the return of the more valuable objects; but it is quite clear that no sum of money could secure to the Prince Regent any of the distinguished works from his Holiness's collection. The other claimants would be still less likely to sell. In taking, therefore, the disinterested line, we have, in fact, made no real sacrifice, whilst we shall escape odium and misrepresentation; and if, through the weight of the Prince Regent's interference,

the Pope should ultimately recover his property, his Royal Highness would probably feel it more consistent with his munificence to give this old man a small sum out of the French contribution, to carry home his gallery, than to see him exposed to the reproach of selling the refuse, without any strict right to do so, in order to replace what is really valuable in the Vatican.

I cannot yet judge what turn this business will take. Russia wishes for a composition between the King and the claimants; but, as you will see by Count Nesselrode's note, will not insist upon it, but will rather insist, as far as a protest goes, against any force being used. This is a little too late, after having patiently witnessed their particular Allies, the Prussians, remove by force not only all the works of art taken away from the Prussian dominions, but those plundered from Cologne and other towns on the left bank of the Rhine—possessions which have since been acquired by Prussia. The Prussians have also assisted the Grand Dukes of Hesse, Mecklenburg, and others of the minor Powers in the north of Germany, to recover in like manner what belonged to them. This proceeding of the Prussians makes it almost indispensable for the King of the Netherlands to replace in the churches of Belgium the pictures of which they were despoiled. His Majesty, I believe, feels this so strongly, that he would rather sacrifice his own family collection, now in the Louvre, than fail in this act of political duty to his new subjects, who, devoted to their religion, would receive such a mark of favour from their Protestant sovereign with sentiments of peculiar gratitude.

I cannot see, therefore, the possibility of the Duke of Wellington, as the military commander of the troops of the King, doing otherwise than giving his aid to remove by force, if necessary, these objects; and it becomes Great Britain not less to see the same measures of justice distributed to her immediate ally, as that which has been obtained by the adjacent States. The protection of the Pope and the other Italian

princes more immediately belongs to the Emperor of Austria; and, though his Imperial Majesty is alive to the subject, I think he will be very reluctant to use force; and yet without force I do not believe the thing can be done, as the King, whatever he may feel of remorse as to the mode in which these works came into his possession, will be very reluctant by any act of cession, or even of composition, on his part, to take upon himself any of the responsibility of their removal from Paris.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, September 11, 1815.

My dear Lord—I have letters from Dr. Campbell of the 29th of June, from Tabriz: he assures me that, whatever are the feelings of Abbas Mirza in regard to the change operated in our relations with Persia, he will in no way disturb the peace with this country. I am well informed that the Russians are daily advancing further into the Persian territory bordering upon the Caspian, notwithstanding the peace lately ratified.

Baba Pacha, appointed Seraskier of Erzeröm, had been on the point of breaking with Persia; but an officer arrived within these few days at Teflis has brought the information that he is preparing to attack the Russians, unless Imeritia is restored to the Porte, according to the article in the Treaty of Peace between this country and Turkey, by which it was to have been given back to the latter.

I have nothing further to write you from this place. The Emperor has not yet mentioned any period for his return, and the delay has occasioned a more profound impression than I have ever before observed. The Empress has publicly announced (as a secret) the intended marriage of the Grand-Duchess Anne and the Prince of Orange.

Sir Daniel Bayley arrived here a few days ago, but has brought me no letters. Pray have the goodness to write me a

line by the post from Paris, to say when Lord Cathcart will return to St. Petersburgh.

Your obedient, faithful servant, WALPOLE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, September 14, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—I forward by the present courier a private letter relative to the Louvre, which ought to have gone with my despatch on the same subject sent on Sunday. I also send you a letter I have just received from Arbuthnot, with his note accompanying it. You are acquainted with his correspondent: his remarks in this, as in many of his former communications, appear to me deserving of attention; and you will observe his impression of the state of parties in France agrees pretty nearly with those I sent you a few days since. His opinion coincides with mine, that the King, by firmness, keeping the Royalists back, and a direct policy, may create out of the men whom the Revolution has bred a party capable of governing; but that, out of the Court party and the high-flying Royalists, he can extract nothing at the present conjuncture but weakness and confusion.

There seems no doubt that an excellent spirit of loyalty will prevail in the new representation. If this could be moderated instead of goaded by the Court, the Ministers would be strong enough for every exertion, and they could hardly venture to fall short of their duty. Thus supported and watched, the Bonapartists and the Jacobins would sink into insignificance; but I am afraid the game will be otherwise played. The Court, that is Monsieur and the Duchesse d'Angoulême, will probably excite the Royalist members to run, first at Fouché, as the more odious object, and next at the Government generally. In both these efforts they will be assisted by the Jacobins, who wish nothing so much as to see the Royalists committed in the Government, which will soon concentrate all the weight of the Revolution against the Court, and thus

render their chance of overturning the Bourbons infinitely greater, or at least of setting aside this branch of the family.

In fact, they appear to me to be creating an Orleans party, which, with a little more management, would soon die away, as the Duke has no great following from personal consideration; he is only looked to as a resource against the known or supposed views of other branches of the family.

As I stated in a former letter, I look with the more alarm to this state of things, because I am convinced it will lead to internal disturbance and a desultory warfare, which will soon turn to the disadvantage of the royal cause, unless the Allied troops are brought forward; and, although one of the great objects of a strong army on the side of Flanders undoubtedly is to support the King, in the event of a new convulsion, yet it is another thing, by intemperate management on the part of the Court, to be mixed in the police of the country. The force that would be amply adequate to the first object, as well as to cover Europe from attack, would dwindle to nothing, if spread over the interior of France.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, September 15, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I can assure you that I am fully sensible of the injurious effect which must result from the general line on present politics taken by our daily papers, and particularly by those which are supposed to be Government papers. You know, however, full well that there are papers, which are vulgarly called Government papers, in consequence of the support which they give to the Government rather than to the Opposition of the day: there are no papers over which we have any authority, or even any influence on which we can depend.

It is supposed by many at home, and, I have no doubt,

generally believed on the Continent, that these papers are in the pay of Government; whereas no paper that has any character, and consequently an established sale, will accept money from Government; and indeed their profits are so enormous in all critical times, when their support is the most necessary, that no pecuniary assistance that Government could offer would really be worth their acceptance. The only indirect means we possess of having any influence over the editors is by supplying them occasionally with foreign intelligence, and by advertisements; but, with respect to the former, it is notorious that some of the papers which are not connected with Government have always had the earliest foreign intelligence; and, with regard to the latter, they know full well that the public offices will necessarily be obliged, sooner or later, to insert their advertisements in the papers which have the greatest sale, and they hold in consequence very cheap any menace to deprive them of this advantage.

It may be difficult to make foreign Governments understand many of these circumstances; but a very little inquiry ought to satisfy them that, even as to our domestic politics, we never can rely on what are called the Government papers, on those points where their assistance would be most necessary. The Courier, at that time, as now, a Government paper, took, as you will recollect, a most decided and mischievous part against the Duke of York in the year 1809, and we could not get any public print to support us last year, either upon the question of the Property Tax or the Corn Bill. The truth is, they look only to their sale. They make their way like sycophants with the public, by finding out the prejudices and prepossessions of the moment, and then flattering them; and the number of *soi-disant* Government or Opposition papers abound just as the Government is generally popular or unpopular.

There can be no doubt that the line which has been lately taken by the daily papers in this country respecting France, has been in unison with the public feeling: and if you ask me

the cause of this public feeling, I have no difficulty in ascribing it almost exclusively to the *impunity* which has hitherto attended, with only one exception, all those who deserted the standard of the King of France, to join Buonaparte. I enter not into the question how far this was or was not unavoidable; but I am persuaded that if, in the first fortnight or three weeks after the return of the King, a proper military tribunal could have been established for the trial of the commanders of corps which had joined Buonaparte before the King quitted the French territory or even Paris, and six or seven examples had been made of the most flagrant offenders, the public feeling as to France would have been as different as possible from that which we have experienced, not only with respect to the King's Government, but likewise as to all the questions relative to the reduction of the power and the territory of France.

I should further add that the publication of Fouché's Reports has done incalculable mischief. I enter not into the propriety of his having made such reports to the King. In that he may be justified; but it was a most flagrant indignity to the Allies that he should allow them to be circulated, and that his agents should have sent them over to this country for publication, before they had been communicated to you, and under circumstances which induced us to represent them generally as gross forgeries.

You will make what use of this explanation you may judge proper. I have thought, however, that you would not dislike to have the ideas which have occurred to me on the whole of this subject brought into one point of view.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Mr. Augustus Foster to Lord Castlereagh.

Copenhagen, September 15, 1815.

My Lord—I take the opportunity of a private conveyance to acquaint your lordship with an interesting conversation that

I had with M. de Kaäs on the subject of Baron Hammerstein's mission, which took place after dinner at my house a few evenings ago.

M. de Kaäs is Minister of Justice, and has lately been created Minister of Police. He is undoubtedly the ablest man in the Administration; he can be rough in his manners, is not of severe morals, and of a bold and ambitious character. He was the firmest adherent of Bonaparte while in power, and was twice sent on a mission to him, though he professes to despise him for his cowardice in not dying in the field of battle. He has now apparently transferred all the respect and admiration which he had for him to Great Britain.

For the rest, his present overture will show your lordship that this Cabinet is not without its intrigues, as he seems to be endeavouring to push himself forward at the expense of M. de Rosenkrantz.

M. de Kaäs then, after telling me that he thought it would have been better if the Government of Hanover had addressed themselves in a more private and indirect manner to this Court, namely, through my medium, instead of through a Hanoverian nobleman, whose talents and whose former situation in this country made his arrival here a subject of curiosity and remark, proceeded to state that much anxiety prevailed in the Danish Government, lest Prussia should, in consequence of Prince Hardenberg having heard of the proposed negociation about the Lauenburg territory, endeavour to produce a further delay in the period of its being ceded to this country. He even seemed to fear that it might have a general bad effect upon their relations with Prussia, which he thought he saw already in the *non-payment hitherto* of the 600,000 Swedish dollars agreed to be delivered to Denmark on the 4th of last August at Hamburgh; as well as in the delay of the ratification by Sweden of the declaration delivered to Prince Hardenberg by Count Löwenhjelm at Vienna—a delay which, he fancied, might have been designedly produced by the Prussian Minister.

He wished to impress me, therefore, with the idea that the present moment was a very unfit one for treating at all about the sale of the Duchy to Hanover, and urging the propriety of waiting until it shall be actually placed in the hands of this country, when he told me in the *strictest confidence*, requesting I would not speak *even to M. de Rosenkrantz on the subject*, that he had great hopes he should persuade the King of Denmark to proceed in person to London, when he might give his consent to the exchange, as an act of personal friendship to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. He had endeavoured, he said, last year, to engage his Danish Majesty to go to England, previously to the arrival of the Allied Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, and regretted much the not having been listened to: now, however, he had hopes of succeeding, and seemed very sanguine as to the good effect to be produced thereby to this country; imagining that it will be the means of their obtaining from us, if not a sugar colony, at least some ships of war, to enable them to contend with the Barbary powers.

It is in the next spring that M. de Kaäs hopes to bring about this proposed journey of his Danish Majesty; consequently, your lordship will have full time to convey to me instructions as to whether I should encourage or throw a damp upon this project; at present, I contented myself with merely observing that, if the journey proposed last year had taken place, it would have been, I thought, very agreeable to his Royal Highness, but avoided giving an express opinion as to that which was advised by him at present; though I was very cautious of appearing to encourage it, or the very extravagant hopes which he seemed to entertain as to the advantages likely to result from it.

I must add that, whatever be the influence of M. de Kaäs with his Danish Majesty, he may not find it so easy to get him to give up the Lauenburg territory; as, however small it is, he is pleased with the idea of its being the acquisition of his reign, important from its military position, and, as such,

some balance for the immense loss of territory which Denmark has lately suffered,

Of the other four Ministers of this Cabinet, I have found M. de Mösting, the present Minister of Finances, and the late one, Count Schimmelman, very favourable to the measure, from financial reasons; Count Moltke ready to support it; but M. de Rosenkrantz, as the direct organ of the King in foreign affairs, unwilling to converse upon the subject. There is, besides, M. de Bülow, the Adjutant-General, who has continual access to his Danish Majesty, and who appears decidedly averse to it.

I will not close this letter without observing that, if activity and able negociation could have induced this Government to agree to the measure, at the present moment, M. de Hammerstein would certainly have succeeded. He is, however, entirely of my opinion, that there is *now* no prospect of success, and has written, therefore, in that sense to Hanover, expecting, in consequence, to be permitted to return home.

Your lordship will conclude that, as M. de Kaäs made his communication relative to the journey he has proposed to the King of Denmark quite confidentially, and unknown to M. de Rosenkrantz, it would not be advisable that M. de Bourke should be let into the secret.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, &c.,

AUGUSTUS FOSTER.

The Right Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Blackheath, September 19, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—You must have too many inquiries after your health, and congratulations on your escape, for me to trouble you with more upon that subject than to say that I have never known the public more anxious about any individual, or more sensible of anything, than of the detriment which the interests both of this country and of Europe must have suffered by even a temporary interruption of your ser-

vices. But I hope the Sovereigns, on their return to Paris, will have found you so much recovered as to leave no reason for apprehensions of this sort.

In the communications which we have seen respecting the contributions to be imposed on France, I cannot think the means of realizing it seem to have come at all under consideration. It may be said, and with a degree of truth, that it is the business of the French to find the means of raising it; but as they certainly will plead inability to pay, it may not be amiss to consider a little what answer to give them. They will urge that the proprietors, being exhausted by requisitions of every kind, are unable to pay their ordinary taxes; that, the frontiers being everywhere opened by the continual passage of troops and baggage, the duties on foreign goods can no more be collected than the internal duties; and that it will be a considerable time before good order can be established, and business resume its course, so as to allow the revenue to be restored to what it was before Bonaparte's return.

Under these difficulties, I have always guessed they would attempt one expedient, of which it is very necessary you should be aware, and which, I have now positive evidence, is in their contemplation—I mean a loan in England. Within the last two days, a gentleman from the City called upon me with a plan of the kind, with a view, no doubt, of sounding me as to the disposition of Government towards it. The outline of the scheme was to raise a loan of £5,000,000, to be repaid in five years, and secured upon the forests, which, by a law of last year, the King is authorized to sell.

I need hardly say I discountenanced the plan as much as possible; but, to prevent your being taken by surprise by any suggestion the French Ministers may throw out, I will trouble you with a few of the objections to it.

1st. It would augment the scarcity of money here, and be very injurious to the subscribers to our own loan, who have by no means too advantageous a bargain.

2ndly. It would totally defeat our plans for the improvement of the exchange, which have been carried into execution with great diligence and extraordinary success, and would, in consequence, bring upon us a heavy addition of foreign expense.

3rdly. It would place a part of our capitalists in a state of connexion with, and dependence upon, the French Government—a thing by no means desirable, even when we are on the most friendly terms with it, but highly embarrassing under many possible circumstances.

4thly. As I have little doubt the forest plan would turn out a bubble, it would add to the difficulties we already experience in satisfying the claims of British creditors.

I have not, however, any apprehension that the plan can be realized, as I am persuaded the money could not be obtained, (if even circumstances were more favourable here than they are just at present) without the guarantee of the British Government could be obtained; and to any proposition of that kind you must steadily answer, as you may with perfect truth, that it could not possibly be proposed to Parliament. We should be putting ourselves into the power of the French, instead of keeping them in any degree under our control; and they would realize Falstaff's proposal, "He that will run with me for a thousand pounds, let him *lend* me the money, and have at him." The very idea and rumour of such a plan must, however, have an unfavourable effect upon public credit.

There is another financial circumstance, with which you should be acquainted. The great expense of Lord Moira's Nepaul war, and of his preparations for war with the Mahrattas, which, however, I hope will not actually take place, have reduced the East India Company to great pecuniary distress. They have, in consequence, been very pressing for repayment of the expenses incurred on account of the public in India. A rough account, which has been made up, shows a balance in their favour of about a million; and the estimated

charges of the present year will add £600,000 or £700,000 to the account. I therefore conclude we shall be obliged to pay them about a million out of the vote of credit of this year, and I think the Navy, from the great expense of paying off ships, to which long arrears of wages are due, will require at least another million, both which sums must be deducted from our estimated resources for the year. I still, however, allowing for them, have not any apprehension that it will be necessary for Parliament to meet before Christmas. I enclose a Memorandum of the grants of Parliament under each of the principal heads of expenditure, and of the sums issued to the 18th of September, from which you may form some judgment, though a very imperfect one, of the time for which our funds will hold out. There may, indeed, be another difficulty of a very serious nature, for which the liberality of our grants affords no remedy. The prevailing scarcity of money has for a considerable time rendered it impossible to raise money on Exchequer Bills; and we have, on the contrary, been obliged to support their credit by redeeming considerable sums. If this stagnation should continue after the 10th of October, we shall have no means of procuring the necessary supplies of cash but by applying to the Bank for increased advances—a measure always objectionable, and at the present time peculiarly inconvenient, for a variety of reasons. I hope, however, before that time, the uncertainty which exists respecting political arrangements, and which presses heavily upon public credit, will be removed, and that we may then be in possession of at least the ordinary facilities of supply.

Since I began writing, your important despatch (No. 54) of the 14th has come to my hands. As we are not making war for conquests, and much less for money, I think the nation will have great reason to be satisfied, if peace can be concluded on the terms you suggest. As far as pecuniary arrangements are concerned, the great point for us is to secure a liberal provision for the fortification fund, and proper security for its due

application. But I remember the fable of the bear-skin too well to discuss questions respecting the French contribution, till we have greater certainty of receiving it.

Your German financiers seem to make much lighter than I do of the difficulty France will have to raise large sums of money. If I thought the finances and internal economy of France in a sound state, I should agree with them; but I see so many elements of disorder and confusion, that I do not believe (whatever Baron Louis may estimate) that he will realize 500,000,000 a-year for a considerable period to come. Bonaparte's system of finance was admirably organized, and most rigorously enforced. The King, on his return, found it in full operation, and, preserving the same instruments, its operation continued without much relaxation. But those instruments all proved traitors, and co-operated with the defection of the army in his overthrow; and, if they are continued in power, the King will be exposed to a repetition of the same perfidy. If, on the other hand, he makes great changes, I apprehend a degree of weakness and counteraction will be introduced, of which it is not easy to calculate the effects.

Even with the limited means to which I suppose France to be reduced, much may be done by means of credit; and, if internal tranquillity is preserved, credit will gradually revive: and I should think an addition of £1,000,000 or £1,500,000 to the national debt so far from an evil, that I believe it would be one of the best means of security both to France and her neighbours. It would create a moneyed interest connected with the Government, and whose natural element would as much be peace and good order as that of the army and Jacobins is war and confusion. On the part of the Government, strict economy and punctuality in its engagements would be equally indispensable, and the co-operation between these parties would equally tend to the prosperity of France and the quiet of Europe.

It is true that, at the beginning of the Revolution, the

moneyed interest was by no means well disposed, but it was irritated by the vanity and pretensions of the noblesse, and alarmed by some real and much imputed bad faith in the Court; and it has suffered too severely by its folly not to be now convinced that, in all confusion, it must of necessity be the first sacrifice. I do not of course speak of a few active, intriguing capitalists, who, however, seldom ultimately escape, but of the body of the national creditors and moneyed men.

Believe me ever, &c., N. VANSITTART.

[Enclosure.]

Account of Sums granted for the services of the Army, Navy, and Ordnance, for the year 1815; *showing what parts thereof have been issued to the* 18*th September*, 1815.

	ARMY.	NAVY. Exclusive of £669,684, granted out of old Naval Stores.	ORD-NANCE.
	£	£	£
Army Grant, exclusive of £4,375,035 for Ireland	35,967,026		
Subsidies — including £1,650,000 Bills of Credit	9,101,056		
	45,068,082	17,974,515	4,039,744
Issues thereout to September 18, 1815. .	30,845,490	14,519,836	705,133
Remains .	14,222,592	3,454,679	3,334,611
Of the above sums there was issued, before the 5th of January, 1815	5,882,533	2,443,360	Nil.
Between the 5th of January and the 18th of September, inclusive	24,962,957	12,076,476	705,133
	30,845,490	14,519,836	705,133

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, September 19, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I received yesterday your despatches of the 14th instant, together with your private letter of the 11th, relative to the restoration of the works of art. Upon the former I have little to say in addition to what has been already communicated to you in my former letters. I think your negociation is proceeding as well as we could desire, and I only hope that the objections of the Prussians will be speedily overcome, and that you will be able, without further loss to France, to bring your propositions before the French Government. I am satisfied that the pretensions of the Prussians on the score of contributions are so unreasonable, that, if persisted in, they will defeat their own object.

The idea you have suggested of stipulating for seven years' temporary occupation of the fortresses, with a power to reconsider the question at the end of four years, so as to make the occupation cease at the end of five, if the security of Europe will then allow of it, is, in my judgment, a great improvement, and far preferable, upon the principle on which we profess to act, to a simple stipulation for seven years' absolute occupation.

Now, as to the works of art, I differ very much from Arbuthnot as to the expediency of any consideration of the French feelings on the subject. I think it is very just and natural to consider these feelings, and to give them all due weight upon the question of the integrity of their territory, the dismantling their fortresses, and even upon that of the temporary occupation of them; because their feelings on all these points are natural and laudable, and should be consulted as far as is consistent with the security of their neighbours. But I confess I have no regard whatever for their feelings with respect to the plunder they have taken from other countries. The feeling is altogether one of vanity, and of the worst description; and by permitting it we are only encouraging a senti-

ment which will hereafter prove hostile to the just rights of other countries.

You will have observed that, amongst the very different opinions which prevail on other points, there is but one sentiment amongst all parties in this country as to the justice and expediency of the restoration of the works of art. I think the King of the Netherlands is quite right in pressing for the restoration of the pictures taken from the churches in Flanders, in preference to those belonging to his own family.

I wish you to consider whether, if the King of France can be brought to no agreement upon the subject, and it shall be necessary therefore to take away the works of art by force, it is not less dangerous to take away the whole which have been plundered than only those belonging to our Allies. It appears to me that the first proposition would rest upon a general principle, and that it would be too much for France hereafter to engage in war for the purpose of recovering all her plunder; but by leaving any part, you acquiesce in her right to a certain degree, and you furnish her with a pretence for endeavouring to recover the remainder, and make the attainment of the object less difficult. With these observations, I am contented to leave the matter in your hands. I quite agree with you that, if the treasures of the Vatican are to be restored, this country ought to give every facility for transporting them in safety.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Mr. Charles Denis to Lord Castlereagh.

Rome, September 20, 1815.

My Lord—I hope before your lordship receives this letter you will have seen Mr. Cooke, and that he has acquainted you with the final instructions he gave me, to put myself in relations with this Government.

In the month of March, Dr. Milner, an English Catholic bishop, came to me, and represented, at the desire of several

cardinals, that Mr. Taylor, who succeeded Mr. Fagan and Mr. Dodwell in presenting English to the Pope, gave great umbrage to the Pope, by appearing before him on these occasions in a secular dress. Mr. Taylor is a Dominican friar: he quitted the habit of his order during the French Government, and has not resumed it since. He also complained that he had introduced improper people to his Holiness. The consequence was an arrangement with Cardinal Pacca, the Prosecretario di Stata, that all English to be presented to his Holiness should be recommended by me to the Pope's Grand Chamberlain, and by him presented to his Holiness. This arrangement was approved of by Mr. Cooke, and he gave me particular instructions whom I should have presented.

Cardinal Consalvi arrived soon after, and resumed his functions as Secretary of State. Mr. Taylor presented some English, particularly Admiral Sir Josias Rowley, and also presented him to the Cardinal Secretary of State. When I saw his Eminence, I mentioned to him the arrangement that had been made with Cardinal Pacca, and said I was informed Mr. Taylor had presented Admiral Sir Josias Rowley to his Holiness: he replied, "He did, and to me also." I observed, "That was contrary to the etiquette that has been established." He immediately said, "Et pourquoi le permettez vous?" On that I wrote Mr. Taylor a note, of which I enclose a copy, and also one of his answer. The note was written and the answer received in the morning, and that night the Hon. W. Clifford, who was passing through Rome, and charged with despatches for your lordship from Naples, came to me with a message from Cardinal Consalvi, that he could not prevent Mr. Taylor from presenting to the Pope; that his Holiness would with great pleasure receive any person I should present; but, as head of the Church, he was ready to receive all who professed the Christian faith.

This was so different from my last conversation with his Eminence, and sending the message to me by Mr. Clifford,

whilst, upon every other occasion, he had always sent to me to come to him, that I waited until his Eminence was sufficiently recovered (Mr. Clifford saw him whilst he was confined to his bed) to know the precise message he sent me, and why Mr. Clifford interfered. When I saw the Cardinal, he repeated nearly what Mr. Clifford had said, adding that, as cases of conscience were often referred to him, he frequently saw the parties with great politeness; repeated that his Holiness would have great pleasure in receiving any person presented by my means; that he had sent the message to me by Mr. Clifford out of particular respect; that Cardinal Fesch, though not accredited, had presented some French to the Pope; he saw Mr. Clifford, and introduced the subject to him. Mr. Clifford, in the course of our conversation, told me his Eminence mentioned the business to him.

I should not have troubled your lordship with this detail, had I not received instructions on that subject, and been informed you had given most particular orders relative to presentations: when Mr. Fagan and Mr. Dodwell, who are Catholics, presented, there was no idea of interference. Mr. Taylor sent to me that a Protestant could not present a Catholic to the Pope; the interference of Mr. Clifford, who is of a Catholic family of distinction—these circumstances induce me to believe this is chiefly a matter of religion.

About the 14th of this month, an Algerine corsair took, between Civita Vecchia and the Tiber, a Roman tartana. His Majesty's ship, the Amelia, the Hon. Captain Proby, coming up, liberated the ship and crew.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES DENIS,
Consul of Civita Vecchia.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, September 22, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—The French Ambassador called on me yesterday. He asked me how I considered we held

Guadeloupe. I answered by conquest. He said that he hoped we should hold it as we held Martinique. I said that the way by which we obtained possession of the one was quite different from the conditions under which we held the other. He replied that Guadeloupe should be surrendered to the King of France according to the Treaty of Paris, which *was still in force.* I answered that, with respect to the final destination of Guadeloupe, it must be settled, with other matters, at Paris. I have thought it right to let you know what passed, as he concluded with saying he should write to his Court.

You have much improved in your terms, and quite satisfy me on the point I was most anxious about. The French Government will, for appearance sake, make every opposition, I imagine, before they consent—but consent they will, because they must, if we agree in not giving way.

Yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, September 25, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—I send you a bulletin from our correspondent to Arbuthnot. It is, I am persuaded, greatly exaggerated; but there certainly is a great degree of violence on one side, and of alarm of reaction on the other. It is a sad moment to set all this a-going; and I understand Monsieur is in the highest intoxication of delight. The Duke of Richelieu is very temperate in his own view of things, and is endeavouring to form his Government with the same materials; but he meets with difficulty in filling up his offices. Laisné of Bordeaux declines to leave the Chair of the Assembly, and Barbé Marbois has refused to be Minister of Justice. These two men would have been of great value. He finds it equally difficult to replace Louis.

The Duke has very good sense, and would be a most valuable Minister in an honest country; but he was never in public life, except as Governor of the Crimea. He told me, last

night, that he did not know the face of one of his colleagues, and has not been in France since 1790; you may therefore judge of the difficulties he has to encounter. The Assembly, I understand, will support the Court; if they can be kept in order, matters may go on whilst we stay here, and they may mend; but the great difference between the new and the former Government is that, with the dismissed Ministers, the King might have stayed in Paris, with the Allies on the frontier. With his new servants, there seems but one opinion, that, if the Allied troops were to withdraw, his Majesty would not be on his throne a week. This may all come round, but it is a serious experiment to force upon us, who are the guardians of his royal person.

The Duke of Richelieu's connexion with the Emperor of Russia, and Pozzo being mixed in all that is passing, gives naturally to the new Government a strong Russian tinge; and it is already attacked on this ground. Hitherto, notwithstanding the tone of protection, which is a favourite one with the Emperor, I do not think that we have had any reason to complain of his Imperial Majesty's conduct in any part of our negociation, even since the change, and he bears our operations at the Louvre very quietly. The whole will soon disappear. The King of the Netherland has finished; the Emperor of Austria is far advanced; and the Pope is going to begin.

Talleyrand played me a very shabby trick on this business. I promised to show him privately my note, and lent it to him, with a few lines marked *private*. Though evidently not addressed to him, he made the note a peg to hang a popular answer upon. Not choosing to sanction so shabby a breach of confidence, I sent him a very short answer, for the purpose of telling him he had done an unworthy act, and that it had made no impression. I shall write as soon as I can give you any delight.

Yours very sincerely, CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Foster to Lord Castlereagh.

Copenhagen, September 28, 1815.

My dear Lord—The Marquis de Bonnaye, in passing through Hamburgh, will deliver this into the hands of Mr. Mellish. I did not wish to omit so good an opportunity of writing to you, although I have not much to communicate.

Baron Hammerstein has left this, upon a visit to a near relation of his in Holstein, from whence he intends to proceed privately to Hanover, to give an account of the state of his negociation to Count Münster, and will return here in about three weeks.

Your lordship will have perceived from my last letter what extravagant ideas M. de Kaäs, one of the Danish Ministers, seems to have formed of the advantages likely to result to this country from his Danish Majesty's undertaking a journey to London, and in the event of his being willing to cede the duchy of Lauenburg to the kingdom of Hanover; but I beg your lordship to be assured that I was very careful not to give him any encouragement, and have simply confined myself to stating that, provided an exchange of the duchy could be effectuated for a fair equivalent with Hanover, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent would be well pleased and gratified; at the same time, on every occasion referring to M. de Hammerstein, as the sole person charged with the negociation.

I was particular in stating this, lest your lordship should suppose, from M. de Kaäs' sanguine speculations, that I had at all exceeded the limits of my instructions, in the nature of the support I have given to M. de Hammerstein. But it would seem as if people here thought that we desired nothing so much as pretexts for making presents; and it is consequently necessary to be very cautious in treating with them.

Prince Christian is still at his country seat in the neighbourhood of Copenhagen. Since his return from Norway, and his marriage with the Princess of Augustenburg, he is

not in favour at Court. The King of Denmark is very much attached to the elder of his two daughters, and would have wished the Prince, as heir presumptive to the Crown, to have married her; but, unfortunately, she is very far from being good-looking; nevertheless, his Highness is accused of selfishness in not having preferred her. His conduct in Norway is said to have been strongly liable to reproach for want of courage; and I have even heard that a physician who was with him during the campaign in that country, makes no scruple of saying that he exhibited, on the occasion of some skirmish that took place, as strong symptoms of the effects of personal fear as he had ever occasion to observe. Nevertheless, the people of Copenhagen, who believe him to have behaved like a hero, received him with great applause when he returned here last year, and went to the theatre, making a public exhibition of himself, which was not thought becoming, after the inglorious issue of his enterprise, and the misfortunes which he had brought upon his country. Considerable jealousy was, in consequence, entertained in regard to him, and he will be obliged to go to the seat of his Government, at Odensee in Fünen, for the winter, instead of being allowed to reside here: his stay in this neighbourhood, indeed, having only been permitted till now, in consequence of much entreaty.

Persons in the confidence of this Prince, affect to say that the Norwegians are still by no means amicably disposed towards the Swedes; but that the Prince Royal, as a Frenchman, is much more liked by them than a Prince of the Swedish royal blood would ever be; giving to understand, at the same time, that so capricious a people as the Swedes are, being very likely to make a change in their present dispositions relative to the succession to the Crown, the Norwegians would, in such case, probably not think themselves bound to imitate them.

Reflections of this sort certainly tally with the idea pretty generally received, that the Prince Royal, in the arrangements

he made respecting Norway, had in view to carve out for himself some political support without the limits of Sweden, and which should make him continually necessary to the latter. I am even told that many Swedes impute to him that he thought too much of this in the terms of union which he agreed to.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

AUGUSTUS FOSTER.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, September 29, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—There are two points in your *projet*, upon which we are all agreed in principle; but which will require more attention than appears to have been paid to them in the draft you forwarded to us, before the *projet* is reduced into the form of a treaty for signature.

The first point is, that there appears to be no stipulation for not evacuating the fortresses, which we are to occupy temporarily till such time as the full amount of the contribution agreed upon shall be paid. A provision to this effect has always been understood as reasonable, and should be made as clear as possible.

The other point is of equal importance—the terms on which the restitution is to be made to the King of France and his lawful heirs. We are all agreed that the restitution should be stipulated only in favour of the King and his lawful heirs. Indeed, such a stipulation will be one of the best securities of his Majesty's throne, and to it, therefore, he cannot object. The words in your *projet*—"*héritiers et successeurs*"—may certainly be ambiguous, and I can recommend no words so likely to answer the purpose as those which the Chancellor suggested, viz.—"Louis XVIII., or his successors by rightful inheritance."

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, September 29, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—We have received, this morning, your letters of the 25th instant, and most entirely approve all your proceedings.

The want of judgment of the King, in changing his Administration at this particular moment, is most truly to be lamented. I could not resist saying to the Prince Regent yesterday, that if his father had been in a situation to be obliged to make a humiliating peace, and at the same time was desirous to get rid of his Ministers, he would have taken care to make the Ministers whom he was anxious of turning out the instruments of the peace, and not have thrown the inevitable unpopularity and odium of such a transaction on those who were to succeed them.

The answer of the French Plenipotentiaries to the *projet* of the Allies is very much what we expected. I do not think, however, that you seem to be aware of an argument which may be of essential service to you in the view you have taken of the principles on which the negociation ought to be conducted. If the French Government insist upon the principle of the integrity of France, as it stood in 1789, before the French Revolution, they ought to restore certain *enclaves* within their own territory, viz., Avignon, the Comtat Venaissin, and Montbeillard, to their former Sovereigns. If they are allowed to keep these territories as *enclaves*, nothing is more reasonable than that they should cede to the Allies the *enclaves* which they claim in compensation.

By this mode of viewing the question, their honour might be completely saved, as the condition of the cession of the several *enclaves* might be made *reciprocal*. If they should, however, say—We would rather restore Avignon, &c., than cede Landau, Philipville, &c.—we might fairly reply that our proposition must, in reality, be more advantageous to both parties; that, in the situation in which we are placed, we have fairly a

right to make the option between two alternatives not very unequal in their value and amount; and that we cannot admit that, from any motive of perverseness, or, from the endeavour to advance a principle inconsistent with the whole public law of Europe, they should defeat an arrangement, which would be highly advantageous to Europe, and not prejudicial to France.

We have been most truly gratified with reading the Duke of Wellington's letter to you on the subject, and removing the pictures, &c., from the Museum. It is a most satisfactory statement in all respects, and will, I trust, sooner or later meet the public eye. I shall be most happy to hear that the statues and pictures belonging to the Vatican are packed up. It is become now of the utmost importance that our principle should be carried through consistently. We cannot irritate the French more by completing our work than we have done by beginning it; and, as I have stated to you in a former letter there is more safety, in my judgment, in a general removal of the whole plunder, than in one which is only partial.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, September [blank] 1815.

Sir—The immediate departure of the messenger, the bearer of your despatches of the 7th instant, prevented my replying to that part of your despatch No. 22, of the 19th July last, which relates to the transactions between Major Nicolls and the Creek Indians, against which the American Government has remonstrated. In order that you may be enabled at once to convince the Americans of the total ignorance in which this Government was respecting the conduct of that officer, and of its disapprobation of it, I transmit to you the copy of the answer which was returned to Major Nicolls by the War Department, previously to the receipt of your above-mentioned

despatch, to a communication made by him on this business; and I likewise enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Indian Chief who accompanied Major Nicolls to this country.

These documents will satisfy the Government of the United States that the interference of Major Nicolls may have been occasioned by an ill-judged zeal in the prosecution of the military duties with which he was entrusted, but was in no way sanctioned by his Majesty's Government.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, October 1, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—Having pushed our discussions in Conference with the Duke de Richelieu as far as was desirable, and the principal difficulties being narrowed to the two fortresses on the Meuse, some reduction of the money arrangement, and the permission to have a nominal garrison, under suitable regulations, in the fortresses within the Allied line of demarcation, but not occupied by them, it was thought advisable to entrust to the Duke of Wellington to bring the negociation to an issue in a separate interview. I have no doubt more might have been extorted, if the four Powers had been unanimous in taking their *sine qua non* higher; but you will have perceived that it required some management to carry Russia so far. In truth, I believe nothing but our early moderation would have induced the Emperor to insist on so much.

The Duke of Wellington and myself would have been disposed to be satisfied with the frontier of 1790, with the *enclaves*, and stood to it; but, having broke ground to manage Prussia, we did our best to fight up to the demand made, and we have succeeded in getting the fortress of Saar-Louis for Prussia. It is, perhaps, as well that the King should have obtained some relaxation of the original terms.

The Prussians are very sore about the Louvre. The Austrians were driven from their work, the night before last, by the Duke of Luxemburg and the Garde du Corps; but, being thus justified in laying aside delicacy, they worked by day, under the protection of a strong force, and have safely removed the Venetian horses from the front of the Tuileries.

Canova was made happy last night by Austria, Prussia, and England, agreeing to support him in removing the Pope's property. The joint order is issued, and he begins to-morrow.

Both the Emperors are gone: the King of Prussia moves in two or three days. You will perceive and hear of a great deal of flirtation between the French and Russians. The Duke de Richelieu is certainly a bond; but I see no rational motive on either side, at least for the present, to form a connexion which is likely to change the state of affairs; nor should a jealousy of this, in my opinion, induce us to weaken the Duke of Richelieu's Government. The great object is to keep the King on his throne. A moderate system, I believe, is the best chance for doing so; and I do not believe that the Duke will give in to extravagant notions; but he will have great difficulties. I think, however, better of his prospects than I did.

I am, dear Liverpool, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Earl of Buckinghamshire to Lord Castlereagh.

October 1, 1815.

Dear Castlereagh—I write this line to apprise you that it has been determined to send a mission to China. The Court of Directors urgently represented the necessity of the measure, in order to counteract the impediments thrown in the way of their commerce by the local authorities at Canton, and proposed that the mission should consist of a person of high rank from this country, to whom their chief supercargo, Sir George Staunton, should be united. After much difficulty in finding

a proper person, Lord Amherst, with some hesitation, accepted, and is to be at the head of the embassy.

Without troubling you with anything further on this subject, at a time when you are so much occupied, I have only to add that, as Henry Ellis is to be Secretary to the mission, he will not avail himself of your kindness with regard to the appointment you had been so good as to intend for him.

Liverpool has informed me of the internal state of things at Paris, and says you are in good spirits, which I rejoice at, not only because I consider it an indication of your looking to a satisfactory termination of your labours, but because I hope it may be taken as a proof of your approaching recovery.

Yours most sincerely, BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, October 2, 1815.

My dear Lord—In reply to your private letter of the 29th, I beg leave to state that I shall again bring the wording of the article relative to the retrocession of the fortresses under the consideration of the Allied Ministers. I ought to apologise for having omitted before to state that I did not fail to call their attention to this point, and to lay before them the form of words suggested by the Lord Chancellor. After much discussion, their opinion was in favour of the simple expression, "*héritiers et successeurs.*" They were of opinion that, under this form of words, they never could be required to admit as heir a successor brought forward to the prejudice of the regular succession: whereas it was difficult to add descriptive terms to an heir which could render the legal idea more clear and precise, whilst an attempt to do so might unnecessarily lead, at the present moment, to inconvenient cavil. I shall have the point reconsidered, and ought, however, to add that the difficulty of translation was amongst the number of objections stated; nor have I yet found any French expression that renders satisfactorily the English words, "rightful inheritance."

With respect to the retrocession being contingent upon the previous completion of all the money payments, that is clearly and fully understood, and, I should hope, may be expressed in the separate Convention, by which the pecuniary arrangements are to be regulated, without implying any doubt as to the undoubted right of the Allies to consider the treaty as a whole, and to make each stipulation a security for the due performance of all its obligations.

The principle of considering the *enclaves* extra the French frontier as matters of exchange for those within, you will perceive, has not been overlooked. It was necessary, however, to take up a broader principle, to cover the cession of Saar-Louis and Monaco. It is some consolation for having found, upon the points of Condé and Givet, that we have got the whole arrangement introduced into the Treaty patent. In truth, the Secret Article could not have long escaped disclosure, and it would have done the King more mischief tenfold than an open avowal of the truth.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, October 2, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I send you a letter I have received from Wilberforce, on the subject of the last communication between Mr. Vaughan and the Spanish Government, respecting the Slave Trade. I wish you would write to Vaughan on the subject, as soon as other more pressing business may permit. It can only be from perverseness that the French Government continue the trade north of the Line, and, if anything, even persist to decline agreeing to the general abolition in less than eight years. I should hope they might be induced to concur in a limited proposition, which can be of no real detriment to them, and is of such incalculable importance to the civilization of Northern Africa.

I have suggested to Mr. Wilberforce the advantage which might arise from his sending Mr. Macaulay, or some person conversant in their African concerns, to assist Mr. Vaughan in the negociation on this subject.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

[Enclosure.]

W. Wilberforce, Esq., to Lord Liverpool.

Brighton, September 25, 1815.

My dear Lord Liverpool—I return your lordship many thanks for your obliging communication of Mr. Vaughan's despatches; and, forgive me if I say that they confirm the strong persuasion I before entertained, that Sir H. Wellesley cannot have pressed as he ought the extreme perverseness of the Spanish Government in selecting for their slaving ground the very district which the other Powers, though not consenting to give up the Slave Trade entirely, had agreed to abandon. Had Sir Henry seconded Lord Castlereagh's efforts with *any* share of the same intelligence and spirit, that point might at least have been carried.

I am rather of this opinion, because, when the topic was touched on at Vienna, Count Labrador's language rendered it clear that he thought the district ten degrees north of the Line had been specified by mistake; and Sir H. Wellesley's letter, to say the least, suggested the idea that it was a mistake in which he participated. But, with this persuasion, I had no doubt that the mistake would be rectified, on Count Labrador's, and still more Lord Castlereagh's, statements from Vienna. And it is a sad disappointment to find that, on the 23rd of August last, the British Minister at Madrid had advanced no farther than his despatch of that date indicates, and that the idea of the former arrangements having been a mistake seemed to be wholly lost sight of; as, if (which I fear must have been the case) the British Minister at Madrid had never read Count Labrador's declaration at Vienna, as I stated to Lord Castle-

reagh in the spring, (though even then he had anticipated me; for I assure you, my dear lord, that I do feel justice both to his, and to your own, and to Lord Bathurst's procedures also, as far as I have been acquainted with them) the Spanish Court had far better be apprised that *no restriction at all* on the limits for carrying on the Slave Trade would be infinitely preferable to this.

That Spain will not give up the trade altogether I am so firmly convinced, that I myself should have questioned the policy of urging her on the new ground of the French abolition, unless on the principle (which is not, however, pressed as dexterously as perhaps it might have been) that if you will not give us all we ask, do not, however, render your withholding what you keep, doubly injurious and provoking. I cannot help most earnestly imploring your lordship to instruct our Minister at Madrid to be as explicit as possible on this point; I foresee that otherwise the northern shore of Africa will, ere long, swarm with slave ships. I trust your lordship will immediately execute your idea of sending a ship of war, to see to the execution of the Portuguese stipulation to give up the Slave Trade north of the Line. I presume that would be understood to prevent their suffering ships under the Spanish flag to slave in their settlements—at Bissao, for instance; because otherwise an easy opening would be provided for the carrying on the Slave Trade to as great an extent as before.

The letter in which the fact I before named to your lordship was specified, that, I mean, of the slaves which used to be shipped from the factories in the rivers near Sierra Leone, being now carried to and shipped from Bissao, is dated the 26th of May; and the writer stated that he had recently received the intelligence, not, as I said, through mistake, from a missionary, but from an English factor. It would have indicated greater than Portuguese celerity in any instance, more especially in a case in which they cannot be supposed to move from any strong stimulus, either of interest or feeling

for the Convention (made, I presume, at Paris, by Lord Castlereagh) abolishing the Portuguese Slave Trade north of the Line, to have been not merely announced, but carried into execution in Africa on May 26th; but there has now been time enough for both, and therefore this is just the time when the execution should be insisted on.

I am always sorry to engross your lordship's time; I will therefore trespass on it no longer than to assure you that I am always, with respect and regard, my dear Lord Liverpool, your lordship's very sincerely,

W. WILBERFORCE.

The Right Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Blackheath, October 4, 1815.

Dear Castlereagh—I have accidentally omitted to forward to you the enclosed letter from Dumouriez, which fully explains his views with respect to his friend Morgan. I shall add nothing on the subject, as you have the best opportunities of knowing Morgan, and whether it can be worth while to employ him. I suppose you have seen his defence of Fouché to the Duke of Wellington.

You will be sorry to hear that your caution with respect to the Spanish subsidy has not been effectual. More bills are come upon the Treasury, and we have no distinct account of the amount to which they extend. We have directed them to be paid, for the sake of public credit, but written to Carroll and Tupper, the Consul at Cadiz, that we shall hold them responsible for the money, unless they can show proper authority for drawing. It will, however, of course, be difficult to enforce this threat, but it is necessary to check them; and I think you ought to write pretty sharply to Mr. James upon the subject. "The Morning Chronicle" has got hold of this business already, and we shall find it hard enough to explain in the House of Commons.

In other respects, I think the little Spanish invasion has

done good, by giving the King an opportunity of coming forward in a popular manner, and raising the character of the Duke d'Angoulême.

I heartily congratulate you on the favourable turn the negociation seems to be taking. I never have been relieved from more unpleasant feelings than I was by your last despatch. From that which preceded it, I had conceived the greatest apprehensions that the King, under the impression of feelings of national pride, and embarrassed by the inconceivable blunder of allowing Talleyrand and Fouché to answer the propositions of the Allies, when he had decided to dismiss them, would have been induced in despair to have laid the propositions before the Legislature, instead of proceeding with the negociation. In this case, I have no doubt that the different parties would have vied with each other in flattering the national vanity, and that such an Address would have passed as to preclude the possibility of concession. Under such circumstances, an immediate rupture must have taken place, and a scene of discord would have been opened, of which no mortal can pretend to foresee the issue. Thank God, we have better hopes now! though I am far from thinking all difficulties will be removed, even when peace is signed.

I do not know whether Liverpool has mentioned to you that he thinks it not improbable that, when the arrangement of the contribution has been finally settled, the French may offer to compensate our share of part of it by colonial cessions. If such an idea should be started, it will probably be the subject of a reference home; but it may not be amiss to give it a little previous consideration. We think in general that the idea ought not to be suggested or encouraged by us, because it is desirable that the views of France should not be wholly diverted from colonial objects, and that she ought to have something to lose by a maritime war. But, supposing the offer to be made, and rather pressed by her, we must look a little at the different objects she has to offer. Martinique

and Guadaloupe are the only colonies of real value to France, and, though we must be sensible of their commercial importance, I think they ought to be the last colonies we should retain. The Saintes are of no use to France, and would be worth having as a naval station; but, after what passed last year, the French Government might feel some reluctance to ceding them.

The settlements in India are not worth having, except for the sake of saving the rent of £40,000 a-year the East India Company are to pay, in compensation of their commercial exemptions. The Isle of Bourbon has no harbour, but, as it produces excellent cotton and coffee, it is of some value. The settlements on the coast of Africa are of small value to France; but they would, particularly Senegal, be of great importance in forwarding our plans for abolishing the Slave Trade, and promoting civilization and commerce in Africa. I should, therefore, think them more desirable than any other colonies France could offer us.

I had forgotten Cayenne. It is now of little value, and very unhealthy, but it might, in time, be of some use, as connected with our Guyana settlements: and there is some danger of its becoming a depôt for smuggling slaves into them, as slaves may be imported into the neighbouring ports of Brazil, though not directly into the Cayenne river, since the French abolition of the trade.

As for the other most curious paper you sent, I think the turn Liverpool proposes to give the transaction renders it perfectly innocent, and that, however strange it may appear, it will rather do good than harm.

Believe me ever most faithfully yours,

N. VANSITTART.

Let me know what arrangements have been made with respect to the ten millions of livres which you said we were to receive immediately. If ready money cannot be obtained, it is very desirable to get bills to as large an amount as is practi-

cable, not only on account of the old proverb of *a bird in the hand*, but because I hear they are easily discounted at Paris, as low as at four per cent.; and the money so raised might be employed very advantageously in improving the exchange. I am told the Prussians have realized a very large sum (fifty millions) in that way. In any arrangement of this kind, you would find Rosenhagen of use.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Walmer Castle, October 5, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—Bathurst will have communicated to you officially the Prince Regent's approbation of all your proceedings, and particularly the memorandum of conditions on which the pacific relations of the Allies with France are to rest, which are certainly more favourable than those to which your instructions would have authorized you in agreeing: you will now, therefore, have only the trouble of settling the treaty in its detail. My letter from London will have apprised you of the importance we attach to the stipulation for the return of the fortresses occupied *only* to the lawful Sovereign, as we are persuaded a provision of this nature will have the most beneficial effect, in reconciling the French nation to the existing Government, as the necessary instruments for recovering those places which they must otherwise have submitted to the humility of losing.

If the nation can be brought to submit for five, or even for three years, to Louis XVIII., this Government will have become habitual, and it is not likely to be overturned, unless by the folly of his successors. I shall be curious to hear what are the first proceedings of the new Assemblies.

Is the Duke of Wellington likely to remain at Paris much longer? I put the question because I understand he has written to the duchess to say he was going to take a house, and to desire that she would come over.

I send you enclosed a memorandum of Harrowby's, on the subject of the claims of the British creditors in France. The suggestion appears to me to be a good one, and at least deserving attention, in bringing this matter to a conclusion. You are aware we have Guadeloupe and the Saintes in our hands, which have in fact been conquered. We have no desire for any more colonies, but it may not be amiss to consider them as fair pledges for the just claims of our own subjects. The loyalty of Martinique ought to be respected, and the island surrendered to the King as soon as he can send troops to take possession of it.

How much longer do you think you are likely to stay at Paris? I was happy to find that you were able to walk out.

Ever most truly yours, LIVERPOOL.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, October 6, 1815.

My Lord—I have the honour of enclosing to your lordship the *projet* for placing the United Ionian Islands under British protection, with the modifications which it has appeared desirable should be introduced. The absence of the King's Advocate and of the Attorney and Solicitor-General from London, has prevented me from availing myself of their assistance; but, as the first-named is at Paris, your lordship may consult him, if you think proper.

It appears so very desirable that this matter should be definitively arranged, either before the signature of preliminaries with France, or at least at the same time, that your lordship will not think it necessary to suspend the conclusion of the business, if you should find any serious objection to any of the modifications herewith recommended to your Lordship's consideration.

I have the honour to be, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Exmouth to Lord Castlereagh.

Boyne, off Marseilles, October 9, 1815.

My Lord—I have the honour to inform your lordship that Captain Bastard, of the Meander frigate, joined me this morning, from Corsica, with the report of Marshal Murat having departed from Ajaccio the night of the 28th, accompanied by three small vessels, and about one hundred persons, generals and other officers.

I beg to enclose for your lordship's information a letter addressed to Murat by Colonel Macirone, with the reply to it.

I have the honour to be, &c., EXMOUTH.

[Enclosures.]

T. Macirone to the King of Naples [Murat].

Gènes, Septembre 28, 1815.

Sire—J'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de votre Majesté une pièce officielle, munie de la signature de son Altesse le Prince de Metternich, renfermant les conditions sous lesquelles sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche offre à votre Majesté un asile dans ses états. Je les propose à l'acceptation de votre Majesté, et je suis autorisé à lui notifier qu'en cas qu'elle y obtempère, j'aurais à ma disposition un officier Autrichien, qui accompagnera votre Majesté à travers la France et la Suisse; et dans le cas qu'elle se déciderait pour le voyage par mer, j'ai pour son usage un passeport achevé par les Plénipotentiaires Anglais et Autrichiens, qui la servira de saufgarde jusqu'à son arrivée à Trieste, où les autorités sont déjà prévenus pour sa réception.

Je suis autorisé aussi à prévenir votre Majesté que M. Bastard, Capitaine de la frégate de S.M.B. le Meander, se trouve dans ce moment à Bastia, prêt à se rendre à mon invitation dans le port d'Ajaccio, pour recevoir à son bord votre Majesté ainsi que moi-même, et nous conduire en toute sûreté à Toulon, lieu du rendezvous que j'ai assigné pour l'officier supérieur Au-

trichien qui devait accompagner votre Majesté jusque dans les états de sa Majesté Imperiale et Royale.

J'ai trouvé à Paris deux domestiques qui avaient appartenu à votre Majesté, tout-à-fait sans œuvre et manquant les moyens d'existence. Il m'a convenu de les prendre à mon service. Maintenant je viens d'être instruit que votre Majesté se trouve tout-à-fait dépourvu des aises et des commodités que les services de ces hommes pourraient lui apporter, étant entièrement dépourvue de valets de chambre, et quelle désirerait les reprendre à son service. Je me fais, Sire, un vrai plaisir d'assurer votre Majesté qu'ils sont tous les deux parfaitement à sa disposition, d'autant plus que je puis très bien en attendant me prévaloir des services de mon palefrenier ; et si votre Majesté le désirerait ils pourront, dès ce soir même reprendre leurs fonctions auprès de la personne de votre Majesté.

Je prie votre Majesté de vouloir bien me rendre une réponse décisive sur ses intentions, et de daigner agréer les sentimens de respect et d'estime avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être de votre Majesté le très humble et très obéissant serviteur.

T. MACIRONE.

The King of Naples to T. Macirone.

Ajaccio, Septembre 28, 1815.

Monsieur Macirone, Envoyé des Puissances Alliées auprès du Roi Joachim, je viens de prendre connaissance des pièces dont vous êtes porteur. J'accepte le passeport, que vous êtes chargé de me remettre, et je compte m'en servir pour me rendre à la destination qui y est fixée. Quant aux conditions que sa Majesté Imperiale et Royale impose à l'offre d'un asile en Autriche, je me réserve de traiter cet article important à l'époque où je serai réuni à ma famille.

La sommation peu mesurée qui m'a été addressée par M. le Capitaine de la frégate de sa Majesté Britannique m'empêche d'accepter l'offre que vous me faites en son nom de me recevoir à son bord.

Persécuté, menacé, même en Corse, parcequ'on avait pu me supposer des vues sur cette Isle, j'avais déjà préparé mes moyens de départ. En effet je pars cette nuit. J'accepte avec plaisir les valets-de-chambre que vous voulez bien me céder.

Sur ce, Monsieur Macerone, je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde.

JOACHIM.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, October 16, 1815.

My dear Lord—In answer to your private letter of the 2nd, enclosing one from Mr. Wilberforce, suggesting the propriety of further instructions being given to his Majesty's Minister at Madrid, to urge the Spanish Government anew to direct the cessation of the slave trade on the part of their subjects to the north of the Line, I beg to refer your lordship to the despatch enclosed, which I addressed to Mr. Vaughan, on communicating to him the unqualified abolition of the slave trade by the French Government.

You must be aware that any further representations which I might direct to be made at this moment, and under the present circumstances of the Spanish Government, would probably not produce any more satisfactory result.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Walmer Castle, October 17, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—Hamilton, and Fagel the Ambassador, paid me a visit here, on their way to town, and I have since received your letter of the 12th inst., with the account of the unpleasant transaction that had occurred at Naples, in consequence of Lord William Bentinck's arrival there.

I am informed by Bathurst that he had no special authority whatever to go there, for the purpose he assigned. His name

was inserted in the Order in Council, as is usual on such occasions as a trustee, but it never could be considered that this constituted him as agent. I conclude that you are aware that Lord William Bentinck has no command or public character whatever in Italy. It would be impossible to put him on the staff now in France or Flanders, without putting him over the head of Lord Hill, and I believe Lord Combermere, and of several other officers, who would naturally conclude that they had superior claims, after all that had passed, to commands in that army. I am not insensible, however, to the importance of inducing Lord William Bentinck, if possible, to retire quietly out of Italy.

I hope, if it is intended to leave the British force in the neighbourhood of Paris during the winter, as I can easily understand may be necessary, that there will be left at the same time some proportion of Prussian troops, and, if practicable, some proportion likewise of the other Allied corps.

I feel confident that the Duke of Wellington will take every due precaution to secure the force in question against any possible accident by surprise, and that you will insist on the same principle of precaution being extended to his own person. We ought never to lose sight for a moment of the consideration that, with whatever humanity and indulgence the French may have been treated by us, they hate us far more than any other nation, and that they would most willingly embark in any project for the destruction of the force which has saved them, if they only thought that it was likely to prove successful.

The arrangement for distributing the contribution to be paid by France appears to me to be as good as could have been devised, with the exception only of the sum which it is agreed should be given to Portugal. This sum is indeed inconsiderable in amount; but, however small, I do not conceive that Portugal is in any way entitled to it—the Regency of that country being the only Government in Europe which

actually refused to co-operate not merely by their unwillingness to comply with the requisition of the Duke of Wellington, but even by declining to lend any part of their force for the other objects which were afterwards proposed to them.

I wish to suggest to you whether the engagement respecting the abolition of the Slave Trade should not be inserted in the general treaty. If this should meet with difficulties, it ought at least to form a part of the Convention by which Guadaloupe and the Saintes are to be restored to France; but I should think it much more desirable, on every account, that it should constitute a provision in the treaty to which all the Powers of Europe will be parties.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Liverpool.

Downing Street, October 19, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—I circulated the two despatches to Lord Sidmouth and to Vansittart. The messenger has carried them also to Pole, but he has unluckily gone to Staines; I have therefore neither received his answer nor the despatches. Lord Sidmouth and Vansittart were at Carlton House to-day; and, on talking over the despatches with them, I find we agree in approving the arrangement respecting the contributions. It does not appear to hazard their ultimate payment; and, on many accounts, it is advisable that the payment should be made as practicable as possible, provided it creates such a pressure on the resources of France as to give to Europe a reasonable prospect of permanent peace.

It is very desirable that the fortresses to be occupied, under the treaty, by the Allies, should be delivered up to us before any considerable portion of the Allied forces are withdrawn. This, it is presumed, will be provided for in the arrangements referred to in the Postscript of No. —.

You may convey our approbation to Lord Castlereagh of the *projet* of alliance. We are all, however, of opinion that

it is natural that the words, *Souverain légitime*, in Article —, should be altered. As these words have been often canvassed in Cabinet, you can explain to Lord Castlereagh the objections to them. "Louis XVIII., *ou* les *héritiers*, et successeurs à Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne," would do better.

The conclusion of the — Article appears to me to contain a permanent engagement to maintain the reigning family on the throne. We are afraid lest this may create some difficulty in Parliament, and that, in order to reconcile those who object to so unlimited a period, the engagement itself will be so explained away in debate as to mean too little, even at its outset, when it is most material that the French nation should be impressed with the conviction that it is positive and efficient.

We very much approve of the powers proposed to be given to the Duke of Wellington, and of the manner in which he is to carry on his communications with the French Government.

If the Allies think it necessary that an admonition should be given to Louis XVIII., it is very desirable that it should be verbal and very confidential. The knowledge of it would give great countenance to the reports circulated in France to the prejudice of the present Government; and, if it be in writing, the document may be produced in Parliament; and it will be impossible so to frame it as to be satisfactory to the very discordant opinions in this country on the system which the King of France ought to adopt.

I had nearly forgot to say, on the subject of the contributions, that Vansittart bids me suggest that, with respect to the annual excess of 20,000,000 in the expense of the army, beyond the 130,000,000 to be provided by France in the first instance, he thinks it should be provided for by retaining an equal amount from the general contribution previous to any division. so as to leave the ultimate deficiency to be made good by France on the war contribution, and not on the military expense. By this means we shall avoid the necessity of

making advances to the Allies, which it might be difficult afterwards to settle.

I am, yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

I send a messenger with this, and with order to proceed to Paris with your letter.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Walmer Castle, October 20, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—As I received your despatches of the 16th at this place, and did not conceive that there was anything sufficiently new or important in them to render it necessary for me to go to London, I forwarded them to Bathurst, and desired him to let me know whether anything occurred to himself or our colleagues upon them.

I cannot do better than transmit to you the letter which I have just received from him. You will see that the arrangement respecting the contributions is entirely approved, subject only to a suggestion of Vansittart's.

The *projet* of alliance in substance meets all our ideas. Bathurst suggests two critical alterations, which I should conceive there could be no difficulty in adopting. As the term *legitimate sovereign* has been ever a subject of cavil in this country, since the origin of Whig and Tory, it is very desirable that it never should be used in the sense in which we mean to apply it to France, without the Crown heirs being connected with it.

I am not aware of any further observations with which it is necessary that I should trouble you, in order to enable you to bring the great work in which you are engaged to a conclusion. I will only, therefore, further call your attention to what is stated by Bathurst, that it appears to be a reasonable precaution that the occupation of the fortresses should take place previous to the evacuation of the French territory by that part of the Allied force which exceeds the contingent agreed to be left in it.

I will likewise again repeat that, if a foreign force is to remain in Paris or its neighbourhood, it is very desirable that it should be an Allied force, (in such proportions as the Duke of Wellington may judge expedient) and not *exclusively* a British force. This part of the arrangement will certainly be the subject of much controversy in Parliament. The justification of it will be much more easy, if it is considered as a *general* measure; and, in the event of any difficulties or unpleasant scenes arising out of so novel a circumstance as the presence of a force near the capital of such a country as France, it must be very desirable that most, if not all, the Allied Powers should be equally affected by them, and that they should not be confined to the British only.

I have brought this subject again under your consideration, from knowing that some of our most rational friends entertain an alarm upon it—I can name Charles Yorke—who highly approves every other part of the intended arrangement.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, October 23, 1815.

My dear Lord—The extreme length of the General Treaty of Vienna, and of all the annexes, has rendered it extremely desirable that the ratification should be made in a form more concise than is usual. According to the common form, the whole Treaty, and every piece annexed to it, is set out at length, word for word, in the body of the Ratification. This, however, does not appear necessary in the present case, inasmuch as the Treaty of Vienna has been signed in eight originals, one of which is preserved in the archives of Vienna, and the other seven divided amongst the signing Powers. It is, therefore, very easy to give such a description of the Treaty in the Act of Ratification, as will designate with certitude the Treaty to be ratified.

An instrument of this nature has been prepared in the

Austrian Chancery, which I have shown to Sir Charles Robinson, who sees no objection to its form, and I enclose a copy to your lordship, in order that you may consult upon it with the Chancellor. If his lordship approves, it will be a matter of great convenience, and will enable us to have the Treaty ratified, so as to be ready for Parliament, which could not well be the case, if the Treaty at full length were to be set out in the ratification we are to give, as well as in those we are to receive in exchange.

If the Lord Chancellor should think it necessary that the Treaty, with its annexes, should formally be ratified under the Great Seal, the same may be done in a separate instrument; but I should hope the usual form may be dispensed with in the Act of Ratification to be exchanged with the signing Powers, and the draft adopted which I have enclosed.

CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosure.]

Projet de la Ratification de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Autriche.

À mettre en Latin.
Nos Georgius, &c.

Nous George, &c.,

Les puissances qui avoient signé le traité de Paris du 30 Mai, 1814, s'étant réunies à Vienne, en conformité de l'article 32 de cet acte avec les Princes et États, leurs Alliés, pour compléter les dispositions de cette transaction, il a été conclu et signé en la ville de Vienne, le neuf Juin, de la présente année mil-huit-cent-quinze, entre—

(A) N.B. Chaque Puissance ratifiante se mettra en première, et les six autres dans l'ordre alphabétique des Cours.

La Grande Bretagne; (A)
L'Autriche;
La France;
Le Portugal;
La Prusse;
La Russie; et
La Suède;

un traité général et commun, en huit exemplaires originaux, tous de mot-à-mot les mêmes et entièrement conformes entr'eux, dont sept exemplaires pour chacune des sept Puissances signataires, et le huitième exemplaire se trouve déposé en exécution de l'article 121 de cet acte, aux archives de cour et d'état à Vienne, pour servir de titre commun tant aux signataires ci-dessus mentionnés qu'aux autres Puissances et États accédant, et le dit traité général, ayant été revêtu entr'autres signatures, de celles de nos Ministres plénipotentiaires et de ceux de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche. (B)

(B) Dans les cinq autres actes de ratification il sera fait mention, au lieu des plénipotentiaires d'Autriche, de ceux de la Puissance, à laquelle l'instrument de la ratification sera destiné.

Nous, après avoir lu et examiné tant le traité général du neuf de Juin, que les traités, conventions, déclarations règlemens, et autres actes cités dans le 118e article et joints à la transaction commune, lesquels sont, les uns et les autres, censés insérés ici de mot-à-mot, les avons trouvés, en tout point, conformes à notre volonté : en conséquence Nous les avons approuvés, confirmés, et ratifiés, comme par ces présentes Nous les approuvons, confirmons, et ratifions, promettant, tant en notre nom qu'en celui de nos héritiers et successeurs, d'en accomplir fidèlement le contenu.

En foi de quoi, Nous avons signé et fait munir de notre sceau les actes de ratification en sept expéditions conformes, dont une sera réunie au traité déposé, comme titre commun, aux archives impériales à Vienne et remise à cet effet au ministre des affaires étrangères d'Autriche; les six autres seront échangées avec les six Puissances signataires entre les quelles expéditions la présente sera échangée contre les actes de ratification (C) de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Septembre, (D) l'an de grace mil-huit-cent-quinze.

(Signé) GEORGE.
(Contresigné) N. N.

(C) Dans les autres expéditions destinées à être délivrées aux cinq autres Puissances signataires, il sera fait mention du Souverain auquel l'acte est destiné.

(D) On est convenu de faire expédier les actes de ratification sous la date du 15 *Septembre*, parceque l'acte du Congrès doit être ratifié sous une date antérieure aux transactions actuelles de Paris.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, October 31, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—Your despatch No. 84, of the 24th instant, has been received and read by the Prince Regent. In conveying to you the approbation of the Government of the *projet* of the Treaty which you have transmitted, and which, it is supposed, you will sign without delay, I have only to call your particular attention to the concluding stipulation of the fifth Article, by which it is agreed that, in all events, the places and fortresses occupied by the Allies within the French territory shall be evacuated at the expiration of five years.

It had, I conceive, been clearly understood that, either in

the body of this Treaty, in one or other of the Conventions regulating the occupation and contributions which are to be signed at the same time, an engagement should be introduced to make the evacuation of the fortresses at the expiration of five years, or any other term, dependent on the final payment of the whole of the contributions agreed to be paid by the French Government.

It is indeed expressed in Prince Metternich's *projet*, annexed in the Protocol of the 20th, that the prolonged occupation of those places forms one of the guarantees we are to have for the liquidation of the demand; but we conclude that such agreement must be stated in a more formal manner, before it can be binding upon France or we can be authorized to continue the occupation on the ground of non-payment alone.

I trust I shall not be too late in bringing this consideration before you, and beg you will consider it as one of the most urgent importance. As we cannot but contemplate the possibility that delays may occur in the payment of what France agrees to furnish, even without any intentional fault on the part of the Government, it is most desirable that we should have in our hands the strongest and most effectual of all guarantees, that is, the right, under certain circumstances, to continue in possession of her fortresses until her other engagements by Treaty are fully executed.

It would be preferable, if not too late, that this engagement should be in the general Treaty; but the purpose may be answered by its being in the Convention for contributions, (or even an additional Article, if necessary) provided it be so expressed as to admit of no cavil.

I am, my dear Castlereagh, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Mr. Brackenbury to Mr. Planta (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

November 4, 1815.

Mr. Brackenbury presents his best compliments to Mr. Planta, with the enclosed Paper, which contains some infor-

mation relative to the Bordeaux claims, in addition to the communication which Mr. Brackenbury had the honour to make to Lord Castlereagh.

In the midst of Lord Castlereagh's most important avocations, Mr. Brackenbury entrusts the delivery of the enclosed entirely to the discretion of Mr. Planta.

[Enclosure.]

References to certain Letters and Documents concerning the Bordeaux Claims, under the Decree of the King of France.

November 3, 1815.

OBSERVATIONS.	REFERENCES.
This letter contains a proposition, which is replied to in the letter of his Excellency Sir C. Stuart, July 5, 1814.	The letter of his Highness the Prince de Benevente to his Excellency Sir C. Stuart, July 2, 1814.
In this letter his Excellency Sir Charles Stuart happened to omit the word insurance. On my discovering the error, he immediately wrote to have it rectified (vide note, Aug. 4 or 5); and M. de la Bernardière personally assured Mr. Bidwell, then Secretary, and myself, that we might charge the assurance, and the payment of it would not be disputed, as the error had been noticed.	The letter of Sir C. Stuart, of the 5th July, contains the ultimatum of the British Government, and details the principles upon which alone he can consent to the proposition of the French Government.
	In this letter, it will be observed that the demand of Sir C. Stuart includes the entire fulfilment of the Tariff *in every case* which occurred between the 24th of March and the 24th of May—the admission of British manufactures alone excepted, and upon them an indemnity of 5 per cent.,

For the purpose of retarding the execution of the Decree, the Comité des Finances, to whom the documents from Bordeaux were referred, presumed to dispute the right of foreign vessels being admitted to the benefits of the Decree, although it specifies the articles upon which the indemnity was granted, a great proportion whereof was imported in neutral bottoms.

The documents and accounts, properly attested by the authorities at Bordeaux and by myself, have been *twelve months* in the possession together with freight (and insurance) out and home

The note of Sir C. Stuart of the 15th July, 1814, presses with much warmth the decision of his Most Christian Majesty upon his Excellency's letter of the 5th of the same month.

The letter of his Highness the Prince de Benevente, of the 29th or 30th July, contains the decision of the King of France, which imports his Majesty's compliance with all the demands of his Excellency Sir C. Stuart; and, as a proof that no exceptions were taken, there is not only a repetition of the words used by Sir Charles, but there is also annexed to the letter itself an enumeration of the articles upon which the indemnity, &c., is accorded, and an assurance that the delay has "not proceeded from any hesitation on the principles upon which the transaction ought to be decided," &c.

The letter of Baron Louis to his Excellency Sir C. Stuart of the 19th August, 1814, promises that, as soon as the necessary documents shall be

sion of this Government. The order in which they were made out, and the regularity with which they were preferred, in strict conformity with the Decree, left an impression on the parties interested that the repeated assurances of the different Ministers would be carried into prompt execution.

Lord Castlereagh will therefore perceive how little prospect the British merchants entertain of being relieved from the embarrassment into which the breach of good faith and the non-fulfilment of the engagement of this Government have plunged them, if his lordship should not demand some security for the payment of the amount claimed under the Decree, 1,316,212 fr. 85 c., without interest.

transmitted from Bordeaux, and their correctness ascertained, that the money shall be paid; and he therein recommends that I should, on behalf of the claimants, concert with the authorities at Bordeaux and in Paris.

The letter from his Highness the Prince de Benevente (Talleyrand) to the Duke of Wellington, dated 12th *September*, 1814, states the satisfaction which his Highness feels in being able to announce to his Grace that the business is on the point of being terminated "in a manner conformable to the desire of the British Government;" and another, from the Office of the Relations Extérieures of the 28th December, confirms the promises previously made.

J. M. BRACKENBURY.

Memorandum upon the Application of the Twenty-five Millions coming to Great Britain and her Allies, for the Battle of Waterloo and the Capture of Paris.

BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Head-quarters, Paris, November 6, 1815.

My opinion is that Government ought to give this sum to the army, to be distributed amongst them in the shape of

prize-money. It should be given, in the name of the Prince Regent, the King of the Netherlands, the Duke of Brunswick, and Grand-duke of Nassau, to the officers and troops present in the battles of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, or present with their regiments, or at their posts with the army at any period from that time till the 7th of July, when the army entered Paris.

According to this scheme, the officers and troops of the armies of the King of the Netherlands, King of Hanover, (with the exception of those corps in garrison in the Netherlands) Grand-duke of Nassau, and Duke of Brunswick, would be included with the British troops, with the exception of those of the latter in garrisons in the Netherlands; and the consent of the King of the Netherlands, King of Hanover, Grand-duke of Nassau, and Duke of Brunswick, must be obtained.

If this plan should not be adopted, the sum of twenty-five millions would be to be divided between the several Powers whose troops formed the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, according to the numbers which each Power was bound to furnish for the common cause.

Thus, then, Great Britain would receive for 150,000 men, the Netherlands for 50,000, Hanover for 10,000, Brunswick and Nassau each for 3,000 men. But the regiments composing the Brunswick and Hanoverian subsidiary corps, the former consisting of 4,100 men, the latter of 16,400 men, would share with the British troops, supposing, as I imagine, that the British Government would allot its share to be divided as prize-money to the army.

It is obvious that, supposing all the Powers should agree, and should give what should come to them on this account to their troops who were present in the battle and on the occasions mentioned, there would be a great difference in the amount received by the officers and soldiers of each rank in the several services, and therefore it would probably be the best mode to allow the whole sum to be divided according to the

plan first proposed, as one mass, amongst the officers and soldiers of the whole army.

W.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, November 7, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—Mr. Fagel has been twice with me on the subject of the fortifications to be erected in the Netherlands. It appears that the King's plan does not exactly accord with what I understood ours to be: he seems to consider that they are to be executed by his engineers—that, in addition to what is to be allotted out of the French contribution, we are to advance the two millions, and his Majesty is to be relieved from all charge.

My impression is that the system of fortification must be agreed upon between him and us; that we must have our share in the execution of the works; and that, if the expenses exceed what is to be allotted out of the French contribution for that service, it must be borne equally out of the two millions which each country stipulated should be respectively applied to that purpose, but that we might be induced to advance money on the credit of what France is to pay, if those payments should not be made to an amount sufficient to cover the running expense.

This I suggested to Mr. Fagel to be my opinion; but I added that the treaties had gone through you, and that I could not, therefore, give him any answer, except referring him to you, whose return was expected, and to whom I would communicate what had passed.

Mr. Fagel, in his second visit yesterday, expressed a great desire to have the business explained as soon as possible, because, he said, that the King of the Netherlands was strongly impressed with the idea that we were to make up, out of the two millions, whatever was deficient in the French contribution, and that Holland was to be completely relieved from

all charge whatever. From some letters he had received from Holland, he was apprehensive that the King himself would pledge himself gradually (not publicly, but in private interviews) that Holland was to have no charge put upon her, and that he then would feel embarrassed, on a different interpretation being given to the transaction. I promised Fagel that you should be apprized of this as soon as you returned, but I have since thought I might as well write to you. We shall have no difficulty on the other points, except as to the system of fortification, as the King will prefer a large or a contracted one, according to the quarter from which the money is to come.

Yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

Mr. Brackenbury to Joseph Planta, Jun., Esq.

Paris, November 14, 1815.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 11th instant, enclosing an extract of a communication from Baron Portal to his Excellency Lord Castlereagh, recommending that I should concert with Monsieur St. Cricq, Director-General of the Customs, respecting the amount due to British subjects under the decree of his Most Catholic Majesty of the 30th July, 1814, expressing also the opinion of his Excellency the present Minister of Finance, that no difficulty could arise out of the principle upon which the claims which I represent ought to be adjusted, and that nothing could remain after the proofs of their accuracy were ascertained but to fix the periods of payment.

I have in consequence waited upon Monsieur St. Cricq, and have seen in his absence M. Vigerie, the Secretary-General of the Customs, with whom I had last year repeated conferences upon the same subject. It is not without great regret that I announce to you, for the information of his Excellency Lord Castlereagh, that M. Vigerie still entertains sentiments which are in direct contravention with the opinions of those by whom

I was referred to M. St. Cricq; and although the Prince de Talleyrand, the late and present Minister of Finance, and the Baron de Portal, all admit the justice of the principle, M. Vigerie and the Comité des Finances du Conseil d'État presume to put their own construction upon the decree, and to make four objections to the claims, notwithstanding they are accompanied by proofs of their authenticity, properly attested by the authorities at Bordeaux, to whom the investigation, in conjunction with myself, was entrusted.

Although I am prepared to enter into exceptions so unjustly and so frivolously taken, the fallacy of which has been already demonstrated to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, and solemnly protested against by the British Ministers residing at this Court respectively since the decree of the King, I will not occupy the time of his Excellency Lord Castlereagh by entering into such details in this letter; I must, however, claim permission to observe that, if his lordship should leave Paris, without obtaining from the minor departments to which this business has been referred an acknowledgment of the amount claimed, or without some other security for the payment than the Baron de Portal's admission of the principle, not only no advantages can result from the powerful diplomatic intervention of his lordship, or the position we may still hold to enforce the fulfilment of an engagement contracted by the Bourbons themselves, and ratified by their own Ministers; but, the transaction being still left open to negociation, the British claimants will find themselves dependent upon the caprice of M. St. Cricq for the restitution of their property, amounting, without interest, to 1,316,212 francs, who, it appears to me, ought not to enter at all into the principle, but to confine himself strictly to the details of the accounts.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. M. Brackenbury.

Mr. W. Hamilton to Sir Henry Bunbury, K.B.

Foreign Office, November 15, 1815.

Sir—I transmit to you, by the direction of the Secretary of State, the enclosed note from Mr. Colquhoun, the diplomatic agent for the Hanseatic Republics, giving a circumstantial account of the manner in which the Senate of Bremen had been forced by the Danish Government to quarter and support in that city a certain number of troops, commanded by the Prince of Hesse, but forming a part of the army under the Duke of Wellington, and also representing the little prospect there is of getting these expenses refunded; and I am to desire that you will lay this paper before Lord Bathurst, submitting to his lordship whether, in his opinion, the nature of this transaction is such as to justify the interference of this Government, by retaining from the subsidies that may be due to Denmark a sum of money equal to the claims of the city of Bremen.

I am, &c., W. HAMILTON.

PS. It is requested that the enclosure may be returned when done with.

[Enclosure.]

Note.

James Street, Westminster, November 14, 1815.

The Undersigned Diplomatic Agent for the Hanseatic Republics begs leave to state to his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, on behalf and by virtue of instructions received from the Burgomasters and Senate of Bremen, that, on the 22nd day of July last, the Danish Minister Rosenkrantz addressed a letter from the Royal Department of Foreign Affairs at Copenhagen to the Senate of Bremen, stating—

"That, by order of the King, his most gracious Sovereign, he had the honour to inform the Senate that, his Majesty having agreed with his Britannic Hanoverian Majesty's Go-

vernment that a division of royal troops, consisting in all of 15,000 men, with about 5,000 cavalry, and a park of artillery, consisting of forty cannon, shall join his Britannic Majesty's Hanoverian army *standing in the field*, and that the said division, on its march to France, not being able to avoid the territory of Bremen, requested that the Senate would take measures that the troops, in their passage, should meet with accommodation and quarters, on the same footing and on the same terms as are granted to other friendly armies, promising, in the name of the Royal Danish Government, that the receipts delivered by the chief of the said royal army, his Highness the Prince of Hesse, should be settled by payment after the mode practised with respect to other friendly troops upon a march."

On receiving this letter, the Senate of Bremen despatched a letter by express to Prince Frederick of Hesse, Commander of the Danish forces, dated the 29th of July, stating that, since the receipt of the letter of the 22nd from the Danish [Government], Captain Ramling had notified to the quartering Committee of the City certain measures indicating an intention of assembling the whole of the Danish forces at Bremen, and to halt in the town till the arrival of orders expected from the Duke of Wellington.

The Senate protested against this measure, and stated to his Highness "the impossibility of giving shelter even for the shortest time to 15,000 infantry, and 5,000 cavalry, at the same time peremptorily refusing to accede to the proposition, and appealing to the Prince of Hesse for relief, inasmuch as the request of the Danish Captain Ramling could not be considered official, inasmuch as it was not in unison with the letter from the Danish Minister of State, which extended only to a passage through the city. The Senate reminded the Prince of the long stay in Bremen of the troops in 1814, and of the extreme burden of maintaining them, for which the promised remuneration had not been made by the Danish Government."

The Senate, greatly alarmed in consequence of the new and unexpected burdens to which the Danish Government proposed a second time to subject them—a burden which, in consequence of the great losses their citizens had sustained by the enemy, they were totally unable to bear—addressed a letter, dated also on the 29th of July, to his Majesty the King of Denmark, repeating, in the strongest terms, the impossibility of supporting the troops, if they should halt in the city, and protesting a second time against the measure of billetting the soldiers for *an indefinite time*, and furnishing rations, as proposed by Captain Ramling, craving in the most emphatic terms the interposition of his Majesty that so severe a burden may be averted.

On the 11th of August, the Senate presented a memorial to the Prince of Hesse, in which, after alluding to a verbal promise made by his Highness, that the expense of the troops then quartered in the town and neighbourhood should be refunded at the same rate which was allowed in the Hanoverian territories; after showing that the two cases did not apply, and that, in consequence of the halting of the troops for so long a time, the *actual expenses* incurred should be repaid, it was proposed, in order to show every disposition on the part of the Senate to act liberally, that his Highness the Prince of Hesse should declare in writing, that he will grant twelve schillings for the ration, and eight schillings, Hanoverian money, for the portion, and offer fair terms of payment; stating, at the same time, "that upon the answer received would depend the further supply of rations to the troops."

A note dated the 19th of August, to the Prince of Hesse, contained the reiterated protest of the Senate against the stay of the Danish troops, and a claim of reimbursement for the expenses to the full amount. The Senate received from the Danish Minister Rosenkrantz an answer to the letter which had been addressed to the King, in which he states "that it is his Majesty's constant will that everything to be furnished to

his troops shall be paid in cash, and that, after the determination of the amount, the whole will be settled; desiring, in the mean time, that the troops may be furnished with everything his Highness the Prince of Hesse may deem necessary, and that, besides full indemnification, his Royal Majesty will acknowledge the obligation." It further states—"I am also authorized to state that the expenses incurred last year, by the stay of his Majesty's troops at Bremen, shall be refunded as soon as the amount of the same shall be fixed."

On the 21st of August, the Senate of Bremen addressed a letter to the Danish Minister, Count Rosenkrantz, accompanied by a statement of the expenses incurred by the troops, adding that the standard proposed is below the *actual expenses*, offering various reasons why, after all, *the city will be losers*. But, in order to remove every difficulty, sacrifices have been made, in order to facilitate the payment, in consequence of the urgent necessity of having the money which has been expended restored as soon as possible—beseeching his Excellency to accelerate as much as possible the payment of the money, and the total removal of the troops.

The statement transmitted evinces the very generous proposals of the Senate. It was only on the 22nd of September that the last division of the troops left the town and territory of Bremen, and even on the 21st of October, a part of the hospital remained; and, in spite of the most urgent solicitations on the part of the Senate, the Danish Government has made no provision, either for the payment of the expenses incurred in respect to the troops *in* 1814, *or the present year;* and there is no prospect of any speedy reimbursement, unless such payment shall be retained from the subsidies granted by Great Britain to Denmark.

It appears from the public documents transmitted to the Undersigned by the Republic of Bremen, that the Senate was not only required to pay for the rations furnished to the troops, the sick in the hospitals, the provender for the

cavalry, and even the military conveyances, but also for the table of his Highness and his officers, exhibiting the singular instance of an army marching without a military chest, trusting to the strong hand of power in extorting supplies from an innocent and unoffending friendly State, already exhausted by the late rapacity of the French, thereby imposing a most intolerable burden on a small community of about 45,000 inhabitants, while, at the same time, the Danish army were receiving a subsidy from the British Government, equal, at least, to the expense of sustaining the troops.

The Undersigned is authorized humbly to represent to his Britannic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as the troops in question were in the pay of Great Britain, and under the orders of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, thus virtually assuming the character and quality of a British army, such conduct on the part of the Danish Government, so derogatory to the usage of war, and so diametrically opposite to the line of conduct uniformly pursued by British armies and British commanders, it is humbly hoped would call for the interference of his Britannic Majesty's Government, for the purpose of obtaining that redress which the Government of Denmark appears so unwilling to grant; since, had it been really intended that the money should be *immediately refunded*, the Danish Minister would not have withheld from the proper authorities on the spot the power of liquidating the accounts, and of *fixing the sums to be repaid to the Republic of Bremen.*

The subsequent conduct of this Government in paying no attention to the reiterated applications of the Senate but too plainly demonstrates a disposition to postpone the settlement and the payment of the money till an indefinite period, knowing that, when a Sovereign State is so disposed, no means exist on the part of a weaker State by which justice can be obtained. No answer has been received from the Danish Government to the repeated applications which have been made since the assurances

given by the Danish Minister in his letter of the 19th of August.

	Rix-dols.	Groats.	In sterling, about.
The sums expended on Danish troops in 1814, amounts to .	47,073	49	7,060 19
The sums expended on troops in British pay in 1815, amounts to	65,057	7	9,758 11
Rix-dollars at 3*s.* per rix-dollar	112,130	56	16,819 10

This is the actual money laid out, independently of the time occupied in providing rations, and the expense of providing lodgings for the soldiers, and the labour of washing the bed and table linen, cleaning apartments, and other incidental charges, not to speak of the great loss and inconvenience arising from the interruption given to the general course of industry upon which the inhabitants depend for the support of themselves and families.

Under all the circumstances attending this very hard case, the Undersigned is authorized to state that little or no hopes exist of obtaining repayment of the money thus expended, unless through the humane interference of his Britannic Majesty's Government, by retaining from the subsidies which may be due to Denmark a sum of money equal to the just claims of Bremen, or to suspend the payment of an equal amount until the Danish Government shall fulfil its engagements.

The Undersigned has the honour to express to Lord Bathurst the highest sentiments of respect and consideration.

P. COLQUHOUN.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

November 16, 1815.

My dear Lord—The ukase for the *arriérés* has excited considerable emotion, as it is said to be written in the Emperor's

own hand, and is in direct opposition with his real or supposed promises. The Governor of Kalouga answered, that he must resign, as the province neither could nor would obey, having furnished, since 1812, 80,000 men. Arekschiew signed the counter-order.

The motive for this increase of the forces is said to be the immense desertion that has taken place in the army abroad. The whole are much discontented, the Guards not the less so, and breathe nothing but foreign war, in order to have their payments made in silver, with the advantage of living at free quarters, and the hopes of crosses, decorations, &c.

The Austrian Minister at Copenhagen is coming here upon a special mission. Blöme hinted to me it *might* be relative to an attack upon Turkey; but you can better judge than myself. The exchange fell to-day, and looks worse than ever, as not only that upon England, but the Hamburgh and Amsterdam, all went together. It had risen during the two last posts, and great efforts were made to keep it up, as a *fête* upon the Emperor's arrival. The Jews will not lose, but the Government must pay the difference.

I expect Lord C[athcart] on the 19th or 20th, and shall immediately set out after seeing him.

Your obedient servant, WALPOLE.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Berne, November 17, 1815.

My Lord—In a former letter, I mentioned my having received from Mr. Liston a confidential communication of what he had written to your lordship respecting his idea of supplying the Persian Government with officers from this country. In compliance with his wishes, I have endeavoured to ascertain how far the suggestion would be practicable, in case his Majesty's Government should approve it. The result of such inquiries as I have been able to make, without attracting public attention, or giving room to suppose that I have any authority

upon the subject, is that something between a dozen and twenty, possibly a few more, officers or non-commissioned officers might, perhaps, be procured for the service in question. To those who have been sounded, the name of Persia has not been mentioned. They have only expressed a general readiness to enter into a distant foreign service. Privates, it seems, would be more difficult to be procured than officers, and of such as might be willing the greater part would probably be deficient in the necessary qualifications.

The Dutch service is daily carrying off a great number of recruits, and those of the best sort. The requisite spirit of adventure and professional knowledge are likely to be found among the remnants of the old French regiments. Notwithstanding their good conduct at Paris, it might perhaps be hazardous to count upon their political opinions. I know not whether it would be particularly an object to have engineers and artillery officers; but, if so, the difficulty would be materially increased, and to procure them in any number is out of the question.

The individuals who might be found disposed and qualified to undertake so distant and strange a service, would doubtless expect advantages both present and future, in proportion to its risk and inconvenience. A direct engagement between the Persian Government and the Swiss Confederacy, or any of its Cantons, would be next to impracticable; and it may be doubted whether a single individual would venture to engage himself upon the mere faith of such a country as Persia, without an immediate and positive security from the English Government.

If your lordship should decide upon following the matter up, there is another expedient that might perhaps be tried with more success than any direct recruiting in Switzerland. It is this: to give permission to the officers in the three regiments in his Majesty's service to volunteer to Persia for a certain number of years. By this method, which I mention with the

utmost deference, some of the principal difficulties might possibly be removed. The transaction would occasion less noise; the individuals would have less risk to incur; the interference of England might perhaps be attended with less inconvenience; and the residence in Canada is not so popular, but that it might be exchanged even for one in Persia without regret.

This, my lord, is the best information that I have been able to obtain, without committing myself in a case upon which I am unprovided with any knowledge of your lordship's intentions. I have only to add, that the number of persons disposed to come forward is likely to diminish from day to day, as they happen to find situations in the service of other countries.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

Lord Bathurst to the Hon. Charles Bagot.

Foreign Office, November 20, 1815.

Sir—Mr. Baker's correspondence, which has been communicated to you, will have put you in possession of the state of our relations with America, and you will have observed from these papers that the Government of the United States has brought on a discussion with that of Great Britain, since the restoration of peace between them by the Treaty of Ghent, on two subjects of great importance: the first being an assertion, on the part of the United States, to resume the privileges of fishing, as conceded to them by the Treaty of 1783; the second arising out of the interpretation by the Government of the United States, widely differing from that of this country, on that part of the 1st Article of the Treaty of Ghent which stipulates for the restitution of slaves or other private property.

As both these points have been fully discussed in London with the American Minister, it only remains for me to enclose for your information and guidance copies of the Notes to this Government, and to desire that, in your language respecting

these matters towards the Government of America, you conform to that which has been held towards that Minister in the two Notes in answer to his, of which I also enclose copies.

In immediate reference, however, to the second point in question, I have the honour to enclose, for your further information, a copy of Mr. Baker's despatch No. 30, covering a letter which he has received from the American Commissary-General for prisoners of war, in reply to an inquiry the former had made respecting the detention and present situation of several black and coloured people captured on board of British vessels during the war; and, as no reply has been made to Mr. Baker from this Government, I am to instruct you to intimate to the Government of the United States, upon your arrival in America, that, on the principles adopted by Great Britain, if the persons detained are really slaves, not carried away subsequent to the exchange of the ratifications from any fort or place to be restored to Great Britain, according to the Article of the Treaty of Ghent, we do not of course claim them; but, on the other hand, you will at the same time observe that, if the persons in question were slaves, and, as such, to be deemed "private property," the captors, in that case, ought surely not to have received subsistence money from the British Government, as if they were prisoners of war; and you will lay in a claim to have all moneys advanced on that account returned. You will, at the same time, express a readiness to redeem the slaves at a fair valuation, subject to the reduction above stated.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, November 24, 1815.

Sir—This despatch will be delivered to you by the Honourable Charles Bagot, whom his Royal Highness has been pleased to appoint his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the United States; and I am to

desire that you will deliver over to Mr. Bagot the originals of the official correspondence in your possession, and also that you will furnish him with such other information respecting the state of affairs in the United States as may be useful in promoting his Majesty's interests, and which your experience and knowledge of that country may have enabled you to obtain.

I have now the pleasure to acquaint you that I am commanded by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to signify to you his Royal Highness's entire approbation of the zeal and ability with which you have conducted yourself during the period in which the affairs of his Majesty's mission in the United States have been entrusted to your charge.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Note Confidentielle.

Paris, le [blank] Novembre, 1815.

Les soussignés Ministres des Cabinets Alliés, en adressant à son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu le projet de Traité principal, ainsi que ceux des Conventions particulières qui l'accompagneront, ont l'honneur d'ajouter à ces communications les observations suivantes.

Il n'échappera pas à Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu que les soussignés ont eu constamment en vue, dans la rédaction de ces différens Actes, d'éviter tout ce qui auroit pu blesser le Gouvernement Français, ou faire une impression défavorable sur le public de France.

Cependant, comme, d'un autre côté, les devoirs que les soussignés ont à remplir envers leurs Souverains leur prescrivent de ne pas négliger les précautions propres à prévenir des doutes et des incertitudes que le texte de quelques uns des articles, tel qu'il est à présent, pourroit faire naître, ils ont cru devoir préciser le sens qu'ils attachent aux dits articles, en réunissant dans une Note confidentielle les explications qui leur ont paru nécessaires pour obvier au dit inconvénient.

La première de ces explications se rapporte au dernier paragraphe de l'Article V. du Traité principal. La durée de l'occupation militaire n'est limitée, dans ce paragraphe, que par les considérations politiques qui ont motivé cette mesure. Mais attendu qu'il est expressément dit dans le paragraphe 6 de l'Annexe ci-jointe du Procès Verbal du 13 Octobre, "que si, au bout de trois ans, la situation des choses est telle que les Puissances ne se trouvent pas dans le cas de prolonger l'occupation militaire par les motifs politiques, cette occupation sera réduite à une échelle proportionnée aux sommes qui resteront encore à acquitter sur l'indemnité pécuniaire, et la France pourra la faire cesser entièrement, en acquittant le restant de l'indemnité, soit en valeur réelle soit par des arrangemens qui seraient jugés par les Alliés l'équivalent d'un payement effectif," et que le dit Procès Verbal, signé par son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu, est considéré par les soussignés comme parfaitement obligatoire dans toute ses clauses. Ils déclarent que quoique la disposition qu'ils viennent de rappeler ne soit pas énoncée dans l'Article V. du Traité principal, elle n'en sera pas moins regardée comme partie intégrale de cet Article.

Les explications à ajouter à la Convention Militaire se rapportent aux Articles suivants:

1. À l'Article II. Les soussignés ont entendu par cet Article que tout ce qui regarde l'entretien de l'armée d'occupation sera réglé conformément aux dispositions du Procès Verbal du 13 Octobre; et que s'il est au pouvoir des Alliés de diminuer la force de cette armée, et d'opérer par cette mesure une réduction des dépenses dans la partie de l'entretien que la France doit fournir en nature, la somme à payer par le Gouvernement Français à titre de solde sera augmentée dans la même proportion, afin de rembourser aux Puissances dans des termes plus rapprochés le surplus de dépense que la perte de la solde leur aura causée pendant la première année—bien entendu toutefois que la France ne payera pas au-delà de cent

et trente millions par an pour la solde et les subsistances réunies de l'armée d'occupation.

2. À l'Article III. et final, on s'est borné à dire dans cet Article que le Gouvernement Français se concertera avec le Général en Chef de l'armée Alliée sur les moyens d'assurer les différens services énoncés dans les Articles II. et III. de la Convention. Cependant les soussignés ont entendu par cette rédaction que si, contre toute attente, les autorités Françaises se refusoient à faire droit aux réclamations, que le Général en Chef de l'armée Alliée leur auroit adressées à cet égard, ce général seroit autorisé à recourir à des mesures militaires pour assurer dans les départemens occupés par les troupes sous ses ordres l'exécution des dites stipulations.

3. À l'Article III. § 2. Par rapport aux places énumérées dans ce paragraphe, dans lesquelles le Gouvernement Français tiendra garnison, il doit être entendu que les troupes et les transports militaires de l'armée Alliée auront le droit de passer librement auprès de ces places.

À l'Article IV. paragraphe avant-dernier, commençant par les mots, "S'il parvenoit à la connoissance du Général en Chef," &c., il doit être entendu que le Général en Chef de l'armée Alliée aura le droit d'envoyer, de tems en tems, des officiers dans les dites places, afin de vérifier et de constater que les stipulations qui les regardent sont exactement remplies.

Les soussignés prient son Excellence Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu, Ministre et Secrétaire d'État de sa Majesté très Chrétienne, de leur donner acte des Explications et Déclarations contenues dans cette Note.

Les Ministres des Cabinets Alliés ont l'honneur de renouveler à son Excellence l'assurance de leur haute considération.

Mr. John Bramsen to Lord Castlereagh.

Sackville Street, London, December 2, 1815.

My Lord—It is with the highest deference and respect I venture to entreat your lordship's perusal of the accompanying

letter, which contains the outline of a tour which I performed during the last two years, accompanied by a gentleman of rank in this country.

My principal object was to ascertain the sentiments which existed towards Great Britain at the various capitals at which we sojourned. I am sensible of the disadvantage I labour under in presenting myself to your lordship's notice; but I cherish a hope that, in the liberality of your lordship's mind, I shall meet with that indulgence to which the gratitude and affection I bear towards the British Government, created by a residence of the greater part of my life under it, may give me some claim.

I request your lordship will accept the enclosed letter, as a testimony of my earnest desire to render myself personally useful to his Majesty's Government, as also of my readiness to afford your lordship any further information on the several points herein mentioned.

I have the honour to be, &c., JOHN BRAMSEN.

[Enclosure.]

I embarked from Scotland for Göttenburg, and travelled through Sweden to Stockholm. In Sweden it appeared that two parties existed. The merchants and second class of people were in favour of the Crown Prince; the nobility and the army, with few exceptions, were inimical to him. The ex-King of Sweden (now Count of Gottorp) is spoken of by the two latter classes with enthusiasm. The general feeling in the higher circles, who dare pronounce an opinion, and who observed with a watchful eye the Crown Prince's conduct during the war, when Sweden took an active part, was that Bernadotte had an inclination to favour Napoleon's views, had it not been for the fear of appearing to compromise the Swedish Crown, and thereby sacrifice his own interests. It appeared that the proposed contingent, on the part of Sweden, towards the general alliance, was a subterfuge, to obtain from the

British Government the subsidies and the possessions lately ceded by Denmark, in order to ensure, at the same time, the friendship of the Allies and ultimately his succession to the throne of Sweden.

The merchants held forth that it was owing to the Crown Prince that Sweden obtained the peace with England and the revival of their commerce, which not only supports the Government, but contributes highly to the support of the lower class of citizens. The inhabitants of Sweden are generally poor, very little specie in circulation—in short, little else is seen but paper money.

The Swedes are very friendly disposed towards the English, individually, and, as a nation, they fear them. Their navy is well manned, and the officers respectable and well-informed; but their army the reverse. Though the Crown Prince (who is generally thought on the Continent a better drill-sergeant than general) takes great care of it, the officers look poor and badly equipped: they are generally young noblemen of the country, possessing little information.

From Sweden, I passed through Stralsund to Berlin. The inhabitants of Stralsund complained bitterly of Sweden: an English garrison was there; the French were every hour expected. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and the whole Court were in the town, flying from their residence; and the English turned out, expecting the French every hour, till General Walmoden defeated them, and forced them, under Marshal Ney, to retire. The inhabitants complained that the Crown Prince had no garrison or troops to defend them, and that, without the English, they should be again given up to the French.

It is impossible to describe the patriotism that existed in Berlin. Every man volunteered as a soldier; the ladies offered their trinkets in aid of defraying the expenses of the war. The Princesses attended the Hospital. The hatred against the French was universal, and the English were

adored, and their Government eulogized. They acknowledged that it was to the English they were indebted for being made sensible of the danger which surrounded them, and that it was by the English they were urged to think of defending themselves against the enemy. The Arsenal was quite empty, and they wanted arms, as the French had taken away all they had possessed. There was not a single cannon left, and, as soon as they took some from the French, they painted them, according to the custom of the country, and horses were taken in requisition, in order to convey the cannon to the army.

The inhabitants of Berlin said that it was owing more to General Walmoden that the French did not enter Berlin, under Marshal Ney, in August, 1813, than to the Crown Prince of Sweden.

The present monarch is adored, and the loss of the late Queen greatly regretted, particularly as grief was the cause of her death, she having humbled herself to kneel to the usurper of the French Crown, to obtain Silesia for the Prussian Monarch, to which the tyrant answered, "On ne peut rien faire refuser à votre Majesté." Her loss will for ever be felt as a deep wound to that nation. The King, to show his gratitude towards the English and England, ordered that English officers should be exempt from having their passports visited [*visés*, examined] at the police, which, at that time, was rigidly required of all travellers. Every mark of attention and respect was shown to the several English noblemen and gentlemen who rode out to the head-quarters of Bernadotte, and they were cheered all along the road. "God save the King," was played in every street, at every hotel.

The general opinion at that period was that, though a national feeling existed against Austria, the Prussian Ministry viewed with a more jealous eye the power of Russia; and the recent events have proved the justness of such an impression, more particularly should the proposition for an alliance between

the Imperial Family and the House of Orange be met by the two Courts.

From Berlin, the route was through Bohemia and Moravia to Vienna, visiting Hungary and Gratz. On arriving at Vienna, the melancholy but invariable attendants upon a country which distrusts its Government, were exemplified in the depreciation of public credit. The *Einlösungs-scheine*, which were 230 florins in paper for 100 in cash, fell to 430 to 460 florins for 100 florins cash. Money and patriotism were equally scarce; and, though the country was poor, there were some wealthy inhabitants at Vienna, yet none of them came forward voluntarily to assist their country in its distress. Advantage was taken of the state of affairs; the greatest personages used to speculate largely in the national funds.

The army was intrinsically good, but the officers, upon whom the conducting of it depended, were men of little education, and the want of proper national feeling, added to their miserable state of equipment, rendered them open to the disgraceful influence of mercenary recompense, though in opposition to the good of their country and the preservation of their honour and character. The cavalry is good. The Hungarians are patriots and good soldiers: they like their Sovereign; but the general opinion throughout Austria is, that there are too many French and Italians in Government offices.

It was said in Vienna, that there was a strong French party in the Government, which consisted of the last Prince de Ligne, the Prince de Trautmansdorf (Grand Master of the Ceremonies), the Prince d'Aremberg, &c. Vienna contained many French spies; and many houses were kept by ladies of Polish nobility, which formed a rendezvous for those characters; and the conduct of the late French Government was there openly praised. It was believed by them that their Prime Minister was a deep politician, and, like a certain French actor, cried with one eye and laughed with the other.

The Emperor is much liked, because he is affable and

friendly to the inhabitants. He hates luxury. He is more liked in the Tyrol than anywhere else. When he intended lately to raise a levy there, the people sent a deputation to Vienna, to tell his Majesty that he must not execute his plan, for two reasons: 1, the country being very hilly, it wants more men to cultivate it; 2, they were all willing to rise when his Majesty wished it, in defence of himself and their country. The Emperor received them graciously, and immediately granted their request. The only fault of which his Majesty is accused is, that he is too good and too easily guided, particularly by his Prime Minister.

The Prince Stahremberg, formerly Minister to Great Britain, is ruined, because he will not yield to the Metternich party, as he told me himself. The old Prince Esterhazy was of the Anti-Anglo party, as they called it. The Empress is much admired, and cheered wherever she publicly appears. The Archdukes must exert themselves to be again in favour.

An Ambassador at that Court must be aware that all the ladies in the first circles are disguised spies, and he must know that great information can be obtained through them. As I visited all the first circles, I may say that, of the whole diplomatic corps at that time, it was only the Russian Minister, Count Stackelberg, who was aware of it. The Prince Razumowski got, through the old Princess Esterhazy, many interesting hints.

We went from Vienna, *viâ* Triest, to Corfu. When we arrived, the French were yet in possession of the island, and felt sorry to quit it. The French Government had given to every French soldier an acre of land to cultivate, and many of those military farmers did not like to quit their small tenements, and they spoke violently against the Bourbon Government. The island was in a dreadful situation, and it is not surprising that they had some partisans, having been so long a time there. As some hold lands and have not emigrated,

they ought to be closely watched, for they are the military of the revolutionary school. Governor Campbell appeared to fulfil the duties of his station most judiciously.

When I visited the island again in November, 1814, the change was very considerable. The town was cleaner, the houses whitewashed, the streets well paved, and the country generally well cultivated. Arts were reviving: the character of the inhabitants is greatly ameliorated, and they are now attached to the English Government. The bad character of the Zanteotes was proverbial. Under the French and Russian Government, there were always frequent assassinations; and the perpetrators, immediately after the commission of the crime, went over to the Morea, where they bought the protection of the Bey of Patras for a trifling sum of money. Governor Campbell put a stop to this villanous system. When the last assassination was committed, he pursued the villains to the Morea, and, through the aid of the British Consul at Patras, Mr. Stranie, had two arrested and sent to Zante. The chief of them was put to death, and his head stuck up on a pole at Zante, and placed on a hill, that the people of the island might see the recompense those barbarians are to expect: and it had a good effect.

They are now constructing a fine harbour at Zante, which was much wanted, as the port was very unsafe in winter. M. Foresti, now at Corfu, and Colonel Moore, Governor of Zante, contributed much to improve the mind of the people, and to bring them to industry, and to inspire them with a taste for the arts.

We sailed from Zante to Alexandria, and were well received by Mr. Lee, Consul at that port. It is generally observed in the Levant, that the French Consuls have an advantage over the British: they are more cunning, and in many cases possess better information, as Napoleon left there many engineer officers; and they have all a decided influence, not only over the Pachas, but also over the Beys of the districts. I found

this report partly confirmed at the ports I visited in Egypt and in Palestine.

Mr. Lee is considered as a good merchant and clever man; but M. Drouetti, formerly French Consul, (lately recalled) has considerably the advantage over him. M. Drouetti, a military officer, speaks the oriental languages, is accustomed to intrigues, and told me that many disasters suffered by the British army in Egypt arose from his intimacy with the Pacha of Alexandria and with all the Beys; he prevailed on them not only to send no provisions to the English army, but to stop all that was bought and sent by their agents. M. Drouetti's opinion was that, had the English, at their first landing, taken possession of Rosetta, which could not long defend itself, before they marched into the interior of the country, they would have never suffered want of provisions, and could have obtained as great a supply as they wished. He showed me a letter from General Frazer, thanking him for his attention towards the British prisoners in the hands of the Pacha of Alexandria. He even opened for several English officers credits in Constantinople, whither the Pacha sent them.

The Turks and inhabitants of this port were very friendly to the English, and spoke of them with great respect. Most of the ships in the harbour were under the English flag; and, although France was then at peace with all the Powers of Europe—in July, 1814—there were only two French ships in that port.

We went from Alexandria to Cairo, and were well received by Colonel Misset and Major Taberna, both gentlemen of great merit: the former is in a bad state of health. I endeavoured to ascertain from physicians or others who visited the French hospitals, how far the report was correct, of Napoleon having poisoned in the hospitals many thousand soldiers, which was believed at Alexandria; but all the information I could obtain on the spot was, that the French soldiers were

so badly attended in the hospitals, and suffered so much from want of comfort, that they died by hundreds a day. Still I have strong reasons to believe, by the conversation I had, that all those whose recovery they thought doubtful were poisoned, to relieve the wants of those whose recovery was thought certain.

Cairo is in a bad state of discipline; murders are there committed almost every week, and the police so bad, that they do not give themselves the trouble to seek the assassins. In fact, the natives and Mamelukes hate and despise the Turks, and the Pachas of many parts of Egypt are not on terms with the Grand Signor, and many towns in revolt against the Beys; and the greatest part of the country presented scenes of confusion and disorder.

We stayed at Mahomed Bey's at Gizeh, five miles from old Cairo; a major and thirty Turks and Mamelukes escorted us to see the famous Pyramids. A Mameluke, who spoke Italian, said to Colonel Maxwell, my travelling companion, "You English are fools to come here to kill so many honest men, and chase them from this fine country. Why don't you chase those barbarians, the Turks, who are as ignorant as cruel, and destroy all the good you have done?"

The Bedouin Arabs do not fear the Turks, and many thousand of the latter were lost during the late war with the Arabs. The Pacha of Alexandria received very bad news from his army at the time I was at Alexandria: the Arabs took a great number of their camels, richly laden, and the plague was raging in the army of the Turks.

We went from Cairo to Damietta, and were well received by Peter Surure, an Arab, who is English Consul there. His father, whose successor he is, died a few months before. He is twenty years old; his chancellor, born in Smyrna, writes and speaks Italian. The Consul is rich and thought clever; but the French Consul, M. Facker, an Arab, about forty-two years old, is not only very rich, but very well informed, and

has such an influence over the Bey of Damietta (who was a common soldier, and is cruel, but brave), that he decides many difficult cases for the Bey. His chancellor was secretary to Lord Elgin at Constantinople, an Italian, who is well informed.

We went from Damietta to Jaffa, where we stayed at M. Damiani's, the English Consul, a Levantine, of very little education, no information, and who fears in such a degree the Bey, that he runs into the house when he is in the neighbourhood. He lives miserably, though he is a man of property. He was a long time at Marseilles, and speaks French well. He was very desirous that an English ship or armed vessel should come there, because the Bey, who is a cruel and savage man, and who appears to be on bad terms with the Grand Signor, would not respect the firman of Constantinople. He forced the Consul to pay taxes as a common Christian, without respecting his official situation.

This port is much frequented by French and European ships, bringing pilgrims thither to disembark, to go to Jerusalem. The natives are in open revolt in that neighbourhood against the Bey, refusing to pay the taxes; and in August, 1814, the Bey was besieging several villages: the Turks lost many men, and the Bey was much in want of soldiers.

From thence we went to Jerusalem, through El Rama. I found that part of the country without order or regulations. The Bedouin Arabs, and those living in villages, carrying on a kind of warfare against the Turks, we were stopped by a picquet of Arabs, well armed and mounted. When they were informed by our guide that we were travellers and Milordi, the name they give to all Englishmen, they let us proceed. The Arab we had as a guide told our interpreter that they were very friendly when they were informed the travellers were English.

Jerusalem is in a shocking state, the houses going to ruin; the Christians barbarously treated by the Bey, who is not on

terms with the Grand Signor, and so disliked by his own soldiers and the Turks that he never goes out of the house without a large escort, and never dares venture to go out of the city, fearing to be taken by some partisans of the Grand Signor. He extorts very great sums from the Convents and Christian inhabitants, and treats them very barbarously. We met him in the street, and he behaved very politely, inviting us to come to his house. The Arabs in the Jerusalem mountains, formerly very cruel, appear now very friendly. We met a great many, and only two treated us with contempt.

We went back to Jaffa, and from thence to Acre, and stayed with the English Consul, M. Malagamba, born in Genoa, who is polite and naturally clever, though far from a well educated man. The French Consul there, M. Villavert, is not a dangerous man, as his greatest knowledge consists in hunting, but he has a good chancellor, who is an Italian. M. Malagamba has no chancellor, but he appears to be on good terms with the Pacha, whose Prime Minister is a Jew, and who entirely rules the Pacha. The English are here much esteemed by the inhabitants. A good understanding exists between the Pacha and the Grand Signor. Sir Sidney Smith is well known here and much feared.

We went to Sidon, where there is no English Consul, and stayed at the house of the French Vice-Consul, M. Taitbout, an officer of the army left there by Napoleon, who does what he pleases with the Bey, and has even planted four cannon in front of his house, which no Christian ever did before in those countries. Lady Hester Stanhope, who was then in the mountains of the Druses, has been at Sidon, and the Consul informed me he had had the honour of escorting her several times a distance out of the town. The Turks call Lady Stanhope Princess, and think her a daughter of his Majesty. We had not the pleasure of seeing her, as the plague raged in the neighbourhood through where we should have been obliged

to pass. We saw her major-domo, and were informed that she was unwell, but in a fair way of recovery.

We went from Sidon to the island of Cyprus, and were well received by the English Consul, who is a rich Greek of that island, not without information, though the inhabitants did not speak highly of his general abilities: he is not much respected by the Bey, as the Turks always treat the Greeks with the utmost contempt. The port is much frequented by English ships. The inhabitants are rather inclined towards the French, and the English not so much liked as in Egypt, owing to the French Consul, M. Regnaud, an engineer officer left there by Napoleon, who not only is a very well informed man, but a complete master of intrigue *à la Française*. He has absolute influence over the Bey and all the public officers, whom he forced to interdict, during the war, the exportation of grain to Malta, and those who did export by contraband were obliged to pay him a fee that he might shut his eyes, or give him a share in the business. The only English merchant there, Mr. Howel, from London, ships the most corn to Malta.

Consuls in the Levant ought not to be Greeks, and they will be always more respected by the Turks. If an English armed vessel was to appear in the Levant occasionally, it would assist the Consuls very much in having an influence over the Beys. Colonel Cook died lately at Port Larnica, in Cyprus, and left many valuable trunks with the English Consul. His friends in England would do well to claim them. I was in his rooms, and the Consul showed me many trunks belonging to the Colonel.

We went to the island of Rhodes. I visited the French Consul, M. Magallon, a very old, respectable Frenchman, who received me very kindly. Though the port is often frequented by English ships, there is no English Consul there. The inhabitants are friendly to the English. The French Consul told me that Lady Hester Stanhope was shipwrecked there two years ago, and he gave her every assistance to facili-

tate her return to Egypt, and that she lost there several valuable writings. The Beys in Cyprus and in this island are on good terms with the Grand Signor.

At Cerigo, Captain Taylor, Governor of the island, gave us a letter to the Bey of the Mainotes, in the bay of Coron, famous robbers, who are independent of the Turks, with whom he keeps up a friendly intercourse, as they permit his letters and despatches to go through their territory by land to Parga, from whence they are sent to Corfu. They received us very politely. It appeared that they flattered themselves that they should be able to form a free Republic, and to receive arms and ammunition from England, which, the Bey said, was all he wanted to defend his territory against his enemies. Their cities are fortified by Nature; as they are built on very high mountains, to attack them by land, it is necessary to pass immense defiles of mountains; and by sea they can defend themselves from the mountains with a few field-pieces, and they are very expert in firing muskets and pistols.

We passed Mistra, Tripolizza, Corinth, and Athens. We saw the English Consul at the latter city, a Greek, who is little respected by the Turks. English travellers complained that he pays no attention to them, and that they could obtain from him very little or no assistance. His name is M. Logotetti. The French Consul, M. Fauvel, a very clever Frenchman, is on good terms with the Bey. We found at Patras the English Consul, M. Stranie, born in Zante. He is very well informed, and much esteemed by the Bey and inhabitants, and he has been of great service to Governor Campbell, in finding out malefactors that come over from Zante.

The Turks in the Morea and Greece are very friendly to the English and very attentive to the wants of travellers. The Government has no discipline, and the Beys do what they please, without listening much to the orders from Constantinople. Ali Bey affects to be friendly to the English, but I believe he is little trustworthy: they said he has about thirty

thousand men, well armed. He is very cruel towards his subjects.

We landed, *viâ* Corfu, at Otranto, and traversed the whole of Calabria to Naples. The opinion of the inhabitants was there divided. The new nobility and soldiers liked Murat, the old nobility and merchants were attached to their legitimate Sovereign; and the English are much esteemed by the Calabrians and all over the kingdom of Naples. They said that, without free intercourse with England, they could not pay the heavy taxes Government imposed on them. The price of oil was 40 per cent. higher as soon as the first English merchantman arrived in the port of Naples, and the silk trade revived immediately.

At Naples, the English Consul was Mr. Walker, formerly a merchant, very little known, who lives very retired. At Rome, the Abbot Taylor presented Englishmen to the Pope; and there is another British agent, whose name I do not recollect. The Romans are polite and attentive to the English. They complained bitterly against the present Governor of Rome, who is said to be cruel and partial. The French have warm partisans in this city, particularly among their countrymen established there, who have been supported by some men of the revolutionary tribe who reside in Rome, and are of course not friendly to the English.

At Florence, the confusion was so great, in consequence of the approach of the Neapolitan army, that we stayed there only a few days. The Tuscans are much attached to their Sovereign, the Grand Duke, and hate the French. They showed great attachment to the English, in assisting them to get off before the Neapolitans arrived.

We passed Bologna with Lord Granville Somerset and Lord and Lady Clare, and I waited on the Duke de Gallo for him to inspect our passports, and to inquire if we could pass through the Neapolitan army. He received me very politely, and requested me to assure those distinguished personages that

not only we might pass, but that every assistance would be given to us. I was surprised to see the aides-de-camp of Murat wearing all blue great coats, like the English, and I understood that Murat wished to impress the inhabitants with a belief that they were English officers. The inhabitants were rather *des têtes chaudes*. They walked in the evening in procession, with torches and music, crying, "*Viva Joachimo Napoleone!*" The towns where the French revolutionary spirit is still rooted are Bologna, Lodi, Milan, and Venice.

We crossed the Tyrol, through Brixen and Innspruck, to Salzburg. The Emperor of Austria is much loved in Tyrol, and the patriotism is there very great. They hate the French very sincerely, and esteem the English, and spoke of them with the highest eulogy, acknowledging that all Europe owes its salvation to the English Regent and to the present Government. They are all soldiers, and are expert in using firearms.

All over Bavaria, the people are much attached to their Sovereign, who is very affable, though not a prince of a great mind. He is whimsical: he never rides on horseback, and is frightened to death when he mounts a horse, fearing it will kill him. The Queen has a strong mind: she guides the Ministers, and the King follows her advice. Eugene Beauharnois is a great favourite with the Queen, but more so with the King. The Queen hates the French, and shows much attention to the English. When I was at Munich, the Empress of Russia was with her sister, the Queen of Bavaria, and showed at the Court particular attention to two young English noblemen of my acquaintance, who dined very often at Court. Luxury is disliked by the King; and each individual of the royal family was extremely affable to all.

We went from Munich to Frankfort on the Maine, to the kingdom of Wirtemberg, through Stutgard, and I had the honour of being presented to Mr. Taylor by the Earl of Conyngham, where we were very kindly received. The King

is not much liked by the inhabitants, and accused by them of being partial to the French, having in his own apartments paintings representing battles where the French defeated the Germans. The person who showed us the palace observed that it was too elegant for the King, whose revenues were not adequate to his expenses. The Queen is much loved, and every apartment showed proofs of her industry. During the absence of his Majesty, Lady Conyngham and Lady Elizabeth, her daughter, had the honour of dining with the Queen. Lord Conyngham, Lord Sunderland, the Honourable Mr. Perceval, Colonel Maxwell, and myself, dined at the inn at Ludwigsburg, for the purpose of seeing the gardens during the time the King and Queen were absent.

We went from Stutgard to Cassel: I found, to my surprise, many of the inhabitants there regretting the loss of the imaginary King, as he expended large sums to gratify his taste for luxuries; and I am sorry to add that there are yet remnants of a French party remaining, which the present police ought to destroy, to secure fully the happiness of the inhabitants.

We went through Hildesheim to Hanover. I conversed with the postmaster at Brügge, one post before Hildesheim, and he told me the sentinels are not strict enough in seeing the passports of travellers, nor the innkeepers to inquire; in consequence, many French deserters roved through the country. He arrested, three weeks before our arrival, a French officer of rank, who was sent to Hanover. He saw him riding before the post-house out of the town. The postmaster, an officer of the Landsturm, pursued the French fugitive, overtook him three miles from Brügge, arrested him, and brought him back: he did this alone, without any assistance. He likewise told me the inhabitants of the new countries complain of the existing ground taxes; that a merchant opposite to the post-house, the richest in the town, paid not a quarter of the taxes he does, though this merchant is twenty times richer than he is; that

many instances of this kind were in the town; and that, under the Prussian Government, they paid taxes according to their fortune. I heard in Hanover the same complaint, and I found the military all over the kingdom very neglectful of inspecting passports; though, at that period, in May, 1815, it was very necessary, as, from the absence of the troops, many bad subjects may get into the kingdom. The inhabitants show everywhere a loyal attachment to his Majesty's Government, and hate the French.

We went through Hamburg to Copenhagen. I heard from good authority that, in the present Senate of Hamburg, there are still some persons who are attached to French principles: the inhabitants are strongly attached to the English, and if among them there exist some French partisans, they are only among the females of the gallant circles.

I never witnessed such false patriotism as in Denmark. As soon as we left Holstein, the Jacobin sentiments began, and invariably continued till we got again into Germany. The Danes hate not only the English but the Germans, and all other nations, except the French Jacobins, who are adored. I had the honour of visiting Mr. Foster, but was prevented by indisposition from accepting his invitation to a dinner which he gave on the 6th July to the *corps diplomatique* and the first Danish noblemen, on the glorious event of the battle of Waterloo. All the hotels of foreign Ministers were elegantly illuminated: the hotel of Mr. Foster was the most splendid: on the front were the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher crowning Louis XVIII., and above was La belle Alliance. At nine o'clock, after some toasts had been given, Mrs. Foster retired to her apartment: the crowd before the house was then very great, and she distinctly heard cries of "Vive l'Empereur!—vive Napoleon!" Soon after, some stones were thrown at the windows where she was, and at the porter's lodge—three panes were broken, and the painting of the Duke of Wellington torn. The gendarmes immediately arrested four of those per-

sons—two students, one officer, and one soldier; the crowd then disappeared. The inhabitants exaggerated this incident, stating that it was a tumultuous riot, and that all the windows of Mr. Foster were broken.

It was understood at Copenhagen that the King had been advised by his Ministers to give up his alliance with France; but he persisted in not doing so, and said he had promised, and would not depart from it. They generally acknowledged that, had England not taken their fleet, many of their ships would have been sold to the French, and the greatest part of their fleet given to them, until a general peace was signed. Many Danish sailors were sent to Antwerp to man the French ships. Little is thought of the Queen and Crown Prince. The country is very poor, and the army badly equipped, and of French sentiments.

I passed the Great Belt with forty-eight officers of different ranks, going to the army with their contingent. I conversed with almost all, and found that one sentiment of Jacobinism prevailed; they were all attached to the late usurper of France.

We went from Copenhagen, through Bremen, to Münster and Westphalia, and found that the inhabitants hate those French who destroyed the peace of Europe, and were strongly attached to the English Government.

We went through Utrecht to the Hague and other parts of Holland. I found the Dutch Government attached to England, and English travellers are here much respected; but, among the inhabitants, particularly of the Netherlands, the French have many partisans. I had the honour of visiting Mr. James, and brought over despatches from him to the Foreign Office, Downing Street.

We were obliged in a heavy gale, coming from Cyprus, to enter the uninhabited island of Stan Dia, [?] twenty-four miles north of Candia, and we found the port very safe. The entry is easy, and in the port there is water and room for frigates

of the largest class. The harbour is very safe and good anchorage.

JOHN BRAMSEN.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, December 13, 1815.

My dear Lord—I must beg you to lay me in the most humble manner at his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's feet, and convey to him my warmest acknowledgments of all his Royal Highness's gracious favours, more especially for that which you have conveyed to me of his royal sanction in advance of the option I should make between the Hague and home employment. You may, I think, safely assure his Royal Highness, in my name, that I shall at all times exert my best efforts to merit the continuance of his gracious approbation.

I must also request you to convey to Lord Liverpool my best thanks for the kindness he has been so good as to evince towards me upon this subject, and for the partial view he has so favourably taken of my capacity. I am truly sensible of the high value of his good opinion, and, though sufficiently flattered by it, should make but a poor return by engaging him to place me in situations whence neither the promotion of his views nor my own reputation would result. It is the way of the world that, when men receive favours, they are immediately ready to ask more. If, however, in the course of the next year, the situation of public affairs abroad shall admit, I should wish, at the time this can most conveniently be accorded, to obtain leave of absence for six weeks, till after spring, or perhaps midsummer.

Upon another subject, immediately connected with embassies, I had intended to speak to you, had my destination been home, but must now write summarily what I had to say.

Just before I left Paris, Hamilton mentioned to me in conversation that it was not the intention of the Foreign Office to name the *attachés* to embassies in future. Perhaps I am wrong,

but it appears to me that leaving these to the nomination of ambassadors is losing a great card to the patronage of your department and of influence to Government. Hundreds of the first families in England would be indebted to Government for suffering their sons to go out with embassies, both for education in business and for the prospect thus afforded of making diplomacy their line in life. Under another arrangement, this would be converted into a personal compliment from the ambassador to his friend, and there would still be a claim not less strongly felt, though perhaps somewhat in fact less legitimate, for the future employment of persons thus nominated. This is my view of the subject; and, if you think with me, you cannot have a better occasion than the formation of my embassy to commence the practice, which ought to put an end to all claims of ambassadors hereafter appointed to make nominations of this sort. I shall thankfully receive whomsoever you shall send.

Ever yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, December 18, 1815.

My dear Lord—I have nothing to add to my official despatch except what I learned from Gentz, who passed through here a few days ago. I write at the risk of repeating what your lordship is already acquainted with.

He told me that there was no doubt of the Emperor's fixed determination to carry through his pretensions upon Bavaria by war, if it should be necessary, and added, that the whole transaction was contrary to the wishes and views of Metternich, who would willingly have relinquished the provinces in question to Bavaria, and have kept Landau and as much as could be obtained for Austria on the left bank of the Rhine. At the latter end of October, or beginning of November, he received a letter from the Emperor, written at Innspruck, and enclosing the reports of the Vienna police, in all of which was contained the greatest abuse of Metternich, while the depres-

sion of the Austrian paper and every other subject of discontent were charged upon him and upon his weakness and lightness of character. The letter of the Emperor was extremely harsh, and, as Gentz expresses it, humiliating, so much so, as to render it evident that there was no alternative but to carry through the exchanges with Bavaria or to quit his place. From this, coupled with the declarations of General Wacquant, it appears quite certain that Austria is prepared for a rupture: and Gentz also informed me that General Langenau was directed to station a corps in Bohemia, and another in Upper Austria, so as to be able to act hostilely and to take possession of Salzburg upon the first order.

Your lordship will appreciate how much credit is to be given to Gentz's information: he impressed me with a belief that it was true. It appears certain that Bavaria must yield as soon as she is convinced that Austria is in earnest; and General Wacquant informed me that, in conversation with Wrede, whom he knows intimately, he had said to him—"Now that we two are alone together, what is it you can expect to do, with your three millions of population, against us, who have twenty-eight, and who are supported by all the great Powers of Europe?" and that Wrede himself had laughed at the idea of it. But I shall not the less regret if the arrangement cannot be brought to a conclusion, without the appearance of a determination to employ force, as it will infinitely increase the discontent against Austria, which has already been excited here by the present transaction, and which, I am afraid, is already likely to be very lasting.

I do not trouble your lordship with any account of the negociation with which I have been charged by the Duke of Wellington, relative to the orders given to the Bavarian contingent, as I conclude he will not have failed fully to inform your lordship upon the subject.

I have the honour to be, &c., F. LAMB.

Account of Murat's Descent in Calabria.

Transmitted by Lord Exmouth.

Extrait de la Lettre remise officiellement au Général Delaunay.

Murat s'embarqua la nuit du 28 Septembre, avec 200 hommes armés et une trentaine d'officiers sur six gondoles, avec de vivres pour huit jours. Dans la nuit du 30 au 1 Octobre, une forte tempête jetta sur les côtes toute l'expédition et sépara les six barques.

Le 4, on vit sur la côte de Sorrente une barque, que l'on crut appartenir aux Barbaresques, et qui sembloit chercher ou attendre d'autres bâtimens. Le 5 il en fut signalé une autre dans le golfe de Salerne, et ensuite on vit que deux barques se réunissoient à la précédente.

Murat débarqua avec le Général Franceschetti, un Colonel, et 50 hommes armés à Pizzo, sur la côte de Calabre, non loin de Monte Leone et environ à 40 lieues de Naples. Il laissa 40 hommes et quelques officiers sur les deux autres barques, leur donnant l'ordre de côtoyer la Calabre.

A peine débarqué, il se porta sur la grande place, réunit le peuple, et lui ordonna de crier *Vive le Roi Joachim!* lui disant qu'il étoit le Roi, et qu'il venait prendre possession de ses états. Il n'y avoit pas de troupes sur ce point; il y eut un mouvement d'incertitude; mais les villageois et autres braves gens des lieux voisins, ayant eu connoissance du débarquement de Murat, s'armèrent et vinrent l'attaquer. Après une longue et opiniâtre résistance, le parti de Murat fut défait; lui-même fut pris, mis aux fers et conduit au Général Nunziante, Commandant de la Calabre. Au départ du Courrier, la plus parfaite tranquillité régnoit dans cette province.

Le 10, une division de barques cannoniers prit les deux autres barques qui courroient la côte. Les patrons de ces gondoles, ainsi que les officiers, déclarent que Murat, en partant, leur avoit dit à Ajaccio, qu'il voulait aller à Tunis; mais

qu'arrivé à la hauteur du Cap Carbonara, il leur fit ordonner de faire voile vers la Calabre.

Au Consulat des Deux Siciles, à Livourne, le 18 8bre, 1815.

Le Docteur GASPERO DI SPERATI, Vice Consul.

Signé, pour copie conforme, le Maréchal de Camp, commandant la 23 division militaire,

BARON DELAUNAY.

Received this moment from Toulon—Noon.

EXMOUTH.

Boyne, Marseilles, 24th October, 1815.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, December 28-16, 1815.

My dear Lord—I have little to trouble your lordship with by this conveyance, in addition to my despatches. I must, however, beg leave to remind your lordship of the disadvantages under which all manner of correspondence is placed at this Court, where every letter is opened and read, with no other distinction than in the degree of care in the making them up for delivery or transmission after perusal. Everything sent through the Russian office, even by individuals, if in the service, is liable to the same scrutiny, whether forwarded from London or from hence. In the summer months, there are more frequent opportunities by ships and by travellers; but, during the winter, I cannot help urging the expediency of establishing a regular communication by messengers between St. Petersburgh and Berlin, or through Berlin to Hamburgh.

For ordinary transmission of business intelligence and documents, the periodical departure of a messenger from each of the Courts of St. Petersburgh and Berlin respectively, once a fortnight or once in three weeks, might suffice. But that arrangement would require the stationing another messenger at each Court, for extraordinary communications, which would

amount to an appropriation of the services of four messengers during the winter, to the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburgh.

We received yesterday, through Berlin, the account of the condemnation and execution of Ney. I most sincerely congratulate you, my dear lord, upon the treaty. I wait with impatience for the messenger you were so good as to promise me, with the copies of papers relating to that business, and such instructions in regard to the relations with France for my guidance, and for language on any part of them, as your lordship may deem necessary.

I fancy a more complicated or laborious task never presented itself to any sovereign than that now before the Emperor, of examining into the management of all the old and new provinces of this Empire and the administration of its resources. Some irregularities, to a serious amount, have, it is said, been discovered in Volhynia, and have occasioned charges of a criminal nature against the Governor, which are to be examined by a special commission. The energy with which this matter has been taken up is thought to forebode very strict investigation in other quarters.

I at present augur favourably of the Persian business; that is, as far as is recommended in the memorandum enclosed in your lordship's No. 3. But, as I have no instructions to make any communication as to the fruits of Mr. Ellis's mission, I have said nothing either of Sir Gore Ouseley's engagement, or of any other arrangement that may have been made between the Courts of London and Tehran. I have already begun to urge the expediency of clearly defining the frontier; and, as this was not objected to, I trust there will be no difficulty in regard to the employment of Captain Monteith, of the Honourable India Company's service, who has been detained for that purpose by Mr. Morier. The Emperor assured me that the frontier, being once defined, will not be violated by the Russians.

The line of demarcation of the *status ad præsentem* of the territory of Talish, which had been occupied by both armies, was undefined at the period of the signature of the preliminary treaty, and was to be regulated by Commissioners, as provided in the 2nd Article; and it is in this quarter only that the encroachments noticed by Lord Walpole are stated to have occurred. The difficulty of dividing this territory is one of the arguments used by Mirza for the restitution of the whole to Persia.

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Rose.

Blickling, December 28, 1815.

My dear Sir—I take advantage of a bad day to spare the pheasants and to send you a despatch, which I shall probably make circular to all our missions.

I perceive in more than one quarter a tendency to alarm as to the designs of particular Powers, but especially of Russia, for which I have no reason to suppose there is the smallest foundation, but of the prudence of which I should equally doubt, were I apprehensive (which I am not) that the Emperor of Russia, after making such stupendous sacrifices for a peace, which in its provisions has met his cordial concurrence, was stupid enough to meditate new convulsions to pull his own work to pieces. His language, his engagements, and his proceedings, as far as they are known to me, are in direct opposition to such a conclusion; and it must be my duty to discourage a line of conduct, which, although unauthorized, may produce distrust and alienation between two Courts, whose counsels being in unison is perhaps more essential than any other circumstance that can be stated to the preservation of that state of relations in Europe, which is best calculated to preclude any serious interruption of peace.

When I thus express myself with respect to the views of

Russia, or indeed of any Court, I must be understood as not indulging that species of blind confidence which does not belong to the politics of any foreign State; but I wish to guard our missions abroad against the danger of accelerating, if not producing, a conflict for influence between the two States. The existing state of European relations may possibly not endure beyond the danger which originally gave them birth, and which has recently confirmed them; but it is our duty, as well as interest, to retard, if we cannot avert, the return of a more contentious order of things: and our insular situation places us sufficiently out of the reach of danger to admit of our pursuing a more generous and confiding policy.

In the present state of Europe, it is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put herself at the head of any combinations of Courts to keep others in check. The necessity for such a system of connexion may recur, but this necessity should be no longer problematical when it is acted upon. The immediate object to be kept in view is to inspire the States of Europe, as long as we can, with a sense of the dangers which they have surmounted by their union, of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance, to make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every State of Europe; and that their true wisdom is to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order.

I have every reason to hope that the advantage of this course of policy is justly appreciated by the Allied Cabinets. The negociations at Paris were terminated with the utmost cordiality—whatever differences of opinion had existed either at Vienna, or in the early stage of our discussions at Paris, had ceased to disturb the general harmony; and there appeared

a general satisfaction in the results of our labours. I should say that the relations between Austria and Russia had become much more amicable, those of Russia with Prussia perhaps proportionably less intimate; but this I attribute not to any essential relaxation of friendly feeling, but to the manner in which the Prussian counsels were conducted at Paris being less congenial to the Emperor of Russia's feelings than the more moderate tone of the Austrian Cabinet. All, however, appeared to separate deeply impressed with the value of their common connexion to themselves and to the world; and I trust nothing may arise to shake this impression.

With respect to the particular Court to which you are accredited, every consideration of common interest must make me partial to the conservation of its preponderance as a great Power, inasmuch as Prussia must be the basis of every system in the north of Europe to preserve Holland as an independent State, and to keep France in check; but, with all that partiality and a grateful admiration of the conduct of that nation and its armies in the war, I fairly own that I look with considerable anxiety to the tendency of their politics. There certainly, at this moment, exists a great fermentation in all orders of the State; very free notions of Government, if not principles actually revolutionary, are prevalent, and the army is by no means subordinate to the civil authorities. It is impossible to say where these impulses may stop, when they find a representative system in which they may develop themselves.

I call your attention to these circumstances, not as any motive for interference on your part, but in order to impress your mind with the importance (and especially to Prussia herself) of keeping up a good understanding amongst the adjoining States, on which these disorganizing principles have made less impression, till the internal state both of France and of the north of Germany is more assured than it can now be considered to be. To this view of European policy, I can venture

to assure you, the Sovereigns themselves and their immediate Ministers are not insensible.

Your safest course at present will be to *keep quiet;* to cultivate the good will of your colleagues; to inspire them, as far as possible, with confidence in your Court, by making them feel that it is equally the ally of all; and, in order to do so with effect, you will avoid evincing distrust of theirs. Consistently with these suggestions, you will not neglect to cultivate suitable channels of intelligence, and to keep me accurately informed. I shall not neglect to put you in motion, when I see occasion to do so; but, in general, it is not my wish to encourage, on the part of this country, an unnecessary interference in the ordinary affairs of the Continent. The interposition of Great Britain will always be most authoritative in proportion as it is not compromised by being unduly mixed in the daily concerns of these States.

I trust you have found Prince Hardenberg return in good health. I regret his age does not present the prospect of his being long at the head of affairs in Prussia. I have always found him, although warm, alive to every honourable feeling, and incapable of long resisting an appeal to his reason upon any question. I beg to be remembered most cordially to him, and that you will believe me, dear sir, with great truth and regard, very faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum.

The Subsidies voted in 1815 are as follows:—

	£	s.	d.
For engagements prior to 1815 . .	1,451,056	8	3
For engagements with Austria, Russia, and Prussia	5,000,000	0	0
For Sweden	1,000,000	0	0
For Bills of Credit outstanding . .	1,650,000	0	0
	9,101,056	8	3

	£	s.	d.
Brought forward . .	9,101,056	8	3
Applied under the above heads . . . £8,228,811 18 2			
In course of payment 715,277 15 6			
	8,944,089	13	8
Less than the Grant	156,966	14	7
Subsidies under the Duke of Wellington's engagements, not specially voted, paid and in course of payment . . .	1,753,242	4	6

1816.

NEGOCIATIONS RESPECTING TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN CONTINENTAL STATES—AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, AND NAPLES.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, January 1, 1816.

My dear Lord—Since I had the honour to write my private letter on Thursday, the knowledge that an intrigue, supported by the Princes, for effecting the return of M. de Blacas through their own influence, induced the Duke of Wellington to mention the subject, in the course of the various communications to M. Pozzo di Borgo and the Duke de Richelieu which have taken place upon the subject of public affairs last week.

The former appeared very sensible of the reasons which weigh in favour of the return of M. Blacas: the knowledge, however, that such a measure is not agreeable to the Emperor of Russia induced him to suggest the propriety of delay during six weeks, or till he should receive instructions from that Sovereign. The objections of M. de Richelieu are more decisive, and he does not hesitate to say that his enemies will take advantage of the outcry which has been raised against M. Blacas, to overturn the Ministry which shall venture to recommend his return. My certain knowledge that the party of the Pavillon Marsan and that of M. de Talleyrand decidedly concur in the expediency of this measure induces me to believe that the opinion of M. de Richelieu, supported, as he may be, by Russia, will not counteract the wishes his Majesty is known to entertain upon this point.

Prince Talleyrand, indeed, told me yesterday that, unless

the return of M. Blacas shall give that strength and energy to the King's opinions which he considers the present circumstances render essentially necessary, he will not only declare, at the head of his friends, that he will on no consideration accept of office on any contingency; but that, with M. de Jaucourt and several others who are attached to his fortunes, he will quit the country and travel for some years.

I remain, my dear lord, most faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosure.]

La Valette.

Various reports from places he is said to be arrived at, Brussels among others, state amongst the anecdotes I heard, that the sentinel of the Conciergerie deposed that he was so much struck by the unusual manner of his, or rather her, going out, and the way in which the jailor accompanied, that he called to arms, and for a few minutes nobody came.

A Member having asked in the House for *des renseignements*, it was overruled, as being more proper to wait for communications from the Ministers. None being produced for twenty-four hours, he got up next day and produced a paper. "Here is information for you!" He then produced an order, signed by the Minister of Police, dated the 18th, to all the editors of newspapers, forbidding anything whatever to be inserted respecting La Valette. The person who told me this added—"He was evidently saved by the faction—it was known that he meant to make important discoveries."

As this person is a thorough Royalist, and firmly persuaded that the country and King are only to be saved by their system, and as I believe him to be conscientiously of that opinion, I take notes generally of what he says. I must give them as shortly and incoherently as I took them.

The day after Vaublanc was in a minority, I expressed my surprise. "You don't know our way of doing things here.

The Ministers will do nothing on their own responsibility. The King is nobody. These laws, or propositions, are framed by the Conseil d'État of each department. These Conseils d'État are all Fouché and Talleyrand, as much as if they were still Ministers. These, then, wish to overturn the dynasty, because they can be nothing under it. The plan of altering the mode of elections, making *curés* and others vote, who have no property, merely to get rid of some Royalists whom they fear, will not succeed; and if the House was dissolved, other and stronger Royalists would be chosen—for the people of France are determined to get rid of all the *révolutionnaires*. Pasquier, Barante, Louis, &c., are all *révolutionnaires*. Barbé Marbois is a Quaker. I believe the man is more a dupe than anything else, but his daughter, Madame de Plaisance, is *la plus fine Jacobine* that we know.

"The club in the Rue St. Honoré is gone or going down very fast. There are many seceders: they found they were deceived. There is a club of Modérés: what did such people ever do but mischief! What nonsense is a club of Modérés now!—no man can take a middle course. The parties are *en présence*. We must save ourselves, and by doing so we shall have the King and the dynasty, in spite of the King. The amnesty will not pass.

"The King's word is not violated. Fouché and Talleyrand made the list: they put in many who were innocent, and left out the great culprits. These *révolutionnaires* want to throw the odium of everything upon us, even for punishing those they named themselves. The King may take all his Ministers from that party, but he cannot reign with them. The great majority of the nation is for the severest justice of the law against these men and their adherents, who are eternal enemies of the dynasty—we are every hour more and more convinced of it. We must destroy them, or render them null: by any other process, a civil war is inevitable. If the Allies come back, they must rule by a Royalist party, and can rule by no

other. We cannot believe in the sincerity of the Allies, when we see them supporting these men. We know how your ambassador talks on these subjects—they do not know the formation of our Conseils d'État, or the wishes, or objects, or sentiments of them.

"The Anti-Bourbon party affect to wish the troops may remain: their reasons are known to us. The evasion of La Valette is their work, as his discoveries would be fatal to them; and you will see he will not be caught. We want tranquillity, the dynasty, and the *Charte un peu modifiée.*

"We know what would be the consequences of new disturbances—Prussia wanted four provinces, and none of the money: she got money, but was refused the other: she will get both, on any new disturbance. Wirtemberg wants an arrondissement at the expense of France. We dread these things, but we prefer anything to submitting to a single man being employed or suffered to exist in France who acted under the *Acte additionelle.*"

This is, beyond any doubt, the language and feeling of the King's family; it has never varied, and is not likely to vary.

An anecdote is mentioned of the King's saying to one of the deputies—"You think this majority against my Ministers a fine triumph—such men and such triumphs brought Louis Seize to the scaffold, but shall never bring me." I don't think it likely to have happened; but, out of the High Royalist party, the state of things is described to be—a constitutional King and Ministers contending for the liberties of the country against their representatives. Such a state of things cannot end *à l'aimable.*

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, January 1, 1816.

My dear Lord—The arrival of Krowse [Kraus] from Vienna, with despatches from Gordon, who desires to have him sent back, has confirmed me in the intention of despatching a mes-

senger to England, although we have but very little progress hence to report.

The arrangements with Bavaria will, I fear, be spun out still for a considerable length of time. Though it seems to be the opinion of all that this negociation will finally terminate in a satisfactory manner, yet the state of parties at the Court of Munich—the wish to give a measure not very popular in itself the appearance of having been operated by a sort of compulsion, and that a reluctant assent was at length obtained, as the least evil, after every effort had been unsuccessfully tried to render the measure more palatable to his Government, will naturally induce Montgelas considerably to protract the term of conclusion, in order to make such a case for himself as may uphold him against his opponents.

This seems to be the game at present playing; and, if so, it is impossible to foresee to what period we may be detained here. I have, indeed, but very feeble hopes that the matter can now be accomplished, as you were desirous it should, by the meeting of Parliament. But this is not all. Some days since, M. d'Anstett came to me, and expressed strong apprehensions that Bavaria would endeavour, as the price of her acquiescence, to obtain the present immediate cession of the Palatinate, instead of its contingent reversion — stating that Austria, anxiously desirous of the accomplishment of her objects, would, he feared, very little regard the interests of Baden, and consequently might, through General Wacquant, be led to entertain a prospect of this sort. Anstett's view evidently was to sound me upon this subject, and I did not hesitate to acquaint him that it was one upon which I had no instruction, and consequently one on which, if it should arise, I should not feel myself authorized to act without directions from my Court.

What seems to strengthen Anstett's suspicion is that, by the accounts subsequently received from Munich, it appears that that Court actually despatched a courier to St. Petersburg on the 24th December. Wessenberg, in announcing the fact

to me in a private note received yesterday, adds, "Mais je ne vois pas quel résultat elle pourrait attendre d'une pareille démarche, le Cabinet Russe ayant été d'accord avec nous sur l'arrangement en question." Hence we may conclude that Wessenberg, at least, is ignorant of any intention existing in his Court of extending the indemnities to be made to Bavaria beyond those agreed upon at Paris. You will, however, observe that he evidently connects the despatch of this courier with the pending negociations, and Humboldt does the same. If, therefore, we are to wait the return of this messenger from Petersburg, it is obvious that this preliminary branch of the subject cannot be concluded till long after the meeting of Parliament.

Another branch of the same subject, or in a great degree dependent thereon, is also likely to encounter difficulty—I mean the arrangements with Darmstadt. Humboldt has lately made an excursion to that Court, and acquaints me that considerable reluctance is expressed to acquiesce in the proposals presented by the Tableau approved of at Paris. I do not wonder at it. By the Tableau No. 3, annexed to the Protocol of the 3rd November, she is required to cede countries containing a population of 185,045 inhabitants, and in addition to this, Witgenstein and Berleburg, containing 13,664, making in the whole a cession of 198,709. Without, at present, controverting the accuracy of the statistics adopted, furnishing these results, which, however, Darmstadt will not only place much higher, but also state that the countries required to be ceded contain large and valuable domains—the same Tableau proposes to indemnify her by countries therein set forth, affording a population, as asserted, of 201,646. These I have gone over, with such statistic information as is in my possession here, and the most I can make of them places the population only at 179,703, so that a considerable loss arises to Darmstadt by the exchanges, even on the score of population. It is not, however, my business to embarrass, but, on the contrary, to

further the negociation; I shall, therefore, to those here keep my statistic information to myself, and only mention it now, to show that there may arise causes of delay which were not foreseen at Paris. Happily, Darmstadt is not one of the Powers who, in her stipulations to lend herself to the territorial arrangements, has reserved to herself the right of treating *de gré à gré*.

Upon the arrangements with the Netherlands I have somewhat more to state than will be found in my despatches. When acquainted by M. de Gagern, on the 19th, with his want of instructions to convey the nomination of the Commandant of Luxemburg to the King of Prussia, I immediately wrote to M. de Nagell, and send enclosed herewith a copy of my letter, which was forwarded on the 20th by M. de Gagern's messenger. My manner towards M. de Gagern having subsequently led him to conceive that I suspected him of fallacy in his statement of possessing no power to cede the nomination of the Commandant, he placed his full powers and instructions in my hands; of these I have caused copies to be made, which are enclosed herewith. On these you will observe that, in all the authenticated documents, the assurances given me at the Hague have in strictness been complied with, because, where no mention is made to the contrary, the right of nominating the military Governor of a place carries with it the right of nominating the Commandant, the latter being an executive officer of the former; while in an unsigned, undated paper, M. de Gagern is desired, in direct opposition to the assurances given me, to endeavour to reserve the right of naming this officer to his Batavian Majesty.

What this Court could have promised itself by such an attempt it is difficult to determine; but it has taught me this piece of wisdom—not again to trust to parole assurance, which, in the present case, I was induced to do, partly from the consideration of really possessing no official character while at the Hague, and partly from having the most thorough confidence

in the assurances then given. I have, however, no doubt that the return of M. de Gagern's messenger from the Hague will set all this matter to rights.

In addition to the documents enclosed upon this subject, I send you the copy of a despatch to M. de Gagern from M. de Nagell, referring to a letter written by me to the latter on the 13th December, pressing the arrival of the instructions, which had not at the time been received by M. de Gagern, and setting forth the different points which I conceived ought to form the treaty, and which tally with those comprised in the *projet* of Articles transmitted with my despatch No. 3, of this date.

M. de Reinhard is arrived here as Minister of the King of France to the Diet; he has also received from his Court and presented here letters of credit to the Town: so that he is already, though no Diet has yet assembled, or has any prospect of assembling for some time, an acknowledged Minister resident at Frankfort. Anstett's *créance* is only to the Diet, and not to the Town, consequently, he is hitherto only here as I am. I can, however, entertain no doubt that the Diet, when it shall assemble, will receive Ministers from other Powers than those connected with the Confederacy. Most of those with whom I have conversed are of this opinion. In fact, the German association is, with reference to other nations, a substantive Power, possessing the right of making war and peace, and entering into other treaties: it seems then to follow of course, that the relations of other countries with it will be admitted to be maintained in the same manner as those of other sovereign Powers with each other; while, if any difficulty should exist on their part, the same object may be accomplished by accrediting Agents, as France has done, to the Town where the Diet assembles, which will render it impossible for the Diet to interfere with their residence.

The note from M. de Marshall, enclosed in my despatch No. 2, of this date, has been sent in circulation to Humboldt, Wessenberg, and Anstett. To the first I have communicated

the substance of my answer to it, and his will be made in conformity with it. Wessenberg I have not seen since I learnt that a note had been addressed to him; and Anstett acquainted me that he had not yet read that forwarded to him.

A Mr. Horn, formerly in the employment of the Foreign Office, and now here, who seems jealous of any other person being employed but himself, has been the occasion of those inconveniences which the Commissary-General's agent has suffered, and which have now been put an end to, in consequence of your despatch No. 5, of the last year.

I am aware that we cannot expect compliance with my request for a correspondence twice a week by messenger, and must content ourselves with receiving our letters from England by an irregular and ill-administered post, except when you may have instructions to convey, or think it necessary to keep up our supply of messengers. Of those within our present power for the purposes of this mission, one is with Lamb, at Munich, one goes with the despatches of this date to London, and one remains with us. You are aware that my full powers have not yet been received.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, January 6, 1816.

My dear Lord—Lamb's despatch No. 3, and the private letter to your address herewith transmitted, came both under flying seal; but the cover of the former was so injured in the opening, that I have been obliged to renew it. I also send you herewith the copy of my private letter to him in answer to a short note, in which he seeks my opinion on the suggestion contained in his to you: I hope you will not disapprove of what I have written. It appeared to me advisable to impress him with the idea to the full extent in which it is felt by me, that all the wrong is not on the side of Austria.

Although it can be no question for us at Frankfort or those at Munich to agitate, I agree very much with Lamb in thinking that Austria is unwise in pushing the question with Bavaria, at least at present.

Whether it would not be a better mode of consulting her real interests for Austria altogether to forego those exchanges, and sit down quietly on her territories on the other side of the Rhine, is a question on which even her own Cabinet is far from being agreed. Metternich, as I learn, is favourable to this course, and, as Wessenberg informs me, who is also of this faith, all those uninfluenced by the military authorities unite in this opinion. However this may be, it seems to me, and I am far from being singular in this idea, (in which you will see that Lamb appears to participate) that, for the very purpose of obtaining the assent of Bavaria to these exchanges, the best course for Austria to pursue would be to appear to forego them. If, following up this line, she were to proclaim her intention of continuing in occupation of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and to obtain a military road through the Bavarian territories, an object in which, from its necessity, she would be supported by all Germany, I am very much mistaken if, after a very short period of time, Bavaria would not be induced herself to seek those very exchanges which she now so vehemently opposes. Whether Austria will follow this course it is impossible for me to determine. Wessenberg is aware of it, and, I doubt not, has communicated with his Court upon it.

I cannot think that Austria will endeavour directly to push her point by force, in the manner in which, from Lamb's despatch, it should seem that General Wacquant so injudiciously threatens. If determined to carry her object by the intervention of force, she has a far better ground for its employment in the occupation of the territory she seeks to acquire, than is to be found in the refusal of Bavaria to effectuate these exchanges, relative to which a free option is stipu-

lated in her treaties. By the treaty between Austria and Bavaria, signed at Paris on the 3rd of June, 1814, a joint occupation by both these powers of the territories between the French frontier and the Rhine, was agreed upon, "jusqu'aux arrangemens définitifs en Allemagne:" but the "arrangemens définitifs en Allemagne" are fixed, except in so far as Bavaria herself impedes their final settlement.

By the Act of Congress, these countries were made over to Austria in full sovereignty. Nevertheless, Bavaria still continues to occupy them. Now, it seems unjust that she should not only hold in her hands, but refuse to treat upon the claims demanded from her, and at the same time occupy those countries intended to indemnify her, and which are the absolute and acknowledged property of another. This was so thought by the Allies at Paris, and, by the Protocol of the 3rd of November, they engage to make a *démarche simultanée*, for the purpose of engaging Bavaria immediately to evacuate them. This *démarche* may be considered as having been already made by the communication of that Protocol to the Bavarian Minister. Bavaria has not, however, as I understand, shown any disposition to evacuate those countries, unless a declaration may be considered as such, made, I know not when, or in what form, by M. de Rechberg, that she would retire from them when certain liquidations should be made, which may, and probably, in the exhausted state of that country, will continue uneffected for an indefinite period of time.

Austria may, therefore, and with some show of reason, march into Salzburg, &c., founding herself upon the injustice of Bavaria, in holding over at once the territories sought from her, and those intended for her indemnification; and, being in possession, may work out the unwilling assent of Bavaria to effectuate the exchanges. I should most seriously hope that things will not take this turn. Any resort to force, besides the calamity in itself, could not fail to cast odium upon all that has been done, and so perseveringly done, for the pur-

pose of establishing complete repose in Europe. Better would it be, even for Austria herself, to renounce these exchanges altogether, or to have recourse to the line above suggested of appearing to do so, than, even with the plausible case above presented, to make use of violence for the realization of her object.

As far as I may be enabled, therefore, I shall conceive it to be my duty to use every exertion for the maintenance of quiet, and should I hear of an attempt of this sort being actually in contemplation, shall not fail to urge its relinquishment. I have dwelt upon it the more particularly, because Humboldt, of his own accord, started the subject, in conversation with me yesterday, and, as I gathered from him, he had also spoken to Wessenberg upon it. From the latter, probably, I shall be able to draw whether it is a proceeding likely to be pursued, and shall act accordingly.

I received a short note from M. de Nagell last night, in answer to mine of the 19th ult., the copy of which was sent you by the last messenger. Full instructions, which I have since seen, have been sent to M. de Gagern upon the subject of Luxemburg, according with the former assurances to me. It seems to have been the object of the Government of the Hague, in heretofore withholding the instruction relative to the Commandant, to endeavour to obtain by this means from Prussia the possession of the *enclaves* of Hyssen, Sevenaar, &c., made over to the Low Countries by the Act of Congress, and the settlement of the limits between the two States, fixed by the same treaty; both of which, notwithstanding Prince Hardenberg's promises both to you and to me—the official notes of the former asserting that the orders had actually been issued for this purpose—the promise of the King of Prussia to the King of the Netherlands at Brussels, that these matters should be executed without further loss of time, still remain uneffected.

I send you a correspondence, consisting of two pieces, which

Nagell has transmitted to me, and which has lately passed between him and M. de Sack, the Prussian Governor of the provinces *entre Rhin et Meuse*, upon that subject. From this it appears that M. de Sack is desirous of making an exchange, which his Government wishes to effect, for the purpose of extending themselves in front and to the north of Aix-la-Chapelle, a condition precedent to the settlement of the frontier, or, in other words, to force accession to a private object, as the price to be paid for the execution of a general treaty to which all Europe are parties. However legitimate the object, the mode of attaining it cannot be supported; and however reasonable the desire of Prussia may be, in this instance, I am sure they have chosen a line for its attainment the least likely to accomplish their design. I must beg of you to read these papers, and to take this matter up in such wise, that our efforts may not be wanting at length finally to terminate this irritating conduct of Prussia towards the Netherlands, and that the Treaty of Vienna may, as respects this last Power, at length find its execution.

I have spoken to Humboldt upon this subject, and told him that his Court would never obtain the desired extension about Aix, in any other manner than by acting loyally by their neighbour. He reprobates the conduct of M. de Sack in the line he has taken; professes his desire, in the first instance, to have the treaty executed, and to trust to the reasonableness of the request and the natural desire of the King of the Netherlands to lend himself to a measure of exchange, by which he would do an act so agreeable to his Prussian Majesty. He has promised to write to his Court upon this subject. He told me also that this negociation for the exchange for the enlargement of the *rayon* at Aix was to have been entrusted to him here, but that Prince Hardenberg altered his mind, and placed the negociation in the hands of M. de Sack. Whatever faith may be placed in Humboldt's professions, (and it may be permitted to doubt of Prussian promises)

it seems clear that Sack, in this proceeding, has done no more than follow Hardenberg's instructions.

Gagern's instructions being now arrived, and being also as explicit as I could have wished, we are now only delayed by the want of Humboldt's. Be assured I shall do my best to push this matter to a final conclusion, as early as circumstances over which I have no control will admit.

Yours, my dear Lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, December 31, 1815.

My dear Lord—I am sorry to send you so unpromising an account of this negociation. I have always thought that Austria attached an importance to these provinces far beyond their real value; as Bavaria, on her side, shows an equally unreasonable determination to refuse an indemnity which I am inclined to believe is, in fact, an equivalent for the cessions demanded.

If, however, it becomes clear, as I expect it will, that Austria cannot carry her point except by the display of force, I cannot help thinking that she would better consult her own interest by adopting some other mode of arrangement rather than commit an act of hostility against a friendly Power in the face of such positive treaties. The courses she might adopt are either to retain possession herself of the countries on the other side of the Rhine, with a military road through Bavaria, the proposition of which might be expected to produce its effect in disposing Bavaria to another arrangement; or else to buy the consent of Bavaria by some further sacrifices. Perhaps for this it would be found necessary to leave her the Inn-viertel, the real value of which to Austria is scarcely worth thinking of. If this were done, she would at least get out of the affair with honour, which, unless by obtaining the consent of Bavaria, it is impossible for her to do.

I think myself bound to submit my opinion to your lordship; but you may be assured of my using every means to induce the Bavarian Government to accede to the terms which Austria has proposed, though almost without hopes of success.

I have the honour to be, &c., F. LAMB.

Lord Clancarty to the Hon. Frederick Lamb.

Frankfort sur Maine, January 4, 1816.

My dear Lamb—From all the accounts received from Munich, and principally from yours of the 28th and 31st, received nearly at the same time, it appears to me that General Wacquant has not adhered much more to system, or exerted much more address, than his Chief has heretofore employed in his negociations with Bavaria. The base and very foundation of the preliminary negociation entrusted to his direction is to be found in M. de Rechberg's circular note of the 11th of November, and in the proceedings thereupon of the Allied Ministers of the 17th of that month.

In consequence of M. de Rechberg having, in this note, taken upon himself to forego the principle of contiguity, M. de Metternich declared his intention of opening a preliminary negociation at Munich, and the other Allies consented to instruct their Ministers at that Court to support its object; hence the origin of General Wacquant's mission, the very existence of which depended upon the previous renunciation of the principle of contiguity. It was certainly open to the Court of Bavaria to disavow the act of their Minister at Paris; but then this ought to have been done immediately, and, even so done, it would have been, according to my view, the duty of the General to have thrown odium upon the Bavarian Government, who, by reasserting the principle of contiguity, which rendered all further negociation impossible, had thus demonstrated a desire to counteract the wishes of the other Powers of Europe, and to avail herself of an undue advantage, arising from the former exchanges prematurely

made by Austria, principally out of regard to the interests of the Court of Munich.

Before the receipt of your despatches, we, at Frankfort, did not conceive that a doubt could have existed of the confirmation by his Government of M. de Rechberg's note, upon which all possibility of negociation solely depends. Surely M. de Wacquant has not acted with much dexterity in presenting his Tableaux, and discussing details, till assured that the principle of the negociation was acknowledged. But when, after entering into the discussion of these details, from the period of General Wacquant's arrival, on the 13th, to the date of their interview on the 31st of December, after not only receiving the Tableaux of the Austrian negociation, but presenting counter-Tableaux of his own, M. de Montgelas had in effect tacitly admitted the principle, he at the interview positively reasserts the claim of contiguity in opposition to the note of his Minister at Paris, and to his own subsequent conduct; it became abundantly necessary, in my mind, that General Wacquant should make use of the means he fully possessed of placing the Bavarian Government in the wrong, by declaring the conduct it had observed, its marked indisposition, nay, absolute refusal, to entertain a negociation, which the great Powers of Europe had so much at heart; and that, therefore, considering all further negociation at an end, he should return forthwith to his Court. This appears to me to have been the conduct best adapted to bring the Court of Munich to an alteration of the course it had pursued, and to have induced them to have renewed the discussions on the only principle upon which they are at all practicable, viz., that of foregoing the claim to complete arrondissement.

As it is, General Wacquant has chosen to remain quietly, and to wait the instructions of his Court. Under these circumstances, it does not seem to me that we mediators have aught to do except to wait also.

With respect to your suggestions respecting the Inn-viertel,

on which you ask my opinion, it seems to me that, if Austria could be brought to renounce her demand for this part of her claims, and that this would induce Bavaria, in opposition to her present assertion of maintaining the principles of contiguity, to join heartily on the other points, it must be the same thing to us, whose principal object appears to be that the arrangement between the two Powers should be peaceably and quietly settled, and as much to the satisfaction of both as circumstances will admit. But then, even the avidity of Bavaria can scarcely expect that, for diminished cession on her part, she would acquire *all* the indemnities now offered, adequate as they are to compensate the whole of the demands made upon her; and, when coupled with the former exchanges of Wurtzburg and Aschaffenburg against a portion of the Tyrol, exorbitant.

However, on this the previous question arises, whether Austria will at all be inclined to forego her demand of the Inn-viertel. On this I have spoken privately to Wessenberg, who does not afford much encouragement: possibly, he dare not, from want of information. Some of our accounts from Munich state that Rechberg complains much of being disavowed by his Court.

Lest you should not have them with you, I send you my instructions upon the negociation with Bavaria prior to the time at which a preliminary discussion at Munich was resolved upon. They may be useful to you, and certainly furnish all the strong arguments which we, as mediators, are called upon to urge. The *soi-disant* address from the inhabitants of the Inn-viertel and Salzburg I have caused to be translated, and shall send to England with your despatches. It is manifestly written by some *attaché* to the Court, and is as much an address from the inhabitants of those countries as it is from me; nay, we know that at Salzburg a very different spirit exists; that some movements have manifested themselves there of impatience to leave the Bavarian for the Austrian

Government; and that the magistracy have interfered to prevent reunions and discussion of all subjects connected with the projected exchanges.

Gordon has sent Kraus the messenger to me from Vienna. I shall detain him here till we shall receive packets for Vienna from England, and shall then despatch him with such things as we may then have for him *viâ* Munich; so that, in a few days, I shall again have an opportunity of addressing you.

I remain, &c., CLANCARTY.

The Chevalier de Sack to the Baron de Nagell.

Aix-la-Chapelle, le 19 Decembre, 1815.

M. le Baron—La lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, en date du 11 de ce mois, m'a été remise hier par M. le Colonel de Man, et je ne perds pas un instant pour y répondre que rien ne sera plus utile aux sujets des deux royaumes, et par conséquent plus conforme aux intentions du Roi mon maître, que de voir cesser toute incertitude sur quelques points des frontières réciproques, source inévitable des inconvéniens et de mésentendus. Il est vrai que j'aurais préféré ne traiter qu'avec un Commissaire sur toute la ligne des frontières sans exception; il est pareillement vrai que la saison actuelle est peu favorable aux opérations de la délimitation sur les lieux; enfin j'aurais désiré attendre l'arrivée de M. le Conseiller intime Eytelwein, chargé de m'éclairer au sujet des constructions hydrauliques, afin de commencer toute l'opération à la fois; mais mon désir de terminer n'est surpassé que par celui de prouver à votre Excellence combien je suis porté à faire tout ce qui peut lui être agréable, et conduire au seul but désirable, la convenance et l'utilité réciproque.

Je vais par conséquent déléguer M. de Bernieth, président désigné de la Régence Provinciale d'Aix-la-Chapelle, pour commencer de suite les négociations. Ce fonctionnaire doué de qualités aussi éclairées que conciliatoires, sera assisté par

M. Bernard, Directeur des Contributions indirectes, et Neugebauer, Directeur de Cercle, en se servant d'un géometre là où il sera nécessaire.

Je suis charmé de ce que M.M. les Commissaires de sa Majesté le Roi des Pays Bas acceptent la ville d'Aix-la-Chapelle pour centre des négociations, puisque les affaires d'administration de quatre Gouvernemens généraux m'y attachent essentiellement.

Quant aux opérations sur le Rhin, et sur la rive droite de ce fleuve, elles pourront se faire en même tems, dès que M. le Conseiller intime d'Eytelwein, que j'attends d'un instant à l'autre, sera arrivé. Je déléguerai alors un second fonctionnaire, pour éviter toute perte de tems.

Que votre Excellence me permette encore une seule observation. Elle contient tout mon système de négociation. L'utilité réciproque ne pourra être obtenue que par une condescendance mutuelle. Si ce principe ne se perd jamais de vue, nous aurons bientôt terminé à la satisfaction générale. La frontière provisoire du côté d'Aix-la-Chapelle est dénaturelle et inadmissible pour la Prusse: ce sera donc dès le commencement de la négociation que M.M. les Commissaires des Pays Bas devront faire l'avance de procédés conciliatoires. Mais plus tard et sur le Rhin, la Prusse sera dans le cas de compenser amplement, et par des objets d'un intérêt bien supérieur pour la Hollande, tout ce que celle-ci aura cédé aux dits environs. Si les lumières de votre Excellence ne lui laisseront pas échapper l'évidence de cette vérité, la loyauté de mon Gouvernement lui en garantira en même tems l'exécution.

J'ai l'honneur, &c., SACK.

The Baron de Nagell to the Chevalier de Sack.

La Haye, 26 Decembre, 1815.

Monsieur le Chevalier—Si j'ai lu avec un véritable plaisir les assurances contenues dans la lettre de Votre Excellence, du 19 du courant, reçue ce matin, de son désir de concourir aux

vues du Roi mon maître, en terminant la délimitation des États respectifs, et du choix qu'elle avait fait à cette fin de M. de Bernieth, je n'ai pu voir, d'un autre côté, qu'avec la plus sensible douleur, que Votre Excellence par l'observation qui termine cette même lettre détruit les espérances qu'elle a fait naître, en établissant en fait que la frontière décrite par le traité de Vienne du côté d'Aix la Chapelle *est dénaturelle et inadmissible pour la Prusse*, et conclut de-là que c'est aux Commissaires des Pays Bas à faire l'avance de *procédés conciliatoires*.

Votre Excellence voudra bien me permettre de mon côté d'observer:—

Que le traité de Vienne du 31 Mai, 1815 a été négocié et signé par le premier Ministre de Prusse, et ratifié par sa Majesté Prussienne;

Qu'un instrument politique aussi solennel, aussi récent, ne saurait être déclaré inadmissible pour la Prusse, sans ébranler jusqu'aux fondemens le droit public des nations;

Que ce même traité a été signé par les Cours de Vienne, de Petersbourg, et de Londres;

Que ces Cours étant parties contractantes, sont par-là même garanti de son exécution;

Que ce n'est pas la valeur des stipulations de ce traité qui est soumise au travail des Commissaires délimitateurs, mais, au contraire, l'exécution de ce traité qu'ils doivent remplir;

Que si du côté de sa Majesté Prussienne on trouve que des arrangemens de limites pourraient être avantageux aux parties interessées, c'est à elle à manifester ses désirs et ses vues.

Ceux du Roi mon maître tendent uniquement à observer ce qui a été solennellement signé à Vienne, et c'est pure condescendance, bonne amitié, et relation de famille, qui peuvent engager sa Majesté à recevoir les ouvertures qui pourront lui être faites.

Je croirois manquer d'égards pour le Gouvernement de sa

Majesté Prussienne, si je n'étois pas persuadé que la loyauté lui fera reconnaître la justice d'exécuter ce à quoi il s'est engagé, il y a naguères sept mois, et je ne saurais m'empêcher de nourrir l'espérance que la présente discussion se terminera de gré à gré, sans aucune intervention des autres parties contractantes.

Votre Excellence me permettra encore une réflexion. La remise des enclaves de Huissen, Malleure, Le Lismers avec la ville de Sevenaer et la seigneurie de Wehl, n'ont absolument rien de commun avec l'ouvrage de la délimitation: et la fixation des limites dans les districts de Ryfwaerd, Lobith, et de tout le territoire jusqu'à Kekerdom, et celui qui concerne les ouvrages hydrotechniques lui est également étranger. Voici, cependant, près de sept mois encore qu'elle a été procrastinée; et je manquerais essentiellement à mon devoir, si je ne réclamais de l'équité de Votre Excellence l'exécution des promesses solennelles que son Altesse le Prince de Hardenberg m'a fait parvenir, que ces enclaves seraient remises au Roi mon maître immédiatement.

J'ai l'honneur, &c., R. W. C. de NAGELL.

Pour copie conforme,

Le Secrétaire du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,

A. le CLERQ.

Mr. B. Frere[1] *to Lord Castlereagh.*

Constantinople, January 10, 1816.

My Lord—I am inclined to attribute much of the ill-humour manifested by the Ottoman Ministers at the Treaty of the 5th of November to their apprehensions respecting the designs of the Allied Courts, in regard to the four continental districts mentioned in my public despatch of this date.

[1] Mr. Frere, formerly Ambassador to the Spanish Government, both before and after the emancipation of Spain from the French yoke, was at this time his Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

For it is not possible to suppose that they could have expected that the Islands themselves should be replaced under their protection, or that they would have preferred seeing them under that of Austria or Russia rather than of Great Britain.

As the present convention refers for the description of the Seven Islands and their dependencies to the Treaty of 1800, and the four districts above mentioned were by that treaty ceded to the Porte, I understand them not to be comprised in the United States now established. One of them, however, (Parga) was conquered from the enemy, and is still occupied by British arms, and the Turkish Government will be naturally very anxious for its restoration, which, I believe, if I were authorized to hold it out, would do away much of the difficulty which I seem likely to meet with in obtaining their accession.

Your lordship's silence, however, upon this point, will make me cautious not to give any opinion upon the subject; but, if asked for an explanation, I shall confine myself to a reference to the treaty, as containing all that I am authorized to say upon it; and endeavour rather (as far as it can be done without compromising his Majesty's Government) to let them feel the claim which might be brought forward; in case it should be intended to make use of this point for some future negociation.

In the treaty with Russia, by which these districts were annexed to the Ottoman territory, stipulations were made to protect the inhabitants and their property from the oppression and rapacity of their new masters; and I believe many of the islanders have possessions there, and are therefore interested in the renewal of these stipulations, if it be designed to confirm the former cession. Whilst, therefore, on the one hand, these places seem not to be comprehended in the late convention, it appears, on the other, improbable that they should be meant to revert to their former owners, without something more

specific than the mere silence of the treaty with respect to their destination.

These are the considerations which have determined the conduct which I mean to pursue. It will be a great satisfaction to me to find that they are not erroneous; and I trust that your lordship will excuse the liberty I take in mentioning the difficulty which has thus presented itself to my mind, and which, perhaps, I have magnified by endeavouring (through my anxiety to promote them) to see further into the intentions of his Majesty's Government than it was necessary for the present that I should do.

I have the honour to be, &c., B. FRERE.

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, January 13, 1816.

My dear Lord—I have the honour to enclose to your lordship a copy of a private letter to Lord Stewart, in writing which, I hope your lordship will be persuaded that I was animated only by the most sincere desire to neglect no means of bringing this very unpleasant negociation to an amicable conclusion. The detail contained in it relative to the Count Capo d'Istria was received in confidence from Count Pahlen, with whom he passed some hours on his passage through this town for St. Petersburgh. The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires here assures me that he and M. de Wacquant have urged the policy of concession to their Court, but he does not give me much reason to expect that their representations will produce any effect.

I also enclose a copy of a letter to Lord Clancarty, with which I should not have thought of troubling your lordship, if he had not informed me that he had sent home his letter to me of the 4th January, to which mine is an answer. I have less apology to make to your lordship for troubling you with it, as it contains some points which I should otherwise have been forced to lay before your lordship in another form.

If your lordship should not be satisfied with the note to Count Montgelas, let me request you to recollect the difficulties which always attend the combining a joint representation. The instructions of the Prussian Ministry are considerably stronger than mine or those of Count Pahlen. He is not confined to amicable representations; and it was only by obtaining the omission of several sentences which he wished to insert, that we could succeed in avoiding all language which might bear a hostile interpretation. This was my principal object, as it will always be in your lordship's power to strengthen the interference, if you should deem it expedient, and as I am convinced that a change in the policy of this Government can only be arrived at by the determination of the three Courts to support the line they have adopted, and not by the strength of the language employed by their Ministers.

The Russian and Prussian Ministers have agreed with me to demand a conference of M. de Montgelas, in order to take advantage of the concluding sentence of his Note, by desiring him to state what are the expedients which Bavaria will admit of, in order to reconcile the existing differences. As Austria has already made repeated propositions, it appears equally regular and reasonable that Bavaria, if she is really animated with a desire to conciliate, should, in her turn, propose a basis of negociation. I have no expectation that it will either be such a one as Austria will accept, or as, under our instructions, we can propose to her: but we may thereby succeed in throwing the difficulty upon Bavaria; and, if her propositions are unreasonable, the case of Austria will be strengthened, and a better ground of argument prepared than, I think, we at present possess.

I believe that the real object of Bavaria, if she cannot obtain a diminution of the cessions claimed by Austria, is the acquirement of the northern part of the grand-duchy of Baden, by which Würzburg and Aschaffenburg would be connected with the transrhenane provinces. The territory thus obtained

would include Manheim, which would become the residence of the Crown Prince, instead of Salzburg. Should the negociation take this turn, it is impossible to foresee an end to it; nor do I believe that the Grand-Duke would ever consent to the cession required.

A pretended address from the inhabitants of Salzburg was forwarded to your lordship through Lord Clancarty; two other publications of the same nature have since appeared; one of them was even more obnoxious, but, upon the representations of the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, they were immediately suppressed, so that I am not enabled to forward copies of them to your lordship. Their publication is calculated to throw much discredit on the Bavarian cause, and I believe it to be very contrary to the wishes of M. de Montgelas.

I have the honour to be, &c., F. LAMB.

[Enclosures.]

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Stewart.

Munich, January 7, 1816.

My dear Stewart—I enclose copies of the Notes demanding the intervention of the three Powers, and of that addressed by them to Count Montgelas. Thus the intervention of Russia is obtained, but there is great reason to doubt how far it will be supported. I know, from undoubted authority, that Capo d'Istrias is extremely unfavourable to the whole proceeding, and that, before leaving Paris, he wrote to the Emperor of Russia a strong remonstrance upon the subject. He has since, upon his own authority, directed Count Pahlen to use only the mildest language, and to put himself forward as little as possible until he shall receive the further orders of the Emperor; and, as the Protocol was signed at Paris after the deposition of the Emperor, and the Bavarians have since sent representations upon the subject, it seems not impossible that some change in the views of Russia may take place. This alone

would not have induced me to write to you, but I understand from Lord Clancarty that the Ministers are anxious that this question should be finally arranged before the meeting of Parliament.

Of this I see no possibility, unless Austria should be inclined to make some further cessions to Bavaria; unless she should adopt this line, I do not think that she will ever obtain the provinces in question without a demonstration of force; and even then it is highly probable that Bavaria will allow them to be occupied without signing any arrangement or relinquishing her claims upon them. This result appears to me to be calculated to produce so bad an effect in Europe, and particularly in England, that I lose no time in acquainting you with the state of the negociation, in order that you may judge how far you are authorized, or think it expedient, to attempt to dispose Austria to some further concessions.

What Bavaria wishes to obtain is the Innviertel, relinquishing the other provinces; but I should suppose that a smaller concession might be sufficient to induce a renewal of the negociation with every prospect of success. The principle of contiguity has only been asserted at last by Bavaria, when she saw that the offers of Austria were not sufficiently advantageous to induce her to relinquish it.

F. LAMB.

The Hon. F. Lamb to the Earl of Clancarty.

Munich, January 13, 1816.

My dear Clancarty—I must answer your letter of the 4th at some length, and begin by agreeing with you that the Austrian negociation has been extremely ill conducted. It is only lucky that Wacquant has not taken some violent step, which he was once on the eve of doing. He is a hot-headed little General, who would delight in a war, but, though sixty years old, is much too wild and too lively to be employed as a conciliator.

I conclude you are right about the origin of his mission, and the fixing upon Munich as the place for the negociation; but, having never seen the Protocol of the 17th, I knew nothing of it before your letter arrived. If, however, this negociation depended upon the supposed renunciation of the principle of contiguity contained in M. de Rechberg's note of the 11th, I am totally at a loss to imagine how such an interpretation could ever have been put upon that note. Read it attentively, and I think you will find it the most carefully guarded exposition that ever was put together.

After asserting the perfect right of the King to yield nothing, except *en raison des convenances qu'on lui offre*, and his expectation that, in return for his even entering upon the discussion, the cessions which are demanded from him will be diminished, he proceeds to qualify the order of things proposed as entirely new to him, and declares that he has no instructions whatever upon the subject. This alone is surely sufficient to prevent the note in question from being looked upon in any other light than that of a first step towards establishing a basis of negociation. It declares that, from M. de Rechberg's knowledge of the King's conciliatory disposition, he takes upon himself to say that he will *perhaps* consent to treat and to pass the Rhine, not on condition of receiving an equivalent for the territority which he cedes, but provided he shall obtain such advantages in population and finance as may in some measure repay him for the losses attached to the relinquishment of an *arrondissement qui lui a été tant de fois garanti*. What is this "arrondissement which has been so often guaranteed to him?" It is either the one which he actually possesses, extending from Aschaffenburg to the Lake of Constance, or such other as shall form, according to the Treaty of Ried, *une contiguité parfaite avec le royaume de Bavière et à sa bienséance*. I believe the words *non interrompue* are there also; but, as no one of the treaties has been sent to me, I cannot be perfectly certain. By renouncing this, he by no means

renounces the principle of contiguity—a renunciation which is, under no supposition whatever, to be found in Rechberg's note. The most that can be collected from thence is that the King will consent to break into his arrondissement, if you will make it worth his while; but he by no means allows that he is to be tempted even by considerable advantages, unless the territory which is to be taken in exchange shall be contiguous.

I am sure Metternich could never have mistaken the language of this note; but it suited his purpose to appear to do so; and, being such a petty affair, everybody else trusted him, upon his word. This difference, however, between the words *contiguité* and *arrondissement* appears to me essential to a clear understanding of the case; and, if we debate the matter, will probably be put forward; therefore, pray attend to it carefully. Rechberg has never been disavowed, nor considered himself so. Montgelas said, in an interview with M. de Wacquant, that, if M. de Rechberg had renounced the principle of contiguity, he had exceeded his powers. They understand one another well, and play their game well: nobody here is a match for them. Rechberg, so far from being dissatisfied, is, in his calm way, more violent against the exchanges than anybody here. He appears to work most cordially with Montgelas, and to have almost equal influence with him in the affair.

As to the idea that the mutual exchange of Tableaux constitutes an admission of the principle, this appears to me a field for a sort of argument which never leads to anything; but I perfectly agree with you as to the want of dexterity which it has shown in Wacquant, and the advantage it has given to Bavaria. In whatever manner the negociation had been conducted, the reply of Bavaria would probably have been the same; nor do I see that any line which Wacquant could have adopted would have thrown much odium upon her. It is impossible to make the reproach of avidity to a Power who says merely—"Leave me what I have, and what you have re-

peatedly guaranteed to me, if you cannot give what you promised in exchange for it."

As to the odium of resisting the wishes of all Europe, the answer of M. de Montgelas will be that of everybody else—"Ce raisonnement est excellent pour les quatre Puissances, mais nullement applicable à la Bavière, ni fait pour être adopté par elle, dont tous les intérêts sont froissés par ce que les Puissances en demandent." She may yield to their power, but her attention to their wishes must depend upon the justice and the reason of them; and does it sound unreasonable that, if she renounces the advantages of a perfect arrondissement—if, besides this, she waives the right of contiguity—she should demand, not a bare equivalent, but some further advantages, to counterbalance those which she resigns? Or even suppose that she mistakes her real interest, the loss she thereby sustains is her own work and at the same time her punishment: but, to obtain possession of that which she has the right and the desire to preserve, there are but two ways—purchase, or force: persuasion goes for nothing *en pareil cas*, and you must not expect it to have the slightest weight here.

If Wacquant had chosen to go away, according to your view, you may depend upon it that this Court would have let him do so; nor can I think that this would have advanced the chances of an accommodation; neither can I agree with you in the principle that, he having chosen to wait and to ask for instructions, the mediators have nothing else to do but to wait also. I have always thought that he would have done better to ask for our interference much earlier, in order to establish the principle of the negociation; but, having neglected this, I am sure he could not, according to his instructions, have left Munich without claiming it, when his own endeavours had proved fruitless: and, as our intervention is in no document made to depend upon the previous renunciation of the principle of contiguity; as the Protocol of the 3rd, and your instructions of the 5th, which are in fact also mine, are

both anterior to M. de Rechberg's note of the 11th; I do not see how it was possible for the Ministers of the three Powers to have refused it when demanded; and I cannot help hoping that it may lead to the establishment of a clear basis of negociation, though I still foresee infinite difficulty in the details.

I shall be cautious how I put forward the former exchanges as having afforded advantages to Bavaria, which ought now to be taken into the scale. Wacquant allows that he was completely beat upon this point by the production of the Articles signed in June last at Vienna. I have never seen the original stipulations upon the subject between Austria and Bavaria. Can you send them to me?—for, till then, I must own that the sanction given by the Articles of the Congress appears to me to stamp the transaction as complete between the two Powers, as confirmed by the rest of Europe, and not liable to re-examination. The bargain may have been a most improvident one for Austria; but is this a reason for giving to all the acts of Congress such a character of uncertainty as this would throw upon them? No human foresight can anticipate at what period it may suit the interests of other Powers to re-examine other acts, and the principle, once established, can no more be recalled.

As to the comparative value of the exchanges proposed, I have not so decided an opinion as you: they are both thieves, though Bavaria is the greatest thief of the two. Montgelas assures me that he is willing to submit his proofs to examination, and says that a better administration has increased the revenues of the provinces demanded by Austria since the Bavarian Government has possessed them. Wacquant answers that, if they administer so well, they may go and do the same in the countries which are offered to them. These, however, are the difficulties which it is not yet worth while to think of.

I suspect that you are not much amused at Frankfort, and

eager to quit it. Our feelings are similar; but this negociation will last some time yet, depend upon it.

Adieu, &c. F. LAMB.

Mr. G. H. Rose to Lord Castlereagh.

Berlin, January 20, 1816.

My dear Lord—Both your private letter to me of the 28th ult. and its copy reached me by Mr. L. Casamajor: you would probably wish to have the latter, and I return it. Your instructions in it, and your despatch No. 1, shall be acted upon, not only scrupulously but most cheerfully, and this I earnestly request you to believe. I fear you will think I make a sacrifice of views and opinions in so doing; but there does not exist the demerit of views repugnant to yours, which it would be in any degree a merit to sacrifice by an obedience I am bound implicitly to yield.

At the time when I informed you of the opinions generally entertained at Munich and here, in the autumn and the beginning of winter, as to the views of Russia upon Turkey, I did it reluctantly, aware of the danger I ran in transmitting it to you, who had very superior means indeed of judging the character of the policy of the Emperor, whilst the tone and character of the negociations at Paris, and their progress, could be scarcely known to me; but, without forming any determinate opinion of my own, I thought I had best fulfilled my duty in apprizing you of what I heard on every side, and unsolicited by me. The mistrust the Emperor Alexander inspired arose much, I believe, from temporary and local circumstances, and much from reasonings as to what his conduct would be by analogy from the past. The unanimity of the opinions determined me to transmit them; they were offered on every side, and I never had to seek them. I lived in friendship and confidence with the Russian Envoy at Munich —here, particular circumstances will render it more difficult to

me to do so: I am an old friend of the elder Alopeus, formerly Russian Envoy here, and once in England. He, too, is an old friend, and a very valued one, of Prince Hardenberg: he resides here, and it would be a great and natural object to him to be again Russian Envoy, which, too, would be very grateful to Prince Hardenberg; but his younger brother is the actual Envoy here, and he is certainly neither well with Prince Hardenberg nor with his brother. His brother's friendship with the Prince, and his being employed by the Emperor in some minor negociations, displease him, and inspire him with no brotherly feelings.

Him I am doing all I fairly can to conciliate, but he is not of a disposition which renders it easy, and his brother's regard for me is to my disadvantage with him; but I have the thing at heart so much as to have gone out of my way twice in the last three days to mark attention to him. He is harsh, rough, and mistrustful, and his mind is soured by disappointment at not being removed from this Court, and annoyed by the ill state of health of his wife, who is most anxious to go to a climate that is, she thinks, more favourable to it. Such being the case, I have not thought it prudent to make to him advances so marked, in communicating with him on public affairs, as might lead him, minded as he is, to mistrust; but I am endeavouring to give to his mind a generally friendly impression. I fairly state thus what I have not attained, what you would naturally wish me to attain, but which I have reason to think can be attained by no man—his confidence: but I trust he has not imbibed, nor will imbibe, any unfavourable impression as to my views or feelings towards himself.

I am living on the most satisfactory footing with my other colleagues, and I hope to be able to improve it. I have always had a strong opinion of the mischief done by foreign Ministers meddling and intriguing; I have always, too, applied it peculiarly to British foreign Ministers, and it appears to me more true than ever in our present situation towards the rest of the

world. If I have acted otherwise, I am not conscious of it, and it is certainly against my own opinion. I have strong reason to believe I created the view of myself in which I wished to be seen at Munich; and I felt it to be so desirable to do the same here, and that it was still more important I should, that I cannot but be persuaded, should a report be made on my conduct here by an eye-witness, he would say I was too busily employed in skating and bodily exercises to attend duly to my public duty.

I have said nothing in my late despatches respecting Russia, because I ought only so to do while the Emperor was *in transitu* and absent from Petersburgh, and much more in the sight of Germany than of his Majesty's Ambassador or Minister at Petersburgh: but the instant he returned thither, I felt it my duty to cease to refer to him. To finish the subject, I add that the alarms which had existed are nearly dissipated. The elder Alopeus, who is perfectly well disposed, and who, I am confident, spoke under a perfect conviction, told me, a few days since, that he saw nothing which could disturb the peace of Europe for the next four or five years.

I have unavoidably had but little intercourse with Prince Hardenberg; but my despatches will have furnished proofs of my opinions respecting the full justice he does to the part Great Britain took in the late negociations, as wise in policy, and as friendly towards Prussia; and he has taken marked pains to set right upon these points the public mind here, which had been poisoned in some degree by the revolutionists. All I have heard of his opinions respecting Great Britain, as standing in relation to Prussia, or on the general policy to be observed, is wholly satisfactory. You have the advantage of knowing him infinitely better than I do, but all I learn of his character coincides with the favourable view of it contained in your letter.

I send my despatches of this date by a person I have reason to think fully deserving of confidence, but I wait for a more

complete certainty to write on one or two points, on which, moreover, there is no urgency whatever.

From the occupation from which you were called off to write to me, I trust your health is perfectly restored.

I am, my dear lord, &c., G. H. Rose.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, January 21, 1816.

My dear Lord—You will see from the enclosed copy of Lamb's letter to me of the 10th, and of my answer to it, also sent herewith, that we are at direct issue upon what was, in my opinion, the principal point of the negociation, or rather its very essence. If you should agree in the view which I have taken upon this subject, and think it necessary (as I should hope you will not) to say anything to Lamb upon it, I pray you deal most lightly with him. I have, as you will see, if you shall take the trouble of reading my letter, been induced to enter strongly with him into the subject, and this I have thought it requisite to do from feeling that he may have gone perhaps somewhat too far in following a propensity to which we are all liable, and of which I have myself been often, and possibly with some appearance at least of justice, accused—that of entering too much into the objects and interests of the Courts to which we are accredited.

In fact, Humboldt acquainted me that their Minister at Munich had, by the same messenger which brought me Lamb's, complained to him that he derived no support, in his assistance to the Austrian, from either the British or the Russian Minister. Having said this, because both duty and inclination lead me to keep nothing from you, let me again request that nothing strong or harsh may be said to or felt towards Lamb, in consequence of the impressions by which he may have been influenced.

I have very little hope of the renewal of the negociation

with any probable hope of success at the present moment; and looking at the extreme and extensive inconvenience its being hung up occasions, the state of suspense in which it holds this part of Germany in particular, nay, the whole of it, by preventing the proceedings of the Diet, its immediate operation in postponing the arrangements with Darmstadt, &c., I am sure the breaking it off altogether would be the most happy event at present to be expected. Nay, paradoxical as it might otherwise appear, had I not explained my meaning in a former letter, I am convinced that this course would be the most likely ultimately to accomplish those very views of Austria which the actual negociation with Bavaria intended to accomplish. Whether this will or will not be the result of the references to Milan, it is not in my power to say, neither General Wacquant's, from the last advices, nor Wessenberg's couriers having yet returned from that place.

Having yesterday asked the latter why he, who was not only so well versed in all the statistical knowledge respecting the countries proposed to be exchanged, but who also had gone through all the details of the negociation on the subject at Vienna, and who was also the actual accredited Minister of Austria at the Court of Munich, had not been the person selected to recommence these discussions, instead of General Wacquant, he told me confidentially that the whole of this negociation, as at present pursued, grew out of a party at the Austrian Court in opposition to Prince Metternich, (we had some experience of this party at Vienna) at the head of which was Prince Schwarzenberg—that their reasoning went on military grounds, and that they had succeeded in persuading the Emperor of the necessity of acquiring those territories which he now sought to obtain from Bavaria—that Metternich, contrary to what he avowed to be his (Wessenberg's) opinion, and contrary to that which *he gave me to understand* was Metternich's, had felt himself obliged to give way, and, in order at once to conciliate his opponents, and to exempt

himself from the charge of supineness in the event of failure, and to throw its responsibility from his own on their shoulders, he had thought it advisable to employ a military man as the negociator.

I have heard nothing further since my last of the project of occupying Salzburg, as therein stated; but this may possibly arise from the want of instructions from Milan, in consequence of the non-arrival of the courier despatched thither.

We have experienced some little delay in the prosecution of our Netherlands' Treaty, from the sudden death of the Prince of Nassau-Weilburg, who, on the 9th instant, in the evening, was found by his son, the present reigning Prince, at the bottom of a flight of stairs near his own apartment, with his skull horribly fractured, supposed to have fallen down the whole flight in consequence of a fit, probably apoplexy. This tragical event necessitated Gagern's absence for two days at Weilburg.

It is Gagern's intention, as Humboldt sends his treaty to Berlin prior to signature, to do the same by his Court, and I cannot blame him. The practice, however, is a vile one to introduce into diplomacy, as being calculated to add to the delays, already sufficient, in that branch of public affairs. We have to thank Razumowski for this, who set the precedent at the Congress of Vienna. Notwithstanding all this, except its introduction into his Royal Highness's speech from the throne, I think you may venture to argue upon all the territorial arrangements connected with this projected treaty as being finally adjusted, if you should conceive such arguments necessary to be urged in debate at the commencement of the Session.

Ever most affectionately yours, CLANCARTY.

PS. My accounts go with the present messenger direct to Mr. Bandinel, my agent: they have, however, been signed by me, and he will deliver them to you.

Sir Thomas Maitland[1] *to Lord Castlereagh.*

Malta, January 23, 1816.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I am convinced, when you consider the only motive that can actuate me upon the present occasion, you will find no apology necessary for the liberty I now take.

I understand that young Foresti is trying in England to procure the situation of Resident with Ali Basha at Jannina. This appointment is, in a variety of ways, of extreme importance to our interests in the Ionian Islands, and I apprehend is one of those that ought not only to be held by an Englishman, but by one of known prudence and discretion. Young Foresti has already held that situation, and there are strong grounds for suspecting that, when such, he actually aided the French in getting supplies into Corfu. Besides, the politics both of his father and himself are, to say the best of them, of a very suspicious character, and such appointment would infallibly give him much weight among his countrymen —a point that I think, under the present circumstances, ought to be most carefully avoided.

I thought it well to say thus much on the subject to your lordship, as you may not have been informed relative to this young gentleman's past conduct. Should, however, what he says prove true—that he is actually to be appointed—your lordship may rely upon it that I will, as far as I can, try to keep him right; nor have I any other view upon the present occasion than simply to put your lordship in possession of the fact.

I have the honour to be, &c., T. MAITLAND.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, January 23, 1816.

My dear Lord—I was this evening honoured with your private letter of the 19th, and immediately went to the Duke

[1] Brother of the late Earl of Lauderdale, Governor of Malta and the Ionian Islands.

de Richelieu and to M. de Caze, for the purpose of fulfilling the instructions it conveys. They have equally manifested the best possible disposition to comply with your wishes, and I am assured that copies of all interceptions, memorandums, and other papers connected with the subject of Sir R. Wilson's arrest, shall be entrusted to me, together with a written detail of everything which the police have been hitherto able to discover respecting the intrigues carried on by the English at Paris. As there are, however, many papers to copy, it is doubtful if the whole can be got ready before next mail.

I believe Kinnaird to have been committed in the first instance, but to have had the prudence to avoid committing himself in the transactions which have led to the arrest of the other gentlemen. The information received before the other papers by "The Morning Chronicle" upon this business must, moreover, have come through the channel of his correspondents, because he is the only person who sent letters to England by the courier despatched the evening the arrest took place.

I have already exchanged the ratifications of the Congress and of the Paris Treaty with the French Government. My repeated remonstrances and official notes have, however, failed hitherto to obtain the same from the other Powers; indeed, with this exception, of course, I much doubt if I shall obtain anything satisfactory from them before the meeting of Parliament.

Ever, my dear lord, &c., CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosure.]

Paris, Janvier 22, 1816.

Les alarmes du Gouvernement ont été très grandes dans ces derniers jours. On a redoublé les gardes aux Tuileries, et on a donné des cartouches aux soldats. Les Anglais aussi ont fourni de la cavalerie pour faire des patrouilles. On craignait effectivement une explosion et il paraît que les ennemis du

Gouvernement, qui certainement sont en très grand nombre, voulaient tenter un coup pour faire en sorte que le service funèbre pour Louis XVI. n'eut pas lieu. On avait même cherché à exciter des troubles parmi les ouvriers qui travaillaient à l'église de Saint Denis pour cette cérémonie. La police fait toujours des arrestations nouvelles, mais il paraît qu'on ne parvient pas à découvrir les fils de ce qu'on machine.

On a commencé à ouvrir des régistres dans plusieurs villes de France pour faire inscrire tous ceux qui dans le tems n'adhèrerent pas à la condamnation de Louis XVI. Mais comme on sait qu'il y a plusieurs centaines des milliers de Français qui la signèrent, il est très sûr que cette autre misérable mesure va encore diviser et enflammer les esprits davantage; et malheureusement ils l'ont été beaucoup par suite des discussions de la chambre des députés et de l'exil des votans. Les cris contre les infractions faites à la charte s'élèvent de toute part, parceque on craint qu'à la première occasion on ne veuille revenir sur les ventes des domaines nationaux.

Au reste, comme la situation de la France devient tous les jours plus alarmante, je suis forcé de répéter plus que jamais que, dans l'équilibre politique de l'Europe, la France ne peut plus entrer que comme force répugnante qu'il faut très soigneusement contenir. Le meilleur moyen d'atteindre ce but est décidément celui de contenter les autres nations aux dépens d'elle; car si la France, dans l'état actuel de l'Europe, parvenait à avoir l'appui de quelqu'une des autres nations qu'on a injustement mécontentées, on peut être sûr qu'il en résulterait un bouleversement universel dans le monde politique.

La brochure du Général Sarrazin, dont j'ai parlé dans un de mes précédens bulletins et que le Gouvernement Français avait fait saisir, a été payée quatorze-cens francs par ce même Gouvernement au libraire qui l'avait achetée et imprimée. À présent le dit libraire imprime un autre ouvrage de Sarrazin qui est intitulé: *La guerre de la Restauration.* Le Gouverne-

ment Français, qui croit avec raison que dans cet ouvrage, il n'y aura que des sottises contre le Duc de Wellington, a déjà fait offrir six mille francs au libraire pour que le livre ne paraisse pas. Je tiens ces détails du libraire lui-même qui m'assure encore que Sarrazin lui avait dit qu'il ne cesserait d'écrire contre le Gouvernement Anglais et les Anglais en général que lorsque le Gouvernement de France lui donnerait, au lieu d'une solde de retraite, sa solde toute entière. Qu'on juge d'après cela quelle est la foi qu'on peut ajouter aux faits racontés par un homme qui n'écrit que pour un vil intérêt.

Il paraît que le Gouvernement Français ne peut pas encore trouver des gens qui veuillent se charger de la fourniture des troupes étrangères aux taux stipulé dans le traité. Un agent du Duc d'Orléans vient de recevoir une lettre du Duc, dans laquelle celui-ci lui dit qu'il est possible qu'il aille faire un voyage à Naples. On croit que c'est le Roi de France qui lui a conseillé de se retirer à Naples pour dissiper les soupçons qui planent sur lui.

Je suis très sûr que la plus grande partie des Membres de la Chambre de Députés firent tous leur efforts pour tâcher de faire comprendre Talleyrand dans la liste des proscrits, mais ils ne purent trouver aucun moyen d'en venir à bout. On dit maintenant que lui aussi est obligé d'aller faire un tour à Naples quoiqu'il soit le grand chambellan du Roi.

Les Français qui détestent cordialement les Anglais, prennent cependant un très vif intérêt aux trois Anglais qui ont été arrêtés dernièrement, parcequ' ils firent sauver Lavalette. Ils disent aussi qu'il n'est pas vrai, comme le Courier semble vouloir faire croire, que l'Ambassadeur Anglais n'eut connaissance de cet évènement que par M. Bruce qui s'addressa à lui. Selon eux, non seulement l'Ambassadeur mais le Duc de Wellington et le Ministère Anglais furent instruits de tout cela avant l'arrestation, qui n'eut lieu que d'un commun accord, parceque le Gouvernement Français, dans la situation où il est maintenant, n'aurait pas osé de son chef faire arrêter trois

Anglais de marque à Paris. À l'appui de tout cela Messieurs les Français disent qu'un Prussien, qui avait commis des désordres dans le pays occupé par les Prussiens, ayant été arrêté par les Français, qui lui font les procès à Metz, les Prussiens réclament contre cela, parcequ'ils disent que la connaissance de cette affaire leur appartient exclusivement. D'après cela les Français ajoutent: "Pourquoi les Anglais ne feraient pas autant pour leurs compatriotes arrêtés dans un pays occupé par eux? C'est que le Gouvernement Anglais s'entend là-dessus avec le Gouvernement Français."

Dans tout cela, je n'ai fait que répéter ce que j'ai oui dire dans les sociétés de Paris; dans lesquelles (il faut le dire) on ne se serait jamais attendu à trouver tant de zèle pour des Anglais. Mais cela prouve plus que jamais que la haîne qu'on a ici en général pour toutes les opérations du gouvernement l'emporte même sur les rivalités nationales les plus acharnées.

Deux officiers Anglais, qui traversaient le Palais Royal la semaine dernière furent très injustement et très cruellement insultés par un mauvais officier réformé. Les Anglais se mettaient en devoir de le repousser comme il le méritait, lorsque toute la canaille se rassembla autour d'eux et contre eux, de manière qu'ils furent obligé de se retirer. C'est un nouvel avis aux Anglais pour qu'ils soient toujours en force et toujours sur leur garde dans ce pays-ci.

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, January 25, 1816.

My dear Lord—I have nothing to add to my public despatches except a statement relative to the money intended to be offered to Baden. M. de Wacquant has twice suggested to me that this might be taken from the sum appropriated to the building a fortress upon the Rhine, and it seems possible that the proposition may be made to your lordship.

The Austrian Government seems at one time to have entertained the same idea with regard to the exchanges with Bavaria; and M. de Wacquant requested me to ascertain whether a sum of money would not be a facility in the negociation. I had no difficulty in making the inquiry of M. de Rechberg, who said that compensation in territory was the only one which they would accept. I hope that the opinion of Austria with respect to Baden is better founded.

The Prince Royal set off last night at ten o'clock, and M. de Rechberg omitted sending for my despatch to Lord Stewart, as he had promised. This is of no importance, and I equally forward a copy of it to your lordship, and have the honour to be, &c.,

F. LAMB.

As I had told M. de Rechberg and Montgelas my opinion about the two notes, and they had both admitted it and treated it as a good joke, I should not be surprised if he had purposely avoided receiving my despatches, preferring to make his communication himself to Lord Stewart, without any comment of mine.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, January 27, 1816.

My dear Lord—I avail myself of a courier which M. de Gagern is about to despatch to his Court, for the purpose of obtaining, as I really hope and believe, a last instruction, to acquaint you with the state of that negociation.

In my despatch of the 20th, I acquainted you with the then intention of the two plenipotentiaries to forward the treaty, as soon as the several articles should have been previously agreed upon, to their respective Courts for approbation prior to signature. This, however, is now necessarily altered, from the circumstance of neither party feeling himself authorized to yield further than he has now done to the views of the other, and so a perfect agreement being for the present

unattainable. I am, however, far from thinking that this alteration of proceeding will create delay, and am strongly of opinion that the return of M. de Gagern's courier, and that of one already despatched by M. de Humboldt with the same object, will enable us to complete this business to the reasonable satisfaction of all parties.

We had last night, Humboldt, Gagern, and I, a sitting of near four hours' duration, in which we went through the whole treaty, during the course of which many points were reconciled, and several ceded on both sides; so that it may now with truth be asserted that only one subject of difference exists to prevent the entire accord of both plenipotentiaries. This is upon the proportionate share which each party should incur in the expense of supply and maintenance of the fortress of Luxemburg; which, upon first statement, would appear a large obstacle to prevent agreement, but which, upon examination, seems to me to dwindle almost into nothing. In the first place, it has been agreed to lay down as a principle in one of the articles that this expense should be borne by the German Confederacy, whose fortress Luxemburg is, and it is stipulated by the same Article, already assented to, that the High Contracting Parties shall exert their efforts, according to their *moyens respectifs*, to obtain the adoption of this principle by the Diet. (Note, I do not see any objection to our signing an Article thus qualified: if you should think there is, be so good as to acquaint me with it without the least delay.) The difference then only operates materially upon a contingency which may never occur, viz., that of the Confederacy refusing to supply and maintain their own fortresses. As there are, however, some rumours of opposition on this point, and some opinions abroad (our friend Münster's *par exemple*) that the Confederation should not be loaded with the expense, at least exclusively, of supporting those fortresses, the governors and garrisons of which have been disposed of without her authority, the parties are right in ascertaining by what means these

supplies shall be borne, in the event of refusal, either in the whole or in part by the Diet.

Those expenses are principally—1. Provisions for the garrison to be used in war—for, in peace each party is willing to undertake the nourishment of its own troops. 2. Ammunition. 3. Fuel, and light furniture and utensils for barracks and hospitals. 4. Repairs and maintenance of the fortifications. Of these, though M. de Humboldt professes to hold that the whole should be *equally* borne by both parties, he has authorized M. de Gagern to write to his Court that, if the principle of equality shall be acceded to on the two last, he will consent that his Court shall bear the expense of the two first, in the proportion assented to by M. de Gagern for the whole, viz., in that of the number of troops to be furnished by each, or, in figures, in that of three to one. And, from private conversation with Humboldt, I have but little doubt that, provided *equality* is acceded to as the governing principle on the last point, he will not be indisposed to give way on the third also.

The only point then which I consider to exist to impede the final arrangement (supposing, however, their Courts to be in unison with the plenipotentiaries here—a fact of which they both state themselves to be doubtful) is the fourth. Now, on this I really think the arguments are in favour of Prussia; nay, after establishing it as a principle, that the whole *matériel* of the place is the absolute property of the King of the Netherlands, and, under this, having undertaken that his Court shall supply barracks, hospitals, stables, &c., at their own exclusive expense, M. de Gagern and his Government may, in my mind, rejoice that Prussia is ready to take an equal share in the expense of improving, repairing, and maintaining the works, instead of throwing the whole upon the Netherlands. I have privately communicated to M. de Gagern my opinion in this respect, in which he states himself fully to coincide, and informs me that he will not fail to reason the matter thus in his present despatches to his Court.

If, then, the Court at the Hague shall take what I consider a reasonable view of this matter, the treaty may be said to be closed, for whatever Humboldt thinks fit to urge in Conference, he privately states himself to have no doubt of being borne out by his own Government. You see we have made gigantic strides towards the completion of this business since my last. Both parties have, indeed, evinced an anxious desire to approach each other; and latterly the effect of this has been the leaving only one point of difference between them, and this of such a nature that, if the others shall be agreed to at the Hague, there can, as I should conceive, be but little difficulty in their yielding to the Prussian proposal upon this particular point. In my opinion, then, on the return, and that a speedy one, of the courier, we shall be called upon to sign. You will, therefore, see the necessity, if they shall not already have been forwarded, of sending my full powers to me without the least delay.

From Munich I have heard nothing since my last, and, having no messenger either on this or that station, I can scarcely expect to hear but imperfectly through others. Humboldt, however, acquaints me he has letters down to and dated the 22nd. In consequence of Montgelas' note, and in order, if possible, to make something of the last paragraph of it, the plenipotentiaries there had sought a conference with Montgelas. This had, in the first instance, been assented to, but afterwards postponed upon the plea of taking the King's previous orders; but, up to the 22nd, these orders had not been received. Wacquant has received despatches from Prince Metternich, (who, it appears, is confined with the ophthalmia at Milan) by which the General is directed to adhere to the Paris Protocol.

This is all the intelligence that Humboldt gives from his letters, and, I must confess, I can make but little of it. What is to be done, under the direction of adhering to the Protocol, further than what ought from the first to have been done

without it, viz., ascertaining whether the Court of Bavaria would or would not treat upon the principle of renounced contiguity, I am ignorant.

Adieu! this Bavarian question keeps all Germany in suspense. The Diet cannot open till it shall have been disposed of.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, January 28, 1816.

My dear Lord—I wrote to you yesterday, intending to have sent my letter by a courier despatched by M. de Gagern to the Hague, and to beg of James thence to forward it. But Lamb's despatches, which subsequently reached me, and the opportune arrival of the Messenger Vick from Berlin, on his way to Paris, induced me to recall my letter from M. de Gagern, and to send it with Lamb's and my despatches, *viâ* Paris, to England.

I have nothing to add to what I have said on the Netherlands' Treaty: this matter, brought as it is to a point, and that of Bavaria being hung up *quant à nous*, for at least a fortnight, by the Prince Royal's appeal to the Emperor, here we are for that space of time perfect idlers.

I tremble at opening the indemnities proposed by the Paris Protocol to Bavaria; great apprehensions will result from such a step, and it will involve such an unsettlement and resettlement of territory as will reflect upon the proceedings at Vienna, place the term of final arrangement probably still at some distance, and hazard our acquiring in style what we shall almost be in fact—a second Congress. I greatly fear Metternich's incaution will involve us in all this.

The following extract of a letter of the 25th inst., from Carlsruhe, may be interesting to you. I received it yesterday from Wessenberg:—

"M. de Lavalette est arrivé le 17 Janvier, sous le nom d'un Colonel Anglais, (Lossack) à Manheim. Il en est reparti deux jours après, a passé par Stutgard, et s'est acheminé paisiblement vers Munich. Le Gouvernement Badois en a reçu l'avis hier l'après-midi de Manheim. Il est cependant étonnant que la France n'ait fait aucune démarche près du Gouvernement d'ici au sujet de l'arrestation de Lavalette dans le cas qu'il vint se refugier dans le grand-duché. Elle n'a pas même trouvé bon d'envoyer son signalement dans notre contrée."

The following is an extract of Lamb's note to me—I know not that it is of any value, but send it, lest it should be:—"There seems to be an extremely active communication between Austria and Prussia. A courier direct for Berlin passed through here two nights ago: I believe another had passed about a week before. I have not mentioned this to Lord Castlereagh—do, if you think it worth while." Although I scarcely think it worth while, you have the fact, and the words in which it has been conveyed. From everything which appears here, these two Courts are on the best possible footing—and, in my mind, so much the better.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to the Hon. F. Lamb.

Frankfort sur Maine, January, 1816.

My dear Lamb—I have received your long letter of the 10th instant, with its long reasoning, which, for both our sakes, I could either have wished to have been more sound, or, if sound, that my understanding had been sufficiently acute to comprehend its force.

In the first place, I send you a copy of the Protocol of the 17th of November, in support of my former assertion respecting the origin of General Wacquant's mission. And now to your dissertation upon Rechberg's note, which I had not failed to read with my best attention, before I addressed you on the

4th instant, and have, since the receipt of yours, followed the advice therein contained, and have again gone over it most attentively. The result has been my confirmed conviction that, as far forth as he was qualified, M. de Rechberg intended to convey the renunciation of his Court of the principle of contiguity—that the document will bear no other construction —that it either means this or it means nothing—and that, out of Munich, it would be difficult, nay, I might venture to say impossible, to find any person who would otherwise interpret it. We are then at direct issue upon a point, now, perhaps, of little importance, but which, properly understood at the commencement, ought, in my mind, to have led to a very different course from that which has been adopted by the Austrian negociator. You seem, however, still to attach such consequence to this part of the subject, inasmuch as the reasoning upon it occupies nearly two sheets of your letter, that I shall endeavour to lay before you the manner in which my conclusions, so totally at variance with yours, have been drawn.

I cannot admit your distinction as applicable to the present case between the words contiguity and arrondissement. Strictly speaking, nothing in surface can be said to be *rond* but a circle; but, as no country (with the exception, I believe, of one mentioned in Gulliver's Travels) was ever a complete circle, so different States are said to be more or less *arrondis*, as they approach nearer to or are further removed from a compact or circular form. I have always conceived, then, that a country may properly be styled *arrondi* (*tant bien que mal*, assuredly) whenever it can be circumscribed by a single or uninterrupted line; and this I take to be also the exact definition of *contiguity*. Under any other supposition, you, with your distinction between *contiguité* and *arrondissement*, would perhaps be puzzled to mark by any intelligible rule at what precise point arrondissement ceases, and simple *contiguité* commences.

By renouncing the principle of arrondissement, therefore, I hold that M. de Rechberg renounced the principle of contiguity. His note either means this, or it means nothing. However guarded, he in terms seeks compensation "par des convenances statisques et financières" (not a word of contiguity, you will remark) for the disadvantage "de renoncer à un arrondissement qui a été tant de fois garanti." Now where, let me ask you, who seem to assert the fact, has arrondissement been ever guaranteed to Bavaria in any other sense, or by any other expression than that of *contiguité?* I have not, it is true, the entire of the treaties of Ried and the Convention of Paris with me; but I have copies of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th additional Articles of the former, of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Articles, and of the 1st and 3rd additional Articles of the Convention of Paris, copies of which go herewith; and these, I conclude, contain all that has reference to the case of Bavaria upon this subject, because they were selected by M. de Rechberg himself in support of his reasoning on these very points, presented in the shape of a confidential Memoir to Lord Castlereagh on the 28th of October last. Although in these the stipulation of Bavaria to cede these very countries now sought from her is positive, they do not in any part contain a single mention, still less a guarantee, of "arrondissement," renounced in M. de Rechberg's note of the 11th of November. The latter relinquishes nothing at all; and, with all its pompous detail of the sacrifice it takes upon itself to conceive its Court ready to make, means nothing. Now, I believe it is a universal rule of construing the meaning of every instrument, so to construe it, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat;* and consequently as, in any other sense, these high-flown expressions of surprise would mean nothing, the renunciation of M. de Rechberg of the principle of "arrondissement" must be taken to be his renunciation of "*contiguité*," and nothing else. But this is not all. What, let me ask, was the ground and foundation of M. de Rechberg's note? to what

was it an answer? Why, to the communication made to him of the Protocol of the Allied Ministers of the 3rd of November. And what was this? Why, an undertaking of theirs to urge the Court of Bavaria to certain specified exchanges, professing to indemnify that Court financially and statistically, under the provisions of the Treaty of Ried, but founded upon the very principle of foregoing that of *contiguité*, as guaranteed by the same Act. And what is M. de Rechberg's answer? Why, saving the points of discussion on the "*convenances statistiques et financières*," and taking ground for the diminution of the cessions required from his Court upon the base of those proposed at Vienna, he renounces (as far as he is qualified) "à un arrondissement qui lui a été tant de fois garanti." But there was no relinquishment of the principle of "arrondissement" proposed to him in any other sense than as synonymous with *contiguité*. Neither was *arrondissement* ever, that I am aware of, guaranteed, except under the denomination of *contiguité*.

I see that both Rechberg, in his note of the 11th of November, and Montgelas, in his of the 11th instant, forwarded in your despatch No. 5, talk of a Convention signed at Vienna, which the latter dates the 23rd of April, 1815. As a Convention, I know nothing of such a document; neither was that or any other arrangement made on this subject, under the mediation, although with the *concours* of Great Britain, as well as of Prussia. What they both term a Convention, I take to be a discussion and arrangement in the usual course of Vienna Conferences, of which I send you a copy of the Protocol—the only paper that I know of signed on the subject by a British plenipotentiary. The arrangement therein made, you will see, was eventual, and subsequently altogether failed, from the impossibility of obtaining the consent of the other Powers to the great sacrifices required from them to satisfy the demands of Bavaria; and, accordingly, by a subsequent secret Protocol of the sitting of the 10th of June, Austria

revived her claim to the entire of the cessions stipulated by the Treaty of Ried and Convention of Paris, and the plenipotentiaries of the other four Powers undertook to support her claims.

Perfectly confirmed in the construction given in my former letter to Rechberg's note, all the reasoning, in my opinion, follows from it, as conveyed in mine of the 4th. I agree with you that it might be difficult to reproach a Power who says, "Merely leave me what I have, and what you have repeatedly guaranteed to me, if you cannot give me what you promised in exchange for it." But this is not the case of Bavaria. So far from any Power having guaranteed to her what she has, she is under a positive stipulation to cede a part of it; and, though she was assured in return of equivalents in *contiguity*, her Minister (subject, no doubt, to the future confirmation or dissent of his Court) waved this, and his Court, so far from *immediately* disavowing him, as it was their duty to have done, if they thought he had gone too far, have practically confirmed his act by entertaining a negociation incompatible with this principle, and now they turn round and reassert it, thereby raising an insurmountable barrier to all further negociation; and in this, I conceive, consists their wrong; and General Wacquant's in not having ascertained his point in the first instance, and, having blundered here, blundering again in not availing himself of the wrong of his adversary.

So far from thinking it unreasonable that Bavaria should assert a right to seek advantages to counterbalance those which, under my construction of M. de Rechberg's note, she resigns, in my mind, this very note takes fair ground to seek such advantages as a consideration for the relinquished contiguity. But M. de Montgelas has not, latterly at least, placed the negociation upon this ground; but, by again reviving his principle of contiguity, has raised an effectual bar, as long as he shall adhere to it, to all ulterior negociation.

I know not whether M. de Wacquant's retiring from

Munich, as suggested in my last, would have had the effect of recalling Bavaria to a renewal of the negociation; but the threat of it, properly motived, seems to me to have been the most likely means to have induced that Court to declare finally the principle upon which she would consent to negociate, and in the event of her positively reviving that relinquished by her Minister at Paris, by which all future negociation would become impracticable, have enabled him to place his Court rather on higher ground before the world than the expertness of his adversaries has now permitted.

Au reste, I have not now much hope of any satisfactory result from prolonging discussions at the present time with Bavaria. If, through your management, the negociation can be replaced upon the only practicable ground, so that there may be an early prospect of terminating this the last matter in the settlement of Europe, you will render great service. But I do not conceive that adherence to the principle of contiguity can by any possibility effectuate this object, or otherwise operate than to create considerable alarm in other countries, without any possible good effect.

The Tableaux annexed to the Protocol of the 3rd of November I take to contain the denominations of all the indemnities which can now be offered, if, by a proper understanding of the real value of these as compared with that of the cessions demanded from her, Bavaria will enter into negociation; or, if on this ground she should even propose a diminution of the required cessions: these are fair subjects of discussion, may be fairly examined, and lead to satisfactory results; but her now seeking as indemnity the northern part of the Baden territory, for the purpose of uniting Aschaffenburg and Würzburg with the transrhenane provinces, &c., I look upon to be just as much as to say she will not treat at all; and I cannot but believe, after what has passed at Vienna and Paris, she does so likewise.

When I stated in my former letter that, "Wacquant

having chosen to wait for instructions, the mediators having nothing else to do but to wait also," I was perfectly aware that you might be called upon, as you have been, for a joint interference, and which there was certainly no reason to refuse; but, after the full effect, whatever it might be, of the interference of other Powers had been already obtained from the communication of the Protocol of the 3rd of November, I really deemed its repetition, thus late especially, *nothing*, and the result has proved it; nevertheless, I perfectly agree with you, and for your reasons, that the joint representation, if requisite at Munich, ought to have been made at the very outset. If, as you seem, though rather distantly, to hope, it shall still have the result of recalling Bavaria to the only practicable basis of negociation, it will have done much, and I shall have great pleasure in making *amende honorable*.

I know not why General Wacquant should allow himself to be beat upon placing in the balance of indemnity the comparison between Würsburg and Aschaffenburg and the Tyrol. The bargain was an entire one by the Treaty of Ried, and the conveyance of these exchanges a part execution of it; and without at all shaking the Treaty of Congress, the comparative value of these exchanges may fairly be urged and relied upon in endeavours to perfect the original agreement. I have reason to think that this is not only mine, but Lord Castlereagh's opinion, because, in his despatch to me, acquainting me with your instructions, he not only compares the relative value of the exchanges remaining to be effected, but those already made.

There are no other stipulations that I know of than those contained in the enclosed treaties and the Articles in the Act of Congress—the latter conveying Würzburg and Aschaffenburg to Bavaria, and the Tyrol to Austria.

It is unnecessary at this time, or till we shall be sufficiently advanced for the consideration of details, to enter into any examination of the comparative value of the Tableaux. I

shall therefore only remark on this subject that, if M. de Montgelas would have looked into the heading of the Tableaux contained in the Note of the 11th instant, he would have found an answer to some of his observations therein contained. Though M. de Beauharnois has doubtless a claim, arising out of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the proceedings at Vienna, and latterly, under the Protocol of the 21st November last, to an *établissement*, I know of none he can form to a sovereignty, and consequently of none which can give him a title to the relinquishment of one over 50,000 persons. The Protocol above referred to excludes, in fact, all idea of sovereignty: he cannot, therefore, transfer to Bavaria a claim to that which does not belong to him. His prospects of an *établissement* he may transfer, for they are his; and we, though no parties to an Act, said to have been framed by the other Powers at Vienna upon this point, are bound by the Paris Protocol to forward the object of an *établissement* for him, and to act as mediators in obtaining this in a negociation, with the view agreed to be commenced by the other three Powers with the Court of Naples.

Adieu! I have written enough, and am always heartily tired of a subject that does not advance.

Yours, my dear Lamb, very sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

Extract of a Despatch from Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1816.

Your despatches of the 12th instant from Milan have been received and laid before the Prince Regent. His Royal Highness has commanded me to express to you his approbation of the judgment and discretion with which your lordship has remarked upon the views of Austria, both on the side of Turkey and of Bavaria, and also of the temperate mode in which you have endeavoured to correct erroneous alarms as to

the designs of Russia; a line of policy the importance of which has been fully laid down in the instructions already transmitted, but which your own discernment had led you to anticipate.

After fully conversing with the Austrian Ambassador on the affairs of Turkey, I have addressed an instruction to Mr. Frere, the British Minister at Constantinople. I send it under flying seal, in order that you may confer with Prince Metternich upon it.

I shall again instruct Mr. Lamb to support the Austrian negociation at Munich, by every means short of the measure of war: to such a proceeding the British Government cannot be a party, because in their judgment Bavaria was left by the Treaty of Ried *a free agent* to accept or refuse the proposed exchange.

It is my opinion that the Bavarian negociation has been discreditably conducted; and that, were she even to succeed in defeating the exchange, contrary to the wishes of the great Powers of Europe, she would have acted upon the whole unwisely, in keeping alive a point of controversy with her natural ally. There is one facility which exists at present, which might be considered as having lapsed if delayed; namely, the right of requiring Baden to submit to some modification of territory, with a view to the settlement of this part of Germany.

I certainly should regret that it had been found necessary to complicate this question by imposing sacrifices upon a third Power, and should be extremely desirous that the arrangement could be managed upon the principle of exchange between Austria and Bavaria; but I consider that, according to the state of the treaties existing with the respective Powers, it is more competent, in good faith, for the Allies to impose some sacrifice of territory upon Baden, with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria, than it is to *force* the latter to submit to what the mediating Powers may deem a fair equivalent.

I think, however, after the part Baden has taken with the Allies, that the demand on her for cessions ought to be framed upon a very moderate scale, and, as far as possible, limited to some district, from its position calculated to approximate, if not to connect, the Bavarian territories on opposite sides of the Rhine.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Foreign Office, January 31, 1816.

My dear Clancarty—To you a private letter will be more acceptable than an instruction, because I can state in it without reserve the colour of my opinion, without embarrassing the progress of the negociations. This will be more conveniently done by sending you a copy of my last despatches to Lord Stewart, together with the short despatch I now address to Mr. Lamb.

With respect to Prince Eugene's claims, I send you my correspondence with Mr. à Court. I agree with you that the stipulation to Prince Eugene is *un établissement convenable*, and not a sovereignty. I object to any territorial concession in Italy; but I think the character of the Alliance is interested in something being done for him. Perhaps it is too much to throw the whole on Naples. My motive is that he should have a round sum, suppose £200,000, to provide a suitable residence for him near Munich, which, together with his estates in Italy restored to him by the Emperor, and valued at £35,000 or £40,000 a-year, would make him "un très grand Seigneur." Half of this sum might be charged on Naples, as having spent little on the war; the other half on the other Powers, in the ratio of the French contributions, or, in other words, should be defrayed out of the Caisse Française. The charge would scarcely be felt; and as the Treaty of Fontainebleau, whether wise or unwise, was made with a view to a supposed general interest, it seems not unreasonable out of a general fund to rid Naples of this incumbrance which

the negociations at Vienna threw upon her, but against which the Austrian treaty of guarantee has furnished her with a tolerable defence.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. J. James to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 10, 1816.

My dear Lord—I think it right to place before you in a private letter, and in a stronger light than it may be proper to do in a public despatch, the manner in which this Government conducts its interior affairs, which, I am sorry to say, are not in the state of harmony that those who wish to see these countries united on the basis of a good understanding could desire.

The King, with very liberal ideas, has given his kingdom a Constitution that does not invest him or his Government with the requisite degree of strength. By allowing his Ministers no share of responsibility, he has placed his own popularity on a tottering foundation, without rendering them less liable to censure; and by the manner in which the Provincial States are to be organized, he will remain without power of controlling the Second Chamber, which he has reserved to himself no right of dissolving. In the First Chamber, where the members are appointed for life, and whose numbers are limited to sixty, a faction of thirty-one individuals are able to counteract the measures of Government; and the disposition which the members actually composing it have on some occasions evinced, gives reason to suppose that such a crisis may not unfrequently occur.

Without discussing the wisdom of such a Constitution for countries, the contrast of whose interests and feelings affords the prospect of a troublesome reign, we are already enabled to judge of its consequences. The King finds himself in the necessity of imposing nine millions sterling of taxes upon five

millions of subjects, and his Ministers have neither force nor influence sufficient to make their measures palatable, or to procure that unity in the component parts of the Government which can alone ensure the consideration of the nation. You will have seen by my despatches that several laws have been rejected. It is true that they were not of importance in themselves; but the very circumstance, and the irritation attending it, prove that a vice is latent somewhere in the political machine.

The conduct of the Government respecting the *Loi somptuaire* has afforded a proof of the justice of this observation. It was conceived important to establish the generality of contributions. The Belgians did not object to the principle, but they were unanimous, both in the Council and in the Chamber, as to the inexpediency of the law in question for the southern provinces; and yet the appearance of a resolution to maintain its execution created irritation and divisions during six weeks, when it was abandoned with petulance.

Another instance of this nature has occurred this very day. The Government thought proper to interpret the part of the Constitution that consecrates the right of petition as not implying a direct appeal to the Chambers, and the President was consequently charged with a proposition that all petitions should be addressed in the first instance to the Provincial States. The unpopularity of the President alone sufficed, it appears, to create an opposition that would certainly have produced another rejection, had not such an event been averted by the motion being timely withdrawn. It is not surprising that the consideration of the Government should suffer from such a system; and, indeed, whilst the southern provinces express their contempt and discontent, the devotion of the northern ones is by no means so unbounded as it is thought to be.

The democratic spirit of the Republic still exists to a certain extent in Holland, and may show itself in the occasions that

future elections may present; in addition to which, the agricultural provinces of Gueldres and Overyssel are naturally disposed to unite their interests to those of the Belgians, who, during the present system, will remain in opposition to the Government.

When the causes of these embarrassments are inquired into, they are not only ascribed to the defects of the Constitution, but also to a Dutch oligarchical party that surrounds the King. To this party the selection of Dutch for all public employments, and his Majesty's want of affection for his subjects of the Southern Provinces, are equally attributed. The absence of persons in Belgium capable of taking a lead in public affairs was an argument by which the former evil complained of was long defended; and the idea entertained of the superiority of those to whom the administration of this country had been confided commanded, for some time, a respect that their subsequent conduct has apparently deprived them of. Accustomed, indeed, to the clock-work *administration* of Holland, they seem lost in the government of the various interests of the Netherlands; and the King, with abilities that command but little respect, has the mania *de tout faire*, and is consequently absorbed in a routine of detail, to the prejudice of more essential points.

Presuming on your indulgence, I have thus ventured to describe the light in which I cannot avoid seeing the embarrassments of this new Government. They are to be regretted, because, on one hand, the wide difference between the countries and their inhabitants rendering the arrangement and command of their resources a matter of difficulty, (even with the best dispositions) cannot be assisted by discontent and opposition; and, on the other hand, a spirit of opposition to Ministers that are not responsible, proceeding from members chosen and nominated by the King, augurs little in favour of the devotion that may hereafter be expected from the choice of the Provincial States. As long, therefore, as the weakness of

the Constitution remains on one side, and the neglect and discontent of the Belgians exist on the other, little harmony can be looked for in the administration of these amalgamated countries.

If it were possible to impress the King with the idea that many of his most enlightened subjects entertain of the imperfection of this Constitution, which unfortunately he regards as a *chef d'œuvre*, (probably because it is the production of his own imagination) an advantage might be taken of the present composition of the Chambers to effect a salutary change, when it would not be less important, perhaps, that he should be also impressed with the idea that he holds his countries *from* and *for* the interest of Europe, and not *from* and *for* the interest of the Hogendorps, Maasdams, Maanens, and half a dozen others, who compose the party I have above alluded to.

I should not omit to mention that the Duc d'Ursel and De Thiennes have been led to remonstrate with his Majesty upon many points concerning the management of Belgium. The latter showed me the letter he addressed to the King upon the subject, and which, allowing for the natural partiality of his feelings, appeared tolerably just; and the immediate journey to Brussels has, it seems, been the consequence of these proceedings.

Of all the Ministers, Falck is the only one who may be said to have credit with all parties, or who is supposed to possess fair and conciliatory views for the government of the country. As a man of low birth, however, he is too much taken up with the attention that the preservation of his own situation demands to allow him the weight that it is perhaps desirable he should have in the affairs of this kingdom.

Trusting you will receive this long letter with indulgence, I remain, my dear lord, ever most gratefully and truly yours,

J. JAMES.

Count de Fernan-Nuñez to Lord Castlereagh.

Portland Place, ce 15 Fevrier, 1816.

Mon cher Castlereagh—Je vous envoie ci-joint la traduction des deux derniers Décrets portés par le Roy mon maître. Il me semble que vous pourrez y trouver quelque fondement pour annoncer un changement plus doux dans les dispositions du Cabinet de Madrid. J'ai tout lieu de croire d'autant plus que mes dépêches doivent avoir arrivé trois jours après cela. Je ne crains point de vous faire remarquer que ce n'est pas *commun* que les Souverains reconnoissent publiquement et sans y être forcés par aucune *commotion* qu'on les a trompés. Le Roy mon maître l'a dit très clairement comme vous voyez; et cela à mon avis est la marque la plus certaine de ses sentimens de faire le bonheur de son peuple, ainsi que de son cœur porté pour des dispositions très contraires à ce que l'on prétend faire croire ici.

C'est en vous assurant de ma parfaite tranquillité sur vos sentiments, vos talents, et dispositions *naturellement oratoires*, que je vois arriver la soirée d'ajourd'hui, et votre triomphe sera d'autant plus brillant pour celui qui comme moi connoit que vous avez à lutter contre une opinion *trompée*, mais par malheur trop générale dans ce pays.

Agréez, je vous prie, mon cher Castlereagh, les sentimens de la plus haute considération, estime, et particulière amitié de votre dévoué.

Le Comte Duc de FERNAN-NUÑEZ.

[Translation.]

Madrid Gazette Extraordinary, 27th January, 1816.

OFFICAL ARTICLE.

The first duty of Sovereigns is to restore repose and tranquillity to their subjects: when they are judged by tribunals legally established, they repose under the cover of their protection; but when sentences are pronounced by commissions,

my conscience cannot feel free from all responsibility; my subjects cannot have confidence in the administration of justice, without which men cannot enjoy tranquillity in society. To avoid evils which may be attended with such important consequences, I order that all the commissions employed on criminal proceedings be instantly suppressed; that the said proceedings be immediately handed over to the competent tribunals; and that the informers be held to appear, in order that there may be no doubt as to the motives of public good which they allege, they being made rigorously responsible for the consequences of their denunciations.

During my absence from Spain, two parties have formed themselves, under the appellations of the *Liberal* and the *Servile*. The division which, from the first, existed between them, has extended itself through the most part of the provinces of my kingdom. One of my most sacred duties, in my character of Father of my people, is to put an end to these dissensions. I order, therefore, that the denunciators be held to appear before the tribunals, and to give there legal security; that the appellations of the *Liberal* and the *Servile* disappear from common discourse; and that within six months all affairs of this nature be terminated, the ordinary modes of justice being, however, always observed with respect to them.

Signed by the hand of the King.

To Don Pedro Ceballos.

The Palace, January 27th, 1816.

Further Decree for the re-establishment of M. de Ceballos in the Office of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Being satisfied of the fallacy of the motives which had determined me to dismiss you from the office of my Prime Minister, and being well convinced of the zeal, the exactitude, and the attachment, with which, in the most trying times you have served my person and the State, I re-establish you in the exercise of the functions of the said employment of my first

Secretary of State, of which you will immediately retake the portfolio.

Signed by the hand of the King.

To Don Pedro Ceballos.

The Palace, January 27th, 1816.

Statement of Sums paid on account of Subsidies to Foreign Powers in the year 1815, *and to the* 13*th of February*, 1816, *inclusive.*

POWER.	To complete engagements prior to 1815.	Under the Treaties of Subsidy, 1815.	Total.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Austria . . .	355,555 11 2	1,388,888 17 6	1,744,444 8 8
Russia	308,278 14 9	1,701,389 13 6	2,009,668 8 3
Prussia . . .	355,333 6 8	1,388,888 17 6	1,744,222 4 2
Sweden . . .	687,728 10 5	.....	687,728 10 5
Portugal . . .	100,000 0 0	.....	100,000 0 0
Sicily	117,748 6 8	.....	117,748 6 8
Hanover . . .	175,000 0 0	.....	175,000 0 0
Bills of Credit to Russia and Prussia	1,650,000 0 0	.....	1,650,000 0 0
Minor Powers under Engagements made by the Duke of Wellington, as specified in the accompanying Paper	.....	1,723,726 16 0	1,723,726 16 0
	3,749,644 9 8	6,202,894 4 6	9,952,538 14 2

Sums remaining to be paid.

			£ s. d.
Sweden . . .	.....	.....	333,333 6 8
Russia	.....	.....	381,944 8 10
Minor Powers .	.....	.....	29,515 8 6
			744,793 4 0

Statement of Sums paid on Account of Subsidies to Minor Powers, under Engagements made by the Duke of Wellington.

POWER.	Number of Men, at £11 2s. per Man, per annum.	Number of Months Subsidy payable.	Paid.		
			£	s.	d.
Anhalt-Bernburg	480	Nine.	3,996	0	0
Anhault-Dessau	1,120	Nine.	9,324	0	0
Bavaria	60,000	Ten.	555,000	0	0
Baden	16,000	Nine.	133,200	0	0
Brunswick	7,149	Nine.	30,000	0	0
Denmark	15,000	Ten.	138,750	0	0
Frankfort	750	Nine.	6,243	15	0
Hesse-Cassel	7,500	Nine.	62,437	10	0
Hesse-Darmstadt	8,000	Nine.	66,600	0	0
Hanover	26,400	Seven.	170,940	0	0
Hanse Towns	3,000	Nine.	24,975	0	0
Holstein-Oldenburg	1,600	Nine.	13,320	0	0
Hohenzollern-Hechingen	194	Nine.	1,615	1	0
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen	386	Nine.	3,213	9	0
Lippe	1,000	Nine.	8,325	0	0
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	3,800	Nine.	31,635	0	0
Mecklenburg-Strelitz	800	Nine.	6,660	0	0
Nassau	3,050	Nine.	25,391	5	0
Reuss-Greitz	900	Nine.	7,492	10	0
Sardinia	15,000	Nine.	124,875	0	0
Saxe-Coburg, Hildburghausen, and Meiningen	1,804	Nine.	15,018	6	0
Saxe-Gotha	2,200	Nine.	18,315	0	0
Saxe-Weimar	1,600	Nine.	13,320	0	0
Saxony	8,000	Nine.	66,600	0	0
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen	650	Nine.	5,411	5	0
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt	650	Nine.	5,411	5	0
Schaumburg-Lippe	300	Nine.	2,497	10	0
Waldeck and Pyrmont	800	Nine.	6,660	0	0
Wurtemberg	20,000	Nine.	166,500	0	0
	208,133		1,723,726	16	0

The whole of the above-mentioned Powers have been paid in full, with the exception of Brunswick, upon whose Subsidy the sum of £29,515 8*s.* 6*d.* remains to be paid, unless it has been paid from the Military Chest at Paris.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, February 25, 1816.

My dear Lord—After the exchange of the ratifications with the different Powers who are parties to the Treaty dated the 20th of November, M. de Richelieu called here and delivered me a diamond snuff-box, which he said he was directed to give me upon the occasion. I told him he must certainly be mistaken, because I conceive that your lordship and the Duke of Wellington, who negociated and signed the Treaty, are entitled, as a matter of course, to the usual present; that he would, therefore, do well to point out to whom this box should be transmitted. He said that he could not admit this mode of reasoning; that the box was destined for the person who exchanged the ratifications, and not for the *signataires;* and he hinted that this principle was laid down by the French Government for the purpose of avoiding the expense which the distribution of presents to an unequal number of *signataires* employed by other Powers must necessarily occasion; which expense they propose to avoid by the distribution of decorations to the parties who are willing to receive them.

The same conversation has passed with Messrs. Vincent, Golz, and Pozzo di Borgo, all of whom have received boxes, which they have retained, alleging that they must be returned to the Duke de Richelieu, if their respective Governments do not approve their conduct.

As the Duke of Wellington declares that, under these circumstances, he will have nothing to do with the question, your lordship will, I presume, decide how far I am to follow their example.

I am, &c., CHARLES STUART.

M. Fouché (Duc d'Otrante) to Lord Castlereagh.

Dresde, 26 Fevrier, 1816.

Mylord—La crise où se trouve la France, l'exil auquel me condamne le parti qui y domine en ce moment, me force à

chercher une autre patrie. Je pourrois aller en Angleterre sans autre précaution que mon estime pour votre nation, et pour votre caractère personnel. Je suis certain que j'y serais accueilli avec bienveillance. Toutefois je dois vous faire connoître ma position.

Le Roi me laisse libre de choisir le lieu de mon exil, et n'excepte que la France des voyages qui pourraient entrer dans mes projets. Toute contrée qui m'offre sureté et repos me conviendrait, mais j'ai une femme et des enfans; je désire leur procurer un séjour agréable. Je ne présume pas trop de l'intérêt que votre Seigneurie a bien voulu me promettre en la priant de m'accorder ses bons offices, et de me dire dans qu'elle partie des états de sa Majesté Britannique je pourrais espérer de me fixer.

Mon projet est de consacrer le temps que je passerai dans la retraite à écrire un mémoire sur les évènemens depuis mon entrée dans les affaires en 1789 jusqu'à nos jours. J'ai vu de près les ressorts secrets qui ont mis en jeu toutes les passions. Je crois rendre mes loisirs utiles à mon siècle et à l'histoire, en expliquant les révolutions qui ont fait passer la France de l'antique monarchie à la République, de la République à l'empire de Napoléon, et de cet empire à la royauté des Bourbons. Je serai amené naturellement à rendre compte de notre situation politique.

Je n'ai pas besoin de dire à votre Seigneurie que mon langage sera sincère, et qu'il n'aura aucune ressemblance avec celui de mes ennemis. Mes idées sont trop élevées pour que l'exagération et le ressentiment les atteignent. L'intérêt et le repos de ma patrie marchent avant tout. Il s'y trouve déjà trop d'élémens de discorde, pour en ajouter de nouveaux.

On sera convaincu après avoir lu mon mémoire que mes principes et mon caractère ont été constamment dans la ligne de la modération. Beaucoup de gens me jugent encore d'après les articles du Moniteur et des biographies rédigés sous l'influence des factions. J'ai toujours aimé la liberté,

mais je n'ai jamais voulu qu'elle fût sans objet et sans règle.

Votre Seigneurie peut me rendre cette justice que, dans mon ministère sous Louis XVIII., j'ai fait tous mes efforts pour ramener l'esprit d'ordre, de subordination, et de modestie, mais sans secousse, sans réaction. J'ai pensé qu'au lieu de compulser et d'agiter le passé, qu'au lieu d'alarmer, d'inquiéter, et d'aigrir l'opinion, il valait mieux assujettir tout le monde aux devoirs. L'armée même a-t-elle cessé un moment d'être soumise et obéissante? Tous les désirs des souverains n'ont ils pas été remplis?

On a méconnus mes services. On les appréciera, lorsque le parti qui domine sera lui-même accablé. Si toutes les passions qu'on fait fermenter en ce moment n'amènent pas un choc violent, il faut renoncer à juger les affaires humaines par l'expérience et par les lumières de la raison.

Je me félicite d'être dispensé de toute responsabilité, et de pouvoir jouir dans la retraite d'un repos qui fait l'objet de mon ambition. Les ennemis de ma patrie ne le troubleront pas de leurs calomnies; le bon esprit de votre nation en fera justice. Les faits parleront d'eux-mêmes.

Au milieu des nombreuses ingratitudes que j'éprouve aujourd'hui, il est consolant pour moi de recevoir des témoignages d'estime, et de voir l'opinion honorer ceux qui me les donnent.

Je prie votre Seigneurie de me faire parvenir à Dresde l'autorisation et les passeports qui me sont nécessaires pour voyager avec ma femme et mes enfans en Angleterre et en Écosse.

Je désire de renouveller de vive voix à votre Seigneurie l'assurance de ma haute et respectueuse considération.

Le Duc D'OTRANTE.

PS. Vos journaux me promènent d'exil en exil; je ne suis cependant sur aucune liste d'exilés. À la vérite je me trouve compris par l'artifice dans les généralités d'une loi dont les auteurs n'ont pas osé prononcer mon nom. Le motif de mon

exil dans cette loi est d'avoir accepté un emploi de Napoléon ; mais depuis ce moment j'ai été appelé au ministère par Louis XVIII. J'ai reçu de lui une lettre de reconnoissance de mes services. Ma mission à Dresde n'étoit pas une faveur, mais c'est une nouvelle nomination du Roi. De plus, je suis membre de la Chambre des Députés. J'ai été élu par cinq collèges électoraux les plus nombreux, notamment celui de Paris. J'aurois été nommé par la France entière si je l'eusse désiré. Il seroit un peu trop scandaleux de me voir banni en vertu d'une loi qui me laisse dans une exception si solemnelle, et si inviolable. La probité du Roi se révolteroit, si on lui présentoit à signer une ordonnance d'exécution où mon nom seroit inscrit. Non—l'iniquité ne sera pas consommée à mon égard. Qui pourroit compter sur la sainteté des engagemens du Roi, si les Chambres mêmes avoient le droit d'en arrêter l'effet ! Qui croiroit à une Constitution, si les Chambres peuvent exclure un de leurs membres, sans jugement, sans même articuler son nom. Après une pareille violation où l'Europe trouveroit elle un gouvernement en France !

Il m'est impossible de concilier dans mon esprit la lettre du Roi qui m'a appellé au Ministère de la Police, celle qui m'a nommé son Ministre à Dresde, les promesses touchantes qui la terminent avec une ordonnance d'exil signé de la même main. La postérité rechercheroit les causes de cette étrange contradiction ; elle ne voudrait pas se persuader que des motifs qui n'ont pas empêché le Roi de me faire entrer dans son conseil, et dans la plus grande étendue de sa confiance, au moment du danger, m'en eussent fait éloigner et bannir de ma patrie quand on a cru le danger passé.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, February 29, 1816.

My dear Lord—Though the decided ascendency the Ultra-Royalist party has acquired in the Chambers has some time

since rendered the situation of the Ministry extremely uncertain, no admission of their embarrassment had allowed me to report to you the probability of a change in the direction of affairs, resulting from the want of influence on the part of the King's advisers in the Chambers, until the discussion respecting the erasure of that article from the budget relating to the arrears previous to 1814, which took place on Monday.

The result of this discussion has placed the Ministers in a most precarious situation; for, the support derived from the friends of M. de Talleyrand having been voluntarily sacrificed by the compromise which took place respecting the exceptions from the general amnesty, their own force does not give a majority upon any question which the views of the Ultra-Royalists may induce that party to throw out. Their existence as a Ministry, therefore, depends upon the will of their opponents, and it is very clear that the slightest circumstance may lead to their removal.

This circumstance has occurred at the present moment; for your lordship is aware that the discussion on Monday last left the Ministers in a minority on the King's message, and the commission appointed to take the Budget into consideration decided on Tuesday that the message shall pass unnoticed, and that the report on the Budget, which is under consideration, shall be brought up next week.

As it is not likely that an Administration which succeeds M. de Richelieu under these circumstances can remain many weeks at the head of affairs, the King will thus be placed in a situation which must endanger the safety of the country, and lead to the suspension of the payments due, under treaty, to the Allies. My colleagues, therefore, determined yesterday to devote the usual conference to the serious consideration of the measures the circumstances require. They invited the Duke of Wellington to be present, and the detail of the mischiefs which menace the country, unless the Court shall cease to

oppose the Government, induced them to recommend that his Grace should address a letter to the King, stating the alarm to which the situation of affairs had given rise, and a hope that his Majesty will interfere to render the influence of the Court beneficial to the real interests of his Government.

During our deliberation, the Duke arrived, and, after telling us that the King had enjoined him directly to communicate his sentiments upon the state of public affairs whenever a proper opportunity shall offer for that purpose, he read, with some slight alterations, the accompanying letter, which had been drawn up before our meeting. The letter, having been approved in the present form, was delivered to M. de Pradel this morning; and I hope it will reach his Majesty in sufficient time to prevent the consequences which may result from the appearance of the report the Committee were expected to bring forward in the beginning of the next week.

My conversation with several persons who are aware of what is passing upon the subject of this measure leaves very strong doubts in my mind how far it is likely to succeed. The King has upon no occasion shown sufficient character to control the party, which, with the sole exception of the Duke de Berry, his own family decidedly espouse; and if his Majesty determines to maintain the Ministry in office, without giving them the necessary support, the Duke de Richelieu has no other alternative, after the report is presented, but to dissolve the Chambers, notwithstanding his dread of encouraging the party who were the former opponents of the Crown, and favouring Anti-Royalist elections.

If our efforts to support the Ministers are unavailing in this particular crisis, I am disposed to think that the return of M. de Blacas is the sole measure which can give the King that influence over the Princes necessary to control the party acting under their direction.

I remain, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Extract of a letter from Sir Thomas Maitland to Lord Bathurst, dated Corfu, March 6, 1816.

Since I closed my letter to your lordship relative to Capo d'Istria, and in which you will find one to Lord Castlereagh open, I have seen the son, Vicaro Capo d'Istria, twice, and have told him very fairly my feeling in regard to his father's conduct; when he several times repeated to me that I must not mind what his father did—that he was in the extreme of old age—and that all he did was to keep himself alive. He did not, in the first conversation, seem to wish to be employed; but in the second, I think his feelings rested more upon all the first places being already promised away, than on any disinclination for employment; and his professions were certainly strong.

Your lordship may rely upon it that, if I can with propriety, I will employ him, if it were only to show we have no disinclination to the family. But we must always look at him with a jealous eye.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.

Foreign Office, March 9, 1816.

My dear Sir—I send you an official instruction for the direction of your conduct in Sir R. Wilson's case, and I have sent to press the report of the Crown lawyers in reply to your reference.

What may be the means of proof to substantiate this more serious charge yet remains to be seen; but, if the French Government have in their possession the means of affording to the world even rational evidence that the conduct of these English gentlemen is not to be traced simply to an impulse of humanity, but that it was connected with a desire to screen all the French traitors from punishment, and to a wish to see the existing order of things subverted, I can neither wonder at nor blame their giving to the accusation that character which may

let them into the whole of the case, involving, as it does, the interests of all Governments as well as that of France.

The assurances given to you by the Duke de R[ichelieu], as well as those received by me through the Marquis d'Osmond, sufficiently dispel any alarm as to the intentions of the French Government to inflict, even in the event of conviction, a capital punishment—a determination which we feel satisfied no ebullition of temper in the Ultra-Royalist party will shake; but it is nevertheless right that your Excellency should be prepared at a proper moment, if necessary, to support them in this determination.

I think it necessary in confidence to apprize you that, probably in consequence of representations from Paris, Lord Grey and Lord Grenville have had an interview with Lord Liverpool, who informed them that we had every reason to believe the intention of the French Government was not to *push punishment* to an extreme against the accused, but that we could not pledge that Government by such declaration. I think it extremely material to impress this on your mind, because these gentlemen may conduct themselves in such a tone of outrage to the Government and laws of France as to make it difficult for the King and his Ministers to treat them with clemency.

Whether Sir Robert Wilson and the other prisoners will or will not be made acquainted with the lenient intentions of the French Government as to punishment, or whether it is useful that they should, I profess not to be able to decide, but confident I am that they ought to be cautious not to provoke by unnecessary offence the Government of the country to whose laws they are now amenable. If I may judge from report, they have indulged in a most imprudent latitude in this respect since their first arrest.

I propose seeing the French Ambassador this forenoon, and shall request him to impress earnestly upon his Government that, whilst the British Government desires to abstain from

interference in what the French Government feels due to itself, they claim, on every principle of common interest, that blood shall not be shed in the present case, *however culpable* may have been the conduct of the accused.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, March 10, 1816.

My dear Lord—I shall be much obliged to you to read and act upon my private letter of the 4th of March, which will go herewith, as I believe its matter will not brook delay.

The instructions contained in your despatch No. 1, of the 2nd instant, were most necessary to me; without them I certainly never should have considered your despatch to Lord Stewart of the 29th January (the only document which I can call to mind by which the Protocol is exceeded) as going the length of authorizing the support of our Government to the cession of Maine et Tauber. What were my ideas upon this subject you will find in the accompanying correspondence between Lord Stewart and me upon this point; which, though in a great measure superseded by your late instructions, yet, as containing points still *en l'air*, and because it is right you should be in possession of whatever has passed, or may pass, in the minds of those you employ upon the matter confided to them, notwithstanding the immense drafts upon your time by Parliament, I think it proper to send *in extenso*. To obviate any ill-effects from this correspondence, I have already, since the receipt of your despatch, by a safe conveyance, communicated to Charles its substance.

Be assured that my sentiments upon this subject have not been influenced by any wish "to save the negociators all trouble," but from perceiving difficulties of a nature to render perhaps impracticable that *speedy* and *satisfactory* conclusion which your despatch so strongly recommends. With Wessenberg, I have been in the habit of free concert and confidential

communication ever since my arrival at Frankfort; and he, I can assure you, is equally with me at a loss to conceive how, upon the bare cession by Baden of the circle of Maine and Tauber, without some indemnity, the matter is ever to be terminated. He, therefore, immediately upon the receipt of his instructions from Milan, wrote to Prince Metternich respecting the difficulties, and imploring him to endeavour to obtain the Emperor's consent to make any pecuniary or other sacrifices to Bavaria, rather than proceed in the course latterly adopted. For the answer to this reference we still wait.

Now, though I am aware of the spirit of party at the Austrian Court, and that as the late instructions from Milan emanated from the success of the military, so the remonstrances against these instructions may partly proceed from a desire to thwart, upon the part of the civil faction, yet the difficulties do in effect exist. They are these: neither the Russian nor the Prussian Minister here has yet received any instructions to go beyond the Protocol; nay, the latter states a precise injunction not to go further than its exact provisions; and though the Emperor of Russia's letter to the King of Bavaria, in Lamb's despatch, leads to a supposition that he may outstep the arrangement at Paris, yet is it possible that he should do so to the required extent? But suppose both these Ministers as fully instructed as I am, if Baden should continue to withhold her signature to an arrangement, and persist, as she threatens, not even to send a Minister here to discuss upon cessions without indemnity, are the territories in question to be taken possession of without her assent?—and are we to lend our sanction to such a measure? As, in my opinion, it will come to this point, I should wish to have your directions upon it. To decide this question, it may perhaps be relevant to lay before you in what precise position Baden stands, as it appears to me, both with respect to her sacrifices and with regard to her Frankfort Treaty.

It is certainly true that no State has proportionably gained

so much, since the French Revolution, as Baden, and that, subsequently to the *recès de l'Empire*, she has gained more than double her population, at that period amounting to 434,000, and now (reckoning the circle of Maine and Tauber, at 948,000) to 949,000. But has she been called upon for no sacrifices? In the first place, as I have been given to understand, when all the other Princes were called upon for a year's produce of their revenues in support of the war, Baden advanced, I believe, the double; and, though the excess was under a promise of repayment, Wessenberg states there is not a chance of its amount being ever, either in the whole, or in part, repaid.

In the second place, is not the disposal of two of her finest provinces in reversion dependent on the failure of heirs male in the existing branch, while there are actually in existence legitimate collateral heirs male, a sacrifice? The sacrifice of part of the Baillage of Wertheim, stated in the Protocol, I will admit to be too trifling for consideration, although unindemnified. Without, therefore, dwelling on this, or on the part taken by this State in the last war, of which you are a more competent judge than I can be, let us see how she stands under her treaty.

By the first separate and secret Article, she engages to lend herself "à toutes les cessions qu'exigeront les arrangemens futurs en Allemagne, *calculées pour le maintien de la force et de l'indépendance de ce pays.*" Is the cession of the province of Maine and Tauber one *calculée pour le maintien ou de la force, ou de l'indépendance de l'Allemagne*, so as to authorize its occupation without the consent of the proprietor? To this question it is for you to answer. For my own part, I should conceive the proposition of M. de Pfeffel, and which is not new to us here, having been stirred both at Munich and Milan, however objectionable in other points of view, far more defensible under the provisions of this treaty, because the contiguity afforded by the cession of this *lisière* would certainly

contribute to the force, and consequently to the independence of Germany.

When the discussions open here, if Baden shall send a Minister, I mean to make use of the argument which the cession of this *lisière* would afford, to induce consent to the lesser cession of Maine and Tauber. But then comes the second secret and separate Article, by which an engagement is taken "par contre à s'employer à procurer à son Altesse Royale en retour de ces cessions, si elles devenoient, *nécessaires une indemnité* compatible avec la masse des objets qui seront disponible à l'époque de la pacification, et avec le but énoncé ci-dessus, et *la plus rapprochée* des dimensions *actuelles* des États de son Altesse Royale." If, then, the cession of Maine and Tauber was *requisite* for the maintenance of the force and independence of Germany, could it be exacted under this stipulation, without some effort to procure indemnity for Baden of the nature recited?

Such, shortly, are the difficulties of this case. To me, however, up to a certain extent, there exists none subsequent to your late instructions. Nothing can be easier than my task, so clearly marked out, to act in concert with Wessenberg, and I shall do so with the best efforts I can, for the purpose of bringing this business to a satisfactory conclusion. But when, as I apprehend, it shall come to forcible occupation, I throw myself upon you to know the countenance it is fitting I should assume.

I send you a private note from Wessenberg, transmitting to me Krusemark's instructions from Hardenberg respecting Mayence, with the Austrian proposition. Any direction you shall give me upon these papers I shall cheerfully obey.

The King of the Netherlands has not yet answered Gagern's reference, made now a month since. I cannot help suspecting, neither can I blame him, (if it shall so turn out) that his Majesty will not forward any treaty with Prussia, till she shall have fulfilled that of Vienna respecting the *enclaves* and limits

designed by that treaty for the Netherlands, and which, notwithstanding all the efforts which have hitherto been made, and all the solemn assurances afforded to you, to me, to his Majesty, by Prince Hardenberg and the King of Prussia himself, still remain in Prussian possession.

I send you a separate letter respecting the Saxe Coburg territories: my despatch No. 13, of the 20th February, was entirely upon this subject, and pointed out the most effectual means (if, where Prussia is concerned, any means can prove effectual) of having justice done upon this subject. Pray, when you shall have some leisure, call for that despatch, and read it.

I wish I could spare you more at the present moment, when, Heaven knows, you have quite enough upon your hands. Farewell, and be well!

Ever affectionately yours, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]

Lord Stewart to Lord Clancarty.

Milan, February 16, 1816.

My dear Clancarty—If I had possessed any means of communication with Frankfort but the common, uncertain post, I should constantly have kept up that correspondence with you, from which I ever derive so much advantage; but I have not had a messenger at my own disposal, and all I could do was to desire Lamb to send you any of my letters to him on the Munich negociations that he conceived of the least moment. I trust he has done this, and that you are in possession of my humble ideas during the progress of these affairs. I shall, therefore, refrain from all repetition, confining myself to annex an extract of Castlereagh's last despatch to me, which points out the course Austria is endeavouring to take.

I do not think the first part of the negociations were conducted well on either side at Munich. Our Minister, before he got your *Lettre corrective*, had learned too much to uphold

Bavaria in her opposition. Montgelas' note, previous to his changing his tone and striking his colours, was extremely unwise and injudicious. When the Prince Royal came here, there was a great deal of diplomatic trick on all sides; but I think he left this in good humour, and with a determination to urge matters to a close, if Baden was obliged to yield what was suggested by the same phalanx of pressure that was in array against Bavaria.

I am well aware of the strict justice of much of your reasoning in your letter of the 3rd; but it has appeared to me that there are only three modes of settling this question—

1st. For Austria to recede. To this I answer—The Emperor is too far committed: his subjects, his army, would not permit him, and his Minister dare not advise him.

2nd. For Bavaria to yield, being satisfied with the indemnities in the Tableau, and giving up entirely the principle of contiguity. This, I say, nothing but force would accomplish or persuade her to.

3rd. For Baden to make a sacrifice, with a view to secure the free consent of Bavaria: this to be limited to a district, and embracing the desirable object of approximation. To this there is surely less objection than to the other two modes. If the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria, *à fortiori* they may urge certain cessions from Baden. What Power has not made sacrifices for the general peace we now enjoy? and I am strongly of opinion those miserable Princes of the old Confederation of the Rhine require a little discipline, and it will do them much good to be kept in order by their superiors. The conduct of Mr. Berkheim and his notes are really ridiculous and too impertinent.

The long instruction to Baron Wessenberg has been communicated to me, and sent to England. It is a correct state of the case, as far as I know. Prince Metternich quotes me, from the extracts I enclose, which it was my duty to communicate to him. *Au reste*, there is so much in not knowing *all*

of a story, in the various diplomatic turns that are given to affairs, that I never feel *quite sure* in any concern.

I shall be glad to hear from you, my dear Clancarty, and long for news of your concerns. If I can be of use, you will not fail to point it out. The Emperor leaves this on the 6th of March for good. He will not be at Vienna before the middle of June, and the *corps diplomatique* are to have a *congé*. I am ignorant yet if Italy, England, or Germany, will contain me.

My best regards to all yours. Believe me, &c.,

STEWART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Stewart.

Frankfort sur Maine, February 26, 1816.

My dear Charles—Your letter of the 16th, from Milan, reached me yesterday by a courier to Wessenberg. Lord Castlereagh had previously forwarded to me the whole of his despatch to you of the 29th ultimo, of which an extract accompanied your letter; and, in the entirely new turn which the proceedings at Milan have given to the negociations, as they regard us at Frankfort, it is upon the precise part of this despatch which you have extracted that I have resolved to square my conduct, till more ample instructions, written for by me, shall have arrived from home.

Lamb has kept me very regularly informed of all that has passed at Munich, and supplied me with copies of your very excellent despatches relating to those affairs. I perfectly agree with you in thinking that the preliminary negociation was very far from being well conducted on either side; and though, at first favourable to the opening a negociation immediately with the Court of Bavaria, I very early regretted, and have never since ceased to regret, that the original design of beginning, continuing, and ending these discussions here, had ever been departed from: but these matters are past, and there is no use in further dwelling upon them.

I can have little doubt that the Prince Royal of Bavaria left you in good humour—and well he might; for, whatever appearance he might wear, his end was answered, and the incessant object of his Court, that of increasing their possessions by every means, gratified as far as it could be by proceedings at Milan, notwithstanding all the coquetry and affected coyness which MM. de Montgelas and Rechberg have since assumed at Munich, in declining to be charged with powers to carry the arrangement into effect; the true object of which is to throw all the odium of exacting sacrifices upon Austria. They well know that their acquisitions are abundantly excessive for any cession they are called upon to make, inclusive of that of contiguity. It is not necessary now to enter into the three modes of settling this matter which you state in your letter, as one of them has been finally chosen; but convinced am I that, if this business had not been extremely mismanaged, (possibly through the state of parties at the Austrian Court) you would have had Bavaria upon her knees, seeking those very exchanges proposed by the Protocol, which have now been obtained by what appears to me a very profuse misemployment of the interests of third parties.

The whole case seems now to have taken an entirely new aspect. As far as relates to the engagements of the Allies, they are upon the eve of being fully satisfied by the completion of those very exchanges which by the Protocol of the 3rd November they undertook to support, and which they conceived comprised indemnities not only sufficient to counterbalance the territories required from Bavaria, but to satisfy her for the sacrifice of contiguity also. Had they thought otherwise—that so large a portion of territory as that of the circle of Main and Tauber was requisite for this purpose, and that so great a sacrifice could be justifiably exacted from Baden, surely they would have said so.

The question, then, to me appears a new one, and the Allies quite at liberty to take whatever line they may deem it expe-

dient upon it; and I believe it will be found, however the others may act, that it will not become quite a facile matter to gain over the *appui* of a great Northern Power to this new demand.

I agree, nevertheless, with you that, if the four Allied Courts can press measures upon Bavaria, they may (though not *à fortiori*) urge certain cessions from Baden. This, to a certain degree, was already done by the Protocol, and to the extent of even endeavouring to obtain *some further modification* of territory, bounded by the *moderate scale* noticed in Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you of the 29th ultimo; some of them, we know, will not be indisposed to use ulterior efforts; but really, when the demand is for one entire circle out of the nine of which the territories of Baden are composed, I should much doubt whether our Court will desire to become a party to such an exaction.

It may be true that all Powers have been, or may be, called upon to make sacrifices for the general peace: I should, however, like to know where, under the proposed arrangement, is the sacrifice of Bavaria. But surely, if the position is a true one, Baden will have the right to ask why she is to be called upon to make the sole and so great a sacrifice in the present instance, and this for the purpose of increasing the Bavarian territories. She may, and doubtless will, if urged upon this point, additionally ask why Wirtemberg is to be left untouched, and claim proportionate indemnity from this last Power as the price of her accession to the terms required; and hence will arise all that unsettlement of territory which it was the object of the Allies to prevent, that complication of negociation which Lord Castlereagh so much and so justly deprecates, and that interminable scene of irritated discussion, which I cannot but apprehend as the result of such a procedure.

Till I shall receive a full and ample communication of the views of our Government upon this new situation of affairs, my march will be guided by Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you of

the 29th January, and so as not to prevent my Court from going, if they shall so please, the full length of lopping off the ninth part of Baden without indemnity, for the future aggrandizement of Bavaria.

Previously to the receipt of your letter, *i.e.*, on the 20th instant, I sent home the whole of Wacquant's instructions, with their ten annexes, Wessenberg's Memoir only excepted.

By accounts received yesterday from Munich, we do not expect to be set agoing here in less than a week, by which time, or very soon after, I should hope, full instructions from Lord Castlereagh will reach me.

Should you go to England, I trust you will make this your road. You might afterwards go home by Brussels, where you will find James and Lady Emily.

We have not a word here worth conveying: all is at a stand, and must continue to be so, till these *revirements territoriaux* shall have been settled.

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Stewart.

Frankfort sur Maine, February 29, 1816.

My dear Charles—I wrote to you so lately in answer to yours of the 16th, that I have little to add to what I then said. Prince Metternich may imagine, and probably does, that he has acted with wonderful dexterity in arranging matters with Bavaria, at the expense of so considerable a sacrifice as that of the province of Main and Tauber, the property of a third party. But measures of this kind are not so easy to accomplish as to imagine; and, however he may have succeeded in effecting his own views upon Bavaria, he will find it totally different, and, if I mistake not, an unattainable matter to satisfy the expectations he has raised at the Court of Munich, for the purpose of extracting her consent to the recent arrangements.

You know the complexion of Lord Castlereagh's feelings

upon this projected sacrifice of Baden, and how little his despatch to you of the 29th of January would justify our support of so considerable an unindemnified demand from the Court of Carlsruhe, more especially in addition to the cession required of her by the Protocol, and to the disposal in succession of a considerable and valuable territory belonging to that Government, without any concert with, or privity on its part.

If this is our case, what is likely to be the conduct of Russia on this new subject? Is it likely that she should stand forward to support this additional sacrifice on the part of her brother-in-law? I am not so simple as to imagine that his Imperial Majesty of Russia has any violent attachment to his wife's family, but, *en revanche*, he certainly does possess considerable predilection for his own fame, quite sufficient to prevent him from laying himself open to the censure of affording his support to the sacrifice required—not demanded with a view of indemnifying Bavaria, for that has been already amply done by the Protocol, but for the purpose of effectually aggrandizing that Power.

If this is the case with Great Britain and Russia, how stands it with Prussia upon this subject? If we may believe the assertions of her plenipotentiary here, (and I see no reason to discredit them on this point) he is directed to give full support to the arrangements of the Protocol; but (and these very recently received) on no account to go beyond these, unless he shall receive further and specific instructions to this effect; which, no doubt, if they shall be issued, will be based upon the demand of some considerable and probably inadmissible *quid pro quo*, as the price of Prussian good offices; so thus another complication will arise in direct contravention of the wishes of all the Allies, as expressed at Paris.

With this view of the probable opinions of the several Allied Courts, there would appear to be but little likelihood of carrying the ulterior negociations, so brightly imagined by

Prince Metternich, into effect. But this is not all—as I learn, and from good authority, Baden has resolved (and who can blame her?) not to send any Minister here, for the purpose of negociating sacrifices on her part without indemnities. If these shall be held out, in order to induce her to grant full powers to her Minister here, they must be held out at the expense of some other Power, possibly Wirtemberg, who will have the same right, and probably act in the same precise manner: so that, if these negociations shall ever be commenced, they will be interminable. If, on the other hand, an attempt should be made to carry Prince Metternich's happy project into effect by force, besides the public scandal of such a measure, it is very clear that two out of three Courts will never lend themselves to such a proceeding; neither will the third, unless induced to do so at a price far exceeding the value of the service. Under these circumstances, I can see but one way out of this labyrinth.

Prince Metternich acted with some dexterity in taking Count Rechberg at his word with respect to the estimated revenues of the circle of Main and Tauber. These being placed at 100,000 florins, Bavaria can have no title to look for more, although I doubt not these revenues amount to at least three times that sum. Nay, upon a subject of such complicated difficulty, aggrandized as she has been, and still will be, it would not be too much to ask of the Court of Munich to retire a little from the amount of the estimate of her plenipotentiary, and to be satisfied with a less increase of revenue than 100,000 florins. I should therefore propose that Austria, by her deliveries of salt to Bavaria, to the amount of 50,000 florins annually, without payment, should personally indemnify her to this extent; or, if she should like it better, that she should withdraw her demands upon the Court of Munich to that amount. Lord Castlereagh's despatch to you, of the 29th of January, would authorize the support of some further moderate sacrifice from Baden; and this, I should think,

would be found in the circle of Main and Tauber, lying on the right of the Tauber, with the exception of the town and banlieu of Wertheim, (forming, as it does, the sole *péage* belonging to Baden upon that river) and thus far, upon the authority of the letter above cited, I should be prepared to go; and our example, in support of this diminished demand from Baden, would probably produce some effect in procuring that of the other two Courts. The revenues of this proposed cession would probably go near to make up the 100,000 florins estimated by M. de Rechberg as the value of the whole circle; but, if not, it is surely more just that Bavaria should charge herself with the difference than that the whole sacrifice should fall on a third Power. If Prince Metternich shall give instructions to Wessenberg for some modified arrangement of this sort, perhaps we shall be able to do something on this subject. As matters at present stand, I think any satisfactory issue absolutely impracticable, and for the reasons above stated.

Farewell, &c., CLANCARTY.

Droit de Garnison de Mayence.

PROPOSITION DE L'AUTRICHE.

L'Empereur consent, dans le cas de l'arrangement avec la Bavière, tel qu'il a été arrêté en notre faveur entre les quatre Cours à Paris—arrangement qui permet à l'Autriche de disposer de la totalité de ses possessions sur la rive gauche du Rhin,

1°. À ce que la place de Mayence, en sa qualité de place fédérative, recevra une garnison composée des troupes Autrichiennes, Prussiennes, et de Darmstadt.

2°. Que le Gouverneur soit Autrichien et le Commandant Prussien; le nombre de la garnison Autrichienne et Prussienne devant être le même; celui de la garnison Hessoise sera determiné de commun accord.

3°. Que tout ce qui sera relatif à l'entretien des garnisons

respectives, des routes militaires, pour établir leurs communications avec les États respectifs—en un mot, tout ce qui concerne tant les objets militaires qu'administratifs, dans la présente question, soit arrangé et convenu, de gré à gré, entre les deux Puissances, de manière à prouver leur parfait accord à l'ouverture des délibérations qui devront avoir lieu à la Diète à ce sujet, et à celui du système général de défense de l'Allemagne.

4°. Que jusques-là, tout reste *in statu quo*, à moins de changemens sous le point de vue administratif, des quels pourraient convenir les deux Cours, en attendant les arrangemens de la Diète.

5°. Que l'Autriche, pour assurer davantage son système de défense et celui des frontières d'Allemagne, reçoive le droit de garnison à la forteresse principale fédérative, qui sera jugée devoir être construite pour la défense du Haut Rhin, sur la même échelle que la Prusse a le droit de garnison à Luxembourg; l'Autriche réservant toutefois la faculté de se relâcher selon la convenance des circonstances, sur le droit de nommer en même tems que le Gouverneur également le Commandant de la place.

CONTRE-PROPOSITION PRUSSIENNE.

Le Chancelier Hardenberg a chargé M. de Krusemark de déclarer au Prince Metternich que sa Majesté Prussienne acquiesce aux propositions susdites, mais qu'elle y attache les deux conditions suivantes:

1°. Que le futur Commandant Prussien dans cette forteresse aura (à l'honorifique près) les mêmes attributions que le Gouverneur Autrichien, et qu'ils agiront constamment dans un parfait concert et en commun.

2°. L'Autriche ayant l'intention de concéder à la Bavière le droit exclusif de mettre garnison dans Landau, qui doit rester forteresse de la fédération Germanique, le Roi demande que la Bavière n'en garde pas seule la disposition, mais que sa

Majesté Impériale se réserve expressément le droit et contracte l'obligation de placer garnison à Landau en même tems que cette dernière.

Mr. B. Frere to Lord Castlereagh.

Constantinople, March 11, 1816.

My Lord—The change of tone on the part of the Internuncio, reported in my despatch No. 8, of this date, requires some further explanation than I am able to give in a public letter, without having the appearance (which I should by all means wish to avoid) of complaining of the conduct of one of my colleagues.

The only instructions which he has received consist in a letter from Prince Metternich, written to him in his own hand, on the night before he left Paris for Milan. The Prince there mentions the Treaty respecting the Seven Islands and the nature of its stipulations, which he tells him that he will receive from the Secretary of State's Office at Vienna, and says that the British Minister is charged with a communication upon the subject.

The despatch, which he received at the same time from the Office at Vienna, enclosed the several treaties which had been concluded at Paris, and amongst them that of the 5th of November, together with the *procès verbal* of the Conference of the 21st. The Under-Secretary, after enumerating them, says, "Though particular circumstances have rendered it advisable to make these treaties public in France, without waiting for the ratifications, you will of course understand that they are not sent for the purpose of being communicated to the Porte, but merely for your private information; without prejudice, however, to the orders which you may have received from Prince Metternich, with regard to your intercourse with your colleagues."

This is, as nearly as I can recollect, the tenour of the letters which he showed me yesterday, in explanation of this

unexpected change in his language. He had never doubted of the sufficiency of his instructions, till the arrival of M. d'Italinsky's; but considered the official transmission of the *procès verbal* as equivalent to the order which it is therein said that the respective Ministers shall receive upon the subject. He now, however, argues that the above document teaches him to expect orders, and that he has received none; meanwhile, he is expressly prohibited from communicating the treaty to the Porte.

The true explanation of these difficulties is no doubt to be found in what I conceive to be a mistaken notion that, by refraining from pressing this subject upon the Porte, he shall the more easily succeed in obtaining her consent to the annexation of Ragusa to the Austrian dominions. I am warranted in this opinion by the language he has himself used towards me; and I was sensibly hurt, in my last conversation with him, at being asked whether I had made any such insinuation to the Reis Effendi. But, though I should not think myself justified in seeking to promote the object which more immediately interests his Majesty's Government by means which would tend to thwart the accomplishment of any other of the arrangements to which it has given its sanction, I apprehend that little assistance is to be expected from the Austrian Minister under the present circumstances, unless I can convince him that, by obtaining the Porte's accession to the treaty respecting the Seven Islands, a step will be gained towards ensuring her assent to the other dispositions that have been made by the Allied Powers, and the question of Ragusa will be facilitated rather than prejudiced by such an event.

I have the honour to be, &c., B. FRERE.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

Florence, March 27, 1816.

My dear Lord Castlereagh—In consequence of General Maitland's request, I send his despatches, together with mine, by courier, and I shall be much obliged to you to let the same

messenger return as soon as you are able. My despatches are but of little interest: we are stupidly dull and quiet in Italy. The Roman States are, however, dissatisfied with the Pope's Government; the people in insurrections constantly give vent to their feelings.

With regard to our communication with that Government, I cannot but return to what I have formerly stated, that, for our consular establishment at least, you should name some person, who should have the charge and direction of the inferior agents, and who should manage the correspondence with the Government. You can hardly be aware of the conduct of some of these agents: their extortions in some instances, their mighty demands from the Government, and their ridiculously haughty demeanour, not to mention their under-practices, of which I constantly hear, neither distinguished for wisdom nor honesty, make it very necessary that some arrangement should be made with regard to them.

I enclose in my despatch the remaining papers relating to the Prince of Piombino's negociation. He has himself transmitted to you his case. You will form your judgment upon it, and, I hope, will give me some opinion with regard to it. There is an advantage in letting a Government like this, which certainly gives very fair protection to everything British, feel that it is thought of and considered in England.

Since the birth of my son, I have a great desire to return to England for a few weeks during the summer. I have not as yet fixed the time; but, if you feel no objection to it, I would thank you to transmit me an official leave of absence, which I might make use of as the opportunity might offer.

Believe me, &c. BURGHERSH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, March 31, 1816.

My dear Lord—The delays in answering the references sent hence to the Court of the Netherlands, relative to the Luxem-

burg negociations, were, as you will see, occasioned by the non-performance by Prussia of the Vienna Treaty. When the enclosed letter reached me from M. de Nagell, communicating this, I immediately stated its substance to M. de Humboldt, who desired me to address him privately upon the subject. This gave rise to the enclosed correspondence between us, which I now forward for your information, as well as the copy of my answer to M. de Nagell.

Your time is so occupied that I shall say nothing upon these papers. Happily the main point of difficulty is done away by the order at length issued for the delivery of the *enclaves;* and, if the new demand for a military road by Namur and Liege does not delay us, I scarcely think we shall be long in finishing this business satisfactorily. I shall only add that, though Humboldt's letter of the 26th is an *amas* of *verbiage*, his conduct on all points of discussion here has been perfectly fair.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]

Baron de Nagell to the Earl of Clancarty.

Hague, March 17, 1816.

My dear Lord—I avail myself of the opportunity which the messenger I send to Baron de Gagern affords me, to acquaint your Excellency that I have sent new instructions to the said Baron, relative to the Convention now negociating with Prussia. The reasons why they were kept back are—

1stly. That I flattered myself that the Treaty of Vienna of the 31st May, 1815, would at last be executed, the *enclaves* in Guelderland given up—the limits regulated.

2ndly. That Baron de Humboldt would be sufficiently instructed about the *projet* of the pending negociation at Frankfort.

In vain have I looked to the first. The *enclaves* are still in Prussian hands, and M. de Sack, disputing about Tegelen, a

village *on the border of the Meuse*, tries to keep possession of Gemnich, Moresnet, and the Calamine, by drawing a line to the west, instead of from south to north. On the 22nd inst., the respective Commissioners meet again, and a few days will bring this business to some issue or another. I fear we shall be obliged to appeal to the interference of Austria, Great Britain, and Russia, for the execution of a treaty which those Powers have signed and ratified.

Ad secundum, I am still ignorant, but do not accuse myself of slothfulness. I have instructed our Plenipotentiary, but under the express reserve to declare to Baron de Humboldt that, if the Treaty of Vienna is not executed after the most liberal offers (on which we are never honoured with an answer) made by my Royal Master to the King of Prussia, at Laken, in October, 1815, we must give up all hopes of seeing any other Convention adhered to. It is a mere mockery to say that M. de Sack will not obey commands. If Prince Hardenberg was serious, he certainly has means enough to make his orders respected. I am seriously concerned that these unfortunate circumstances keep your lordship so long from us; but at the same time I am convinced that your Excellency will approve our conduct, and will protect, by all the energy of your influence, our just claims upon Prussia.

I remain, &c., A. W. C. DE NAGELL.

Lord Clancarty to the Baron de Humboldt.

Frankfort sur Maine, March 21, 1816.

My dear Sir—I yesterday received a private letter from M. de Nagell, in answer to one long since written by me, pressing for an answer to the last reference made from hence by M. de Gagern.

The difficulties are such as I had latterly apprehended they would prove to be. These, in consequence of that open communication which has subsisted between us on all the subjects of our discussion here, I suggested to you, as my surmises, the

moment they were formed. The feeling entertained by the Government of the Netherlands appears to be, and, I must own, I cannot blame it, that, till the Treaty of Vienna shall have been executed on the part of Prussia, by the delivery of the *enclaves*, and such reasonable and conciliatory proceedings adopted for the precise settlement of the frontiers between the two kingdoms, as ought to exist even between two of the most indifferent States, much more between those united by the closest family ties, and whose best interests are so much involved in the well-being of each other, there can be no security for the due execution of future treaties.

Notwithstanding the repeated assurances given by Prince Hardenberg to me, to Lord Castlereagh, and latterly, as I have been informed, by his Prussian Majesty himself, to the King of the Netherlands, these still remain without effect; the *enclaves* continue in Prussian possession, and the treaty, at the end of ten months, as much unexecuted as on the day of its signature. How is this to be understood? Doubtless orders, and peremptory orders, were issued by the Prussian *employés* for the delivery of these *enclaves*. Of this I can have no doubt, because Prince Hardenberg assured me at Paris, in August last, that such had been the case, and subsequently gave similar assurances to Lord Castlereagh.

Have they been received and not obeyed? Would a high-minded and justly proud Government for a moment tolerate such a disobedience in any case, but more especially in one wherein the froward conduct of the subordinate agent might tend improperly to compromise the good faith of his Court, and to interrupt that harmony and good understanding which, for the interest of both, and I may say of the whole world, ought to subsist between the two Governments? I am at a total loss how to answer these latter questions.

With respect to the arrangement of the precise line of division between the two Powers, the conduct of M. de Sack, to whom I am sorry that the direction on the part of Prussia

has been given, seems, as represented by M. de Nagell, to have been the very reverse of conciliatory—I have in my possession a map describing the limits traced from the original now in possession of the King of the Netherlands, whereon the line of division was drawn by the hand of Mr. Hoffman, in the presence of M. Jourdan and me; we three having been formed into a Commission for this purpose at Vienna; and from this division the article of the treaty was framed.

No doubt the line of limit thus described was to be afterwards finally established upon the spot by Commissioners, and this subject to a reciprocal divergence to a certain extent, in consequence of the banlieus of such towns and villages as might intercept its course; but, with this exception, it was to remain entire.

From the north of Schwalmen, this line, according to the map, and according to my thorough recollection, runs northward along the exact limits which divided the French department de la Meuse Inférieure from that of Roer, till it reaches the north-eastern point of that limit beyond Venloo. Nevertheless, M. de Sack, without any authority that I can discover, either in the Article or anywhere else, insists that this line between Schwalmen and Venloo is to take a western direction, to comprise the village of Tegelen within the Prussian possessions, and, on other points specified by M. de Nagell, shows a disposition as little conciliatory. Insomuch that, upon this subject, as well as on that of the Guelderland *enclaves*, M. de Nagell expresses his apprehensions that his Government will be necessitated to resort to the interference of the three other Courts, with whom the same treaties were signed at Vienna, and have since been ratified. You will observe that this is not put forward in a tone of menace by M. de Nagell—far from it; stated in a private letter to me the statement is accompanied with expressions of regret that such may become the necessary alternative.

You have long since been aware, my good sir, of the anxious

desire of my Government to draw as close as possible the ties of good fellowship and confidence between Prussia and the Netherlands: that this is also the desire of the other high Allies, I am equally persuaded, and, to descend from the great to a very insignificant being, I am sure you will do me the justice to acknowledge that there exists no individual who more anxiously entertains this desire than he who has the honour of addressing you. Perhaps this address is an imprudent one. The confidence which has existed between us—the open and candid manner in which you have conducted such discussions as our mutual mission to this place have necessitated—lead me to think otherwise.

Its motive is that, avoiding official proceeding and consequent record, and much more, foreign intervention, through your private representations the Treaty of Vienna may be executed by Prussia with respect to the Netherlands. As far as relates to the *enclaves*, there can exist no reason why this should not immediately be done; and, as relating to the fixture of limits, that this may be put in such a liberal and conciliatory train of arrangement as may tend to the final termination of this matter without unnecessary delay.

I am far from wishing that Prussia should give way upon any point to which she is justly entitled; and, even if capable of harbouring such a desire, I should most certainly be far from borne out in it by my Government; but I am indeed most anxious that, to the transcendent glory which Prussia has so justly acquired, in putting down bad faith and breach of treaties, should be added that of furnishing a bright example of the very opposite of those qualities, and thus convincing Europe and the world that, not less by the skill and gallantry of her sons in war, than the loyalty and good faith of her Government in peace, the general interest of the community is in the fullest manner promoted by the conduct of Prussia.

I remain, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Baron de Nagell.

Frankfort sur Maine, March 22, 1816.

My dear Sir—Your letter of the 17th instant reached me on Wednesday morning, the 20th. M. de Humboldt, who, to do him justice, ever since our arrival here, has expressed himself warmly against the delays of his Government in fulfilling the Treaty of Vienna, and most especially with respect to the non-delivery of the *enclaves*, dined with me on that day. It appeared to me that, without in any degree committing your Government, an opportunity was thus offered of endeavouring, with some hope of success, to further the very legitimate views of the King of the Netherlands upon the subject in question, and this without resorting to the extreme (though perhaps necessary) measure of calling upon the other Courts to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty.

I therefore acquainted M. de Humboldt that, from a private letter received from you, it appeared that the difficulties which opposed the progress of our present negociation proceeded not from any subject of embarrassment rising out of the negociation itself, but, as I had apprehended, and previously communicated to him, from a feeling, with which no one could find fault, of want of assurance for the execution of new treaties, while those, now of somewhat ancient date, and of the most solemn and important nature, still remained unexecuted. M. de Humboldt fully admitted to me the legitimacy of the feeling, and, after some conversation upon the particular points of grievance, he proposed to me the very measure to which I was desirous of leading him; viz., that I should write him a private Note of such a nature as he might send confidentially to Prince Hardenberg, and which might, if found requisite, be shown to the King of Prussia. In consequence of this, I yesterday addressed to him a letter, the copy of which I now send for your and his Majesty's information.

What the result of this proceeding may be, after all that has passed, it would be somewhat hardy to predict. The best,

perhaps, that may be said of it is, that it is capable of doing no harm, but leaves you quite unfettered to take whatever course you may think fit, ignorant, as you are supposed to be, of its existence. Judging, however, by a letter received by me yesterday from Mr. Rose, our Minister at Berlin, I should be inclined to hope that the Prussian Cabinet is about to proceed towards you with more of conciliation than has hitherto marked its conduct.

Mr. Rose states that an official notification issued on the 16th announces the dissolution of the Provincial Government of the Rhenish provinces, the recall of M. de Sack, the nomination of M. Ingersleben to the Chief Presidency of the Lower Rhine, and M. de Salms Laubach to that of Berg, Juliers, and Cleves. Mr. Rose adds that M. de Sack's conduct has been highly disapproved by Prince Hardenberg, and assures me that the principles and disposition of M. d'Ingersleben are such as will render him an acceptable neighbour to my Netherland friends. May he prove so! I pray God; for we have had quite enough of inconvenience from evil vicinage, to hope for some relaxation in future.

In addition to this, M. de Humboldt acquaints me that the Comte de Fleming, now here, attached to his mission, is to go Chargé des Affaires de la Prusse to your Court. It is not easy to foresee what any young man will turn out to be after his entry into public life; but, if ever one would venture to speculate upon matters of this sort, I should be led to augur favourably of this young diplomate. His manners are pleasing, and he seems to possess good judgment and good taste, which I should hope he will equally apply in matters of State as he does in those of society. Although he was at Vienna during the whole of the Congress, and I had often opportunities of meeting him at Prince Hardenberg's, (whose nephew he is) and in other good societies, I can, however, venture to say no more than that he promises well. Brockhausen, I should conceive, will not return to you.

I communicated to M. de Gagern the conversation I had had with Humboldt on the evening on which it passed, and have furnished him with a copy of my letter. M. de Gagern has, in return, acquainted me with the heads of your last instructions to him; but these I have not yet had time to compare with the *projet* of the treaty, and consequently can make no observation upon them.

I hear from Brussels that the Embassy House in the Park is intended for the Prince of Orange: if this is so, I cannot have a word to say; all I would expect was, not that the Government should interfere in my favour in matters of property—such an expectation would have been most unreasonable—but that they should not, with their irresistible weight, oppose my claims in favour of any subordinate department.

The best wishes of my whole family wait on you and Madame de Nagell.

Believe me, &c., CLANCARTY.

Baron de Humboldt to Lord Clancarty.

À Francfort sur Maine, ce 25 Mars, 1816.

Mylord—J'ai été infiniment charmé de la lettre franche et amicale que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire, sur les rapports de la Prusse avec les Pays-bas. J'y ai trouvé une nouvelle preuve de la part que vous prenez aux intérêts de la Prusse, et des sentimens que vous me témoignez personnellement. Vous savez, mon cher Lord, combien j'y ai toujours été sensible et reconnoissant, et mes sentimens ne changent jamais là-dessus.

Je crois que je puis entièrement me reposer sur votre témoignage, Mylord, que partout où j'ai eu de traiter des affaires relatives aux Pays-bas, j'y ai apporté tous les moyens de conciliation qui ont dépendu de moi. Vous m'avez rendu souvent vous-même cette justice. Veuillez donc être persuadé que j'agirai de même aussi dans cette occasion. Mais permettez moi aussi de vous exposer la véritable situation de

l'affaire, d'après ma manière de l'envisager ; car je ne puis pas convenir entièrement de celle dont M. de Nagell la regarde.

Ne craignez certainement pas, mon cher Lord, que la Prusse ne se fasse pas un devoir exact de remplir scrupuleusement ses traités. Cela est dans les intentions du Roi, dont le caractère à cet égard est bien connu, dans les sentimens du Prince Chancelier d'État, enfin, je dirois même dans la régularité par laquelle la marche de notre Administration est toujours distinguée. Le Gouvernement des Pays-bas excepté, je ne connois non plus personne qui ne fasse et puisse nous faire une reproche à cet égard : en revanche, nous aurions des plaintes bien justes à porter. Les négociations dont nous sommes, Mylord, conjointement chargés ici prouvent bien que l'Acte du Congrès n'est pas rempli à notre égard jusqu'ici ; et les objets dont nous sommes privés par-là sont bien autrement intéressans que les enclaves que réclament les Pays-bas.

Mais je ne veux pas m'éloigner de l'objet qui nous occupe dans ce moment. Soyez bien persuadé, Mylord, que je ferai tout ce qui dépend de moi pour l'applanir. Mais je vous prie d'y contribuer également, et je crois que les observations suivantes peuvent y conduire, si on veut bien y entrer et y avoir égard.

Le point duquel il faut partir pour bien envisager la chose, et sur lequel, si vous me permettez, mon cher Lord, de vous parler avec un abandon entier de confiance et d'amitié, vous-même ne paraissez pas assez juste envers nous, et que dans l'affaire de notre délimitation avec les Pays-bas, il ne s'agit pas d'exécuter simplement sur les lieux la ligne tracée dans le traité de Vienne, mais, au contraire, d'entrer dans un arrangement qui soit plus favorable à la Prusse sur une partie de la frontière, moyennant des concessions que nous pouvons faire sur une autre.

Vous avez certainement lu, Mylord, la Note que j'ai addressée le 9 Janvier à M. de Gagern. Elle explique entièrement les intentions de la Prusse à cet égard. Le Gouvernement des

Pays-bas est convenu lui-même de l'admissibilité d'un tel arrangement, et la Commission travaille dans ce sens.

La ligne qui a été fixée dans la conférence entre vous, Mylord, M. de Jourdan, et M. Hoffman, comme vous le rappelez dans votre lettre, nous est tellement désavantageuse, et si pernicieuse à notre commerce, que nous ne pouvons pas nous y soumettre sans épuiser tous les moyens qu'une négociation franche et loyale, entre deux Gouvernemens équitables et amis, peut offrir. Nous ne pouvons pas nous imaginer que le Gouvernement des Pays-bas voudroit profiter de la hâte avec laquelle il a fallu traiter à Vienne sur des points qui dépendent des localités et de mille détails. Nous sommes prêts à lui offrir en revanche des avantages sur une autre partie de la frontière. Y a-t-il en cela quelque chose qui ne soit pas franche, juste, analogue aux rapports de bonne harmonie et d'amitié qui lient les deux Gouvernemens ? Ces considérations changent cependant entièrement la question si la Prusse remplit ou non son traité avec les Pays-bas.

Je n'applique pas cela aux *enclaves*. Vous savez mes opinions à cet égard, Milord ; je l'ai dite sans détour dans ma Note du 9 Janvier. Je n'ai pas eu depuis de communication sur cet objet ce que je m'explique facilement par l'immensité de travail que M. le Prince Chancelier d'État a du trouver à son retour à Berlin. Je lui ai écrit de nouveau. Je lui ai envoyé copie de votre lettre, Mylord. Il m'importe infiniment de lui procurer la satisfaction de voir lui-même quel intérêt vous prenez à la Prusse ; de quelle manière vraiment amicale vous tâchez toujours d'établir nos rapports avec les Pays-bas sur les bases de conciliation et d'amitié, que nous cherchons également. Je suis sûr qu'il me répondra tout de suite, et je sépare par conséquent le point des *enclaves* entièrement des autres.

Mais si, du reste, M. de Sack, ainsi que vous me le dites Mylord, insiste à donner à la ligne de démarcation entre Swalmen et Venloo une direction plus vers l'Ouest que ne lui en assigne le traité : je ne puis point nommer ceci une infraction

de ce dernier ; c'est une proposition résultant du désir de faire un arrangement des frontières plus convenable—désir manifesté ouvertement par la Prusse et accueilli par les Pays-bas. Ce ne seroit que dans la manière d'insister que M. de Sack pourroit avoir eu tort.

Je dois observer à cette occasion que, par suite d'une mesure générale qui tient à des raisons administratives, le Roi a confié à M. de Sack la direction d'une autre province. Il est à la veille de son départ d'Aix-la-Chapelle.

Je ne comprends pas au reste ce que M. de Nagell vous a mandé, Mylord, sur la partie de la négociation déjà entamée. D'après une lettre de M. le Prince de Hardenberg, j'en croyais applanies les plus grandes difficultés. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous en communiquer la traduction, et je vois par la réponse que vous avez bien voulu me faire que la lettre de M. Nagell à votre Excellence, dans laquelle il se plaint des demandes de M. de Sack, est d'une date où il doit connoître l'état de la négociation à l'époque où M. de Bareuth avait fait son rapport à M. le Prince de Hardenberg.

Quoiqu'il en soit, veuillez être bien certain, Mylord, que les Commissaires Prussiens ont, et auront toujours, l'ordre de faire tout ce qui est possible pour concilier les intérêts : mais il faut les concilier et non pas les sacrifier, et ce seroit les sacrifier entièrement au détriment de notre commerce et de nos manufactures, que de vouloir rester littéralement au traité de Vienne. Le Gouvernement des Pays-bas en sauroit être aussi plus équitable. Et je vous prie instamment, Mylord, de vouloir bien vous joindre à nous, pour qu'il nous procure quelque condescendance à cet égard.

Le parti que ce Gouvernement prend à présent de vouloir retarder la négociation sur Luxembourg, qui a déjà éprouvé tant de lenteurs, ne me semble, je vous ne le dissimule point, pas bien conciliant, Mylord. À quoi cette mesure doit-elle aboutir ? Vous dites vous-même qu'elle n'est et ne doit pas être une menace. Cela se conçoit, et la Prusse ne la prendroit

jamais pour telle. Quelle utilité peut donc avoir ce délai? La Prusse occupe à présent à elle seule Luxembourg. Elle l'occupe en conformité des traités. Elle ne perd guères si, sans traité particulier cet état de choses se prolonge; c'est au contraire à prévoir que ce traité lui imposera des obligations qu'elle n'a point à present; mais elle désire de le conclure, parcequ'elle désire régler et fixer tous ses rapports avec le royaume des Pays-bas, et le satisfaire sur tous les points justes et équitables.

Vous savez, Mylord, tous les détails de cette négociation. Vous avez eu la patience de vous en occuper, d'assister à une conférence entre M. de Gagern et moi. Vous avez vu combien peu différent nos avis. Vous n'avez certainement pu, et vous n'avez pas trouvé injustes les demandes de la Prusse. Elle se borne uniquement à vouloir que le Gouverneur ait assez d'indépendance et d'autorité pour pouvoir être responsable de la défense de la place, et qu'elle ne supporte pas à elle seule tout le fardeau de son entretien. Veuillez, je vous prie, Mylord, faire que cette négociation continue le plutôt possible. Il est à espérer pourtant que le terme de nos négociations arrivera sous peu: à présent il est encore qu'il ne sera pas nécessaire de prolonger longtems les négociations territoriales, et combien ne seroit il pas pénible alors de n'avoir pas terminé l'arrangement qui a été le premier dont nous nous soyons occupés!

Je prends la liberté de vous parler encore d'un dernier objet. La Prusse avoit demandé une route militaire durant le tems de l'occupation de la France, par Namur à Sedan. Le Gouvernement des Pays-bas la refuse. Je ne vous envoye les deux Notes échangées sur ce sujet, Mylord, puisque je suis sûr que M. de Gagern vous les a communiquées. Nous ne pouvons nous rendre à présent que par deux routes à Sedan, par Coblenz et Trèves, et par Praüm et Diekirch. La première est un détour énorme: nous nous servirions volontiers de la seconde, car croyez le moi, Mylord, nous aimons nous mêmes à borner nos demandes au stricte nécessaire, mais cette route n'est praticable qu'en été; et nos troupes jusqu'ici ont été

toujours obligées de faire le détour. Je reviendrai nécessairement sur cet objet. Le Gouvernement des Pays-bas demande des routes pour toujours qui traversent une très grande partie de nos États—il refuse une aussi courte demande pour trois ou cinq ans au plus, et pour un objet d'un intérêt qui lui est commun à lui-même. Votre justice, Mylord, ne peut trouver aucune réciprocité là—dedans ; et je vous fais juge vous-même si nous pouvons accorder les routes qu'on nous demande, si l'on nous refuse tout excepté le petit bout de chemin qu'on traverse pour aller par Luxembourg à Sedan ; et lorsqu'on veut nous forcer de chercher ce seul passage, ou par un détour immense, ou par une route impracticable. Je négligerois vraiment d'une manière impardonable les intérêts de ma Cour, si j'y acquiescois.

Voilà, Mylord, une explication bien franche, bien sincère, et ne portant vraiment que du vif désir de voir finir des discussions, auxquelles je ne me croirai jamais appellé que pour y porter l'esprit de la plus grande conciliation. Je crois, et en cela, Mylord, vous serez certainement de mon opinion, qu'on doit y travailler des deux côtés. Je connois les dispositions de ma Cour ; je sais que je n'ai d'autre chose à faire que de fixer davantage l'attention sur ces rapports que la multiplicité des affaires pourrait en avoir détourné momentanément. J'ose bien compter aussi sur votre assistance, Mylord ; j'ai eu la satisfaction de travailler souvent avec vous ; je l'ai toujours regardé comme un avantage dont j'ai vivement réconnu le prix ; j'espère qu'aussi l'affaire de Luxembourg et des routes militaires qui devra nécessairement être terminée ici, sera sous vos auspices, et avec votre coopération.

Je serai toujours, &c., HUMBOLDT.

Lord Clancarty to Baron de Humboldt.

Frankfort sur Maine, March 26, 1816.

My dear Sir—I had the honour of receiving your letter, of yesterday's date, in the course of that evening, and read with

considerable pleasure the assurances you give of the scrupulous attention of the Prussian Government to the fulfilment of its treaties.

The personal and laudable exertions you have used for the purpose of bringing matters to a happy issue, upon some of the points remaining for adjustment between you and the Court of the Netherlands, I have always fully appreciated. To them I attribute in a considerable degree that orders have at length been issued for delivering the *enclaves* to the latter Government.[1] Such exertions are not less calculated to do you honour than to raise the Court which you so ably serve in public estimation. Having said this, which falls far short of what I feel on the subject, you will pardon me for stating that to some of the doctrines and reasoning of your letter of yesterday I cannot subscribe.

Perhaps this may in part arise from my being ignorant of much of what may have passed between yours and the Government of the Netherlands respecting the objects entertained by Prussia for altering partially the line of demarcation between the two countries established by the Treaty of Vienna. But, among the rest, as an abstract proposition, I can never admit that any Power has a right even to defer, much less to decline, the execution of a treaty, because some of its stipulations may prove disadvantageous to that Power, or to retain possession of what is become the territory of another, for the purpose of facilitating rectifications, which ought to be made with the most entire freedom and by the unfettered and mutual consent of both.

To the legitimacy of the object of such rectification to a limited extent in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle, I am fully willing to assent; and to the principle of a fair and equitable arrangement of this sort, as far as practicable and reciprocally advantageous, I have never heard the King of the

[1] The letter and enclosure communicating this fact is sent enclosed in despatch No. 20.—*Note by Lord Clancarty.*

Netherlands object; but sure I am that the best mode of accomplishing it is by equal negociation and conciliatory conduct.

The *manière d'insister* of M. de Sack was certainly very little calculated to obtain this or any other point; and allow me to say that, on the particular point between Schwalmen and Venloo, on which you admit that M. de Sack (right, as you seem to think, in seeking a more convenient arrangement of frontier) in his *manière d'insister* may have been wrong, I never before heard that any rectification of the frontier in that part was sought by the Prussian Government, much less one that would comprise the village of Tegelen, upon the very borders of the Meuse, within their territory, the whole of which borders, to a specified distance, it was always understood (and so stipulated) should remain with the Netherlands.

But enough of this. Happily, another arrangement has been made with respect to those employed to conclude these matters; and I have every reliance that they will now be conducted with a full regard to the dignity as well as the legitimate interests of both countries.

You are so fully aware of the anxiety I have always felt, not only for the termination of these affairs, but of the treaty respecting Luxemburg, that I need only say every fair effort upon my part shall continue to be used, in order, at the earliest date, satisfactorily to accomplish the conclusion of both.

I reserve conveying to you the impression made upon my mind by your latter demand for an additional military road, by your observations on the unlimited nature of those claimed by the Netherlands, and by some other points of your letter, till I have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow. I have merely confined myself to treat lightly herein upon those which appeared to me most in connexion with the subject of that which I had the honour of addressing to you on the 21st instant.

I remain, &c., CLANCARTY.

The Duc d'Otrante to Lord Castlereagh.

Dresde, le 1er Avril, 1816.

Mylord—J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre Seigneurie par duplicata, pour la prier de me faire autoriser à conduire mes enfants en Angleterre, pour leur éducation. Je désire qu'ils étudient les mœurs, les loix, et les moyens de prospérité de votre nation.

Ceux qui voyagent pour s'éclairer laissent ordinairement dans les pays qu'ils parcourent de bons exemples en échange des lumières qu'ils rapportent. Votre Gouvernement ne trouvera donc aucun inconvénient à nous accorder les passeports qui nous sont nécessaires. Votre Seigneurie m'obligera en voulant bien se donner la peine de me les addresser à Dresde.

J'ai écrit au Lord Wellington une lettre importante sur les évènemens qui ont précedé et suivi le 20 Mars, 1815. Je ne veux pas que votre Seigneurie la connaisse par un autre que moi. Je profite du départ de M. Jackson pour vous la faire parvenir. Je la confie à votre discrétion et à votre amitié.

Je prie votre Seigneurie de recevoir l'assurance de ma haute considération. Il me seroit très agréable de vous offrir de vive voix l'expression de ma profonde reconnoissance.

Le Duc d'OTRANTE.

[Enclosure.]

Le Duc d'Otrante au Duc de Wellington.

Dresde, 1er Fevrier.

Mylord—Toutes les lettres qui m'arrivent de Paris me parlent de votre bienveillance pour moi. J'apprends de tous côtés que dans toutes les occasions vous rendez publiquement justice à mon administration. La reconnoissance m'entraine aujourd'hui au delà des bornes de l'expression ordinaire. Je comptois vous écrire quelques lignes de remercimens, et vous faire connoître quelques unes des causes secrètes de la haine de mes ennemis, pour ajouter, s'il étoit possible aux sentimens de votre éstime et de votre intérêt. Je n'ai pu m'arrêter;

mon ame avoit besoin de s'épancher; je vous ai écrit un volume. Daignez l'accueillir avec bonté, et le lire avec indulgence.

J'examinerai dans un autre moment la loi d'exil qu'on a rendue, et l'intention qu'on a eue de m'y comprendre sans oser articuler mon nom.

Il faut être dans un aveuglement profond pour espérer que le Roi, qui m'a placé dans une exception solemnelle et inviolable, ne fut pas révolté, si on lui présentoit à signer une ordonnance où mon nom seroit inscrit au nombre des exilés en vertu d'une loi qui ne m'a pas nommé.

Il m'est impossible de concilier dans mon esprit la lettre du Roi qui m'a appellé au Ministère de la Police, celle qui m'a nommé son Ministre à Dresde, les assurances qui la terminent, avec une ordonnance d'exil, signée de la même main. La postérité rechercheroit les causes de cette étrange contradiction; elle ne voudroit pas se persuader que des motifs qui n'ont pas empêché le Roi de me faire entrer dans son Conseil, et dans la plus grande étendue de sa confiance, au moment de danger, m'en eussent fait éloigner et bannir de ma patrie, quand on a cru le danger passé. Qui pourroit compter sur la sainteté des paroles royales, si les Chambres avoient le droit d'en suspendre et d'en annuler les effets? qui croiroit à la Constitution, si les Chambres pourroient exclure un de leur membres sans le juger, sans même prononcer son nom? Après une telle violation, où l'Europe trouveroit-elle un Gouvernement en France?

Le Duc d'OTRANTE.

À sa Seigneurie le Duc de Wellington.

Un législateur de l'antiquité et l'un des plus renommés par sa sagesse, Solon, après des longues agitations, au premier jour du retour de l'ordre, mit la reconciliation et la paix publique sous la garantie et sous la protection du Ciel; voilà, Mylord, l'exemple que je proposois au Roi d'imiter. J'en

appelle à votre témoignage, dont le poids est autant l'attribut de votre caractère que celui de votre gloire.

Nos maux étoient profonds : il n'y avoit pas à se tromper sur les remèdes ; notre salut, notre existence sociale en dépendoient ; ma voix a été étouffée par le bruit des passions ; les conseils de la modération ont été présentés comme un piége, et des insensés, dans l'égarement de leur raison, ont calomnié à la fois mon ministère sous la République, mon ministère sous Napoléon, et mon ministère sous Louis XVIII.

Il me répugneroit d'occuper l'Europe de ma longue et pénible administration, si elle, ne se lioit pas à la connoissance de la vérité. Je rétablirai les faits dans leur ordre et dans leur intégrité : plusieurs sont ignorés, d'autres ont été intervertis. Je publierai les pièces authentiques à l'appui ; la moindre lacune en affoibliroit l'intérêt : je dirai toutes les causes de nos grands évènemens ; j'ai vu de près les ressorts secrets qui ont mis en jeu les passions. J'expliquerai les Révolutions qui ont fait passer la France de l'antique Monarchie à la République, de la République à l'Empire de Napoléon ; et de cet Empire à la Royauté des Bourbons.

J'ai besoin de croire, en me livrant à ce travail très important, puisqu'il doit servir des matériaux à l'histoire qu'on voudra bien considérer comme une nouvelle preuve de mon amour pour la patrie.

Mais, Mylord, le tems fuit : je ne sais si les choses n'auront pas changé, lorsque mon mémoire sera composé. Je vais, en attendant, satisfaire à l'empressement de ceux qui désirent que j'éclaire l'opinion sur des circonstances qui me sont personnelles, et qui ont été étrangement dénaturées. Personne ne peut mieux que votre Seigneurie rendre justice à mes sentimens et à mes principes : ma conduite politique toute entière est sous ses yeux depuis le 15 Juin, jour où j'ai eu l'honneur de correspondre pour la première fois avec elle, jusqu'au moment où j'ai quitté Paris.

Je n'ignore pas, Mylord, que la justice que j'invoque m'est

mon ame avoit besoin de s'épancher; je vous ai écrit un volume. Daignez l'accueillir avec bonté, et le lire avec indulgence.

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Nos maux étoient profonds : il n'y avoit pas à se tromper sur les remèdes ; notre salut, notre existence sociale en dépendoient ; ma voix a été étouffée par le bruit des passions ; les conseils de la modération ont été présentés comme un piége, et des insensés, dans l'égarement de leur raison, ont calomnié à la fois mon ministère sous la République, mon ministère sous Napoléon, et mon ministère sous Louis XVIII.

Il me répugneroit d'occuper l'Europe de ma longue et pénible administration, si elle, ne se lioit pas à la connoissance de la vérité. Je rétablirai les faits dans leur ordre et dans leur intégrité : plusieurs sont ignorés, d'autres ont été intervertis. Je publierai les pièces authentiques à l'appui ; la moindre lacune en affoibliroit l'intérêt : je dirai toutes les causes de nos grands évènemens ; j'ai vu de près les ressorts secrets qui ont mis en jeu les passions. J'expliquerai les Révolutions qui ont fait passer la France de l'antique Monarchie à la République, de la République à l'Empire de Napoléon ; et de cet Empire à la Royauté des Bourbons.

J'ai besoin de croire, en me livrant à ce travail très important, puisqu'il doit servir des matériaux à l'histoire qu'on voudra bien considérer comme une nouvelle preuve de mon amour pour la patrie.

Mais, Mylord, le tems fuit : je ne sais si les choses n'auront pas changé, lorsque mon mémoire sera composé. Je vais, en attendant, satisfaire à l'empressement de ceux qui désirent que j'éclaire l'opinion sur des circonstances qui me sont personnelles, et qui ont été étrangement dénaturées. Personne ne peut mieux que votre Seigneurie rendre justice à mes sentimens et à mes principes : ma conduite politique toute entière est sous ses yeux depuis le 15 Juin, jour où j'ai eu l'honneur de correspondre pour la première fois avec elle, jusqu'au moment où j'ai quitté Paris.

Je n'ignore pas, Mylord, que la justice que j'invoque m'est

solemnellement et complètement rendue par vous dans toutes les occasions : c'est pour cela même que je prends la liberté de vous adresser le compte que je vais rendre, afin que vous y puisiez de nouvelles armes pour me défendre. Je ne crains point de multiplier vos droits à ma reconnoissance, parceque je sens que j'ai dans le cœur de quoi les acquitter.

Les circonstances sur lesquelles on demande des éclaircissemens se rapportent.

1°. À la rentrée du Roi à Paris.

2°. À mon acceptation du Ministère de la Police.

3°. À l'Ordonnance du 24 Juillet, et à mon Administration.

4°. À ma Mission à Dresde, et aux causes, qui m'ont empêché d'entrer dans la Chambre des Députés.

SECTION I.

Je présidois le gouvernement de la France lorsque les armées des Puissances Alliées avançoient sur Paris. Napoléon avoit abdiqué, mais il étoit encore à l'Elysée ; il demandoit à marcher comme Général à la tête de l'armée française. Cette offre ne pouvoit être accueillie. Onze cent mille baionettes étrangères avoient pénétré de toutes parts sur notre territoire et nous n'avions pas cent mille hommes sous les armes.

La retraite de l'armée fut donc résolue, et Napoléon fut invité à quitter la Malmaison, où il s'étoit retiré et à s'embarquer pour les États Unis. Mes instances à cet égard ont pu être mal jugées par lui ; dans l'adversité l'ame s'ouvre facilement aux soupçons : je suis sûr au moins de n'en avoir mérité aucune. Je ne l'avois point servi à la manière des courtisans ; je n'ai pas suivi leur exemple en l'abandonnant dans le malheur. Personne n'apprécioit mieux que moi la puissance de son génie, mais personne n'étoit plus convaincu que sa présence ne pouvoit plus que précipiter la France dans le dernier abîme de maux. Je le conjurai donc de quitter le Continent.

tardive nous a placée sous le joug des évènemens : je me crois absous de toute reproche par la nécessité.

Le véritable point de la difficulté n'a pas été saisi ; ceux qui vouloient écarter les Bourbons ont cru que le choix du Prince qui seroit appellé à regner sur la France n'etoit que d'un intérêt secondaire : on auroit du voir qu'il falloit envisager la question d'une autre manière.

On prétend que j'ai paralysé l'élan de l'armée : ceux qui ont cette opinion ne connoissent pas la disproportion de nos forces : de nouveaux prodiges de courage n'auroient servi qu'à compromettre l'élite de nos légions, et nous exposerions la capitale à toutes les horreurs d'une invasion à main armée. J'ai du m'arrêter devant le salut de l'État : le plus grand danger pour un pays est la dissolution de tous les liens sociaux ; elle engloutit à la fois la fortune publique et les fortunes privées, et ne laisse plus après elle ni espérance ni avenir.

Au milieu de tous les choix d'opinion, Louis XVIII. approchoit de Paris : il étoit proclamé partout où se trouvoient les armées étrangères : on put présumer dès lors que le même esprit reproduiroit le même phénomène dans la Capitale. Le Roi étoit à St. Denis, lorsque j'eus un premier entretien à Neuilly avec votre Seigneurie. Je ne cherchois point à atténuer les torts de ceux qui avoient trahi le trône. Mais à l'instant où ce trône se rétablissoit, je soutins qu'il étoit de l'intérêt du Roi de tout confondre dans un système, exactement suivi, de clémence et d'oubli : ce qui est crime dans un état réglé peut n'être que délire dans un état de désordre. Plusieurs individus qu'on soupçonnoit de trahison n'avoient été qu'égarés dans la route où la crise les avoit engagés : la sagesse commandoit à leur égard beaucoup de circonspection : tant qu'un homme ne croit pas être sorti du devoir, il est possible de l'y faire rentrer.

Mylord, mes vues obtinrent votre approbation. Les idées de modération sembloient prendre plus de force quand vous en étiez l'organe. Dans les circonstances inouies et dans les postes éminents où nous étions placés, cet entretien devoit

D'autres invoquoient les principes de la légitimité ; mais ils en faisoient une fausse application. Ce principe n'est qu'une loi politique propre à chaque nation où elle est adoptée. Elle est éminemment utile dans tous les pays, parcequ'elle y prévient les bouleversements ; mais elle n'est pas une loi sous le rapport du droit des gens. La légitimité entre les Souverains ne vient que de la reconnoissance que l'on fait de chacun de ces Souverains : la guerre et la conquête annulent cette reconnoissance et par conséquent cette légitimité : le partage de la Pologne en est la preuve. Que Napoléon ait été légitime ou non (il l'étoit en effet, pour tout autre Souverain que Louis XVIII.) on ne l'auroit pas moins renversé. Dans les principes actuels de l'Europe, on seroit forcé de fair la guerre à celui des Souverains qui se conduiroit comme Napoléon. Il y a plus—le principe de la légitimité même, en le considérant comme simple loi politique du pays, admet des exceptions considérables Montesquieu établit qu'il peut survenir entre une dynastie et un peuple une telle incompatibilité qu'il devient nécessaire de changer cette loi pour sauver ce même pays.

Ma correspondance avec les Ministres des hautes Puissances et avec les Généraux de leurs armées sera imprimée à la suite de mon Mémoire. Elle montrera de qu'elle manière j'ai soutenu la dignité de la nation. Il y a eu nécessairement et à dessein diverses nuances dans les négociations : j'espérois que mes argumens acquerroient plus de force à chacune de mes demandes. Quelque désespérées que fussent les affaires, il y a des points subsidiaires, auxquels on peut se rattacher ; car il y a divers degrés de malheur dans la perte de l'indépendance. On se fait une idée bien fausse de la position où je me suis trouvé, quand on me reproche de n'avoir pas défendu les droits de la nation à choisir son Prince, et à établir les conditions de son pouvoir. Ces deux questions ont été décidées par la force des choses : le présent n'étoit plus dans ma puissance. Tout devenoit facile si, comme j'avois proposé, Napoléon eut abdiqué au Champ de Mai. Son abdication trop

tardive nous a placée sous le joug des évènemens : je me crois absous de toute reproche par la nécessité.

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influer puissamment sur les destinées peut-être éternelles de la France et de l'Europe.

Le lendemain je tins au Roi le même langage, lorsque j'eus l'honneur de le voir à St. Denis, et je lui remis une lettre dans laquelle je lui exprimai avec franchise ce qui me sembloit le plus propre à lui concilier tous les cœurs, à rallier tous les partis, et nous mettre en harmonie avec les principes et les désirs des Souverains. Ce Prince parut sensible à mon langage sincère: il comprit que nous avions besoin de calme, pour réunir tous les élémens de l'ordre dispersés par le tems et le malheur, qu'il falloit couvrir toutes les fautes d'une extrême bienveillance, et employer tous les moyens possibles d'ajouter à tous les sentiments de sincérité. Cette entrevue, que j'eus soin de faire connoître fit présager que nous touchions le terme de tous les torts et de toutes les dissentions; mais le peuple Français vouloit autre chose que présages: ce qui est positif peut seul garantir ce qui n'est pas.

SECTION II.

Quelques personnes me reprochent d'avoir accepté du Roi le Ministère de la Police. Sans doute, il y avoit plus de sûreté pour moi à me retirer des affaires après la capitulation; mais il y avoit plus de grandeur à faire tête aux évènements. Ceux qui avoient suivi le Roi dans l'adversité arrivoient avec des fortes préventions: ils étoient dans une cruelle erreur sur notre situation; le tems qui détruit tout n'avoit pas détruit leurs préjugés; plusieurs nous apportoient encore leur vielle routine pour de l'expérience. Le devoir le plus sacré dans ma position n'étoit-il pas d'aller au-devant de tous les nuages pour chercher à les dissiper? Y avoit-il trop de simplicité à espérer qu'en portant sur toute chose la lumière, j'adoucirois les ressentimens, je modérerais l'opinion des hommes les plus enivrés par leurs passions, j'assujéttirois tout le monde au devoir, je préviendrois la réaction? On soit bien où commencent les réactions; on ne soit pas où on les arrête. Du moins

la première ardeur de celle-ci s'est épuisée presque sur moi seul: elle ne s'est développée et étendue que depuis mon départ de Paris. Mon entrée dans les affaires étoit un acte de dévouement, un véritable sacrifice.

Pour un homme obscur et frivole un ministère peut avoir du charme, même dans le péril, parcequ'il ne l'apperçoit pas; mais pour moi un ministère ne pouvoit plus être l'objet de mon ambition: tout étoit embarras et danger. On a pu croire, en me voyant accepter le ministère, qu'après avoir honoré ma vie, je voulois illustrer ma mort. Si j'avois eu des intentions personnelles, j'aurais enflammé plutôt qu'éteint le noble courroux de l'armée; on ne m'eut pas vu frémir à l'idée des ruines et du sang, qui auroient couvert Paris..... Dans ce parti l'ambition avoit quelques chances; dans celui que j'ai pris, on ne peut voir que la résolution d'un homme de bien.

On comprend encore qu'une ambition vulgaire pourroit être satisfaite d'arriver au ministère à la condition de devenir l'instrument docile d'une faction; mais à la hauteur où ma conscience et l'estime publique m'ont placé, la première condition de mes services pourroit-elle être autre chose que l'intérêt national? Qu'on prenne la peine de relire ma lettre au Roi à St. Denis, au moment où j'acceptais le ministère—elle a été imprimée dans le Moniteur—ai-je composé avec mes principes? mon langage donne-t-il à un parti l'espoir que je le laisserai dominer en vainqueur?

Qu'on daigne juger les actes et les paroles de ma vie, non par la comparaison d'un tems à un autre, mais par ce qui se disoit et se faisoit à côté de moi dans le tems où j'ai parlé et agi. Si je n'ai pu maîtriser les évènemens, je suis sûr au moins d'avoir fait tous mes efforts pour diminuer la violence de leur cours. Ne m'a-t-on pas vu constamment entre les oppresseurs et les opprimés? Au reste, je ne veux pas me faire plus généreux que je ne suis: l'expérience m'a appris de bonne heure qu'on est plus souvent dans le malheur que dans la prospérité.

Je me trouve entre un parti qui me reproche d'avoir servi le Roi et un autre qui me fait un crime d'avoir servi Napoléon. Ce dernier parti ne se souvient plus qu'il le redoutoit d'autant moins que j'étois placé plus près de lui. À son retour de l'Isle d'Elbe, quel langage lui ai-je tenu? Je l'ai conjuré de ne pas flétrir la nation par des vaines amnisties, et je n'ai cessé de répéter qu'il devoit *tout ignorer*.

Ma carrière ministérielle n'a jamais prouvé qu'une chose, c'est que mes devoirs envers ma patrie ont toujours tenu le premier rang parmi mes devoirs. Je n'ai du qu'à la faveur de la nation d'être rappellé aux affaires sous les divers Gouvernemens qui se sont succédés et qui se sont perdus, j'ose le dire, pour avoir repoussé la vérité que j'avois le courage de mettre sous leurs yeux.

J'ai été confondu quand on m'a accusé d'avoir trompé le Roi sur l'amour de son peuple—quel excès de flatterie! oser dire à un Prince qui a des lumières qu'après vingt-cinq ans d'absence, il est devenu tout-à-coup l'objet de l'amour d'un peuple dont les générations tant de fois renouvellées ont été élevées dans des passions, des maximes, si opposées à l'amour des Bourbons! Quelle impudence de tenir ce langage, quand on a été témoin de ce qui s'est passé à l'entrée de Napoléon à Paris, revenant de l'Isle d'Elbe, quand les Bourbons n'ont pu trouver un seul refuge en France! Non, je ne méditois pas un parjure en invitant le Roi à calmer les esprits par l'idée de la securité. Il n'y avoit pas un autre moyen d'affermir l'État et de donner de la stabilité au trône. Le pardon étoit une partie de la justice. Qui peut ignorer aujourd'hui que les crises politiques ne sont point le résultat des combinaisons et l'œuvre de quelques individus, que tout est entraîné dans la sphère qu'elles agitent?

La tolérance excessive a des inconvénients, mais la complication des évènemens, la capitulation qui venoit être signée, pourroient-elles comporter un autre système? Toute mesure de rigueur après les proclamations du Roi paroissoit fausser sa

foi. On ne pouvoit plus compter sur rien, si le contrat fait hier n'avoit pas de lendemain. Dans quel moment fut-il plus nécessaire que tout le monde eut la conscience, que la parole du Roi étoit sacrée et irrévocable. La moindre apparence de retour sur ses engagemens blessoit tous les sentimens; le soupçon terrible d'avoir été trompé rentroit de nouveau dans tous les cœurs, et la confiance se retiroit de toutes parts et pour toujours.

Le Roi ne pouvoit plus rien faire que de généreux et de régulier: un seul acte arbitraire établissoit une opposition dangereuse. Comment punir?—comment poser des limites?—et si on n'en pose, où s'arrêtera l'inquiétude?—l'amnistie pleine et entière étoit nécessaire parcequ'il y avoit impossibilité de punir sans les plus graves inconvenients. Toutefois j'eloignois de Paris les hommes dont la présence y eut choqué les convenances; je leur fis délivrer des passeports, et même, je l'avoue, je leur fis donner à plusieurs les moyens de déplacement qui leur manquoient.

Cette mesure ne satisfaisoit pas; le malheur ne donne pas toujours des lumières: on ne pouvoit pas comprendre qu'il fut possible de gouverner sans une liste de proscription; alors comme aujourd'hui chacun vouloit y placer son ennemi; le ministère n'y a pas laissé que les noms qu'il n'a pu écarter.

SECTION III.

Je prie ceux qui me reprochent d'avoir signé l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet de se reporter à cette époque. Si j'eusse pu effacer plusieurs des noms qui sont écrits sur cette ordonnance en y plaçant le mien je n'aurois pas hésité: mais jugeons sans prévention la situation des choses. Tous les esprits étoient préoccupés par l'idée que le trône avoit été renversé par le résultat d'une vaste conspiration, qu'une grande masse d'individus étoient compromise dans le complot qui avoit ramené Napoléon sur le trône, que le plus grand nombre garderoit en secret contre le Gouvernement un germe d'indisposition dont

le développement pouvoit un jour troubler l'Europe. J'ai combattu de tout mon pouvoir et de toutes les manières cette fatale méprise. Elle étoit devenue si générale et si profonde que ceux mêmes qui avoient intérêt à la détruire gardoient le silence; aujourd'hui des procédures solemnelles ont justifié mes paroles et mes écrits.

Le nombre des partisans de Napoléon étoit peu considérable: on vouloit un nouvel ordre de choses, mais on redoutoit son despotisme: il a fallu, pour entraîner l'opinion, qu'il annonçat qu'il étoit soutenu par l'Angleterre et par l'Autriche. Ses proclamations firent croire qu'il revenoit plus grand avec les sages pensées de l'exil, qu'il étoit corrigé de son ambition, après avoir éprouvé tout ce que le hasard et les vicissitudes de la guerre peuvent avoir de revers inattendus et terribles. Les Français sont confians et sensibles à l'excès; il leur sembloit que c'étoit une nouvelle vie, un nouveau règne, que Napoléon alloit commencer, après avoir entendu pendant un an, dans l'Isle d'Elbe, comme dans un tombeau, tout ce que la vérité ainsi que la haine ont dit dans l'Europe sur son premier règne et sur sa première vie.

L'idée d'une conspiration avoit été répandue par ceux qui vouloient des proscriptions: ma démission avant d'avoir démontré l'imposture eut produit des milliers de victimes. Je pris la résolution de signer l'ordonnance du 24 Juillet afin d'enchainer la réaction et de diminuer le nombre de ceux qu'elle vouloit immoler. Si je me fusse mis à l'écart on me reprocheroit tous les maux que j'ai prévenu en restant à mon poste. Pour bien apprécier mes principes et ma conduite, qu'on voye aujourd'hui que les passions sont devenues les maîtres, dans quel rang elles m'ont placées, quelle est la première victime qu'elles désignent! Qu'on relise mes rapports au Roi (ils ont été tronqués; je les republierai dans leur intégrité) qu'on y examine les causes de la haine extravagante dont je suis l'objet; elles ont été comprises de la nation.

Je vais entrer dans quelques détails pour répondre à ceux

qui ont trouvé mes rapports au Roi peu respectueux, et mon administration peu conforme à son service.

Il est moins pénible pour moi d'être accusé d'avoir dit au Roi des choses sévères et même dures, que de lui avoir donné de consolations trompeuses et des espérances incertaines. Que les Princes sont à plaindre ! Toutes les vérités retentissent dans leur palais et à leur côtés ; on les dit, on les écrit, à tout le monde excepté à eux.

Obligé de dévoiler sans ménagement la situation de l'État, j'ai du porter d'abord l'attention du Roi sur les maux les plus imminents, sur les dangers qui menaçoient son pouvoir : le trône venoit d'être ébranlé ; il importoit de ne point se tromper sur les choses cachées et profondes qui seules font éclater de pareils évènemens, et qui peuvent encore en préparer semblables lorsqu'elles sont méconnues.

J'ai donc exposé à sa Majesté tout ce qu'il y avoit de difficultés et d'obstacles pour affermir son autorité. Le plus grand intérêt d'un peuple est que son Gouvernement soit immuable parceque le ciment qui unit les parties du corps social, étant l'ouvrage des siècles, ne reprend presque jamais sa première solidité quand une révolution a eu le tems de la dissoudre. Mais il est de même presque sans exemple qu'une monarchie interrompue dans son cours soit parvenue à se rétablir : il lui est du moins impossible de se reconstruire telle qu'elle étoit après un quart de siècle d'interruption, surtout chez un peuple où le mouvement des idées est si rapide ; elle ne retrouve plus qu'une faible partie des élémens de son ancienne puissance. Ses principes, ses loix, ses intérêts ne sont plus les mêmes ; ils se sont identifiés avec la marche du tems et le progrès des lumières.

J'ai distingué parmi les obstacles ceux qui venoient de notre état actuel de guerre et ceux qui avoient leur source dans nos déplorables dissensions : les premières étoient les moins faciles à expliquer. Je n'ai pas craint d'exposer aux Souverains Alliés des vérités utiles et d'attacher leurs regards sur le

tableau de nos désastres. Deux mouvemens contraires sembloient entrainer les troupes étrangères dont la France étoit couverte; par l'un elles remplissoient nos vœux en nous apportant la paix, et leurs armes avoient autant de droit à notre reconnoissance qu'à notre confiance; par l'autre la licence de quelques corps nous livroit à toutes les calamités dans lesquelles une nation puisse tomber. Le retour du Roi par des circonstances qui lui étoient étrangères seroit alors devenu l'époque la plus désastreuse de nos annales, et nous auroit, pour ainsi dire, détruit d'une main le même trône que de l'autre on étoit venu relever.

D'aussi sérieuses considérations me forçoient à mettre sous les yeux du Roi les suites funestes qu'auroient pour son autorité ce système inattendu d'envahissement successif de nos provinces, quand il n'y avoit plus de résistance, et cette continuation violente d'actes hostiles dans une guerre noblement méditée pour un plus grand but. L'affection d'un peuple pour son gouvernement s'altère toujours par les malheurs de la patrie. Il y avoit quelque courage à publier ces vérités: elles produisirent une amélioration salutaire et subite dans notre situation. Mes services à cet égard n'ont pas même été remarqués; ce n'est pas ce genre de service qu'on vouloit.

Pour l'intérêt même des Puissances Alliées il étoit de mon devoir le leur présenter les mêmes tableaux. Ce qu'il y a de profonde énergie et surtout d'élémens pour une soudaine explosion dans le caractère des Français ne leur est pas assez bien connu, et à ce sujet ils auroient pu justement se plaindre de mon silence.

J'avois à parler à des Souverains magnanimes. Je pourrois oser leur dire que la victoire dans ce siècle éclairé ne suffit point pour justifier tous les abus de la force. Ce n'est pas avec des sentiments nobles et élevés qu'on se nuit auprès des grands Princes. On s'est étrangement mépris quand on a cru me livrer à la haine de l'étranger, mon langage a été jugé d'après les devoirs que j'avois à remplir.

Dans un autre rapport sur la situation de la France, où je l'ai considérée sous l'aspect des dissensions politiques, j'ai eu à me décider entre deux partis impossibles à concilier, celui de dissimuler la vérité ou de la dire toute entière, celui de flatter ou de déplaire. Je n'ai point hésité : il s'agissoit du salut du Prince que je servois ; je n'ai du consulter que mon devoir. J'ai peint les divers partis tels qu'ils sont ; j'en ai montré la force et la faiblesse ; j'ai fait connoître leur desseins, la soumission qu'on doit en attendre, et les concessions qu'ils attendent eux-mêmes. J'ai peint les deux grandes factions qui nous agitent, et dont le choc mettroit l'État dans le plus grand péril. Si c'st ainsi qu'on trompe les Grands de la terre, il faut avouer que la manière est nouvelle.

Je n'ai point révélé au Roi le nom des Royalistes qui s'étoient déclarés contre son autorité, et qui ont négocié avec Napoléon. Je n'ai voulu soulever aucun voile. Ceux à qui on a sauvé l'honneur peuvent revenir à la vertu.

Il n'y avoit que deux moyens de servir le Roi—augmenter sa force physique et sa force morale. Si la force physique est quelquefois nécessaire pour réprimer le désordre, elle ne suffit pas pour constituer un ordre de choses durable. Nous verrons si j'ai fait, à cet égard, tous les efforts qui étoient en mon pouvoir. Je discuterai dans mon Mémoire les observations que j'ai soumises sur l'armée, sur la garde nationale, sur les chambres, sur l'opinion publique, &c.

Je dois l'avouer, le Ministère dont je faisois partie avoit des lumières, l'amour du bien, une grande habitude des affaires, mais les douleurs récentes du passé lui ont trop fait oublier les dangers de l'avenir. Plusieurs de nos actes sont dépourvus de prévoyance ; nous avons de force d'ensemble contre nos adversaires, et d'une pensée commune dans nos travaux. C'est contre les passions les plus violentes que nous étions forcés d'agir, et c'étoient les passions qui nous jugeoient. On scrutoit avec attention le but vers lequel nous tendions, mais on se taisoit sur les obstacles que nous rencontrions. On ne nous

tableau de nos désastres. Deux mouvemens contraires sembloient entrainer les troupes étrangères dont la France étoit couverte; par l'un elles remplissoient nos vœux en nous apportant la paix, et leurs armes avoient autant de droit à notre reconnoissance qu'à notre confiance; par l'autre la licence de quelques corps nous livroit à toutes les calamités dans lesquelles une nation puisse tomber. Le retour du Roi par des circonstances qui lui étoient étrangères seroit alors devenu l'époque la plus désastreuse de nos annales, et nous auroit, pour ainsi dire, détruit d'une main le même trône que de l'autre on étoit venu relever.

D'aussi sérieuses considérations me forçoient à mettre sous les yeux du Roi les suites funestes qu'auroient pour son autorité ce système inattendu d'envahissement successif de nos provinces, quand il n'y avoit plus de résistance, et cette continuation violente d'actes hostiles dans une guerre noblement méditée pour un plus grand but. L'affection d'un peuple pour son gouvernement s'altère toujours par les malheurs de la patrie. Il y avoit quelque courage à publier ces vérités: elles produisirent une amélioration salutaire et subite dans notre situation. Mes services à cet égard n'ont pas même été remarqués; ce n'est pas ce genre de service qu'on vouloit.

Pour l'intérêt même des Puissances Alliées il étoit de mon devoir le leur présenter les mêmes tableaux. Ce qu'il y a de profonde énergie et surtout d'élémens pour une soudaine explosion dans le caractère des Français ne leur est pas assez bien connu, et à ce sujet ils auroient pu justement se plaindre de mon silence.

J'avois à parler à des Souverains magnanimes. Je pourrois oser leur dire que la victoire dans ce siècle éclairé ne suffit point pour justifier tous les abus de la force. Ce n'est pas avec des sentiments nobles et élevés qu'on se nuit auprès des grands Princes. On s'est étrangement mépris quand on a cru me livrer à la haine de l'étranger, mon langage a été jugé d'après les devoirs que j'avois à remplir.

Dans un autre rapport sur la situation de la France, où je l'ai considérée sous l'aspect des dissensions politiques, j'ai eu à me décider entre deux partis impossibles à concilier, celui de dissimuler la vérité ou de la dire toute entière, celui de flatter ou de déplaire. Je n'ai point hésité : il s'agissoit du salut du Prince que je servois ; je n'ai du consulter que mon devoir. J'ai peint les divers partis tels qu'ils sont ; j'en ai montré la force et la faiblesse ; j'ai fait connoître leur desseins, la soumission qu'on doit en attendre, et les concessions qu'ils attendent eux-mêmes. J'ai peint les deux grandes factions qui nous agitent, et dont le choc mettroit l'État dans le plus grand péril. Si c'st ainsi qu'on trompe les Grands de la terre, il faut avouer que la manière est nouvelle.

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tenoit aucun compte des maux que nous empêchions et des désordres que nous prévenions.

On se plaignoit du peu d'énergie de la Police, parcequ'elle n'étoit pas uniquement dirigée contre des hommes qu'on vouloit perdre. Cependant tous les genres de malveillans étoient comprimé; rien ne restoit impuni. L'armée étoit agitée, mais elle obéissoit. Nous cherchions à ramener tous les partis à la subordination, au sacrifice des idées exagérées au bon ordre. Il ne suffisoit pas de modérer les passions. Dans le midi, il auroit fallu les enchainer. Je répétois aux magistrats de ces contrées ce qui dit si souvent la conscience du genre humain, que pour les forts comme pour les foibles, il n'y a qu'un avantage qui ne soit guères sujet des retours—c'est la *justice:* je disois au Roi qu'avec des réactions, il n'y a ni repos public, *ni trône, ni nation.*

La multitude recevant l'exemple de la violence de ceux qui lui devoient l'exemple de la modération on a du s'attendre qu'elle franchiroit et renverseroit toutes les barrières elevées entre elle et les attentats. Quand la licence et la servitude ont tour à tour allumé des passions dans un peuple, on trouve peu d'hommes qui entendent la voix de la raison. Qu'importe à ceux qui veulent mettre leurs fureurs à la place des loix, de compromettre l'indépendance de leur pays et d'ébranler le trône! que leur font le deuil des familles et les malédictions publiques pourvu qu'il se vengent! Il semble qu'il y ait des jours où le souvenir du passé, les impressions du présent, les craintes ou les espérances de l'avenir, portent tous les désordres et tous les délires dans les têtes humaines.

Quel spectacle la France offre à l'Europe! Quand on aura rempli les prisons, quand on les aura agrandies, ces rigueurs donneront-elles une force aussi durable à l'autorité du Roi qu'on lui en auroit donné en pacifiant la France par des idées de sécurité et de clémence! Que fera-t-on quand tout le monde parlera ensemble, ce qui arrive toujours après la compression? Si une partie de la population s'est égarée, est-ce-

en la persécutant et en la diffamant qu'on l'empêchera de prendre à une nouvelle révolte? Toutes les choses humaines ont des bornes : la patience n'est susceptible que d'un certain degré de ressort. Un peuple ne peut rester en repos quand on lui présente sans cesse un avenir qui le flétrit ou qui le menace. Sa tranquillité même, si on pourroit l'obtenir seroit un état violent.

J'étois chargé de veiller au maintien du trône et à la sûreté de l'État. Il ne faut pas croire que ces devoirs, après tant de changemens dans notre esprit public, dans nos institutions, et dans nos mœurs, puissent être remplis par les mêmes moyens. Tout est changé dans la civilisation : elle a fait d'heureux progrès, mais elle nous a laissé aussi de nouveaux vices. On ne trouve plus la même soumission ; rien n'a plus la même stabilité. Il est survenu des troubles d'un genre nouveau par le choc, auparavant inconnu, des opinions politiques ; et tandis que la sûreté de l'État et le repos public sont exposés à plus de dangers, la répression a perdu de sa rapidité et même de sa forme par les garanties accordées à la liberté individuelle. On ne peut plus gouverner les hommes de la même manière.

Les moyens d'obtenir de l'influence sur le peuple, résultat le plus grand que le Gouvernement puisse atteindre, ne sont pas moins altérés. La religion et la morale ne sont plus que foibles auxiliaires des loix. L'opinion publique, élément nouveau dans l'ordre social, a acquis tant de force et de puissance qu'elle est devenue la rivale de l'autorité. L'obéissance qui a maintenant des droits, fait tout ses efforts pour les défendre. On peut punir la résistance, mais il seroit plus habile de la vaincre. La force peut faire exécuter des ordres, mais le langage du pouvoir n'a plus qu'une foible autorité, s'il n'est pas aidé de la persuasion et appuyé sur la raison. Pour se faire écouter des pertes diverses, il faut entrer dans leurs passions, parler à chacun son langage ; il n'y a plus d'éloquence générale.

Avec tant de nouvelles difficultés, la Police avoit besoin de nouveaux ressorts et d'encouragement. Quoiqu'en général son action soit étendue, il y a des points où nous la rendions

inutile. De quoi sert au gouvernement du Roi cette recherche inquiète et minutieuse des mœurs privées, des propos imprudents, et même de traits de scandale qu'aucune loi ne sauroit punir?

Il ne s'agit plus aujourd'hui d'épier les mécontentemens individuels, ni même des propos téméraires. Il y a plus de tolérance dans nos mœurs. La liberté publique est devenue, pour ainsi dire, une nouvelle conscience à laquelle on ne peut pas faire violence; elle sert d'égide à la liberté des opinions. Ce qu'il faut surveiller c'est la turbulence, c'est l'intrigue, c'est surtout la force. L'espionnage ne doit pas violer l'asile des citoyens. À quelque hauteur que le projet d'un attentat prenne naissance dans les classes de la société, les auxiliaires dont il aura besoin suffiront pour le faire découvrir, et ceux-là ne se tiennent pas si haut.

On se plaint avec raison de la violation du secret des lettres: cette mesure de police est odieuse et inutile quand elle est connue. Je l'ai toujours repoussée: elle n'a été imaginée que par des gens bornés, qui ne sentent pas la portée des moyens qu'ils employent.

De quelles recherches s'occupoit donc la Police? de celles des délits et des crimes déterminés par les loix. De quel succès peut elle s'honorer? c'est quand elle remonte aux premières causes que chaque jour augmentent les progrès de l'immoralité, c'est quand elle découvre les plus légers mouvemens précurseurs des troubles publics, quand il parvient à connoître les besoins du peuple, ses sujets d'inquiétude, ses motifs d'alarmes, ses plaintes secrètes, et les mécontentemens que sa fidélité est déjà ébranlée, et surtout ces symptômes effrayans de la misère et du désespoir qui, non moins redoutables dans les individus que dans la masse du peuple, portent bientôt les hommes foibles aux crimes et les nations corrompues à la révolte.

La Police est une magistrature politique, qui, indépendamment de ses fonctions spéciales, doit concourir par des moyens irréguliers, mais justes, legitimes, et bienfaisans, à augmenter

la force de tous les ressorts du gouvernement. La marche ostensible de l'autorité met nécessairement des bornes à son action. Les grands objets l'occupent beaucoup ; d'autres se perdent dans la foule et lui échappent. Tout n'est pas extérieur, tout n'est pas en evidence dans l'ordre social ; il y a comme un monde secret au milieu de ce monde public ; l'autorité ordinaire ne peut y pénétrer : les succès sont trop loins de sa main.

Ce n'est pas là une Police que demandent les factions ; il leur faut des dénonciations, des confidences, des notes personnelles, des intrigues, une foule de petits riens qu'elles transforment en affaires. Les facultés de tous les agens de police suffisent à peine au mouvemens compliqués et clandestins d'une machine qui peut servir à perdre des gens de bien et d'honneur, mais qui n'est d'aucune utilité pour l'État.

À quoi a abouti l'importance qu'on a donné à l'évasion de M. Lavalette ? à mettre en evidence l'impossibilité où est le gouvernement d'avoir des yeux et des oreilles partout et à donner plus d'éclat au dévouement heroïque d'une jeune femme. Quelque chose qu'on dise, la Terre entière est sensible à ce qui est généreux : le malheur est un objet touchant ; il est très vrai que tout Gouvernement a le droit de poursuivre son ennemi, mais où est la nécessité de faire du bruit quand on n'a su ni le garder ni l'atteindre ! L'exercice de ce droit n'est pas aussi pur qu'il est légitime ; c'est une faiblesse peut-être, mais elle est universelle, elle est honorée, et la force même qui la surmonte ne l'est pas.

Admirable effet de la puissance de la Morale ! Des générations s'occuperont de la manière dont M. Lavalette a été enlevé à la mort, et tous les efforts du pouvoir ne parviendront pas à flétrir ceux qui l'ont environné de leur noble et vigilante pitié. Tout ce qui n'est pas inexorable et barbare à applaudi au succès de leur courage : ils se sont rendus coupables devant la loi, mais ils ont accompli un vœu de l'humanité.

On m'a souvent reproché de ne pas faire connoître au Roi ce

que faisoient chaque jour les gens de sa cour, ses Ministres, les Ministres étrangers, ce qui se passoit dans l'interieur des familles, &c. C'est la police d'un courtisan qui veut plaire, ou d'un subalterne, qui a besoin de pareils moyens pour se faire valoir : ce n'est pas la mienne.

La tranquillité des États ne dépend pas des choses qui n'affectent que les hauts rangs de la société, ou de la disposition d'esprit qu'on y observe. Les ambitions qui agitent les grands n'ont aucune influence politique quand elles ne se lient pas à quelque intérêt populaire. Leurs intrigues, leurs conspirations sont impuissantes et sans effet, quand elles ne sont pas favorisées par les dispositions morales, et soutenues par la coopération effective de la multitude. Il n'y a point d'opposition à craindre dans les conseils publics, point de factions secrètes à redouter quand le monarque a pour lui les affections et la force du peuple.

La tranquillité de l'État dépend des dispositions morales des classes laborieuses dont le peuple se compose, et qui forme la base de l'édifice social ; elles doivent donc être l'objet, pour ainsi dire unique des soins et de la vigilance d'une bonne police. La multitude sera perpétuellement calme, si on s'occupe franchement de ses intérêts ; si on écarte tout ce qui peut altérer sa confiance, blesser inutilement ses préjugés, corrompre ses habitudes de penser et d'agir, égarer son ignorance et sa crédulité.

C'est parcequ'on s'étoit écarté de ces principes, parcequ'une police complaisante et frivole s'étoit presque exclusivement attachée au pas des Grands, au lieu de s'occuper du peuple, qu'au sein de la prospérité, de l'aisance et de la paix, lorsqu'il n'existoit aucun motif apparent d'insurrection, elle ne put arrêter les premiers élans de la Révolution, dont les germes fermentoient depuis quarante ans sans être apperçus, du moins sans qu'on y mit obstacle.

Ma doctrine ne pouvoit convenir a ceux qui vouloient qu'on fit de la Police, non une magistrature, qui confondit sous une

protection commune tous les partis que la Révolution a fait naître, et tous ceux qu'elle a combattus, mais une *Inquisition* où ils pussent faire accueillir leurs dénonciations secrètes. Mon système de modération contrarioit extrêmement ceux qui vouloient flétrir le passé afin de le faire punir, faire poursuivre *arbitrairement* des délits pardonnés. Les leçons de l'histoire sont perdues ; on devroit s'en souvenir cependant ; tout n'est pas succès dans une marche hypocrite ; on n'otbient guères la confiance des hommes que par la bonne foi : elle est également nécessaire pour exercer ses droits et pour remplir ses devoirs.

Mais pourquoi toujours compulser le public; si nous n'y puisons aucune leçon pour le présent, si nous ne voyons que les fautes d'autrui et jamais les notres ? Pourquoi chercher à le flétrir ? Devenons plus sages et plus grands s'il nous est possible. Vieux enfans, vous foulez aux pieds aujourd'hui ce que vous admiriez hier. Quand le bon sens vous viendra-t-il ? quand apprendrez vous à observer et à juger ?

Plusieurs de ceux qui ne parlent qu'avec dénigrement de ce qui s'est passé depuis vingt-cinq ans ont été acteurs ; à la vérité acteurs très obscurs dans la plupart des actes de nos révolutions. Selon les circonstances, ils ont pu, à la faveur de leur obscurité, renier ou avouer leurs rôles ; mais enfin ils ont joué, ils ont paru sur la scène, ils doivent même le peu d'importance qu'ils ont dans leurs communes aux places qu'ils ont occupées sous Napoléon. Plusieurs ont fait du bien, qu'ils ne craignent pas de l'avouer ! Le bien ne dépare pas la vie à quelque époque qu'on l'ait fait. Au lieu de s'abjurer, de se renier, ils doivent convenir avec tout le monde, que les orages politiques, comme ceux de la Nature ne produisent pas que des maux. C'est une entreprise extravagante que de chercher à obscurcir ce qui s'est fait de grand et d'utile dans nos révolutions. Personne ne peut tromper sur ce qui s'est passé depuis vingt-cinq ans ; le monde en est rempli.

Quand on a été subjugué par Napoléon il y a peu de jugement à le dénigrer : plus on cherche à l'abaisser plus on

s'avilit soi-même. Le voyageur sourit de pitié en voyant effacer, à grands frais, les aigles qui se trouvent sur les monumens qu'il a réparés ou élevés ; comme si le mémoire des faits devoit périr avec les aigles. Il seroit plus raisonnable de chercher à justifier l'admiration qu'on a eue pour lui.

Tout étoit prodige dans les commencemens du règne de Napoléon. Son gloire avoit frappé tous les peuples, depuis les premiers rangs de la société jusqu'aux habitans des chaumières. Il n'avoit pas seulement le génie de batailles ; il avoit une science plus utile que les forces—c'étoit de savoir les employer. Sa prévoyance sembloit le rendre maître des évènemens. Les obstacles étoient prévus ; tout avoit l'air disposé d'avance pour les vaincre. Les traités étoient aussi rapidement stipulés que les batailles étoient gagnées. Dans quel temps la France eut-elle plus d'éclat et plus de puissance qu'au moment où tous les Souverains reconnurent Napoléon ; où toutes les solemnités de la réligion le consacrèrent sur le trône.

Dans l'intérieur tous les germes des querelles et de combats sembloient oubliés : tant d'intérêts si divers, si compliqués, si croisées, paroîssoit conciliés. Tous les partis vivoient en paix à côté les uns des autres ; les sectes réligieuses se partageoient les temples et les autels. Qui donc alors ne cherchoit pas la faveur, un regard de Napoléon ? ceux là en conviennent le moins qui se sont le plus prosternés.

Au dehors Napoléon avoit étouffé la guerre dans les premières batailles ; tous les Souverains vouloient vivre en paix avec lui : en cas d'hostilités, l'amour de la gloire auroit rassemblé sous les drapeaux et sous les lauriers toute la jeunesse Française qui avoit appris à compter l'héroisme parmi ses besoins et ses jouissances.

La destinée de Napoléon étoit trop féconde en merveilles pour s'étonner que des hommes qui savent mieux admirer que juger aient pu croire qu'elle eut ses causes hors de la terre. Son règne prenoit les formes de la durée, et presque les attri-

buts de ce caractère sacré que le tems imprime aux ouvrages sur lesquels il passe. Toute cette puissance, qui sembloit éternelle s'est anéantie dans les excès de son ambition. L'espoir et la crainte de la voir renaître l'avoit suivi à l'Isle d'Elbe; tout a peri sans retour, mylord, dans les champs de Waterloo.

Il y a quelque chose qui marche avant tout—c'est la probité. Celui qui avoit devenu l'arbitre des destinées de l'Europe dans les jours de sa grandeur, a vu, lorsqu'il a joué de ses paroles, lorsqu'il a voulu faire de ce jeu un privilège de son trône, éclater contre lui à un égal degré la juste indignation de ces mêmes Souverains et de ces mêmes peuples dont il avoit obtenu la foi, et auxquels il avoit donné la sienne. Tous les bras de l'Europe se sont armés pour renverser une autorité arbitraire, qui ne pouvoit être ni, contenue par l'opinion ni réglée par les lumières, ni assujettie par son propre intérêt. Telle étoit la fatalité de la position de Napoléon: il se trouvoit réduit, comme tous ceux qui abusent leur pouvoir, à vaincre toujours pour n'être pas détruit par la vengeance.

Que ce qui s'est passé nous instruise! en sortant d'un abîme, ne nous laissons pas emporter dans un autre! Toutes les forces irrégulières se détruisent elles-mêmes; les extrêmes le plus opposés produisent dans l'œconomie politique les mêmes phénomènes et perdent également les nations. En effet, qu'une autorité excessive soit entre les mains d'un seul ou de plusieurs, il en résulte la même dégradation morale des individus et la même foiblesse de l'État. Il ne faut d'aucun despotisme, d'aucun danger, soit qu'il vienne de la foudre qui éclate dans les airs, ou du torrent des erreurs populaires qui ravagent au moins si elles ne renversent pas.

Je prévoyois les orages que devoit amener la mode et le résultat des élections de l'une des Chambres. Je desirois que l'activité des députés, qui alloit devenir devorante, fut contenue par l'établissement des assemblées communales. C'est le renversement de ce premier boulevard de nos libertés qui a entraîné la chute de tous les autres.

Avant d'appartenir au gouvernement et à l'État, l'homme appartient aux lieux qui l'ont vu naître; c'est au sein de sa famille que nait et se développe le germe des premiers sentimens de patrie, et l'intérêt communal est le principe de tous les autres intérêts politiques. Ceux qui supposent qu'on peut lier les hommes par l'appareil des formules compliquées, et les gouverner par la promulgation de quelques principes abstraits connoîssent ni le cœur humain ni les sources du pouvoir. On diroit qu'ils n'ont étudié l'anatomie de constitutions libres que sur des systèmes morts. C'est l'obéissance qui fait la mesure et le terme du pouvoir; ce sont les constitutions positives qui lient les hommes: plus on multiplie les rapports habituels qui les unissent, plus on les rend confiants et forts par cette union; plus le gouvernement a des moyens, plus il a de force et de puissance. C'est par le rétablissement du régime municipal qu'on peut amalgamer le trône avec le peuple. Les municipalités sont les premières unités dans l'ordre de la représentation nationale, qui remonte à la législature et les dernières dans l'ordre du pouvoir exécutif, qui descend et finit à elles.

Toutefois, au lieu de tant de petites communes qui ne peuvent se toucher et se balancer sans s'embarrasser et se gêner souvent, au lieu de s'entr'aider, j'en diminuois beaucoup le nombre. C'est la nature des choses et des hommes, qui demande, qui exige même, que les corps civils ou politiques ne soient ni trop petits ni trop grands: dans le premier cas, ils sont foulés ou pressés au moins; dans le second, ils pressent au moins, s'ils ne foulent pas. Dans les existences sociales comme dans les existences naturelles, il ne faut ni géans ni nains.

SECTION IV.

Mylord, je me suis laissé entraîner dans des discussions qui m'éloignent de l'objet de cette lettre, et j'anticipe sur des matières que je ne dois traiter que dans mon Mémoire.

Le système qui commençoit à dominer, et qui chaque jour occupoit plus d'espace, me força à songer à me retirer des

affaires; comme je m'en étois retiré sous la République et sous Napoléon, dès qu'il me parut impossible de faire aucun bien. Le Roi avoit pu remonter sur le trône au bruit de la foudre, mais je ne pensois pas que ce fut au bruit de la foudre qu'il put s'y conserver. C'est la corruption et l'impéritie qui perdent les États; c'est la vertu et le talent qui les recomposent.

Je priai sa Majesté de recevoir ma démission; je lui remis moi-même la lettre qui en renfermoit les motifs. Le Roi me fit l'honneur de me répondre qu'il y réfléchiroit. J'attendis quelques jours la réponse; n'en recevant aucune, je pris la liberté d'écrire une seconde lettre, dans laquelle je développois de nouveau tous mes motifs, toutes mes inquiétudes sur un avenir qui menaçoit à la fois son trône, sa dynastie, et l'indépendance de ma patrie. Sa Majesté accepta cette fois ma démission, et voulut bien m'assurer par une lettre écrite de sa main, *qu'elle se souviendroit de mes services, et que je ne perdrois rien de ma fortune par mon éloignement.*

Il ne me restoit plus que de choisir le lieu de ma retraite: quand on a le malheur d'avoir de la célébrité, le lieu le plus ignoré prend d'éclat lorsqu'on veut s'y retirer. Je voulois au moins me dérober à la calomnie par la simplicité, par l'obscurité, et par le bonheur de ma vie domestique. Le Roi me fit offrir une ambassade; je préférois la Saxe. J'avois eu le bonheur d'approcher son Souverain; sa probité immuable, qui l'avoit fait chérir sur le trône, et révérer lorsqu'il en étoit éloigné, motivoit cette préférence. Je conserverai jusqu'à mon dernier jour la mémoire des témoignages de bonté que j'ai reçu de ce Prince depuis mon arrivée à Dresde. C'est surtout dans la disgrace qu'on sait apprécier la bienveillance. Je dois ajouter que j'ai éprouvé dans les rapports que ma mission m'a donnés avec Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu ce que peut un homme d'honneur et sensible pour adoucir une iniquité que tous ses efforts n'ont pu ni prévenir ni empêcher.

On demande pourquoi, en quittant le ministère, je ne suis pas entré dans la Chambre des Députés à laquelle plusieurs

manqueront pas une seconde fois leur noble but; nos convulsions n'agiteront plus l'Europe; nous recevrons une garantie de notre indépendance, parceque nous mêmes nous en donnerons une de notre repos.

Loin de moi l'idée qu'il y ait un parti qui veuille se faire l'horrible instrument de la destruction de la France! Je ne refuse pas à mes ennemis la justice que je dois à tous les hommes. Il y a plus d'aveuglement dans l'esprit de parti que de vues criminelles: ceux qui ont amené la monarchie sur la route des abîmes croyent peut-être l'avoir sauvée. Leur ignorance en matières de gouvernement est pour eux une découverte à faire.

Dans les affaires humaines on se laisse entraîner souvent aux plus déplorables excès par des noms qui les consacrent. Fasse le Ciel que le mot *légitimité* ne nous coûte pas autant de larmes que le mot *égalité!* Le mal s'exécute presque toujours sous des prétextes sacrés. Heureusement que l'erreur n'est pas immortelle comme la vérité: tout finit sur la terre.

Je ne me sens pas la force de me justifier entièrement du reproche qui m'est fait de n'être pas entré dans la Chambre des Députés. J'aurois du paroître à la tribune, ne fusse t-il que pour donner en moi l'exemple d'un acte de tyrannie et d'une violation de plus. Ma mission à Dresde a pu paroître une transaction de ma prévoyance, et il ne m'étoit pas permis de transiger pour moi seul.

Mylord, j'écrivois le 15 Juin à votre Seigneurie: "La République nous a fait connoître tout ce qu'ont de funeste les excès de la liberté, l'Empire tout ce qu'a de funeste l'excès du pouvoir: mes vœux sont de trouver à égale distance de ces excès l'indépendance, l'ordre, et la paix." Je renouvelle en ce moment les mêmes vœux: puissent tous les genres d'excès être arrivés à leur terme! Dans tous les partis, quand les passions s'allument, leurs égaremens se ressemblent, et il arrive aux plus beaux sentiments de s'exalter à des degrés où ils ne sont plus que funestes.

Je ne me plains ni ne m'étonne d'être exilé de la France par ceux à qui j'ai tendu la main pour les y faire rentrer. Je connois les vices du cœur humain, et je suis habitué aux caprices de la Fortune. Dans la situation de la vie où je me trouve, il est consolant de penser qu'il n'est au pouvoir de personne de changer la nature des choses: le mensonge ne peut devenir vérité.

Ma vie politique est remplie; toute mon ambition est satisfaite, après que j'ai obtenu parmi les Français une considération qui suivra partout mon nom et ma personne. La justice et la voix des siècles prononceront si, dans ce qui a attiré des désastres sur ma patrie, les torts ont été ou non de tous les côtés, et de quel côté ils ont été les plus grands.

Je renouvelle à votre Seigneurie l'assurance de ma plus haute considération.

Le Duc d'OTRANTE.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, April 4, 1816.

My dear Lord—I was invited last night to read the draft of the circular to the Russian Ministers at Milan, London, Paris, and Berlin, and the lettre de cabinet from his Imperial Majesty to your lordship. I trust these will afford the most satisfactory and convincing proofs of the pacific intentions of the Emperor, and do honour to the principle and sentiments which dictated the Treaty of the Sovereigns.

I learn from the Bavarian Minister that a Convention has been concluded at Munich, which is to settle the whole territorial question between Bavaria and Austria, both as to principle and detail; but that, previous to signature, a courier had been despatched to Milan to ask the admission of a secret Article in favour of Prince Eugene. Austria consents to pay to Bavaria a sum nearly equal to the revenues of the circle of the Maine and Tauber, until the latter Power can be put in possession of that territory. Bavaria would wish to receive

from Austria the Neapolitan money, if any shall be obtained for Prince Eugene, and to pay part of it to Baden for part of the Palatinate. This will be opposed by the Grand Duke, and will, I am convinced, be thought unreasonable here. Count Bray is instructed to make a communication to this Court, to urge the conclusion of Prince Eugene's business: he has not yet prepared his note, and will show it to me, together with the Convention.

The Emperor is in perfect health, good spirits, and often talks of you in the most gracious terms. The anniversary of marching into Paris in 1814 was celebrated here with great magnificence. Thirty-two thousand infantry were formed in masses on the esplanade in front of the palace, to one of the balconies of which a platform was added, in which the *Te Deum* was sung in presence of his Imperial Majesty and of the Court, and in sight of all the troops, and hearing of most of them. Near five thousand cavalry and forty-eight cannon were connected with the infantry, the whole of which manœuvred on that small space, so as to march past the platform where the Empresses stood, without the least check or confusion. These regiments had all been at Paris, one of them on the last occasion; and afterwards 882 officers had the honour of dining with their Imperial Majesties in the great hall of St. George and a hall adjoining to it. At night the city was illuminated.

I have, &c., CATHCART.

Mr. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, April 6, 1816.

My dear Lord—On the 23rd of last month one of the chief clerks in the department of State called upon me for the purpose, as he pretended, of delivering to me a message from Mr. Monroe, respecting Mrs. Bagot's presentation to Mrs. Madison, which was to take place the following day. Upon leaving the room, he put into my hands a paper unsealed and

undirected, containing, as he informed me, the rules of etiquette to be observed between the diplomatic corps in this city and the Government of the United States. Without reading the paper, I asked him whether he delivered it to me by order of Mr. Monroe: he told me that he did. After he was gone, I examined it, and I think it my duty to enclose to your lordship a copy of it. Your lordship will perceive that it is neither addressed to me nor signed, and, what is perhaps equally worthy of observation, that it differs materially from a paper purporting to have the same object, which was delivered to the foreign Ministers here in the month of March, 1814, which paper had been already shown to me by M. de Kantzou, the Swedish Minister to the United States, and of which I obtained from him the copy which I enclose.

As I have reason to believe that these rules were originally drawn up solely in resentment of some neglect which Mr. Monroe conceived himself to have experienced in his representative character when in England, I thought it desirable that he should be induced, either by signing the paper and addressing it to me, to make it official, or to withdraw it altogether.

For this purpose, I took an opportunity in the conversation which I had with him on the 26th of last month, to advert to the paper, as well as to the manner in which it had been communicated to me, professing my readiness to send it to my Court, provided he would transmit it to me officially; but stating that, considering its present form and the manner in which it had been delivered to me, I was at a loss to know how to act in respect to it.

Mr. Monroe was evidently embarrassed by this proposal, and endeavoured to divert me from the point I had in view, by asking me whether I had found any incorrectness in regard to the etiquette assumed to be observed in England, as, in that case, he should be very happy to discuss those points of the paper with me officially, and to make such corrections in it as I might suggest. I evaded this offer by pleading my imperfect

knowledge of many of the rules of strict etiquette in England; and immediately reverting to the difficulty in which I had at first stated myself to be, told him that I merely wished to know whether I was to consider it as a formal or as an informal communication. Upon this Mr. Monroe told me that it was informal; which assurance being all that I required, I immediately dropped the subject, and in all probability it will not be resumed: but I have nevertheless thought it right to transmit these papers privately to your lordship, in order that you may see what are the rules which this Government wishes to enforce in respect to etiquette here, as well as the high importance which it attaches to an exact observance of it towards its representatives in European Courts.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

PS. It is right to add that, upon the occasion of a formal dinner given on the 2nd instant to Mrs. Bagot and myself by the President, Mr. Monroe took me aside, and told me that, in reference to the paper in question, it had been that day determined by the President that, at the first dinner given by him to a foreign Minister and his wife, they should be allowed precedence of the Ministers of State, upon a principle of hospitality; but that, upon all subsequent occasions, the Ministers of State and Members of the Senate would take precedence of them. C. B.

M. Gallais[1] *to Mr. Quintin Craufurd.*

13 Avril, 1816.

Monsieur—Je n'ai point envoyé mon historiette[2] ni comme vraie, ni comme nouvelle, mais seulement comme une preuve

[1] M. Gallais was an eminent public writer, and author of several important historical works, who particularly distinguished himself by bold and energetic hostility to revolutionary principles and proceedings. The subjoined papers from his pen, addressed to Mr. Craufurd, appear to have been addressed by that gentleman to Sir Charles Stuart, our Ambassador in Paris, and by him forwarded to Lord Castlereagh.—EDITOR.

[2] See forward, Bulletin 14.

de la crédulité superstitieuse, qui, dans l'esprit d'une populace démoralisée, remplace ordinairement les croyances religieuses. Voici une autre affaire.

Je me promenois hier au Luxembourg, tandis que tout Paris se portoit sur la route de Longchamps. Je vis un groupe de curieux qui entouroit des statues colossales qu'on descendoit du palais. Je n'eus pas de peine à reconnoître Mirabeau, Thouret, et Condorcet. Qu'en veut-on faire? rien, on les ôte de la salle qu'ils ornoient depuis 14 ou 15 ans, pour les renfermer dans un magazin—c'est les jetter aux gemonies. Il est donc vrai, "qu'il n'y a pas loin du Capitole à la roche Tarpeïenne." C'est Mirabeau qui l'a dit le premier; c'est lui qui le prouve aujourd'hui. Quels jeux de la Fortune! Combien de révolutions de cette espèce avons nous vues depuis quelques années! C'est bien par le tems qui court qu'on sent les vérités renfermés dans l'oraison funèbre de la reine d'Angleterre par le grand Bossuet. "Celui qui règne dans les cieux et de qui relevent tous les empires, à qui seul appartient la gloire, l'indépendance, et la majesté, est aussi le seul qui se glorifie de faire la loi aux rois, et de leur donner de grandes et terribles leçons."

J'ai vu Marat porté au Panthéon et six mois après jetté dans l'égout de Montmartre. J'ai vu les funérailles de Mirabeau: jamais aucun monarque en France n'en obtint de plus pompeuses et de plus solemnelles: et voilà qu'on jette aujourd'hui sa statue dans le fonds d'une cave! J'ai vu Buonaparte, Fouché, Cambacérès, &c., couverts de gloire, et que sont ils aujourd'hui?

Que ceux qui attachent quelque prix à cette fumée qu'on appelle *gloire*—gloire militaire, gloire de la tribune, gloire littéraire même—doignent réfléchir un moment, et considérer ce qui se passe depuis 26 ans dans notre malheureux pays, ils seront bientôt désabusés.

Je vous demande pardon, Monsieur, de ces tristes réflexions: elles me poursuivent depuis hier; et je me suis un peu soulagé en vous les communiquant.

Agréez, je vous en supplie, l'assurance de mon respectueux attachement.

GALLAIS.

[The following Papers on the State of France, by M. Gallais, appear to have been enclosed with the preceding letter.]

[In Sir C. Stuart's of April 9.]

13*me Bulletin.*

8 Avril, 1816.

Il paroit que Messieurs de la Chambre des Députés ont formé décidément le projet de lutter ouvertement avec les ministres du Roi, c'est à dire avec le Roi. Sitôt qu'ils eurent connoissance que leur loi sur les élections avoit été rejettée par les pairs, les plus fougueux d'entr'eux se réunirent en comité secret; et après les plus violentes déclamations sur la foiblesse du Roi, la connivence des pairs, les dangers de la France, et l'urgence du concours de toutes leurs forces, ils prirent la résolution de ne pas céder un pouce du terrain sur lequel ils se sont placés; de résister ouvertement à ce qu'ils appellent le *despotisme ministériel*, et de rejetter la loi nouvelle, que le Roi, *entraîné par des conseillers perfides*, vouloit substituer à celle que la commission leur avoit fait adopter.

Messieurs les Commissaires de la Chambre, fiers de leurs hautes fonctions, se sont répandus dans le monde, avec leur surcroit de vanité, et ont déclaré à qui a voulu l'entendre, que *le gant leur avoit été jeté et qu'ils l'avoient ramassé;* qu'ils avoient non seulement résolu de rejeter la nouvelle loi, mais de ne plus communiquer avec ministres vendus à la *faction de l'étranger*.

La faction de l'étranger est un mot renouvellé de la Convention, mais dont la puissance est d'autant dangereuse, qu'il dit tout et qu'il ne dit rien. Par ce mot chacun est maître d'entendre ce qu'il veut, et de l'appliquer à l'objet de ses craintes ou de son aversion; mais c'est presque toujours à ce qu'il craint le plus que s'arrête l'esprit du peuple, aux oreilles

duquel les agitateurs le font retentir: ainsi par ces mots les uns entendront Buonaparte, les autres le Duc d'Orléans, ceux-ci Autriche, ceux-là l'Angleterre.

C'est Angleterre surtout que par ce mot les factieux, qui connoissent et savent toujours manier adroitement les préjugés populaires prétendent signaler à l'indignation publique: et à ce propos, je demande permission de faire ici quelques réflexions, qui peuvent tout à la fois jeter quelque lumière dans notre ténébreuse politique et être utiles à mon pays.

Des Anglais.

Il y a 25 ans que les Anglais furent pour nous l'objet de l'admiration sans bornes: ils sont devenus aujourd'hui celui d'un déchainement presque général. Plusieurs causes ont du concourir à une si étrange révolution, et il ne sera pas sans intérêt de les rechercher.

Je trouve la première dans les livres et les journaux, qui n'ont pas cessé depuis cette époque d'être sous l'influence de quelques unes de nos factions révolutionnaires; et, d'après cette influence, de rejeter toutes les fautes, toutes les sottises, et tous les crimes qui se commettoient en France sur le compte des Anglais. Ces livres et ces journaux, sous le Directoire, accusoient les Anglais d'avoir précipité Louis XVI. à l'échaffaud; sous Buonaparte, d'embraser l'Europe et la France; et, depuis la chute de celui-ci, d'avoir contribué à son retour de l'île d'Elbe, et, par conséquent, d'avoir creusé l'abîme de maux dans lequel nous sommes plongés.

Ces maux qui varient suivant les classes qui en souffrent, sont une source intarissable de déclamations contr'eux. Les militaires qui endurent impatiemment la paix, leur reprochent l'insolence avec laquelle ils ont triomphé à Toulouse et à Waterloo. Les fabricans ruinés par la guerre leur reprochent la langueur dans laquelle sont tombées leurs manufactures. Les négocians leur reprochent la dévastation et la perte de nos colonies: et le peuple, écho de toutes ces plaintes, et de tous

ces reproches, se plaint en outre qu'ils nous ont enlevé notre argent, et les chefs-d'œuvres du Musée.

Toutes ces causes réunies n'expliqueraient pas cependant suffisamment le grand déchainement qui s'est élevé contr'eux, principalement depuis le retour des Bourbons, s'il n'y en avoit pas une autre plus active, plus secrète, et combinée de telle manière à se renouveller tous les jours, et cette cause la voici: tous les partis divisés d'intérêts et d'opinions s'accordent cependant pour accuser le Gouvernement Anglais de n'être pas de bonne foi dans l'alliance qu'il a contractée avec le notre. Ils l'accusent de jeter des brandons de discorde dans la nation, et des germes de division dans la famille royale: ils l'accusent enfin de n'avoir placé Louis XVIII. sur le trône que pour en préparer les voies à un autre prince, qui leur devant toute sa fortune sera plus disposé à la reconnoissance et à la soumission que l'héritier légitime, soutenu par le sentiment de ses droits et par le vœu de la nation.

Ces bruits répandus de toutes parts avec une adresse extrême et appuyés d'une foule de petits incidens, plus ou moins vraisemblables, tels que le complot de Wilson et compagnie, les diatribes insérées dans les journaux de l'opposition, la lettre prétendu du Duc de Wellington, gagnent tous les jours davantage, et acquièrent insensiblement la force d'une opinion générale.

J'avoue que je suis du petit nombre de ceux qu'ils n'ont pas encore séduits. Je ne puis croire à tant de perversité, je dis plus, à tant d'absurdité: il seroit absurde, en effet, que les Anglais, arrivés au plus haut point de leur prospérité, n'eussent renversé Buonaparte que pour le rétablir, et rétabli Louis XVIII. que pour le renverser. Quelqu'intérêt qu'on leur suppose à retenir la France dans un état d'humiliation qui ne puisse leur inspirer long-tems la moindre jalousie; on doit supposer en même tems qu'ils ne consentiroient pas volontiers à se déshonorer aux yeux de l'univers sans cause et sans profit; or, tel seroit le résultat de la conduite machia-

velique qu'on leur fait tenir avec tant de complaisance. En répandant ces bruits, les Buonapartistes et les Jacobins jouent leur jeu, qui consiste à saper les fondemens du trône des Bourbons; mais les royalistes qui les répandent de leur côté sont des ingrats, des dupes, et des sots: ils tournent le dos à leur but; ils servent les intérêts de leurs ennemis; et finiroient par aliéner d'eux leur allié le plus puissant, s'il n'étoit pas aussi généreux qu'il est puissant, s'il n'entroit pas dans son inclination, comme dans ses vues politiques, de soutenir son ouvrage.

G . . . .

[In Sir C. Stuart's of 4th April.]

On fait circuler une lettre du Duc de Wellington au Roi de France, qui a bien l'air de sortir de la même manufacture que le fameux rapport de M. Pozzo di Borgo sur la situation de la France. L'une et l'autre pièce sont à peu près du même style, et ont pour objet de représenter la France et le monarque dans un état de foiblesse très proche de la mort. Si je peux me procurer une copie de la lettre, je vous le ferai passer sur le champ.

14me Bulletin.

12 Avril, 1816.

En racontant les visions de Müller, et les effets qu'elles produisent sur l'esprit des Prussiens, un journal Allemand faisoit les réflexions suivantes: "Une manie singulière règne dans ce moment parmi les hommes. Mécontens du présent, ils ne prévoient que des révolutions dans l'avenir. On diroit que les scènes sanglantes du passé les ont jetés dans un délire, pendant lequel leur âme, épuisée de sentimens naturels, ne rêve que des monstres, des fantômes, et des esprits infernaux. Si on observe attentivement les peuples de nos jours, on verra qu'ils offrent un singulier mélange d'audace et de lâcheté, d'athéisme et de superstition, de dureté de cœur et de tendresse sentimentale, de débauche et de dévotion, de froideur dans l'âme et d'exaltation dans l'imagination. Ils ne savent

plus s'ils doivent endosser la cuirasse de la chevalerie, la haire des moines, ou la toge romaine: ils essayent de toutes les situations, excepté de celle qui leur convient. Le vrai leur paroit ennuyer, le repos insupportable, et leur palais blasé ne trouve plus de saveur que dans les liqueurs fortes et les mets les plus épicés."

Ces réflexions s'appliquent à la situation de la France encore plus qu'à celle de la Prusse. Le bouleversement général causé par la révolution subsiste encore dans les esprits, parceque l'autorité, long-tems déposée en des mains viles, a perdu cette majesté qui lui attiroit la confiance et le respect; parceque la balance de la justice, confiée à des mercenaires, a penché au gré de l'erreur et des passions du tyran; parceque les dignités qui font la force autant que l'éclat des empires, prodiguées à des misérables ont éteint l'émulation et allumé la cupidité; parceque, enfin, la religion a perdu tout son empire sur cette classe d'hommes qui, faute d'une éducation convenable, ne connoit point les loix de la morale, et ne peut être conduite que par la crainte des peines de l'enfer ou de l'échafaud. Il s'ensuit que les états les plus nécessaires sont abandonnés, parcequ'ils sont obscurs, et que les places les plus distinguées sont mal remplies, parceque tout le monde peut y parvenir, et qu'elles appartiennent à l'intrigue plus qu'au mérite. Les uns commandent avec dureté, parcequ'ils sont peu accoutumés au commandement; les autres obéissent avec contrainte parcequ'ils ont perdu le sentiment de l'obéissance: tous font effort pour s'élever au-dessus de leur état; et l'intérêt commun est la chose du monde dont on s'occupe le moins dans cette foule d'intérêts particuliers qui le traversent. Le rétablissement des Bourbons étoit la première mais non la seule condition du rétablissement de l'ordre en France.

Pour renverser la monarchie, il fallut commencer par saper les trois fondemens sur lesquels elle étoit établie, savoir la religion, les loix, et l'éducation. Pour la rétablir d'une manière

durable, il faut donc commencer par reconstruire ses trois points d'appui, l'éducation, les lois, et la religion.

La religion, qui est la sanction la plus universelle et la plus forte de la morale naturelle, et qui réunit, tous les hommes dans les mêmes devoirs, dans les mêmes espérances, et dans les mêmes craintes—les loix, qui offrent à tous la même protection contre le méchant et menacent le méchant de la vengeance de tous—l'éducation qui développe et fortifie par ses habitudes le sentiment des devoirs naturels et accroit l'intelligence par l'étude. Tel est partout le fondement de l'ordre social, tel est partout le triple frein que le législateur doit opposer aux passions injustes et violentes, par lesquelles l'homme, également susceptible de bien et de mal, tend sans cesse à troubler l'ordre social, en même tems qu'il en ressent le besoin et les avantages.

Mais cette restauration n'est pas l'affaire d'un jour. Il faudra même de longues années pour réaccoutumer les enfans à l'étude, les hommes aux loix, et le peuple à la religion: en attendant cette époque, la superstition, l'orgueil, et l'ignorance, occasionneront beaucoup de désordres, et nous ferons longtems ressentir les effets de la révolution, lors même que la cause en est détruite.

Écoutez, s'il vous plait, l'historiette suivante.

Le jardinier de l'hospice de Charenton alla trouver son maître, il y a quelques jours, et lui dit que l'ange Gabriel lui avoit apparu et ordonné d'aller voir le roi, et de lui donner certains avis nécessaires à la sûreté de l'État. M. de Coulmiers, directeur de l'hospice, homme éclairé, se moqua du bon homme, et le renvoya cultiver ses légumes. Deux jours après, le même jardinier revint le trouver, lui déclara que l'ange Gabriel lui avoit apparu une seconde fois, et l'avoit menacé de la mort, s'il n'obéissoit pas aux ordres du ciel; en conséquence qu'il avoit résolu de voir le roi à quelque prix que ce fut. M. de Coulmiers le voyant si décidé fit prévenir le ministre de la police de cette étrange aventure, ou plutôt de cette folie; et celui-ci eut la curiosité de voir et de connoître le nouveau

Thaumaturge. Il le fit venir dans son cabinet, et après une conférence de dix minutes, fit mettre les chevaux à sa voiture, y monta avec le jardinier, et arriva avec lui au château. Le roi prévenu ne fit aucune difficulté de les recevoir l'un et l'autre. Le jardinier, obéissant aux inspirations de l'ange gardien, parla pendant un quart d'heure avec beaucoup plus d'éloquence et de raison qu'on n'avoit droit de l'attendre et de son état et de sa tête. On assure qu'il a dit au roi des choses étonnantes; on ajoute que le roi en a paru émerveillé. Quoiqu'il en soit, cette historiette vraie ou fausse se répand dans les campagnes et les faubourgs; on la raconte en ville avec des commentaires plus ou moins longs plus ou moins malins. Mais, chose singulière! j'ai vu des hommes d'esprit, qui ne croient ni à dieu ni à diable, soutenir que tout cela étoit possible, et étoit nullement déraisonnable.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. à Court.

Foreign Office, April 15, 1816.

My dear Sir—I don't know that I can add anything to my official letter. You will see therein the whole of this transaction adverted to; how it mixes itself up with the Frankfort exchanges; and how it has been complicated by Prince Metternich's contradictory proceedings. Prince Castelcicala has been trying to make me blow hot and cold upon this point, as well as the Austrian Minister; but, as I detest this mode of conducting affairs, and believe half the political evils of the world originate in these indirect proceedings, I have given him no encouragement to suppose that the interposition of Great Britain will be other than what is professed.

I wish you not to omit every suitable exertion to reconcile the Neapolitan Government to lend itself to this measure; but you will at the same time watch the state of things at Frankfort, so as to be sure that our efforts are employed for an adequate purpose, viz., a general settlement of all differences.

Believe me to be, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Baron Wessenberg to the Earl of Clancarty.

Francfort, ce 4 May, 1816.

En me référant à notre dernière conversation, par rapport à Mayence, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer confidentiellement l'Extrait des discussions, qui ont eu lieu à ce sujet entre le Prince de Hardenberg et le Prince de Metternich. Je dois supposer que le Prince Esterhazy a été chargé d'en parler à Lord Castlereagh.

Les conditions mises par la Prusse à l'acceptation des propositions de l'Autriche me paroîssent un peu ridicules. L'Autriche céde au-delà de 30 mille âmes de plus à la Prusse sur la rive gauche: elle s'est prêtée à faciliter les arrangemens avec la Hesse; elle concourt à lui obtenir le droit de garnison à Luxembourg: elle est, par conséquent, en droit d'attendre en retour quelque légère complaisance de sa part.

L'Angleterre est intéressée à ce que Mayence, la clef de l'Allemagne, ne soit pas à la *Prusse exclusivement:* Il est déjà assez malheureux que le royaume des Pays Bas soit séparé de l'Allemagne par les possessions Prussiennes. La possession de Mayence par les Prussiens changeroit evidemment la face des affaires, et surtout le système de *défense adopté par les Puissances.* Je ne puis comprendre comment on a pu laisser cet objet indécis lors des négociations à Paris en 1814, et puis à Vienne, et puis à Paris. Les indécisions font le malheur de ce monde.

Tout à vous, WESSENBERG.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 24, 1816.

My Lord—The note enclosed in my despatch of yesterday, originated, I find, with the Baron de Binder, who, having repeatedly complained to Prince Metternich of the licentiousness of the Belgian press, received discretionary powers from his Highness, which have given rise to the present project.

The Austrian Government does not appear, however, to have been, in any one instance, attacked by the writers in question.

The Prussian Chargé d'Affaires has been authorized by Prince Hardenberg to sign the proposed note, but General Pfühl has received no answer to his application long since made to Count Nesselrode on this subject. The publicity which has been given by the Baron de Binder to his proceedings in this affair is not considered likely to contribute to the attainment of the proposed object.

M. de la Tour du Pin, who lately expressed himself with great warmth on the subject of the obnoxious publications, appears now to be satisfied with the measures intended to be pursued by the Government of the King of the Netherlands, and not desirous that the project of the Baron de Binder should be carried into effect. He concluded a conversation last night on the subject, by saying, "C'est vouloir enfoncer une porte ouverte."

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, May 28, 1816.

My dear Lord—The information you will receive by the present courier is so very full on all the points, that I hardly see the possibility of adding to it. It may be, however, proper to apprise you that M. Anstett's language at Frankfort has given an impression that the Emperor is much more averse to accommodate Bavaria than I take to be the case.

The enclosed extract of the Russian note to Count Bray, justifies a different inference. In order to facilitate the required cession of the circle of Main and Tauber, I find that Austria is disposed to press that a pecuniary indemnity should be made to Baden, out of the funds assigned at Paris to fortify the Upper Rhine; and, by some misconception, this proposition, which appears extremely objectionable, is supposed to have been dropped by me in conversation with Prince Ester-

hazy. I shall write to Lord Clancarty to correct this mistake. The difficulties of this question can alone be finally dealt with at Frankfort; therefore, any suggestion I throw out is merely for consideration; but my own impression is, that Baden may well cede this small circle of mediatized subjects, upon the reversion, as settled by the Protocol at Paris, being modified so as to embrace the Hochberg line. If pecuniary indemnities are required, it is not out of the fortification fund they should be taken.

Your lordship will perceive that it is only by making the Slave Trade and the question of the Barbary Powers go *pari passu*, that we can fully meet the wishes of the Emperor and of the other Powers, who press the latter point as one of universal interest. I think his Imperial Majesty will enter cordially into the views of the British Government upon thus combining them in one common cause, and I have no doubt, if we all draw heartily together, upon the broad ground of giving repose upon Christian principles to the human race, of whatever colour, and in every part of the globe, that we shall do ourselves credit, and render a lasting service to mankind.

I have just received your Persian despatch. You may assure the Emperor that the Prince Regent is disposed to rely with confidence on his Imperial Majesty's spontaneous attention to such claims of indulgence on the part of the Shah as his Persian Majesty may appear to be entitled to form, from the circumstances under which the treaty was negociated.

You will at the same time observe that his Royal Highness would never have obtruded his intervention on this subject, if the influence of the British Ambassador had not, at the time, been made instrumental to the signature of the peace, and had not the hope of his good offices in procuring some modification of the terms from Russia formed, as his Royal Highness had reason to suppose, a motive with the Shah for making peace when he did.

You will perceive that the tender of the Emperor's media-

tion on the American question forms by no means a parallel instance; and you will therefore leave the question in such a state as that, whilst the claim to a formal interference is suspended on the part of your Court, their claim to some favour being shown to the King of Persia shall not be weakened; and your lordship will endeavour to persuade the Persian Ambassador that in this state it is most for the interest of his Court that the question should be left.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Cray Farm, June 4, 1816.

My dear Clancarty—I send you a voluminous transmiss, to peruse on its way to Vienna. You will see, in my despatch to Charles, my reasons for wishing these papers should be withheld for the present from your respective bureaus; but you may make notes for your private information on any points you may deem useful.

Since I closed my despatch to you, I have seen Esterhazy, and conversed with him on Metternich's instructions. I have fully explained to him my objection to any diversion, even in the nature of a loan, of the fortification fund. I stated to him further my opinion that, if any pecuniary indemnity was to enter into the arrangement with Baden, it could only come from either or both the States who signed the Treaty of Munich. He seemed to consider an indemnity of this nature an expedient only to be looked to in case Russia pressed it.

I think you will find Russia not impracticable on the territorial question, if the Hochberg line is included in the *actual succession* of the Baden family; and this does not seem either a great or unreasonable sacrifice on the part of Bavaria.

Your appointment to the Hague has been gazetted, and your outfit money issued. This, of course, is exclusive of plate, which will be provided for the embassy. I entirely approve of your return by Paris, and shall be most happy to

see you here for a short time, before you proceed to the Hague.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Send my brother a copy of my despatch to you of this date.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, June 13, 1816.

My dear Lord—I enclose the extract of two statements I have received, which state facts respecting the communication maintained by my Russian colleague with the French Government, which I am disposed to believe.

The examination of Count Toreno and the Spaniards who have been arrested at Paris continues to occupy the attention of the police, and I learn from good authority that their inquiries are principally directed to the objects of the subscription entered into by private individuals in London, for the support of the party which opposes the measures of the present Government in Spain. The Minister of the Police is of opinion that the result of the information he has obtained, proves that the insurrection of Polier and the late conspiracy at Madrid may be traced to the misapplication of this money.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, June 20, 1816.

My dear Lord—I had the honour of receiving your lordship's despatches by the Messenger Latchford, who arrived here on the 3-15 instant. A Russian courier, despatched about the same time by Count Lieven, had travelled with greater expedition, and the Emperor was already fully and accurately in possession of everything that had been said or communicated to his Ambassador at London. His Imperial Majesty was in the country, with all the Imperial family, to make a short stay at the several more distant palaces round this metropolis, and with the Prince of Orange (whose de-

parture with his bride stands for to-morrow). The *fêtes* at several of these places, which were splendid, taking leave, and a great manœuvre with eighteen battalions and thirty-four cannon, &c., made it impossible for his Imperial Majesty to give me an immediate audience, but I was honoured with an appointment this evening, and am just returned from a conference of considerable length.

The lateness of the hour and early departure of the post oblige me to postpone farther report and details. With many sincere thanks for the interesting and most important information your lordship has given to me,

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

Mr. B. Frere to Mr. W. Hamilton.

Constantinople, June 26, 1816.

My dear Sir—The information which I have received from Sir Thomas Maitland of the existence of a party in the Ionian Islands, who endeavour to traverse his measures, and who, to support their credit with their adherents, give it to be understood that the Emperor of Russia means to interfere in their affairs, has made me consider it as peculiarly important to prevent the Russian mission here from doing anything which might give a colour of truth to such insinuations.

This apology may be thought necessary for the length of the correspondence with which I have troubled Lord Castlereagh on this subject. I have endeavoured to conduct it with all the temper and moderation which is due to M. d'Italinsky's[1] professions, and to give way as little as possible to the feelings which the obvious tendency of his proceedings is calculated to excite.

The truth is that in our conversations we seldom differ, whereas in our official correspondence we as seldom agree; and, being disposed to attribute this incoherence to the pen that he employs, I determined to try the channel of a private corre-

[1] Russian Ambassador to the Porte.

spondence, where it could be used with propriety. I have no copy of the letter which I sent on returning him his Note, but the substance of it is reported in my despatch. I trouble you with a copy of his answer, as well as of what I have since written to him. They will enable you to judge of the footing upon which we are better than the mere official correspondence; and, if there is any question whether the cabals in the Ionian Islands are countenanced from without, everything which belongs to the subject must be interesting.

Believe me to be, &c., B. FRERE.

[Enclosures.]

M. d'Italinsky to Mr. B. Frere.

Buyukdéré, 10-22 Juin, 1816.

Monsieur—Je garderai votre note du 20, puisque vous avez cru ne pouvoir m'en faire grace, et tout en vous priant de ne pas rejetter la mienne du 7-19, qu'à cet effet je vous restitue ci-incluse: j'ajouterai une seconde dont la finale et l'ordre dont il y est fait mention vous satisferont. J'aime au moins à m'en flatter, et je serai charmé l'apprendre par un mot de réponse avec le Janissaire porteur de ma présente.

Au surplus, d'après les notions que j'ai demandées à ma Chancellerie, il ne se trouve en cette capitale aucun insulaire dans le cas d'une simple protection.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec une considération très distinguée, monsieur et mon bon ami, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

A. D'ITALINSKY.

Mr. B. Frere to M. le Chevalier d'Italinsky.

Constantinople, 25 Juin, 1816.

Monsieur l'Envoyé—Permettez moi de vous soumettre une observation qui me semble devroit vous engager à *refondre* (comme j'ai pris la liberté de vous proposer dans mon billet du 20) l'instruction adressée à votre Chancellerie, plutôt qu'à y

ajouter l'ordre supplémentaire renfermé dans l'office que vous me fites l'honneur de m'écrire, en date du 22.

D'un côté, la mention de la deuxieme classe doit être superflue, si personne des sujets Ioniens ne se trouve dans la catégorie à laquelle elle s'applique. De l'autre côté elle ne laisse pas de présenter une idée qui certainement n'est pas la votre, ni celle de sa Majesté l'Empereur; car on diroit qu'elle donne à comprendre que l'arrangement qui fixe le sort des Isles Ionienennes fera des mécontents qui voudroient s'expatrier.

Or, quoique cela soit possible, il me semble que le Ministre d'une Puissance qui a concouru à établir cet arrangement ne devroit pas supposer une pareille conséquence. Si vous envisagez la chose de la même manière, je suis persuadé que vous supprimerez en entier l'article.

J'ai l'honneur, &c., B. FRERE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Foreign Office, July 9, 1816.

My dear Clancarty—I wish I could see the probability of an early end of the Frankfort negociations; 1st, from wishing much that you should be at the Hague, where I think your presence extremely desirable on more than one account; and 2ndly, from its being prejudicial that the arrangements of Europe and the meeting of the Germanic body should appear to be suspended by two such questions as the provision for Beauharnois and the claim upon Baden.

The separating these two questions from the rest of the business, and the referring them for a separate negociation by the Ministers of the four Powers at Vienna, has been suggested for consideration by Prince Metternich. At first, this idea appeared to me unobjectionable; but, upon further reflection and conversing with Count Lieven, I have great doubts of its being practicable; that is, I doubt the Emperor of Russia's

fiat being given, either in signature or accession, to any part of your labours, till the whole is concluded, including the arrangement for Beauharnois. Upon the latter point, I see great distrust of Austrian sincerity; and if such is to be the course in calculating the time necessary for negociating with Baden and Naples, I am afraid that we cannot hope to have these two points in a shape for incorporation in the treaty for two or three months to come.

If the parties are agreed upon so dividing the negociation, we could feel no objection to such a course; but I see so little probability of this, that I do not deem it advisable to send you any official instruction to support such a measure. I have some doubts even of the prudence of Austria bringing forward such a proposition, which, if not accepted—and it cannot be accepted, except upon a special reference to St. Petersburgh—will only produce discontent, by creating an idea that, having settled their main objects, the Court of Vienna is desirous of giving the go-by to the point of Beauharnois, by leaving it to pair off with the Bavarian claims upon Baden. It is true, Austria may be argued to have a direct interest in settling the Baden point; but I do not think Russia will accept that interest as her security for settling the Beauharnois point, whilst she has the whole mass of arrangements as a security in her hands.

I am, therefore, hopeless of finding any shorter road to a close of this concern than pushing each question to an issue as fast and as successfully as may be, letting the Germanic body, in the mean time, commence its business. This involves the inconvenience of keeping you for an indefinite length of time at Frankfort, which, in the present temper of the discussions between the French Government and that of the Low Countries, on the exiles, the press, &c., I certainly consider to be a serious evil. I wish you to weigh all these considerations, with reference to the state in which the instructions from St. Petersburgh may place the negociations, and to give me

your own ideas as to the best compromise between these conflicting difficulties.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, July 12, 1816.

My Lord—M. de Hogendorp, President of the Council of State, and one of the Cabinet Ministers, has composed a memorial, to which he has affixed his name, and has caused the same to be printed and distributed amongst the members of the Government. The opinions expressed in this document have given great offence to his Belgian colleagues, and the measure is considered by the Dutch Ministers as extremely injudicious. The inhabitants of the Low Countries are therein accused of a partiality to the French system, and some of the members of the States General are also stated to be animated by a bad spirit.

Whilst conversing with me this morning upon the subject of the memorial, the Baron de Nagell informed me that M. de Hogendorp had, on a late occasion, written to M. de Spaen, the Dutch Minister at Vienna, and had given him instructions upon an affair which was then under discussion at that Court; that M. de Spaen had acted upon these instructions, although they were in opposition to those which he had received from the Baron de Nagell; and that the King had, in consequence, determined upon immediately recalling M. de Spaen, and was with difficulty dissuaded from this measure.

These circumstances occasioned a very warm discussion in the Cabinet between the above-named Ministers, in presence of his Majesty; and M. de Nagell did not conceal from me that the pretensions of M. de Hogendorp to the part of Prime Minister and Leader of the Lower House rendered him extremely obnoxious to his colleagues.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, July 1-13, 1816.

My dear Lord—I rejoice in the opportunity of writing to your lordship without reserve. I continue to believe the Emperor to be perfectly sincere in all the professions he has made of a pacific disposition, and that he is firm in his intention to co-operate fairly and fully with his Allies, in the execution of all his engagements; and I do not at present see any reason to apprehend a change of system.

Incidents may occur to create alarm; and, with a view to render it more easy to appreciate duly the source and value of apparent deviations from the principles which have been professed, I think it may be useful to state some observations upon what appears to be the present disposition of the Emperor's mind.

His Imperial Majesty is certainly fully aware of the power which the extent of his military preparations places in his hand. He is fond of his army, and proud of it. He considers it as brought to its present perfection by his own exertions. He would have pleasure in the task of adding to it, and consequently is tenacious of it, and averse to set about that reduction and consequent diminution of expense, which his discernment and good sense demonstrate to be absolutely necessary for the interest of his empire. He is equally sensible of the important place which Russia now holds in the counsels of Europe. He is surrounded by people of all sorts, who continually paint this power and these advantages in the most flattering colours, and excite him to show it by partial interferences.

He has not, as far as I know, any Minister who would venture to persist in opposing cool reflections to his declared will, and I do not know any to whom he would allow opportunities of giving such opposition. It is generally observed that his Imperial Majesty has acquired, within these last years, much more confidence in himself, and that he is much

more inclined to act from his own judgment. Acting, therefore, in the plenitude of such power, without control, and often without advice, it is difficult to suppose that those passions which generally govern the actions of men shall never prevail with him, and that steps may not sometimes be taken, which would have been avoided on consultation and calm reflection.

The better ordering military arrangements in all their branches has occupied a great proportion of the hours of business. But these hours are found on all days and in all places, and a great deal has been done and is now in progress in various departments. Except military business and foreign affairs, all public business is reported through General Count Arakchieff, who, though afraid of the Emperor, certainly possesses an ascendant over his mind. This general has shown great diligence, method, and ingenuity, in bringing to their present perfection the arrangements of the Ordnance Department, and particularly those of the field train, in their most minute details. I believe he will always make most conscientious and faithful reports of all the business he lays before his Imperial master, but I do not believe he would expose himself to the loss of the Emperor's favour and confidence by persevering in unfolding unpleasant truths or opposing his will. He is the person to whom the Emperor professes to give the greatest share of his confidence; but all those with whom his Imperial Majesty personally and habitually transacts business have more influence than he is aware of, by the manner in which their reports are worded, and the moment when they are made, which may be more or less favourable, for many reasons, but especially when chosen so as to be most likely to occasion the investigation or termination of business to be left to them.

There is no declared favourite. I know of no secret influence, nor do I believe that there exists any excess or predominancy of religious disposition. Prince Galitzin, the Minister

for what concerns divine worship, is often with him. He is a very worthy man, and I do not believe that he either does or desires to interfere in other concerns. The Emperor supports the Church established in his empire, and has restrained the Jesuits and banished them from his capital for making proselytes; but, on the other hand, he has given the most liberal support to the Bible Society, and has not only authorized and encouraged the printing and publishing the Bible in the Slavonian, and in all the other languages and dialects used by his subjects, but has this year permitted it to be printed in Russian, although it is read in the churches partially, and in Slavonian only.

The Emperor appears to me to be generally more cheerful; he is always in his uniform; and, though he often rides out without any other attendant, has always a servant in livery with him.

In regard to the Emperor's disposition towards Great Britain, I have every reason to be convinced that he is extremely partial to it, and that he would rather revisit England than any country he has seen. I think he has great deference for your lordship, and that he has a much more correct notion of public questions in England, and of the nature and composition of opposition to Government, than he had. I see innumerable instances of preference for English opinions, produce, inventions, &c., which he is often more inclined to check and conceal, than to profess, and of which he is often not aware. But all Russians are peculiarly alive to unfavourable comparisons. They are hurt at any apparent superiority. Perhaps it hardly amounts to the definition of envy, but they hate us for doing what they cannot do; and, without any particular object of immediate advantage, will always feel inclined rather to abate than increase our power, and to join in any measure to curb our dominion over the sea, or to check our commerce.

To this disposition I ascribe the popularity in this country

of the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and, in like manner, I am convinced that there exists a jealousy of our influence with the kingdom of the Netherlands, and with Persia, and of the extent and importance of our Indian empire.

In 1812, during the invasion, and when hopes arose of delivering Europe, and of replacing something like the former construction of the nations which compose that quarter of the globe, your lordship may recollect that I reported a conversation, in which the idea of annexing Holland to Denmark was named; but it was, at the same time, said, England will not like that, because there certainly exists a plan to unite Holland more closely to Great Britain by marriage.

That this marriage did not take place certainly was matter of triumph in some minds; and the marriage which has taken place, good as it certainly is in itself, is considered by Russian politicians as particularly advantageous, inasmuch as it may afford the means of substituting Russian influence, and detaching the Low Countries from us.

Marriages of royal persons do not ensure permanent connexion between their courts. I have seen instances, where it has been tried (not by the Emperor himself) to excite jealousy of us, I believe without success, in the mind of the Prince. If the Emperor should make a separate interference in regard to Luxemburg, it will afford a confirmation of my hypothesis. There have been many slight instances which have recalled to me the notion I had formed of this jealousy in regard to the Low Countries; even within these few days, I thought I marked it in his eye when the passage in your lordship's despatch, in which the defensive alliance with Holland is quoted as an example, was read.

I have asked for some more precise details of the reduction of force which is proposed. If carried fully to the extent named, it might go nearly to a reduction of a tenth of the disposable force. The continuance of the establishment, and of the dislocation of the troops on the frontier, are objects of jealousy.

I do not find that the plan of reduction has been spoken of to other Ministers. The continuance of the army in the quarters near the frontier is still stated to be for the purpose of consuming the magazines which had been formed there, and which it is better economy to consume on the spot than to remove to the interior with the troops or dispose of by sale.

There is a great festival and celebration of an anniversary in the Church on the 15th of August, old style. The Emperor has appointed to set out on the 10-22 of August, for Moscow, to be present at this ceremony; and he will probably make some short stay there. Afterwards, he will, it is said, go to Kieff, which may perhaps also have a religious object; and he will then proceed to Warsaw, from whence he will return to this place.

I have not heard that there will be any great assemblies of troops. I shall, however, consider it my duty to do all I can to obtain leave to accompany the Emperor, and at least to meet him at Moscow and Warsaw; but I dare not speak of it yet.

Next week, it is understood, the Emperor will go to pass a few days on a visit to Count Arakchieff's, at some distance in the country.

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

Prince Esterhazy[1] *to Lord Castlereagh.*

Le Dimanche matin.

J'ai l'honneur, Mylord, de vous envoyer ci-joint le mémoire Prussien, que je vous prie de me renvoyer, quand vous en avez pris connaissance à votre loisir, puisque j'ai l'ordre de ma Cour de donner le moins de publicité que possible à cette pièce, par égard pour la Prusse.

J'ose en même temps [vous rappeller] la promesse que vous avez bien voulu me faire de me donner communication des

[1] Austrian Ambassador in London.

instructions de Lord Exmouth, puisque je désirois bien pouvoir les transmettre à ma Cour par Lord Clanwilliam.

Recevez, Mylord, l'expression de ma haute considération.

ESTERHAZY.

[Enclosure.]

Prince Metternich to Prince Esterhazy.

Vienne, le 27 Juin, 1816.

Mon Prince—Vous aurez vraisemblablement été informé directement par le Ministère Britannique de la manière dont Lord Clancarty a envisagé notre réclamation concernant l'excédant du revenu des postes dans la Belgique, réclamation qu'il trouve inadmissible, et au sujet de laquelle il a écrit dans ce sens à sa Cour.

Monsieur le Baron de Wessenberg, en m'informant de cette circonstance, me transmet la note ci-jointe en copie, dans laquelle Monsieur le Baron de Humboldt énonce une opinion tout aussi peu favorable que celle de Lord Clancarty, et qui a provoqué l'ordre au Ministre Prussien près la Cour de la Haye de désister de toute démarche ultérieure à l'appui de la réclamation commune.

En même temps que je charge Monsieur le Comte de Zichy de faire à ce sujet des représentations au Ministère Prussien dans le sens de la dépêche dont Votre Altesse reçoit ci-jointe une copie, je fais parvenir à la Mission Impériale près la Cour des Pays-Bas l'ordre de reprendre la poursuite de cette affaire. Vous voudrez bien, Mon Prince, faire de votre côté les démarches convenables. Le désistement de la Prusse ne doit pas nous empêcher de soutenir une prétention, dont la justice me paroit incontestable, et a déjà été reconnue implicitement par la Cour de Londres; car Votre Altesse n'ignore point qu'elle n'a jamais contesté le principe, et qu'elle a fait dépendre uniquement son acquiescence de la question s'il n'en résulteroit pas un charge trop considérable pour les finances des Pays Bas, ce qui n'est nullement le cas. Vous pourrez même faire observer, Mon Prince, que cette charge, loin d'être

moins considérable, si on admettoit l'opinion de Monsieur de Humboldt le seroit peut-être davantage; car, selon lui, le Prince de la Tour Taxis devroit obtenir la totalité du revenu des postes de la Belgique, au lieu que la réclamation, telle qu'elle existe maintenant, ne porte pas sur tout le produit.

Recevez, Mon Prince, l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.

METTERNICH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.

Cray Farm, July 16, 1816.

My dear Sir—I have not written to you officially, on the subject of the Emperor's rescript, not knowing how far it may be deemed expedient by the Allied Ministers to raise any further discussion on this representation, when there is some reason to hope that affairs have taken an improved turn since it was issued. The British Government can have no difficulty in concurring generally with the remarks contained in the paper of observations, and recommending to the King, in order to escape hereafter similar errors of administration, to give to his constitutional advisers a more determined support, avoiding every measure which is calculated to precipitate reaction and to involve him in acts contradictory to the Charter; but I shall delay transmitting any orders to you on this subject, till I learn from you what is wished and expected.

It is material to state that these documents were communicated to me by the Count de Lieven, *in extenso*, before I heard from you, and that I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Court of Petersburgh, which, on this as on all other subjects, continues to manifest the most cordial disposition to act in concert and confidence with the British Government.

I am disposed to attribute General Pozzo di Borgo's indisposition to record this document on the Protocol, as principally arising from a wish rather to soften a communication, to which

perhaps his own reports had given rise in representing the state of France under a stronger colouring than is applicable to the present existing state of circumstances.

It will have done no mischief, however, but the reverse of it, if it should make Monsieur somewhat more guarded than he has hitherto been, and if it should determine the King to destroy the anomaly of an armed force, not administered by the responsible advisers of the Crown.

In haste, yours very truly, CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. B. Frere to Lord Castlereagh.

Constantinople, July 26, 1816.

My Lord—In my public letter of the 10th April, I had the honour to mention to your lordship that the Chevalier d'Italinsky had informed me of his having received despatches from his Court, which stated that Parga would not be given up till the Porte fulfils the stipulations of the Treaty of 1800 in favour of the other continental districts, which were then ceded to her.

Though I had no reason to doubt the accuracy of this information, I did not take any notice of it at the Porte. It was possible that some understanding of this nature might have been entered into with the Emperor Alexander during the negociation of the late treaty, as the price of his compliance; but, as it tended to involve Great Britain in a question which seemed about to arise between Russia and the Porte, respecting the Treaty of 1800, to which she was originally not a party, I thought it necessary to be particularly cautious upon this point, till I might receive your lordship's instructions.

I had not seen M. d'Italinsky since they reached me; but, the other day, in answer to what I had written to him respecting the Treaty of the 26th September, after thanking me for my communication, he adds: "J'ose aussi me flatter que vous voudriez étendre non moins vos communications à ce qui est

relatif à l'accession au traité Ionien, non encore donnée par la Porte, et au maintien par elle du continent Vénétien dans l'état déjà antérieurement fixé. Je me suis empressé dans le tems de vous donner connoissance des instructions que sous ce second rapport j'avois reçu d'ordre de sa Majesté l'Empereur. Vous n'ignorez pas non plus que j'en ai ajourné l'usage jusqu'à ce que vous-même soyez en position d'entamer et de suivre cet objet près la Porte."

The latter part of the communication had escaped my memory, nor can I now recall it. But, at all events, the instructions I had received do not bear upon the general question of the four Venetian States, nor authorize me to mention the subject to the Porte, as connected with the cession of Parga. And they are even incompatible with the information which was given me by M. d'Italinsky.

The only solution which I can find for this difficulty is by supposing that, at the time of writing that despatch to M. d'Italinsky, the Court of St. Petersburg invited the British Government to concur in the measure which the Russian Minister here understood and represented to me as actually determined on. However it may be, I have thought this incident sufficiently remarkable to justify my troubling your lordship with an account of it under this form.

I have the honour to be, &c., B. FRERE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty and Lord Stewart.

Cray Farm, August 7, 1816.

My dear Lords—After I had in fact closed my despatches to be entrusted to Lord Clanwilliam, Adamberger, the messenger, arrived with the despatches from Vienna and from Frankfort. Having only had time to read the interesting and important communications cursorily over, and unwilling to detain Lord Clanwilliam, I shall state, in the shape of a private letter, addressed to you both jointly, such remarks as

may serve to assist you in any measures you may be called upon to adopt till I am enabled more regularly to reply to these despatches.

I am, upon the whole, extremely well satisfied with their contents, and do full justice to the zeal and ability of those to whom I am indebted for such copious details. I shall, without further preface, trouble you, in the shape of Notes, with such remarks as occur, not feeling it necessary to recall any of the reasoning, which had occurred before the arrival of the messenger, and which you will receive precisely in the shape they had previously taken.

BADEN.

I adhere to my impressions on this point, that the Emperor of Russia will not in the end be found impracticable upon it. Under fine phrases, he will let his *beau-frère* down as easily as he can.

I do not believe that his Imperial Majesty means to make the Grand Duke master of the negociation, nor yet to admit a negociation substantially *de gré à gré*, because, if so, why talk of *sacrifices?*—exchanges and equivalents would be the proper expressions.

The principle of indemnity is claimed in his favour, and the Emperor fairly enough objects to an ultimatum before discussion. He will get for his kinsman as much as he can, and will not very much object to make Austria contribute; but he will not let the negociations fail by the Grand Duke's unreasonableness: and, if this intervention on the part of his Imperial Majesty is well managed by the other Plenipotentiaries, he will make them hear reason at Carlsruhe.

It must be impressed upon the Russian Negociator that, if Baden is permitted to take her claims so high, notwithstanding the Treaty of Frankfort, I know of no ground upon which Great Britain can, as a mediator, press Naples to liqui-

date Prince Eugene's claim. The King was restored without any condition: from Austria he has a guarantee.

The agreement at Vienna, to which, however, we were no parties, may be binding upon the three Powers, who entered into it amongst themselves, but it cannot affect his Sicilian Majesty's rights; and, if the Grand Duke is to be supported by Russia in opposing himself to a final settlement, upon the plea of right, I don't see how we can further press the question with justice upon Naples, except upon the ground of a corresponding and previous indemnity, on the adequacy of which his Sicilian Majesty himself would, in parity of reasoning, be to judge.

NATURE OF INDEMNITY.

I see no reason, but the reverse, to alter my opinion on the Fortification question. The opinion of Russia is explicit upon the incompetence of the four Powers to divert this fund from the object to which it has by treaty been assigned. What can be the object, after such a statement, of professing a willingness to concur with the general feeling? Possibly, to throw the refusal upon us—probably to avoid being left alone, in case we gave way—but in neither supposition can it alter our duty, or the propriety of the thing itself. And I even persuade myself that Prince Metternich, after he has made the attempt, which I have no doubt his financiers have compelled him to undertake, will be the first to admit that the British Government have done what was right.

This principle of indemnity once set aside, the reversions and the military defence of the Upper Rhine by Austria may properly be suggested as an alternative. If money must enter into the arrangement, the Treaty of Munich has already decided on whom the charge must fall, namely, upon Austria.

BEAUHARNOIS POINT.

This question seems at present to languish at Naples, but the Austrian instruction will give a useful impulse. Our

Algerine measure, if successful, will facilitate, if the whole is not thwarted by an undue indulgence to other Powers; but it must always be kept in view at Frankfort, and pressed upon our Allies, that, if things stand still on the Baden point, the motive for pressing the other fails.

LUCCA.

I agree with the Russian reasoning that, to mix this question with the settlement now pending is to throw the whole loose, and to expose it to interminable delay. It would be both unfair and unwise to take Spain and the Queen of Etruria too abruptly at their word upon this point, and apply these indemnities to other objects. Such a course would be peculiarly hazardous for Austria, unless she was sure of maritime support; and it becomes those Powers to whom she would look for support in such a case to use due precautions to obviate such an occurrence as naval reprisals on the part of Spain against that Power.

I had intended to write fully to Vienna on this point by the present conveyance, having received from the Chevalier Labrador, through Sir Charles Stuart, a proposal that the Queen of Etruria will accept of Lucca, &c., but upon conditions, to which I foresee very obvious objections on the part of Austria; but still it shows a disposition to treat, which, for the security of her possessions in Italy, it is not the interest of Austria to preclude. The possibility, however, that she may, in the negociations, plead her European title—but enough of this at present! the subject being extensive, and Sir C. Stuart's despatch by some accident mislaid.

Upon the course to be given to a final measure upon this subject, the Russian suggestion appears to me framed in a proper temper of forbearance and moderation; and, after the Spanish Government has been made properly to feel and understand the question, it may be very necessary to have recourse to some categorical *démarche* of this nature.

SEPARATING THE NEGOCIATION ON THE BADEN AND BEAUHARNOIS POINTS FROM THE OTHER TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

When this idea was first stated to me by Prince Esterhazy, my first impression was not unfavourable (if the other Powers were agreed) to the closing the business at Frankfort with this limited reserve; but the more I have reflected upon it, and especially after conversing with Lieven, the more inexpedient as well as impracticable the proposal has appeared to me—so much so, that I desired to see Prince Esterhazy a second time on the same day he first mentioned the subject to me, for the purpose of stating the objections that had occurred, adding my belief that Russia would not agree to it.

My present impression is, that to separate them would rather augment our difficulties, and that the parties would become more difficult to deal with, if they could pertinaciously resist, without producing that extent of inconvenience which now urges forward the general settlement.

INTELLIGENCE FROM RUSSIA.

The communications received are undoubtedly extremely interesting and sufficiently develop the impulses of various kinds which are operating upon the Emperor's policy; but they do not alter former probabilities, nor affect the course we are pursuing; they rather augment the motives for preventing external incidents from coming in aid of the tendencies of Russia to become an offensive and conquering State; and my opinion still is that, with proper management, the Emperor's particular character may be made in itself an instrument for neutralizing and counteracting the danger with which that State abounds; but, in this respect, whatever may be the issue—and prophecy in politics is a very idle occupation—sure I am that the policy of Europe towards the Emperor is clear; which is all that can rationally deserve attention at the present moment.

I have thrown hastily together these few remarks upon an imperfect recollection of the despatches to which they apply. If they are not sufficiently matured to direct your conduct, they may at least assist you with topics for deliberation. I shall not fail, however, to write by Adamberger what may, upon a more attentive perusal of your despatches, appear wanting.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, August 8, 1816.

My dear Lord—It is necessary to state to your lordship that several Russian officers, who, I have reason to think, are not connected with the legation accredited to this Court, have lately arrived at Paris, and are employed in obtaining and copying all the maps placed in the Dépôt de la Guerre by the late Government, which relate to the countries between the Russian frontier and India.

I remain, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.

August 9, 1816.

Sir—It is with much regret that I feel myself called upon to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed official letter received from Lord Bathurst, covering one from his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief to his lordship, both marked secret.

Although the statement therein made can form no justification of Sir R. Wilson's conduct, it nevertheless appears to his Majesty's Ministers so materially to affect your Excellency's public character, in the highly responsible situation you now fill, as to render it incumbent upon them to call upon you for those explanations which they feel confident your Excellency will be enabled to afford with respect to the transactions to which it has reference: and, in order that you may furnish information upon those parts of Sir R. Wilson's representation

which appear to his Majesty's Ministers most necessary to be satisfactorily cleared up, I beg leave to direct your attention to the following points—

1st.[1] That it may be distinctly ascertained whether any part of the statement which was professedly withheld by Sir R. Wilson from the Duke of York, in consequence of his Royal Highness declining to bind himself to secrecy, related to your Excellency; and, if so, that Sir R. Wilson should be called upon to declare the purport of that statement.

2ndly. That it may be ascertained whether the passport that was procured by Sir Robert Wilson from your Excellency's office, for La Valette, *under a false name*, viz., that of Major Losack, was so furnished with your Excellency's privity, consent, and knowledge of the person for whom it was really intended, or with that of any person attached to your embassy or family, and, if so, of whom.

And 3rdly. That your Excellency, adverting to the statement made by Sir R. Wilson, should declare whether, previous to the escape of La Valette from prison, or after his escape, and before the period of his leaving Paris, you held language in the presence of Sir R. Wilson, or of any other person, which might be understood to give countenance to a British subject becoming the instrument of assisting a French subject to escape from the public justice of his country.

I have marked this despatch "secret," but your Excellency will not feel yourself thereby precluded from making such use of it, or of its enclosures, as you may deem expedient for the purpose of claiming from Sir R. Wilson, or from any other persons, the information necessary to the full elucidation of the subject.

[1] In the original MS. by Lord Castlereagh, this 1st paragraph is struck through with the pen, evidently in consequence of an afterthought, as the numbers of the 2nd and 3rd are unaltered: and as it mentions a circumstance perhaps nowhere else recorded, it has been here retained.—EDITOR.

Count Capo d'Istrias to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersbourg, ce 11 Août, 1816.

Mylord—J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser, en date du 22 Juillet. Le témoignage qu'il a plu à son Altesse Royale de me donner de sa bienveillance et du suffrage qu'elle accorde à mon zèle à l'occasion de la signature du traité relatif aux États Unis Ioniens, m'inspire une vive reconnoissance. Veuillez, Mylord, mettre sous les yeux de son Altesse Royale, Monseigneur le Prince Régent, l'hommage de ma respectueuse reconnoissance.

Les expressions dont votre Excellence s'est servie dans sa lettre, et qui m'assurent de ses dispositions personnelles à mon égard, m'ont procuré une satisfaction d'autant plus grande que je me flatte d'avoir droit à réciprocité par les sentimens que je vous ai voués, Mylord, et qui vous sont connus.

Agréez en de nouvelles assurances, et recevez celles de l'estime et de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Mylord, de votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur.

Le Comte Capo d'Istrias.

The Hon. Charles Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, August 11, 1816.

My dear Lord—I am much disappointed in not being able to acquaint you by this packet, that I have already concluded the convention on the subject of the fisheries—but the fault is in the Government, or rather the no-Government of this country: for it can scarcely be said that a Government exists here during the summer months.

Immediately after I received your lordship's instructions, I requested an interview with Mr. Monroe, at which, after a long conversation upon the subject, I brought forward the first proposition contained in Lord Melville's letter to your lordship, which allots to the use of the United States such part of the

southern coast of Labrador as lies between Mount Joli and the Esquimaux Islands. Mr. Monroe told me that, if he could procure in Washington any circumstantial information respecting the proposed coast, he should be able to proceed immediately in the business: but, on the following day, I received a note from him, stating that he had been under the necessity of writing to the Secretary of the Navy, then at Salem, beyond Boston, for the information which he required.

After repeated interviews with Mr. Monroe, he told me that he imagined that the Secretary of the Navy had sent to have the coast in question examined, and Mr. Monroe himself then went into the country, from whence he only returned yesterday. I immediately waited upon him, when he told me that the tract of coast which I had proposed had several settlements upon it; and, though convenient in point of position, it appeared to the persons who had examined it to want many of the requisite advantages. He then expressed his wish that an allotment should be given up on the eastern coast of Labrador, above the Straits of Belleisle. I told him that I could save much useless discussion upon that point by assuring him that there were insuperable objections to granting any part of that coast; but that, if the one proposed was really unsuitable, I would not disguise from him that I was authorized to offer part of another coast, which unquestionably afforded every convenience which the United States could require. I accordingly offered the second proposition, which gives the unsettled part of the southern coast of Newfoundland, from Cape Ray to the Ramen Islands.

This is the state of the business at this moment, and I expect that, in a few days, we shall come to some final agreement upon the subject; but I have already detained the packet so long, in waiting for Mr. Monroe's return to Washington, that I do not think it right to delay it any longer.

From the manner in which Mr. Monroe received the second

proposition, I entertain hopes that it will be accepted, and that I shall be able to annex to the acceptation an express abandonment of all pretensions to fish or dry on any other of the coasts of British North America—at all events, that I shall not be under the necessity of yielding the two propositions, which your lordship may be assured that I shall not do, excepting in the very last resort.

By a letter which I had received from Admiral Griffith, I learnt that he had already given orders for the seizure of all American vessels found fishing within our limits; but I wrote to him on the 6th of last month, (the day after I had first seen Mr. Monroe upon this business) requesting that he would abstain as much as possible from taking any steps which might, at the present moment, embarrass the negociation, which I confidentially acquainted him was then on foot.

I have the honour to be, my dear lord, your lordship's sincerely faithful servant,

CHARLES BAGOT.

Intelligence from Paris.[1]

Paris, Mercredi, 21 Août, 1816.

On assure que le Gouvernement demande aux étrangèrs un délai de cinq ans de plus pour payer les six cent millions de contributions restant, et qu'il consent à ce prix à solder et entretenir aussi pendant cinq ans de plus l'armée étrangère d'occupation. Ce serait emprunter six cents millions, à cent cinquante millions d'intérêt par an. Je vois que cette mesure du Gouvernement serait fort désapprouvée, mais je ne vois personne en proposer de meilleure, ou même d'équivalente.

Le Pavillon Marsan et ses amis ont un maintien et une conversation singulière et bizarre; ils ne demandent pas mieux

[1] The only information given concerning this sensible Paper is conveyed in the indorsement—"Received from Sir C. Stuart, 1816."—EDITOR.

que de voir se prolonger la résidence sur le territoire Français de l'armée étrangère parce qu'elle protège l'ordre et l'établissement actuel, et ils sont en animadversion contre ces mêmes étrangers parce qu'ils recommandent le maintien de la charte comme moyen d'ordre et de paix intérieure.

Je vois que le Gouvernement, qui se plaint de la manière dont les Gouvernemens étrangers le laissent traiter dans leurs gazettes, fait ou laisse publier dans ses papiers qui sont tous un peu officiels, puisqu'aucun ne paraît pas sans son attache, tout ce qui se débite de fâcher, sur la détresse vraie ou fausse de la classe industrielle de l'Angleterre. Le ton des journaux Français n'est d'accord que sur ce point, et il me semble que cette ingratitude envers l'Angleterre est à l'ordre du jour parmi toutes les Puissances de l'Europe. Elle se conduit envers l'Angleterre comme la France envers M. de Talleyrand. Je ne sais si je suis à la fois trop bon et trop bête, mais je trouve cette conduite aussi imprudente qu'ingrate. C'est Angleterre seule qui a sauvé l'Europe, qui a rallié les souverains et leur a donné les moyens : aucun d'eux seul n'eut pu se tirer d'affaire. Ôtez le pivot Anglais, ou sa force morale, de la machine politique du Continent, les forces des Souverains se vont mettre en jeu au gré de leurs passions privées ; la masse des autres forces n'aura plus de centre, ne pourra plus se rallier, s'organiser, et résister à une force impérieuse et ambitieuse un peu prépondérante telle que se présente la Russie. Il en est des États de l'Europe pris collectivement comme de chaque État en particulier il y faut un pouvoir ou une influence supérieure pour en resserrer et maintenir le faisceau ; et nulle Puissance peut jouer ce rôle d'une manière moins dangereuse pour les hiérarchies continentales que l'Angleterre dont le territoire ne touche à aucune d'elles. Quant au système d'équilibre, ce n'est qu'un beau roman. Je maintiens qu'il faut une influence capitale, et, certes, elle est moins dangereuse à Londres qu'à Petersbourg.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, August 24, 1816.

My Lord—I had the honour of being admitted to a short audience of his Swedish Majesty on Tuesday last, the 20th. I am not very desirous of importuning your lordship with reports on the declining state of the King's health, which are otherwise sufficiently in circulation, although, in that respect, I did not observe any very material alteration: but I cannot refrain from mentioning to your lordship the striking declension in the mental faculties of his Swedish Majesty, which I had never occasion to observe before. The King was sufficiently prepared for my coming, and his first questions, of a common nature, relating to my journey, led me to suspect nothing of the failure of his memory. But immediately afterwards he asked me if I had not remarked the great changes which had taken place in the country. On my expressing by my countenance some surprise at a question of this sort, after so short an absence, he repeated it, and added that since the time of the deceased King (meaning Gustavus III.) there had been great changes in the country, and whether on coming back I had not been struck with them. He repeated this observation and allusion to the late King (*feu le Roi*) a second time.

With regard to the physical health of his Majesty, I did not observe any material alteration. There was perhaps a little in the increased degree of debility, and in the augmented care of the two gentlemen who were present, and who supported the King by the arm as he stood to receive me. But one of them desired me to speak louder, as his Majesty was exceedingly deaf; and this certainly was not the case before, nor when I had my audience of leave last year. I have not yet been admitted to the presence of the Queen.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, August 16-28, 1816.

My dear Lord—I have little to add in the form of a private and confidential letter to what I have stated in my despatches; but as opportunities of writing confidentially do not frequently occur, I am glad to profit by every safe conveyance.

The Emperor, with his accustomed kindness, gave me several opportunities of seeing him before his departure without ceremony and in the country. In speaking of his journey, the language of his Imperial Majesty has been uniform as to intended dates, and as to the places he means to visit. He made it perfectly clear that he wished me not to follow him; but he said that he could not object to my travelling where my inclination might lead me within his dominions, and assured me that, if I did come where he was, I should be well received; and that I must not expect to find him at Warsaw later than the 5-17 of October. It ended at last in a sort of compromise, that I should not make the journey, unless there should appear to me to be a strong and urgent reason for it; but that, in that event, I may set out without farther communication with him, as if it were to make an excursion for my own amusement or curiosity.

Notwithstanding his attention to business, and the number of hours daily allotted to it in all places, the Emperor appears to me to have enjoyed this summer much, and to have taken great pleasure in the country, especially at Czarskoizelo, where he has put the grounds into great order, and planned many improvements. Considerable alterations are also in progress in his palaces and in ornamenting this city. He has also passed more of his time with the Empress, and they appear to be very happy together, nor is there anything of which I am aware likely to interrupt that harmony.

In regard to his popularity, it is difficult here to ascertain

the general tone of the country. His achievements out of th empire have universal applause; and on these subjects, a seem to join with enthusiasm in his praise.

But there are many causes which prevent the general senti ments from being so uniformly pronounced in regard to hi government of the empire. The great expense of living ha led all families to discontinue their former splendour, and a who can make their escape go to their country residences, c ask to go abroad. All who have lawsuits or private claims t solicit complain of delay, expense, and protracted anxiety and all manner of persons, here and at Warsaw, complain c the expense of the military establishment, with very littl reserve.

The truth is, that so much depends upon the decision of th Sovereign in all civil as well as military concerns, and so ver little can be finished in any department upon the responsibilit of Ministers, that business makes very slow progress, and from accumulation, is often done at last upon the report c inferior officers, submitted by their principals without sufficien scrutiny.

This inconvenience, and the discontent which accompanie it, must always be great in proportion to the extent of so vas an empire; and the difficulty of detecting and eradicatin abuses will always continue in the same ratio.

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

The Hon. Charles Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, September 1, 1816.

My dear Lord—In a conversation which I had last yea with Lord Bathurst, during your absence at Paris, he enjoine me, if any question should arise with the American Govern ment, respecting the Indian nations lately in alliance with us not to take measures upon the subject without previously referring to the Government at home. Such a question i now arising, and a very important one it is, not only as it

affects the Indians, but as it may remotely affect the security of the whole province of Upper Canada.

I have strictly obeyed Lord Bathurst's injunctions; and, excepting that I have said what I thought was indispensable, for the purpose of guarding the British Government from any accusations of having excited the Indians to the hostilities into which they may probably be driven against this country, I have made no representations to Mr. Monroe upon what your lordship will see by my despatches is evidently taking place.

I shall continue to act in this manner, but I think it is now desirable that I should be put in possession of so much of your lordship's opinion upon the question, as may serve to guide me generally in any reference which may be made to me either by the Government in Canada or the American Government, upon the many incidental questions which will probably grow out of these proceedings.

There appears to be no prospect of my being able to bring the Convention respecting the fisheries to a conclusion before October. Mr. Monroe will not return from the country till that time. He offered to remain here for the purpose; but told me that he did not think that before that time he could obtain the information which he required upon the subject.

The real history of this delay is, I believe, that the Government are afraid of concluding any arrangement upon a subject in which their Federal opponents in the Eastern States are alone interested, without ascertaining, as nearly as they can, their wishes upon the business. I have not thought it right to manifest any impatience upon my part; but I have apprised Mr. Monroe that, as a much longer delay would take place than I had expected, I should leave the Admiral on the Halifax station to take his own course in respect to the American vessels encroaching upon our rights, as the forbearance which, in expectation of a speedy arrangement, I had

requested him to show during the negociation might be misconstrued, if continued through the whole fishing season.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Mr. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

Hague, September 5, 1816.

My Lord—The Austrian Minister, the Baron de Binder, who returned last week from Vienna to this residence, has been directed by Prince Metternich to make renewed remonstrances against the licentiousness of the Belgian press.

M. de la Tour du Pin received a courier yesterday from Paris, with instructions from the Duke de Richelieu to state to M. de Nagell that, unless some decisive measures are adopted on this subject, his Most Christian Majesty would cause all diplomatic relations to cease between France and Holland.

The accounts transmitted by General Fagel of the intemperate manner in which he had been attacked by the Duke de Richelieu, at a diplomatic dinner given by General Pozzo di Borgo, were not likely favourably to dispose the King of the Netherlands for this communication.

M. de la Tour du Pin, in relating to me these circumstances, did not succeed in concealing that, in obeying the orders of the Duke de Richelieu, he was acting against his own judgment. He repeated how much he regretted that the Court of France had noticed the attacks of the Belgian press, and had thus been engaged in measures, from the prosecution of which it became very difficult to recede.

It appears probable that a compliance with the demands of France and Austria would not only cause great irritation in Belgium, but would also raise up an opposition to the King's Government even amongst those of his Dutch subjects who have been constant in their enmity to France and in their attachment to the House of Orange.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. à Court.

Foreign Office, September 6, 1816.

Sir—In my official instructions to you, of this date, relative to Sicilian affairs, you will perceive that I have abstained from making any reference to that part of the Marquis Circello's communication to you, which had relation either to the engagements or to the discussions which have taken place between the Courts of Naples and Vienna on this question, as connected with the political state of Italy, because, as the Prince Regent is in no degree a party to these engagements; and as his Royal Highness's policy is as far as possible to avoid interference, I have thought it better to found my despatch upon that part of the conversation alone which had reference to the course the British Government was likely to pursue, in the actual state of affairs, and upon which you will have no difficulty, on your return to Naples, in fully explaining yourself.

The British Government is very sensible of the friendly disposition the Austrian Government has shown to concert their measures with them upon this subject. Their relations with the Court of Naples, as well as their general interest in the political tranquillity of Italy, must give them an interest not less warm than we feel in the result of any change which may be attempted in Sicily; but still we think that any actual concert between the two Powers would embarrass, rather than assist, the King of Naples; that it might be open to great misconception in Europe, and expose both Powers to an extent of responsibility more serious than could be counterbalanced by the advantages to be hoped to flow from their active interference.

In the progress of affairs, so far as your personal advice can be employed, to promote the welfare and happiness of the Sicilians, and to avert a state of things which might impose upon the British Government the necessity of interference, I am confident it will not be withheld; but, you will, at the

same time, be cautious not thereby to commit your Court to a responsibility, which they deem it their duty explicitly to decline.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart.

London, September 6, 1816.

My dear Charles—I should be glad if you would endeavour by the return of the messenger to let me know with certainty what Austria will do upon the question of the reversion, because, if she refuses, we must try to make Spain accept at all events. My own opinion is that it is not for the interest of Austria either to keep this question open, or to have Napoleon the Second in Italy *quasi* Sovereign. France will never agree to it; and you may remember, the British Government sent a peremptory instruction to Clancarty at Vienna to protest against the boy being included in the arrangement.

The instruction proceeded on the principle that Buonaparte's leaving Elba had worked a forfeiture of the Paris stipulation, and that a life interest was as much as the Empress had any claim to expect, when not only the preferable claim of the Spanish family, but the general principle of not preserving the dynasty, was against her. You may remember how the reclamations of Maria Louisa, the gallantry of the Emperor of Russia, and the obstinacy of Labrador, led to the compromise of giving the Duchies for life to the Archduchess, saving their reversion for future decision.

What I wish now to ascertain is, whether we can close the point or not. If Metternich hesitates, he means to let Russia again interpose to prevent it; if he does not, and is prepared to give effect to his own proposition, made the 29th of March, 1815, I do not think the Emperor will now oppose a settlement. *This query is to yourself.*

You will explain to Prince Metternich that, in framing my despatches on the Sicilian question, my object has been, not to

bring into view the Austrian policy in any of those documents, which we might possibly deem it necessary to bring before Parliament, in case we should be obliged to produce papers. The line we take is also, I persuade myself, the most convenient to his Court, provided the Neapolitan Government will manage so far wisely and liberally as not to force upon us an interference which we really wish to avoid.

Ever, my dear Charles, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Foreign Office, September 6, 1816.

My dear Clancarty—From your private letter, coupled with some other information that has reached me, I have reason to believe that Pfeffel, the Bavarian Minister here, may mislead his Court upon the *projet* you mention, and which Rechberg brought forward to you for still effectuating a contiguity in the Bavarian provinces. Pfeffel communicated this *projet* to me some time since. I told him I could enter into no discussion on its merits here, and could only receive it and forward it to you, which I have some reason to think, in the hurry of business, and taking it for granted it would reach you from the Bavarian Minister on the spot, I may have forgot to do.

Pfeffel afterwards carried his *projet* to Prince Leopold, who, wishing thereby to assist his brother's exchanges, forwarded it to me with a request that I would promote it as far as I properly could, as a means to assist the Duke of Coburg's interests. In my answer, I told his Serene Highness he might rely on your doing everything you could to serve his brother, of which you had already given proofs, and that you had my directions to do so. This answer having been shown to Pfeffel, he interprets it, as I understand, into a support of his *projet*, instead of the Duke's interests. You will at once see the distinction; and if they quote my letter, you will say that you have instructions to promote, as far as you can, the Duke's

interests, but that upon the practicability of the Bavarian *projet* no opinion was expressed; but, on the contrary, M. Pfeffel was informed that it could alone be judged of at Frankfort.

However much I should wish to render a service to the Bavarian Government, and to see their territory consolidated, I quite agree with you that we must not throw loose the negociation in search of unattainable objects. This *projet* is framed upon the supposition of adequate indemnities being forthcoming to reconcile Baden to these further sacrifices. Amongst others, they count upon the fortification money and the Neapolitan funds: the first is negatived, whilst the second is yet at sea, and, if obtained, is, as the Emperor of Russia not unnaturally requests, to go to Beauharnois, in the first instance, and not to Bavaria. The indemnities, therefore, are nowhere to be found for effectuating so extensive a cession, unless Bavaria can herself furnish them.

I have troubled you with this explanation, that this little intrigue *here* may be productive of no complications at Frankfort. You will, I have no doubt, find it easy to check any false hope on the part of the Bavarians, doing justice, at the same time, to the friendly disposition the Prince Regent feels to promote their interests; taking care at the same time to leave Prince Leopold as much in favour with them as you can.

Ever faithfully yours, CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Perhaps it may be advisable to send Charles a copy of this letter, lest the Bavarians may be working at Vienna upon this false interpretation.

C.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

London, September 6, 1816.

My dear Lord—I am very much obliged to you for your Memorandum on Spanish affairs. I send you a copy of my

letter to Vienna on this subject. You will see I have gone as far as I well could to carry the point of the reversion for Spain. If Austria declines or hesitates, I am clear Spain ought to accede, notwithstanding, to both treaties, by which she will secure much, and, in fact, lose nothing, as the reversion remains equally open to future negociation. Her holding off, so far from operating in favour of her object, may create an expectation that Lucca, &c., by her obstinacy, may also become disposable, and thus both possessions pass into other hands.

I have told Fernan Nuñez how the case *now* stands, and that we have done our best to settle the point in their favour. I have also given him my opinion as to the line his Court should pursue in either alternative, which is not to hesitate in giving their accession; but whilst we have thus endeavoured to serve Spain, we must not be understood to be committed beyond the present time, with respect to the reversion of the Duchies; not that we have any present intention of giving another destination to it, and certainly see serious objections to its going to the little Buonaparte; but, in all such cases, it is right to preserve our free agency; and there certainly is no motive for pledging ourselves blindly to such a Government as that of Spain on any question, without reference to combinations and circumstances, to which the future may give birth, if the Allies cannot at the present moment be brought to agree in closing the question as we have proposed.

I have only to-day received your confidential letter from Paris of the 31st ult. I am not aware of the cause of this delay; possibly the late gales have obstructed the passage. I send you a copy of my letter to Sir Charles Stuart, in reply to his on the reduction of the Allied force in France, in which I have placed the question as we agreed. I rather incline to think that, to give the French Government the full advantage of this measure in point of influence, the Duke de Richelieu ought to address himself officially to the Allied Ministers

without delay, and that they, giving as much hope as their instructions will permit, as to the future, should, upon conference with you, adjourn the final decision of the question till after the Chambers shall have taken their measures for the service of the ensuing year. This will keep you free, and put the French Government in a situation to make the new Assembly feel that the prospect of relief depends upon themselves.

I am not able to judge of the probable success of the intended measure of Parliamentary Reform. It certainly is a bold measure, but it is not necessarily wrong on that account. It seems necessary for the King and his Ministers to do something decisive to acquire the means of going on, and I don't know that any more feasible course presents itself.

I shall neglect no means to awaken the Government of the Netherlands to the danger, I should rather say the ruin, they will sooner or later bring upon themselves, if they do not cease in time to make their press and their territory the instruments of general mischief. *We* may offend by our constitutional license, because we have the sea for our frontier; but such a State as the Netherlands will never be tolerated in doing so; I quite agree with you, however, that Prince Metternich's despatch on this question is very ill-considered, and that the Allied Ministers must be very cautious of obeying his summons.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, September 9, 1816.

My Lord—I understand from M. de la Tour du Pin that he has addressed a very strong note to M. de Nagell on the subject of the Belgian press, and that his Excellency has in consequence informed the French Minister that the project of a law to restrain the license of which complaint is made will be submitted on Wednesday next to the Council of Ministers.

The punishment proposed to be inflicted on persons convicted of a libel is public whipping and branding with a hot iron. The severity of this enactment is, in the opinion of M. de la Tour du Pin, likely to defeat the object, and to cause the proposed law to be rejected by the States-General. An enactment of the same nature as the Alien Bill was suggested by the French Minister, as a more effective and less objectionable measure; but it is said that, as such a law would be an infraction of the 4th Article of the Constitution, the King has declared his repugnance to a measure which his Majesty considers as a violation of his coronation oath.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Count Fernan-Nuñez to Lord Castlereagh.

Londres, ce 11 Septembre, 1816.

Mon cher Lord Castlereagh—À la suite de la conversation que j'ai eu avec vous Dimanche dernier, je ne peux vous donner une plus grande preuve de ma confiance, ainsi que des sentimens du Roy mon maître qu'en vous envoyant la traduction des dernières dépêches que j'ai reçu du Cabinet par la voie du Secrétaire des Affaires Étrangères.

"Le Gouvernement Britannique doit être persuadé que l'Espagne, étant forte, ne succombera jamais à l'influence d'un puissant voisin (comme la France) qui le sera toujours, malgré ses derniers revers, puisqu'elle conserve la richese du sol, de la population, des lumières, l'industrie, son armée, sa marine, sa position géographique, &c. L'union de l'Espagne avec l'Angleterre est celle de deux Puissances qui ont un ennemi commun, puisque ennemi et voisin sont synonymes.

"L'intérêt propre de l'Espagne l'unit aussi bien que la politique à l'Angleterre, car l'Espagne, ayant des colonies, elle doit servir de marché aux manufactures Anglaises, n'en ayant point des nationales, ni ne pouvant en avoir même dans plusieurs années. Si elle doit les conserver et le gouverner, elle a besoin d'une très-forte marine, pour correspondre avec elles;

celle-ci étant détruite du résultat de la guerre, elle doit donc dépendre de l'Angleterre. Il est donc clair que l'Angleterre a un sûr garant de l'amitié de l'Espagne, tant dans sa politique que par ses besoins. D'après tout donc, et d'après les intentions du Cabinet Britannique, de que l'Espagne soit forte et indépendante de toute autre Puissance dans sa conduite, étant son Alliée intime, il est nécessaire que pour arriver à ce but, l'Angleterre influe par les moyens qui sont en son pouvoir à empêcher que la Cour du Brésil ne vérifie point son projet d'usurpation sur le territoire du Roy d'Espagne en Amérique, comme elle vient de l'entreprendre sous prétexte de la garder en dépôt."

C'est avec le plus grand plaisir que j'ai donc occasion, Milord, de vous transmettre des sentimens que je vous ai communiqué de parole bien de fois, et j'ose me flatter que *sans faire usage de cet écrit*, vous y verrez de nouveau la franchise et bonne foi, avec laquelle j'ai toujours parlé, puisque vous avez su me faire inspirer les mêmes particuliers sentimens que je vous conserverai, et avec lesquels je serai toujours votre très-sincère serviteur et ami,

F. N.

[Enclosure.]

Nouvelles reçues à Londres le 13 *Septembre*, 1816.

Artigas a fait la paix avec ceux de Buenos Ayres, pour s'opposer ensemble à l'expédition Portugaise: les partis sont très agités les uns contre les autres. Le Général Belgrano a été mis en liberté, mais il a du se cacher chez le Consul Anglo-Américain, pour échapper les insultes de la troupe. Le Général San Martin a été appelé à Buenos Ayres, pour commander l'expédition contre les Portugais. Cette armée sera de 20 mille hommes, 12 mille de Buenos Ayres, et 8 mille de caballerie, que donnera Artigas.

L'expédition de 4 mille hommes, commandés par des officiers venus d'Europe, qui devoit aller a la côte de Chili est détenu jusqu'à savoir le résultat de cette Portugaise.

Garcia écrit de Paris qu'un officier, qui étoit aide-de-camp du Maréchal Lannes, s'est embarqué pour la Nouvelle York, et qu'il porte la correspondance du Général Esper à Josef Bonaparte.

L'envoi des officiers Français pour l'Amérique continue; et même les Officiers Irlandais qui se trouvent réformés des régimens Anglais, prennent aussi service pour l'Amérique en très-grand nombre, surtout ceux qui ont fait la guerre dans la Peninsule, parce qu'on leur fait croire que Mina les commandera là bas en Amérique; mais ce Général est tranquille à Paris: il n'y a en Amérique que le neveu, qui est un vrai fou, sans connoissance, mais avec beaucoup de vanité. Il étoit capitaine et il est sorti de Londres pour aller en Amérique, avec l'uniforme de général, pour faire à croire que c'est son oncle.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, September 13, 1816.

My Lord—The law, of which I had the honour to make mention in my last letter to your lordship, upon the license of the press, was this day proposed to the second Chamber of the States-General. The communication from the King which accompanied the project, stated in very precise terms that no change of the present system was intended, as far as regarded the affairs of the kingdom, or any part of the Government of the Netherlands; that the power of discussion would remain on these heads perfectly unrestricted; but that the repeated complaints of neighbouring States had rendered some protection for foreign Powers indispensable.

The principal features of the project, as far as I could collect them, when read by the clerk, were as follows:—The author of any publication in which foreign and friendly Governments shall be attacked, or their rights or *legitimacy* questioned, to be sentenced, on conviction, to a fine of 500 florins, (about £50 sterling) and in default of payment to six months' imprisonment: for the second offence to a term of imprisonment not

less than one year, and not exceeding three—Printer of such publication to be deprived of his patent for three years for the first offence, and for six years for the second—The fact of the articles having been copied from any other publication not to be admitted in defence—The Attorney-General to be directed to prosecute, at the demand of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The project, after having been read, was referred to a Committee, with orders to report upon the same to the House.

It appears that the punishment of whipping and branding, which the Baron de Nagell stated as forming part of the project, did not pass the Council of Ministers.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Mr. Rose to Lord Castlereagh.

Berlin, September 14, 1816.

My dear Lord—I obey a strong and earnest wish of my father, in making you a request, which nothing else could induce me to address to you. He is unquestionably right in his view of the extreme importance of which it would be to the most essential interests of my family, that, if the dreadful affliction of losing him befel me, I should be in England with the least possible delay; and this consideration weighs much upon my mind, enforced as it is by that of his age; and the object of my request is to relieve that feeling, although I have the consolation to receive continually accounts of him which give me confidence that the evil thus in contemplation does not menace us.

I would then solicit of you a dormant leave of absence, only to be used in the case of the extremest misfortune, or of the most serious alarm; and even then, should any real urgency exist here, I should certainly make private yield to public duty.

I am, my dear lord, &c., G. H. ROSE.[1]

[1] This letter is endorsed, "Answered, September 30—That he may come home in the event contemplated, without waiting for leave."

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, September 15, 1816.

My dear Lord—With the greatest possible pleasure, I will take charge of Lord G. Seymour's son, or of any other person or persons whom you may, for any reasons, conceive it desirable to send to me. If he can write, and will work, he will be a real acquisition to me, for my last recruit, Weymouth, cannot write, and is therefore of no service whatever to me. You must, however, cover me, *vis-à-vis* Lord Bathurst, who lately recommended to me a Mr. Willes, a young man whose father was desirous of his passing some time on the Continent, and was naturally desirous that he should reside at an Ambassador's house. I, however, found myself obliged to decline becoming *tutor* to this gentleman, whose principal object was to study languages and public law.

To shield me from any charge of unkindness from Lord Bathurst, you have only to represent the fact as it is, viz., that young Seymour is to be sent out to me as an *attaché* upon my working staff, the same being, as, in effect, since Dawkins' departure it is, weak, and requiring reinforcement. The sooner you can send him to me the better.

I wish you had been right relative to the old point at issue here having been worked threadbare—Charles's despatches 77, 79, and 80, will have shown you that we are all at sea again.

Yours, my dear lord, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, September 26, 1816.

My dear Lord—I have sent these despatches by a gentleman in mercantile business, to whom I have given a courier's passport, to enable him to proceed with more expedition on his own concerns—Mr. Littlewood Andrew. In the statement I have

made in the despatch, I have thought it right to give the best account I could at present collect of a person who has been remarkable in this reign, and who, if he should again be brought into confidential parts of the Administration, will probably make a distinguished figure.

The reception of the Emperor by the lower orders of the people has been as much marked by sincere loyalty and attachment as it is possible, and the demonstrations of the same sentiments have been as great throughout all ranks and descriptions of persons: but it is not so easy to judge of the sincerity of the professions of the higher classes by outward appearances. I am assured that the ukase concerning M. Spiransky and M. Magnitzkoy, and their appointment to posts of trust, has excited much uneasiness and jealousy, and has induced anxiety and perhaps exaggerated apprehensions from collateral arrangements which would otherwise have passed without much notice. On the other hand, his Imperial Majesty has had these considerations so much before him at the time he removed this very person from his confidence, that one cannot suppose that he would undertake important changes without having well examined all the possible consequences.

The ukase for founding the military villages and allotments, which I mentioned in a former letter as intended for disbanded and discharged soldiers, has not yet reached me, but I have heard it spoken of with dissatisfaction as a dangerous innovation, inasmuch as it is said that the holders of these lands and tenements are to be governed by martial law, and to be, in some sort, excluded from the law of the land, in regard to other emancipated subjects.

I mention this only as an instance to show that the public mind is disturbed. There exists also great discontent in Poland, and very general clamour against the mode of administering justice in the Russian tribunals.

The Emperor's progress will give him the means of making many useful observations; and if he allows his discrimination

to act impartially, and adopts prudent measures in consequence, he may gain much popularity and extinguish apprehensions which may otherwise become troublesome. A short interval will probably enable me to give more satisfactory and at least more clear information on these subjects, which are most delicate.

I learn that the reduction by the drafting some divisions of the 6th corps has been announced at Moscow, and is said from thence to be in progress. The Emperor went from Moscow to Toula on the 31st, (O. S.) and left that place for Kalouga on the 2nd inst. (O. S.)

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

PS. I have omitted to state that Mr. Sp. is understood to have acquired a considerable fortune.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, September 27, 1816.

My Lord—M. de Nagell communicated to me this morning a despatch from General Fagel, and a note from the Duke de Richelieu to that Minister, expressing in warm terms his satisfaction of the law in progress through the States-General, for the repression of the license of the press.

His Excellency then read to me a letter from the Dutch Ambassador in London, reporting a conversation with your lordship, from the tenour of which it appeared that the existence of this note had never come to your knowledge, and that you considered the differences which lately existed between the Courts of France and Holland as not yet terminated.

The Baron proceeded to state to me, in confidence, that he ascribed this circumstance to a spirit of hostility to the Dutch Government, with which he had reason to think Sir Charles Stuart was animated, and which spirit, he contended, was clearly manifested in a former instance, by the suppression of the Duke of Wellington's despatch, written from hence in April, in exculpation of the Government of the Netherlands.

I observed in reply to the Baron that, looking at the date of the Duke de Richelieu's note, and at the period of the conversation referred to between your lordship and the Dutch Ambassador, it was possible that a sufficient time had not elapsed for the receipt in London of Sir Charles Stuart's communication of the note; or that his silence might have arisen from General Fagel having delayed to give Sir Charles a copy of the same.

I ought sooner to have informed your lordship of the entire satisfaction repeatedly expressed by M. de la Tour du Pin at the reparation given to the French Court by the proposed law. I omitted to do so, because it did not occur to me that any doubt had arisen as to the sentiments of the Duke de Richelieu upon the remedy thus afforded, however impatient he might have been at the delay which preceded it.

M. de Nagell has, by this mail, directed the Dutch Ambassador in London to communicate to your lordship a copy of the Duke de Richelieu's note, and this instruction is accompanied by an expression of surprise at its not having previously reached you—"dont S.S. n'a pas encore (je ne sais trop pourquoi) reçu une copie."

The Baron pointed out this phrase to me as likely to produce an explanation of Sir Charles Stuart's supposed silence upon this subject.[1]

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Lord Castlereagh to Count Capo d'Istrias.

September 30, 1816.

Monsieur le Comte—The Count de Lieven, in submitting to the Emperor the result of our deliberations, in execution of the second additional Article of the Treaty of Paris, is so

[1] This letter is endorsed—"May assure M. Nagell that Sir C. Stuart has reported the whole transaction, and that Lord Castlereagh's conversation with Fagel took place before."

fully in possession of the sentiments of this Government, and will, with his accustomed zeal and precision, bring them so satisfactorily under his Imperial Majesty's consideration, as to leave me no reason to regret Lord Cathcart's absence.

I avail myself, however, with pleasure, of this circumstance, as affording me some excuse for recalling myself to your Excellency's recollection, and in the full confidence that, on this, as on so many other occasions, the counsels of the two States will be unanimous in rendering the proposed work of humanity and civilization consistent and effectual in all its provisions.

I am confident the Emperor will approve of the broad and simple basis given to the treaty. In laying down the maxims of Christianity as to the rule of conduct in Europe between State and State, it would have been unworthy to have assumed a less benevolent principle towards Africa. As the preamble stands, we may defy moral criticism, if our execution shall correspond to the principles we profess.

In strictness, no State carrying on the Slave Trade can or ought to be admitted into a league formed for the suppression of the piratical carrying away human beings, whether white or black, from their friends and country, for the purpose of using them as slaves; but, as this construction of the treaty might impede its own object, I wish you to bring under the Emperor's consideration what it might be reasonable to consider, on the part of Spain and Portugal, as such a satisfaction of the principle laid down in the treaty as might bring those States within this purview, without rendering the alliance nugatory to one of its most essential objects.

I presume his Imperial Majesty will at once feel that, to admit the accession of Powers professing an intention of continuing this traffic during the whole period for which the alliance is to endure, would be rendering the league, upon the face of it, inconsistent with itself; yet such would be nearly the case, if these Powers were to accede, under their declara-

tion made at Vienna, of continuing to their subjects the permission to trade in slaves for eight years, to be computed from February, 1815.

You will observe, by perusing the Protocols of the deliberations held upon this subject at that time, that the period then fixed by France for final abolition, viz., May, 1819, (five years from the peace of 1814) was declared by the plenipotentiaries of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain, to be the utmost period which the respective Sovereigns could possibly be induced to recognize as justifiable or necessary for the trade to endure; and it was in contemplation of this period, as an extreme limit, that they reserved to themselves to exclude from their dominions, upon a principle of moral obligation, the colonial produce of States continuing to trade in slaves beyond that period.

I therefore request you will submit to his Imperial Majesty, whether the parties of this alliance, reserving to themselves to bring Spain and Portugal, if possible, to an earlier abolition, should not consider the period above alluded to, viz., May, 1819, as the period *sine quâ non* of abolition, by States desiring to accede to the proposed alliance.

The Allies having already pledged themselves to this principle, neither State can either complain or be surprised at this condition. Spain can the less complain, as you will see her Indian Council has advised immediate abolition; and she has offered, within the last three months, to this Government to abolish in three years for a pecuniary consideration.

I have said enough to point your attention to the principle upon which this question turns. The Emperor will find all the information necessary for its elucidation in the documents transmitted by Count Lieven. His Imperial Majesty will do the Prince Regent the justice to believe that nothing but a sense of duty would prompt his Royal Highness to press a principle which could by possibility operate as an exclusion of two Courts from the alliance, with whom his Royal High-

ness has been so long and so intimately connected: but the Prince Regent feels, as he doubts not the Emperor will feel, a moral obligation not to sacrifice a principle which he has professed in the face of Europe, even to those two; and his Royal Highness doubly feels this duty to be imperative upon him when he is associating himself in an alliance against the States of Africa.

Forgive this intrusion; present my respectful homage to the Emperor; and believe me, with distinguished regard,

Your Excellency's sincere and faithful servant, C.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton.

Mount Stewart, October 13, 1816.

Dear Hamilton—I return you the Spanish despatches. It appears to me rather desirable to make my absence and the present dispersion of the Cabinet an excuse for not immediately replying to the Spanish proposition on the Slave Trade. I should wish, when the Cabinet deliberate upon this question, that they should have the means of judging how far the Allied Powers will push the point with Spain. This we shall be enabled to ascertain upon the return of the references lately made to the several Courts upon the proceedings in London.

If my colleagues in town concur in this policy, you may write to Vaughan, to say that he cannot expect an answer for the present, or until we are reassembled. In the mean time he will be enabled to turn my last instructions to account. I return Cardinal Consalvi's letter, in order that you may submit it to the Prince Regent.

Yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton.

Mount Stewart, October 15, 1816.

Dear Hamilton—Morier of course must have his pension till we can employ him, but I doubt a little whether we can

sustain the principle of Canning's precedent in amount. It is true both acted as Ministers plenipotentiary, but then it was only *ad interim*, and to return upon their £1,000 a-year, as Secretary of Embassy. Now, if the pension for Secretary of Embassy so circumstanced is to be £1,200 a-year, he gets more for doing nothing, than he would for doing his duty if his principal had returned and the mission subsisted; I do not think this stateable or argueable; I rather think the pension ought to be referable to his real not his temporary rank; and if this principle be the correct one, I do not think the pension ought to exceed £800.

In haste, yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Nicholas is to have the same at Ali Pacha's Court as he had at Heligoland. I believe, £1,000 a-year.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, October 17, 1816.

My Lord—I have no subject of any public importance with which to trouble your lordship by the present mail. A few evenings ago, I took an opportunity of paying my court to the Prince Royal; and, in an accidental conversation, which was brought on by my inquiry after the health of the Princess Royal, whom I had seen at Paris, his Royal Highness took occasion to advert to the situation of the Princess's sister, the wife of Joseph Bonaparte, who is at present at Frankfort, and who, according to the destination assigned to her by the Allied Sovereigns, is hereafter to proceed to Kiew, in Russia.

The Prince observed that her state, as well moral as physical, was at present such as to make it extremely probable that she would sink under the journey and the privation of all her former friends and society; that her character was well known for the little part she had ever taken in political events, and for the exemplary conduct of her whole private life: and he could not but hope that the Allied Sovereigns

would regard her present state with compassion, and would permit her to establish her residence in some country where she would not be so utterly deprived of the society and correspondence of her relations and friends.

It was on this subject that his Royal Highness begged me to say to your lordship that, if the Prince Regent's Government found no objection to it, your lordship would confer a particular obligation on himself personally, by authorizing Lord Cathcart at St. Petersburgh, and Sir Charles Stuart at Paris, to give it to be understood at those two Courts, that his Royal Highness's Government would take no umbrage, and would even consent without difficulty that the destination of Madame Joseph Bonaparte might be changed, and that she might be allowed to fix her residence in Switzerland, or in a *rayon* of about ten leagues about Frankfort. The former of the two places of residence would, I believe, be preferred.

The Prince Royal went into detail on the personal motives which induced him to interest himself in the fate of Madame Joseph Bonaparte, and which must be sufficiently obvious to your lordship without my mentioning them. I need only observe, that the Princess Royal has always lived with her sister on terms of the tenderest connexion, and that the Prince could not do an act more grateful to the former than by preventing a separation, which the distance and circumstances must, in all human probability, make a separation for ever.

Your lordship must be better acquainted than I can be with the personal character of the sister; all that I have ever heard speak of her give her the reputation of the most exemplary and almost saint-like virtues.[1]

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

[1] This letter is endorsed—"There will be no objection on the part of the British Government, if the other Allied Governments think fit to change the place of retirement of this lady."

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Frankfort sur Maine, October 23, 1816.

My dear Lord—I write merely to acknowledge the receipt of yours from Mount Stewart of the 9th inst. Though we might have received an answer to your communication by Mills, from Vienna, on Thursday last, the 17th, allowing sufficient time for consideration, yet nothing has been received by Wessenberg from Metternich. The usual weekly Austrian courier arrived on Sunday the 20th, without a line. In fact, Wessenberg has not received a single word, as he informs me, from Metternich, relating to the Bado-Bavarian negociation, since the 30th of August last. It may be possible that some view may be entertained at Vienna, of arranging matters with Bavaria, and thus terminating our proceedings during the reunion, in consequence of the approaching marriage; and the departure hence of the Comte de Rechberg, and his arrival on Monday last at Vienna, may afford apparent facilities for this.

I should, however, doubt, in the present irritable disposition of Bavaria towards Austria, and which appears but little allayed by the expected connexion, that it will be found easy to settle matters to the satisfaction of the former, without sacrifices which the latter will not be inclined to make. I hope you will approve and find the course I have adopted conformable with your views, as announced in your letter of the 9th, upon the subject of the 16th Article of the Netherland Treaty.

This Article has now been changed in redaction into the form herewith enclosed, and in this shape both Wessenberg and Anstett have approved of it, and also of the whole treaty—objecting on the part of my Court that, even in its present shape, it should enter into any treaty to which the Prince Regent should be made an *immediate* party, I have agreed that the treaty between Prussia and the Netherlands, of which it will form a part, should be annexed to and incorporated with

our final treaty here; and this, in the modified form in which this particular Article stands, and by which the whole discussion is left open for the Diet, cannot prejudice whatever his Royal Highness may think fit to do in his capacity of Regent of Hanover.

Adieu—I will send you in my next the copy of a letter I have received from Prince Leopold, and a copy of my answer, not yet written, in which a strong effort is made on his Highness's part to involve me in the little intrigue, of which one of your former letters makes mention. I need not add, that the attempt will be ineffectual.

CLANCARTY.

[Enclosure.]

ARTICLE XVI.

La place de Luxembourg étant forteresse de la Confédération Germanique, et les Gouvernemens de la Prusse et des Pays-Bas ne pouvant, en conséquence, être censés avoir obligation de l'entretien exclusivement à leurs frais pour la défense commune, la question de ces entretiens, sur les modifications spécifiées dans les Articles précédens est expressément réservée aux discussions de la Diète.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Mount Stewart, October 26, 1816.

My dear Bathurst—I feel, with you, the question between Spain and Portugal to be a very embarrassing one, especially to us; I also incline to think that, as a line of absolute neutrality or indifference would, in the long run, be hardly practicable, the most prudent mode of interfering will be by considering the whole as a species of infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, and that on this ground we should invite the five other Allied Powers who signed that settlement to concur with us in offering a joint mediation to arrange all differences in such manner as may be consistent with the preservation of the general pacification there concluded. This will mix France

and Sweden in the question. The latter will be no embarrassment: the former Power it is essential to carry along with us.

If this is our ultimate measure, the only question is how to prevent additional complications that may in the mean time occur. I rather think, whatever may be threatened, that nothing can happen during the winter. The Spaniards have no army in a state of equipment to enter Portugal. At this season, and, I believe, till the green forage exists, which is not till late in May, operations are utterly impracticable in that country, without a scale of preparation of which the Spanish Government is wholly incapable. On the other hand, we hear of no preparations in Portugal for sending more force across the Atlantic; nor can this be attempted without our having full notice. My notion, then, is that, if you cannot gain time upon the plea of the present separation of the Cabinet, you should take up the ground of declining a separate interference, declaring, at the same time, that the Prince Regent cannot see with indifference so serious an interruption to the general tranquillity, and that it was his intention immediately to call the attention of his Allies who signed the Peace of Vienna to the question, for the purpose of interposing their good offices conjointly to settle matters.

Pending this reference, I think it desirable, if possible, to keep matters quiet, without *actually engaging* to stop the Portuguese Government from moving troops. This is a strong measure in principle, and it is desirable to tranquillize the Spanish Government, by showing them the improbability of such an attempt, rather than by pledging ourselves *by force* to prevent it. As far as management goes, there can be no difficulty in saying that our endeavours will be so directed.

Perhaps it is an additional motive for making this a Congress question, in order that we may be enabled, with the concurrence of Europe, to force upon Spain some more liberal

and practicable system for South America. The conduct of Portugal is not to be defended, and yet she might well say that Spain, by driving her colonies into revolt, was, in fact, republicanizing the whole continent, and ultimately subverting the Portuguese monarchy in the Brazils.

I think Spain may wait with the less impatience the interference of Europe, as she hardly yet can judge of the state of affairs in the Plate, and she must depend upon recovering her ground there by negociation rather than by arms. Whilst in Europe, if the attack upon Portugal is looked to upon a principle of holding that country as a counter-security, she had better not involve herself in a war of serious expense and *possible* failure, till she sees clearly that she has no other expedient left by which she can do herself justice.

The conduct of Portugal is odious and indefensible; and yet that of Spain to Portugal, about Olivenza, is little better. The two Cabinets are well matched in dishonesty and shabbiness.

Ever yours, in haste, C.

Mr. à Court to Lord Castlereagh.

Naples, October 28, 1816.

My dear Lord—The whole of our embarrassments arise from the reports of Prince Ruffo, who does not cease to encourage this Government in its resistance of our demands, and it requires several conferences with M. de Circello to do away with the impressions produced by a single letter from Vienna, the nature of the advice given being so much in consonance with the feelings of the Government here. I am obliged to hold a strong language, to convince the Neapolitan Ministers that we are in earnest. Ruffo tells them that we are acting only for form's sake. This is readily believed, more particularly as the information is derived from a person so much in the confidence of Prince Metternich as Ruffo is supposed to be.

The Ministers here have received letters from the Governor of Messina, stating that it is certainly the intention of the American Commodore to winter in that port. Notwithstanding the refusal given to Mr. Pinkney, the Americans have again demanded permission to erect a telegraph and to establish an hospital; and, although the Governor of Messina has instructions to persist in his former refusal, M. de Circello is not without considerable uneasiness upon the subject.

The insolent and outrageous conduct of some of the American squadron towards the master of a British merchantman, has already been detailed to your lordship by Mr. Douglas. The recurrence of similar scenes is extremely probable, if the Americans winter at Messina. Indeed, we may almost consider it as certain; and consequently the Marquis Circello asked me, a few days since, by desire of the King, whether he should confine himself to remonstrances, or adopt more rigorous measures, in the event of any future proceedings of the same nature. I told him that "our unarmed merchant-ships, so long as they continued in the ports of his Sicilian Majesty, must be considered as under his protection; that it certainly was the duty of every Sovereign to cause the laws of nations to be respected within the limits of his sovereignty."

This is a subject which merits a very serious attention, and I venture to suggest to your lordship whether it may not be advisable that instructions should be sent to Admiral Penrose to order some of his cruisers to look occasionally into Messina, in order to observe the motions of these people, and to keep them in some sort of check.

I have not yet had time to look about me, or to inquire into the state of things here, but, from all I am told, I do not think that the complexion of affairs has improved during my absence. There is a great deal of intrigue going on, particularly in the military department. One intrigue has placed General Nugent at the head of the Neapolitan army, and another, I think, bids fair to remove him. The General, with

all his talent, is not a match for these people at their own weapons. The question is one of such indifference to our interests, and of so doubtful an advantage here, that I have declined interfering in any way.

I have the honour to be, &c., WILLIAM À COURT.

Mr. à Court to Lord Clancarty.

Naples, October 28, 1816.

My Lord—As I am about to send a messenger to England, with an account of our proceedings in the business of Prince Beauharnois, I have deemed it advisable to send him round by Frankfort, in order that your lordship may be fully informed of the state of the negociation here. I have left my despatches to Lord Castlereagh under flying seals, for your perusal, and I shall be obliged to your lordship not to detain my messenger any longer than may be absolutely necessary.

My last letters from Lord Castlereagh upon the subject in question led me to believe that I should, before this time, have received some information from your lordship, both with respect to the amount of the compensation, and the propriety of admitting the proposal of a re-partition. I am, however, without any information upon these subjects.

Our great difficulty arises from the double part which Prince Metternich has played from the beginning of this negociation. The Neapolitan Minister at Vienna still writes by every opportunity, to encourage his Government in its resistance to our demands; and, though I generally leave M. de Circello convinced of the necessity of yielding, I have to fight the battle over again at every succeeding conference, in consequence of the arrival of fresh letters from Prince Ruffo, exhorting this Government to persist in its refusal. As this Cabinet is entirely guided by the reports of its foreign Ministers, your lordship will readily understand how much we are embarrassed by Prince Ruffo's correspondence.

I shall be very anxious to hear from your lordship upon

these subjects. Should you have any opportunity of writing to Vienna, I shall be obliged to you to apprise Lord Stewart of the state of the negociation here. I have no safe means of conveying a letter to him.

I have the honour to be, &c., WILLIAM À COURT.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, November 5, 1816.

My Lord—I communicated your lordship's private letter of the 9th October to M. de Nagell, who, after reading it, expressed his entire satisfaction at the explanation of the supposed delay in the transmission of the Duke de Richelieu's note by Sir Charles Stuart.

The Prince de Hatzfeld has reached this residence, as Envoy Extraordinary from the Court of Berlin. The Baron de Nagell informs me that, in his very first interview, the Prince stated to him his intention of remonstrating verbally with the King against the residence in Belgium of persons comprised in the law of amnesty, and of other obnoxious individuals.

The Baron also states that the Austrian Minister has lately communicated to him the Protocol of the 28th August last, and Lord Wellington's statement in consequence of the same. M. de Nagell, in reply, begged the Baron de Binder would not offer this Protocol to him in an official shape, as it would produce an unpleasant reply. His Excellency frequently speaks to me with considerable irritation of the proceedings of the Ministers of the four Allied Powers at Paris; ridicules the pretension he considers them as having formed of governing Europe; and declares his conviction that the tone and line of their proceedings are calculated to disgust and irritate all the minor Governments.

Much of the ill-humour I conceive to have been caused by the manner in which the Baron de Binder has of late urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs upon the propriety of introducing an Alien Bill. To statements of the expediency of

such an enactment, his Excellency replies that it would be necessary (according to the Constitution) in order to propose such a law, to assemble the States-General in double numbers —a measure which he considers as little short of a revolution.

The popularity of the Prince of Orange, although it has always been very great, seems to increase daily, and his Royal Highness neglects no means of conciliating and attaching the inhabitants of these provinces.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, November 5, 1816.

My dear Lord—Having a secure opportunity of writing to your lordship, I send you some details about the occurrences of the last week, not because I regard them as important, but lest you should hear of them from other quarters, and be surprised I should not have noticed them.

Prince Wrede, who has never before been in the habit of receiving at Munich, has kept a sort of open house ever since the arrival of the Ambassador; while Montgelas, who was in the constant habit of giving entertainments, has not found a single opportunity of inviting the Ambassador or his suite, and has passed the whole time of his residence here in a state of ill-humour and dissatisfaction, which has been evident to everybody.

These are the facts: they excite much remark, and a great number of persons explain them by supposing that M. de Montgelas has always been hostile to the marriage;[1] and that he takes no pains to conceal the dissatisfaction which he experiences at its success. I have some reasons for not par-

[1] The marriage here mentioned was that of the Emperor of Austria with Caroline Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria, who had been separated in 1814 from the present King of Wirtemberg. Prince Schwarzenberg was sent to Munich to negociate this alliance, and the marriage took place on the 29th of October, 1816.—EDITOR.

taking this opinion. The first is the appearance of sincere joy which he wore from the first annunciation of the marriage up to the arrival of the Ambassador—an appearance which, had it been assumed, he would hardly have laid aside at the moment when it became most his interest to continue it. The second is the information I have received from M. de Schulz, [?] the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, through whom the first suggestion of the marriage was conveyed to the Emperor, who has continued to be the active agent in the affair, who has seen all the correspondence, and who has uniformly told me that M. de Montgelas had done everything in his power to forward it.

The motives of his discontent are, I believe, to be found in much smaller causes. Several of the nominations which he had proposed to the King for the occasion were refused by his Majesty, and other persons substituted in their place: besides this, he is supposed to have applied for a sum of money, for the purpose of giving a *fête*, and to have been refused: thirdly, he expected that the Ambassador would have paid him the first visit, in which he was disappointed; the Prince Schwarzenberg claiming, on the contrary, to receive it. This must have been a great source of discontent to M. de Montgelas, whose constant object it is to raise his situation, and who is accustomed to have everybody at his feet.

The King interfered to adjust this difficulty, and engaged his Minister to go to the Ambassador's first dinner, in order to avoid any appearance of dissension; but to a man of M. de Montgelas' extreme vanity, the wound must have been deep. In the middle of these causes of ill-humour, he found that his house was abandoned even by those persons who used habitually to meet there, and who naturally fell off to the balls of M. de Wrede, where the Austrian Ambassador and the whole town were assembled. Montgelas was forced either to go there himself, or to have the air of forming a sort of pettish party against the Marshal, and was thus reduced to be the second

person, where it had depended only on himself to be the first.

Under these circumstances, the extremely susceptible vanity of Montgelas sufficiently explains to me the ill-humour which he has shown: the only thing unexplained is, his not having, in the first instance, determined upon opening his house; and this I attribute partly to an unwillingness to expend money; greatly to his extreme indolence, and aversion to break through his habits of ease and inaction; and greatly, also, to his fear of taking such a step without the consent of Madame de Montgelas, who was daily expected from Switzerland, where she had been pretending to be ill, in order to avoid coming to Munich for the occasion of the marriage. The extent of his subjection to her, in all his private concerns, renders this last supposition as probable as it must appear extraordinary.

The result of the conduct of M. de Montgelas has been to create great dissatisfaction in the Austrian embassy, and it can hardly fail to do him harm at Vienna, where he is regarded, with justice, as a revolutionary Minister. He appears to feel this, as his intended journey thither is already spoken of as doubtful. If he abandons it, and leaves the King there alone, with the Prince Wrede, he certainly furnishes a great advantage against himself, and which might be fatal to his authority, if Wrede had either the talents or the party in the country which could enable him to profit by his position. The friends of Montgelas wish to persuade him to go to Vienna, but if he considers his reception as at all uncertain, it is probable his extreme idleness, which may now be considered as the leading feature in his character, will very probably induce him to decline the journey.

I have no doubt that he regrets the destruction of the power of France, and is the firm friend of the adherents of Napoleon. I know several who have found protection in Bavaria, and am told that the number is greater than I am aware of. He dislikes the present Government of France, and uniformly wishes

that she could afford him the protection which he would rather receive from her than from any other Power; but he has felt strongly, since the last negociation with respect to the Bishopric of Salzburg, that a protector was necessary to Bavaria; and, although he fears the power of Austria, he yet appreciates the moderation of the principles which direct her Government. Prussia and Russia, on the contrary, are the objects of his unmixed suspicion and apprehension, and from these motives arose his wish for the marriage and his joy upon its conclusion. The same causes may be expected to determine his influence in favour of the alliance with Austria, as long as the present situation of Europe continues, nor can I perceive any reason to change this opinion, although the circumstances which I have detailed have led very generally to an opposite belief. I do not regard this as a matter of indifference, as I consider him to have so many advantages over his adversaries, that, in spite of the attacks to which he will always be exposed, it is highly probable that his power will last as long as the life of the King. The Prince Royal is among the most bitter of his enemies. The feeling of the country is very adverse to Austria, and, as far as I can judge, is not at all altered by the marriage.

I ought to apologize for so long a letter on such trifling details; but they sometimes lead to important results, and unexpected ones—at all events, I would rather be blamed for tediousness than negligence.

Believe me, &c., F. LAMB.

The Hon. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, November 10, 1816.

My dear Lord—I am again disappointed in not being able to acquaint you by this packet that the Convention respecting the fisheries has been concluded.

Immediately on my return to Washington, on the 14th of last month, I called upon Mr. Monroe, who had arrived a few

days previously, to inquire whether he had yet received the information which he had been so long expecting, in regard to the portions of coast which I had offered for the purposes of the American fishery; and whether he was then prepared to proceed with the Convention. He told me that he had received a great mass of information, and, he believed, nearly all that was requisite on the subject, but that he had had so little time to examine it, that it would not be possible for him to go then into the question; but he assured me that, before the meeting of Congress, the 2nd December, he would acquaint me positively whether it was the intention of the President that the business should be proceeded in, or whether the offer which I had made would be rejected.

I have as yet only offered the choice of one of the two proposed coasts; but I begin to suspect that Mr. Monroe is alarmed at the idea of accepting any proposal by which the pretension of right which has been made must be for ever renounced. I shall certainly know the determination of the Government in the course of this month.

In the despatches which I have sent home by this packet, your lordship will see the course which has been taken by this Government in regard to that abominable proceeding of Captain Warrington's. In the note which I have returned to that of Mr. Monroe, enclosing the Report of the Court of Inquiry, I have endeavoured to show how little satisfactory such a Report is, but have tried to lay the ground for abandoning or reserving the business, as your lordship may direct.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 11, 1816.

My dear Lord—In compliance with the directions conveyed in your lordship's letter, respecting the papers of the late Mrs. Jordan, the French Government yesterday directed the seals to be taken off the press in which they are said to

be deposited. As they have merely found three small chests, of which the keys are in the possession of a lady, who is expected to arrive very shortly from England, they wait till her arrival again to take off the official seals which have been replaced on the press, and to deliver the letters in the three little chests to the person I shall authorize to receive them.

Ever, my dear lord, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

Count Fernan-Nuñez to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, ce 19 Novembre, 1816.

Vous me permettrez, mon cher Castlereagh, que je vous addresse ces deux mots, pour me rappeler à votre souvenir, et vous témoigner combien votre absence m'est pénible sous tous les rapports.

Vous savez le changement qui a eu lieu chez nous dans le ministère et Monsieur de Pizarro ayant obtenu la place du Bureau des Affaires Étrangères, il m'a confié une lettre *Particulière* pour vous, que je serais bien aise de vous présenter au plus tôt. Vous y trouverez certainement des sentimens qui, j'ose me flatter, devront vous convenir; et moi, j'aurois la satisfaction d'être commandé à travailler avec vous pour l'intérêt réel et réciproque de deux nations qui sont faites pour s'estimer mutuellement. Vous avez connu Pizarro pendant la campagne, et lui, il n'a pu oublier les attentions qu'il vous a dû—voilà donc des assurances pour moi, qui ne peuvent que vous confirmer dans mes annonces.

L'affaire du Brésil à arranger, et plusieurs autres de considération ainsi que la détermination dernière du Roy mon maître, de s'en rapporter au jugement et médiation de la Grande Bretagne, ainsi que des alliés du Portugal et de l'Espagne, sur une affaire où sa dignité royale est outragée, vous prouvera combien il aime la paix, et la confiance qu'il a dans le Cabinet que vous dirigez.

Cette nouvelle, que, je crois, vous sera agréable, me fait

espérer que peut-être elle anticipéra votre retour, Milord; et si vos occupations vous empêchoient, au moins vous y trouverez le désir qui m'anime à correspondre avec vous, de la bonté duquel j'ai lieu de tout espérer pour le bien de ma patrie.

Permettez que je profite de cette occasion pour vous prier de me rappeler au souvenir de Milady et de M. Planta, et soyez assuré des sentimens très sincères et respectueux avec lesquels je serai toujours votre très humble serviteur et ami,

Le Comte Duc de FERNAN-NUÑEZ.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, November 24, 1816.

My Lord—The Prince of Orange has announced his intention of dining on Wednesday next at the house of Lord Kinnaird. The mark of favour thus to be conferred by his Royal Highness upon that nobleman has created much sensation: it is cited with triumph by the French refugees, with censure by M. de la Tour du Pin, and with regret and jealousy by those of the natives of this country who are attached to the House of Orange.

The Prince's frequent visits to Lord Kinnaird, and his intimacy with that nobleman, whose house is the resort of many partisans of Buonaparte, had already caused some animadversion; and the Baron de Nagell mentioned the subject to me this morning, with undisguised regret.

General Alava has also conversed with me upon this point; he ascribed the Prince's determination to want of reflection, and offered to endeavour to dissuade his Royal Highness from carrying his intentions into effect. It appeared, however, to me that, as it had been made public, his Royal Highness could not now retract, without giving increased importance to the matter. I therefore advised the General rather to induce him to remove the singularity of the measure by giving a similar

mark of favour to some other private English gentleman of less exceptionable political opinions.

I observed to the General that the Prince's intimacy with Lord Kinnaird appeared no proof of the sincerity of his rejection of the overture made to him by the enemies of Louis XVIII. For as his Royal Highness had been dragged into notice by the Jacobin writers, and pointed out as a fit person to occupy the throne of France, it seemed peculiarly urgent that he should scrupulously avoid affording any sort of countenance to the members of that party.

The General, in reply, stated his entire belief in the sincerity of the Prince's late declaration on that point, and adduced, in corroboration thereof, repeated assurances lately given to him by his Royal Highness of his monarchical feelings, and of his firm attachment to the system of close union with Great Britain, and of his conviction that, on that system alone, could the Government of the Netherlands rest any reasonable hopes of prosperity. The General concluded by citing, as a proof of the Prince's imprudence, some marked censures directed by him, at dinner, against the Government of Louis XVIII., in presence of servants and attendants.

The sincerity of his Royal Highness does not, however, appear to me quite unquestionable. He is extremely inimical to M. de Falck, and lately expressed in strong terms to General Alava his dislike of that Minister; and yet, a few days after this conversation, I observed that the Prince of Orange was marked in his notice of that gentleman, and that he addressed him with an air of satisfaction and regard, which was no evidence of sincerity.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

The Hon. F. Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Munich, November 29, 1816.

My dear Lord—The King leaves this place for Vienna on the 20th of next month. He professes to intend remaining

there six weeks, but will stay longer if any wish is shown to detain him. The Prince Wrede accompanies his Majesty, and will remain about a fortnight. He has been invited by a letter from Prince Metternich, independent of the verbal invitation which was given to him in common with M. de Montgelas.

In consequence of this, and from other reasons, M. de Montgelas appears determined not to go to Vienna. I shall be sorry if he perseveres in this intention, as I am convinced of the permanence of his influence here, and think that the cordiality of his attachment to the Austrian Government would be much increased, if he could be persuaded that the part he has formerly played was really forgiven; while it will necessarily be much diminished by any distinction that is made between him and Marshal Wrede.

I am, my dear lord, &c., F. LAMB.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 2, 1816.

My dear Lord—The Baron de Vincent some time since read to me a communication which he had received from his Court, instructing him to place on the Protocol of our Conferences a declaration recognizing the principle that, whenever the Legislative Bodies in France shall, in unison with the Government, act upon a principle likely to conciliate public opinion, and to contribute to the re-establishment of tranquillity throughout the kingdom, it will be expedient for the Allies to support the moral force of the Government, by carrying into effect the article of the treaty which provides for the gradual reduction of the Army of Occupation.

Having answered this communication by making known to Baron Vincent the substance of the instructions I had received from your lordship upon this question, he was induced to suspend the execution of *his* instructions until he had written to Vienna. The result of this reference having con-

firmed the former orders of his Court, Baron Vincent again brought me the declaration, in the accompanying form. I requested, however, that the question might not be brought forward until I had consulted the Duke of Wellington.

The accompanying correspondence having passed, Baron Vincent expressed so much apprehension lest the Russian Minister should take the lead in bringing the subject under discussion, if he should delay any longer to execute his orders, that I have determined to suggest to the Duke of Wellington the expediency of an immediate journey to Paris, for the purpose of giving an opinion in the meeting, when this Declaration shall be read.

Believe me, my dear lord, very truly yours,

CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosures.]

The Duke of Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart.

Cambray, November 23, 1816.

My dear Sir—I have received your letter of the 26th, regarding the directions recently received by Baron Vincent from Prince Metternich, regarding the question of the reduction of the Allied forces in France, respecting which I can form no judgment without seeing them. In my opinion, the time is approaching when that question ought to be discussed by the Ministers of the Allied Courts residing at Paris. The course which it ought regularly to take is as follows: It should be discussed by the Ministers in Conference, and I will either attend them, or send them my opinion in writing. They should then inform their Courts of the result of this discussion, and each obtain orders for their guidance. If the result of the discussion should be an early diminution of the forces, each Court will of course give its own orders to its own general, apprising me of the same.

As this measure has long been in contemplation, it is very possible that the Ministers of each of the four Courts have instructions for their guidance, as I know you have, and as it

appears Baron Vincent has. But as these instructions can be only conditional, and depending upon the state of affairs and opinions in France, and upon the result of the discussion among yourselves and with me, which must take place upon this question, I don't conceive that any benefit will be derived from placing on the Protocol prematurely the instructions to any Minister, or the opinion of any Court. On the contrary, it will serve only to cramp and fetter discussion on a question on which it ought to be most free. This, however, is a matter of private opinion, which, of course, must be subordinate to the instructions which Baron Vincent will have received.

The next point to be considered is the period at which the Ministers of the Allied Courts will take this question into consideration. Do they consider the measures and intentions of the Legislature to be sufficiently clearly manifested, to enable them now to reckon upon them as certain in this discussion? Would it not be advisable to allow more time, and, before the question is discussed, to see what will be the nature of the discussions in the Chambers, and what their conduct and decisions on the several questions brought before them by the Government?

I throw out these points for consideration, and shall be glad to hear from the Ministers of the Allied Courts upon them.

Ever yours, &c., WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart.

Cambray, November 27, 1816.

My dear Sir—I received your letter of the 25th, yesterday afternoon. I have nothing farther to say upon the insertion upon the Protocol of the Austrian Declaration, which appears to me very decisive of the question to be discussed.

The Ministers of the Allied Courts must be the best judges of the period to be fixed for discussing the question, and I will either attend them at that period, or will send them my

opinion in writing, if I should not have it in my power to attend them.

Ever yours, &c., WELLINGTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Bathurst.

Stockholm, December 5, 1816.

My Lord—I had the honour of receiving, about a week ago, your lordship's letter marked Private, of the 11th ult., by which your lordship was pleased to communicate to me, for the information of the Prince Royal of Sweden, the pleasure with which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent would see any arrangement with regard to the residence of Madame Joseph Bonaparte, which might be agreeable to the feelings of the Prince Royal, and *conformable to the ideas which he had expressed to me.*

I lost no time in communicating this letter to the Prince Royal: his Royal Highness received this communication with the most unfeigned pleasure, and desired me, in offering to your lordship his personal thanks for this great mark of attention, to express through your lordship his acknowledgments for it to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. There have been few occasions on which I have witnessed in the Prince a more natural and unmixed expression of satisfaction than on the present.

The Prince will, I believe, make use of this communication to the Governments both of Russia and France; and I hope your lordship will not disapprove of my having furnished him with a copy of your lordship's letter, if he should think proper to make use of it for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. G. W. Chad to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, December 9, 1816.

My Lord—The Baron de Nagell has communicated to me the answer which the King has directed him to transmit to-

morrow to the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Ministers. He states that General Vandamme has been conveyed out of the kingdom by the northern frontier; alludes to the incorrectness of the intelligence contained on this subject in the newspapers, and remarks the propriety of viewing such information in future with distrust.

The Baron de Nagell has been induced, by the repeated and daily attacks of Prince Hatzfeld, to tender his resignation to the King. It is much to be feared that, if his Excellency were to retire, he would not be replaced by a Minister equally firm in his attachment to the system which it is the object of the Allied Powers to uphold.

I have the honour to be, &c., G. W. CHAD.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 16, 1816.

My dear Lord—I send your lordship the copy of a letter which Mr. Jefferson, of the United States, has lately addressed to Madame de Staël, respecting the affairs of Spanish America. This letter was translated from the original English into French, by her son, Baron Auguste de Staël.[1]

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Jefferson to Madame de Staël.

Monticello, September 6, 1816.

A request, dear Madam, in your letter of January the 6th, gives you the trouble of reading this. You therein ask information of the state of things in South America. This is difficult to be understood, even to us who have some stolen

[1] It was a copy of the French translation that Sir C. Stuart transmitted with this letter. In a very brief communication of December the 30th, he says:—"I send you the original letter from Mr. Jefferson to Madame de Staël, of which I forwarded a translation some time since."

intercourse with those countries, but in Europe I suppose it impossible. That mendacity which Spain, like England, makes a principal piece in the machine of her Government, confounds all inquiry, by so blending truth and falsehood as to make them indistinguishable. According to Spanish accounts, they have won great victories in battles which were never fought, and slaughtered thousands of rebels whom they have never seen: and as, in our revolution, the English were perpetually gaining victories over us, until they conquered themselves out of our Northern Continent, so Spain is in a fair way of conquering herself out of the Southern one.

Even our information of the state of things in the Spanish Colonies is far from being distinct or certain, so that I can give you but a general idea of it. To do this, we must throw that country into masses, considering Brazil as a nucleus around which they are thus disposed:—

1. Buenos Ayres, and the country south of Brazil.

2. Chili, Tucumana, and Peru, west of Brazil, and on the Pacific Ocean.

3. Caraccas, and the country north of Brazil, on the Gulf of Mexico.

4. Mexico in the Northern Continent:—

1. Buenos Ayres has established its independence as the Spanish functionaries themselves admit. It was for some time embarrassed by the ambition of Monte Video, on the other side of La Plata, which claimed to be the principal place, and endeavoured to maintain it by arms; but they have finally come to an arrangement, which has reunited them, and they have formed their regular Government. Spain, conscious that they are irrecoverable, is, as we are told, bartering them with the Court of Brazil for Portugal. Whether Spain can court or conquer Portugal from hatred to love, you can best judge. The transfer of a people, like cattle with their soil, seems to be growing into a part of the *jus gentium* of Europe, but it is not likely to be received here, where we consider the cattle as owners of

the soil. Surrounded as Brazil is with revolutionary countries and principles, and having at times participated in them, it is possible this may turn out to be a gift of Brazil to Buenos Ayres, instead of a transfer of Buenos Ayres to Brazil.

2. Chili, Tucumana, and Peru, at one time, were entirely ascendant: they have since suffered some reverses, and Buenos Ayres, we are told, is gone to their assistance. The mother country can do little on that coast.

3. The Caraccas are the most accessible to the arms of Spain, and there, accordingly, successes have been most diversified. The Patriots and Royalists have been victors and vanquished by turns: lately, the Patriots carried all before them; but now there is reason to believe they have suffered serious discomfiture; and it is here the most atrocious cruelties have been exercised. The Patriots have in vain endeavoured to end them by examples of moderation: the Royalists answer them by examples of extermination. Yet, difficult as is the contest, this country, too, will ultimately be revolutionized.

4. Mexico. The Royalists still hold the city of Mexico and the port of Vera Cruz, the only one of that province, while it is understood that the Patriots prevail over the country. The siege of Vera Cruz, now believed to be begun, or about to be begun, is supposed to be the cause why Apodaca, the new Viceroy of Mexico, who lately sailed for that port from Havanna, has been obliged to return, without venturing to land at Vera Cruz. This first of all the Spanish possessions, and superior to Spain itself in extent, fertility, population, riches, and information, has nothing to fear from the pigmy power of Spain.

So far, then, all would seem well; but their real difficulties are not how to repel the efforts of the mother country, but how to silence and disarm the schisms among themselves. In all those countries, the most inveterate divisions have arisen, partly among the different castes, partly among rival

leaders; constitution after constitution is made and broken, and in the mean time everything is at the mercy of the military leaders. The whole Southern Continent is sunk in the deepest ignorance and bigotry; a single priest is more than a sufficient opponent to a whole army; and were it not that the lower clergy, as poor and oppressed as the people themselves, has very much taken side with the revolutionists, their cause would have been desperate from the beginning; but when their independence shall be established, the same ignorance and bigotry will render them incapable of forming and maintaining a free Government; and it is excruciating to believe that all will end in military despotism under the Bonapartes of those regions.

The only comfortable prospect which this clouded horizon offers is, that these revolutionary movements having excited into exercise that common sense which nature has implanted in every one, it will go on advancing towards the lights of cultivated reason, will become sensible of its own powers, and in time be able to form some canons of freedom, and to restrain their leaders to an observance of them. In the mean time, we must pray to God, as most heartily we do for your country, that "He will be pleased to give them patience under their sufferings, and a happy issue out of all their afflictions."

Your resolution not to revisit your own country, while under foreign force, is worthy of you. No patriotism requires us to incur the pain of witnessing the miseries which we cannot remedy or alleviate, and towards which, even in absence, your pen may do more than your presence. That such a country and such a people can never be kept permanently prostrate on the earth is a decree of Heaven, which will not pass away. Our great anxiety is, lest they should lengthen their sufferings by premature and abortive attempts to end them, and our wish that they may have patience yet awhile, until dissensions among their enemies may give them a choice of friends. In general it is sinful, but now pious, to pray for

war and strife among nations, as the only means of dissolving their criminal combinations.

I congratulate you on the happy union of your daughter with a peer and patriot of France, and, should your son realize the hope you hold up to us of visiting this sanctuary of the unfortunate of every country, where "the wolf dwells with the lamb, and the leopard with the kid," he will be hailed as the son of Madame de Staël and grandson of M. Necker, and will see an example, in the peaceable reunion here of so many discordant worthies of his own country, how much more happy the tolerant principles of his great ancestor might have made them at home.

Permit me here to renew the assurances of my high consideration and esteem.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart.

London, December 17, 1816.

My dearest Charles—Since I returned here from Ireland I have been intolerably fagged by business, and can write to you but a few lines. I send you a copy of my instruction to Clancarty upon the business at Frankfort. If the *sainte lenteur* is the order of the day, we must take our share of the accommodation of this principle. We have long enough made the advanced guard, to save time, and having no possible interests ourselves at stake, to smooth matters to others, but we must pull up. I trust, however, no ill-humour will be suffered to arise, as the game of delay, and the arts of throwing merit and odium where they are not justly due, are not peculiar to the affairs at Frankfort. We must make Prince Metternich at length feel that he is a principal in the case of Beauharnois, and not a mediator; that we have no question direct with Russia, but with the three Powers; and that he is not to play between Russia and us, and between Naples us, and to make his ground good with both at our expense; but that he must,

at last, make his own appearance, *as a principal performer*, on the stage.

You must not, however, probe these little tricks too deep: I have told Clancarty not to do so, for it never does much good; and when the system is established you might as well quarrel with the complexion. I wish, as I have told him, that both you and he could borrow a dose of *my indifference*, and you would not then be so much on the *Qui vive* with each other. I have given you both my unreserved opinion on your last controversy, and I beg you will immediately write him such a letter as may bury all these little feuds in oblivion.

Fred[1] set out in the mail, the night before last, for Mount Stewart. He dined here, with Turner, the day before, and I think him very much improved. He is the picture of health; and the way in which he supports a long journey is the best proof he is robust. I left my father not quite recovered from a severe chill and cold, but the last accounts are altogether satisfactory.

The Prince is at Brighton, where the family is assembled, and we Ministers all in town, labouring to get our business in shape for Parliament, where we shall have hard work, with our *estimates* and our *sinecures*.

John James is in a very odd state; he neither loses nor gains ground, but desponds about himself. Em. bears up wonderfully.

I had a very pleasant time in Ireland, and nothing could be more cordial than all descriptions of people were to me. I went little from home, and passed seven weeks there in great domestic comfort. We often longed for you to complete the family group. God bless you!

CASTLEREAGH.

[1] The present Lord Castlereagh.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. F. Lamb.

London, December 19, 1816.

My dear Lamb—We are desirous here of bringing matters at Frankfort to a close, or, if that cannot be, of dissolving in appearance the grand Conference there, which holds out an idea of more to do there, or more being left undone, than the question with Baden justifies: but we shall, as soon as the Diet is organized, have occasion for a Minister there; and I wish for one who knows the *carte du pays* and the plan of the different Courts in latter times. As I flatter myself your gout is principally caused by the *ennui* of Munich, and that having nothing to do is as little agreeable to you as it is wholesome, I therefore propose to you credentials to the Diet, in addition to those which you now have to the King of Bavaria. You will have a Secretary of Legation at each residence. Your personal presence can be regulated as the service may require, leaving a Chargé d'Affaires where you are not.

This union of functions is not new in the service: I flatter myself it will not be unacceptable to the King of Bavaria, and it will give you an active, ostensible, and creditable field for exertion, in which, from our past intercourse, I have no doubt of your doing yourself credit.

Lord Clancarty has received an official despatch to forward to you, in case he should find your assistance necessary. It is proposed that he should return to sign what he has arranged, presenting you to the Allied Ministers as our plenipotentiary *ad interim*; lest your health should not admit of undertaking this task, he has a dormant authority to call upon Mr. Taylor. In case you find an excursion to Italy necessary to your re-establishment, Lord C[lancarty] will give you full information and instructions before he leaves Frankfort for Brussels.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Count Fernan Nuñez.

December, 1816.

The undersigned, his Majesty's Secretary of State, has the honour to acknowledge the two Notes received from the Count Fernan Nuñez, of October 17th and November 30th, during the whole of which interval the British Government has remained in the anxious expectation of receiving from the Court of Rio Janeiro the promised explanations of the late events which have been passing in the River Plate. It would have been peculiarly gratifying to the Prince Regent, had he felt himself enabled, through the active interposition of his Chargé d'Affaires at the Brazils, at once to allay the disquietude of his intimate ally, the King of Spain, as to the views of the Brazilian Government in that quarter.

After the full explanation afforded as well by the undersigned to his Excellency the Count Fernan Nuñez as to the Secretary of State of his Catholic Majesty at Madrid, of the protest made and the steps taken by the British Chargé d'Affaires at Rio Janeiro, all of which have received the full approbation of this Government, there remains only for the undersigned to assure his Excellency that, down to the present moment, no further information has been received which can throw light either upon the progress of affairs or upon the intentions of the Cabinet of Rio Janeiro.

His Royal Highness is happy to observe that the sentiments with which his Catholic Majesty might justly view an occupation of his territory by a foreign Power, without any explanation previously given, have not had the effect of turning aside his Majesty from the legitimate course of conduct which ought to be observed in all such cases, namely, the demand of explanation and satisfaction, accompanied with an appeal to friendly Powers, who have all an interest in the conservation of peace, to interpose their mediation and influence to preserve the general tranquillity by effectuating between the two States

such a settlement of all subsisting differences as may be consonant with justice, and with the ties as well of blood as of common interest which so intimately knit the two families.

The friendship and alliance which subsist between his Britannic Majesty and the august Sovereigns of both crowns, cemented, and, as it were, rendered sacred by their common exertions in the late war, must give to the Prince Regent the strongest possible motives to employ his utmost exertions to re-establish harmony and confidence between the Courts of Madrid and Rio Janeiro. It is peculiarly gratifying to his Royal Highness to have been invited to undertake this task in concert with those Powers to whom his Catholic Majesty has, with so much prudence and wisdom, thought fit to address himself on this important occasion. His Royal Highness, animated by the warmest sentiments of zeal to contribute to so just and laudable a purpose, has desired the undersigned to declare to the Count Fernan Nuñez that he accepts without hesitation the invitation of the Court of Madrid to interpose his good offices, in concert with the Courts of Vienna, Versailles, and St. Petersburg, on this occasion, and he is persuaded he shall find in their tried wisdom, zeal, and justice, the surest means of conducting their joint intervention to a happy issue.

If his Royal Highness might form an additional wish upon this subject, it would be that the Court of Berlin should be united with the Courts named in the same honourable responsibility as a Court not only specially associated with them by the Treaty of Vienna, for arranging other questions in which the pretensions of Spain are involved, but as being in itself a Court as deeply interested to preserve the peace of the world by its counsels, as it has contributed to its restoration by the efforts of its arms.

The undersigned is persuaded that his Excellency the Count Fernan Nuñez will be convinced that, at the outset of an amicable interposition of this nature, in which it is proposed to

combine the counsels of the Prince Regent with those of the august Sovereigns named in his Excellency's Note, for the purpose of terminating the subsisting differences, it would be highly unbecoming and impossible for him by anticipation to enter into the discussion of many of the topics which are treated of in his Excellency's Note.

It may be sufficient, at the present moment, to declare to his Excellency that in the event (a case which the Prince Regent will not permit himself to suppose possible) of the Court of Rio Janeiro pursuing, after due representation on the part of the mediating Powers, a course of policy which shall appear inconsistent with justice towards his Catholic Majesty, his Royal Highness will, in such case, consider that Court thereby to have forfeited all claim to demand, under her treaties, the guarantee by his Britannic Majesty of her territories in Europe.

The undersigned is further authorized to declare that this Government has no reason whatever to suppose that the Government of Portugal is employed either in extensive armaments, or in detaching force to her possessions in South America.

His Excellency must be aware that the British officers now in the service of Portugal have ceased to be paid by Great Britain, and that, in the present stage of the proceedings, it would be inconsistent with the attitude of a mediating Power to recall the officers from the service either of Spain or Portugal, however necessarily that measure must follow upon a refusal of justice. His Excellency may, however, rely that, as far as possible, the advice and endeavours of the British Government will be partially employed to dissuade both States from premature and irritating measures of military preparation, which might impede an amicable settlement, and must prove to both a severe, and, as it is to be hoped, an unnecessary expenditure of their resources.

The Prince Regent will lose no time in conferring with the

Powers invited to interpose with him on the present occasion; and the undersigned will take the earliest occasion of communicating with his Excellency the Count Fernan Nuñez on the subject.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 23, 1816.

My dear Lord—I have delivered to Prince Talleyrand the letter your lordship forwarded to me under flying seal. As I observe your lordship mentions that Prince Talleyrand's letter had been communicated to the French Ambassador in London, it is necessary I should state that, on the day it was read to me, I thought it my duty to apprise the Duke de Richelieu of the circumstance: it was not, however, in my power to communicate the letter, because Prince Talleyrand did not leave the copy in my possession, though he assured me that he called twice at my house, during my absence, for that purpose.

I think it very necessary to mention these facts, because M. de Talleyrand and his friends have endeavoured, since his disgrace at Court, to impress many people with the idea that his views are supported by the English Government and by this Embassy in particular, and that his quarrel with the Ministers is the result of intrigue on the part of the Russian Minister, of which your lordship, I am sure, concurs with me in disbelieving the existence, but of which reports may very possibly be circulated in London and Paris.

Believe me, my dear lord, truly yours,

CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 23, 1816.

My dear Lord—Mr. Hamilton has made known to me your lordship's desire that I should state in what terms I have explained to the Allied Ministers the instructions I have received respecting the proposed reduction of the Army of Occupation,

detailing, at the same time, the notions those Ministers, as well as the French Government, entertain, respecting the mode in which it is proposed to consider the measure in our meetings, for the purpose of enabling your lordship justly to appreciate various reports upon this subject lately circulated in Paris and in London.

In compliance with the directions conveyed to me in your lordship's Despatch No. 81, I stated to my colleagues the wish of his Majesty's Government that the military expediency of the reduction should be determined by the opinion of the Duke of Wellington; though the political expediency of the measure cannot be taken into consideration with advantage before the Chambers, by voting the supplies of the year, have enabled the King to fulfil his engagements towards the Allies, had proved their desire to support the present Government upon those constitutional principles which can alone ensure the tranquillity of France.

This language being conformable to the sentiments the Duke of Wellington has expressed in various communications, I did not hesitate, in my letter No. 463, to intimate my intention to persevere in the same line, until I should receive contrary instructions on the part of my Government.

Upon this principle, although I have avoided the mention of any observation in the Protocol which can lead to the notion that his Majesty's Government are averse to the reduction of the army, I have endeavoured to keep back the discussion of the question until after the period pointed out for that purpose.

I succeeded in persuading Baron Vincent not to bring forward the subject until six weeks after he had received instructions to that effect, and the Russian Minister entirely withholds the communications he has received from his Court until the answer come from M. de Lieven, to which I have alluded in my Despatch No. 471.

The enclosed letter which I have received from the Duke of

Wellington since the date of the correspondence sent home, confirms my idea that I had correctly understood your lordship's orders. I think all parties agree in the necessity of saying nothing further upon the subject until his Grace reaches Paris, when we shall consider whether the opinions expressed by the Courts of Russia and Austria authorize a deviation from the line pointed out to me in your lordship's instruction marked No. 81.

I have heard of the reports which have been circulated in London and in Paris upon this subject, and I think that, if your lordship was fully aware of the source from whence they are derived, you would not think them worthy of much attention.

The views of the Duke of Orleans, the treaties concluded in 1815, and the maintenance of a foreign army in France, were the principal objects of Madame de Staël's animadversion, at the time that lady arrived here. The danger inseparable from the circulation of opinions on the former subject in the present temper of the Court, induced her lately to confine her conversation (I believe with the knowledge and approbation of the French Ministers) to the latter question. As Mr. Canning will, however, probably have stated to your lordship what passed in her society during his continuance in this city, the extent of the mischief arising from her mode of canvassing public opinion in every society may be fully appreciated.

Believe me, my dear lord, &c., CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosure.]

The Duke of Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart.

Cambray, December 3, 1816.

My dear Sir—I have received your letter of the [blank]. That which I have always imagined turns out now to be the case, viz., that the anxiety to place the Austrian Note on the Protocol is founded upon the apprehension that the Russians should first stir the question of reduction, and upon a wish to

get a little favour at the Court of France. This policy is beneath M. de Metternich.

I have never changed my opinion. We must know better than we do now how the Chambers will conduct themselves before we can ever discuss the question with advantage; and I won't take any step which can lead to a premature discussion. I think the Austrian Note will lead to such a discussion, particularly if I should be at Paris when it is produced. Therefore, I will not go there till the day shall be fixed for the discussion, and I will then either attend or send my opinion in writing. I am going to Brussels, but shall be back on Sunday.

Ever yours, &c., WELLINGTON.

Precedents showing the arbitrary Authority exercised by the Kings of Spain.[1]

On ne pourrait citer de meilleurs exemples pour prouver que de tous les temps les Roys d'Espagne ont usé arbitrairement avec les individus, et même sans consulter ni se conformer avec les loix et tribunaux, sans que cela fit le moindre effet dans la nation, ni altéra la tranquillité publique, comme on prétend, qu'en se rappelant l'année 1810 et 1811. Le Général Don Francisco Palafox, frère du Général Palafox, défenseur de Zaragose, fut mis en prison par l'ordre de la Junta Centrale, qui commandoit à Séville, sous prétexte qu'il avoit eu connoissance et fait cause avec quelques individus qui firent du bruit à Grenade. Il étoit cependant membre de la dite Junta Centrale: on ne lui fit point de procès; il resta sans communication jusqu'à ce que la Junta s'échappa de Séville à l'arrivée des Français, et l'oublièrent dans la prison d'où le peuple le fit sortir et le nomma membre du Gouvernement provisoire, jusqu'au moment de l'entrée de l'armée Française. Il revint à Cadiz. Les Cortes et la première Régence

[1] Without date, signature, or address—in the handwriting of Count Fernan Nuñez.

lui donnèrent un commandement en Aragon, et delà en peu de mois, sans que la raison fut connue, il fut envoyé au Château de Peñiscola et à l'isle de Mallorque, où il périt dans la prison, sans avoir pu avoir communication ni avec sa femme ni personne, et sans qu'on ait eu connoissance du motif de ce traitement. La nation le sut, en fut affligé, mais personne dit un mot.

M. de Lardizabal, personne très-connue en Espagne par ses talents, devoit être nommé membre de la première Régence: comme étant d'Amérique, l'intrigue l'empécha, il s'enfuit à Alicant, et publia un ouvrage, par lequel il prouvoit que la conduite des Cortes n'avoit point été mesurée; qu'ils n'avoient point le droit de s'absorber l'autorité royale, ni d'abolir les droits, privilèges, &c., de la noblesse, clergé, et autres, moins encore le Conseil de Castille, premier tribunal de la nation. Ceci lui attira la haine des Cortes: son ouvrage fut défendu, lui-même mené en prison à Cadiz sous les plus dures traitemens. On demanda la peine capitale dans les Cortes même contre lui.

Les Conseillers de Castille, pour avoir voulu faire une représentation à cause de leur suppression, furent tous arrêtés et jugés, non par un tribunal connu, établi, ni même par des juges, si non par cinq avocats, nommés par les Cortes, choisis par la faction, et qui, comme il est à présumer, quoiqu'ils ne les trouvèrent point coupables en rien, furent d'avis de leur ôter leurs places, ce que la Régence fit, pour faire la cour aux Cortes.

Il en arriva de même à Lardizabal. Rien ne fut prouvé contre lui digne de sentence, mais il fut exilé à peprétuité d'Espagne, et n'y est rentré qu'à l'arrivée de Ferdinand VII. à Madrid, en 1814.

Monseigneur l'Évêque d'Orense, prélat le plus respectable d'Espagne, connu par ses vertus apostoliques, sa haine contre Bonaparte, et la franchise de ses sentimens, car il a de tous les temps dit au Souverain sa façon de penser, même du temps du Favori, qui n'a jamais voulu admettre aucune faveur de la Cour,

et enfin un viellard adoré par le peuple, étoit membre et président de la Régence. Sa conscience l'obligea à s'abstenir de prêter le serment que les Cortes voulurent lui exiger. Il fit voir que devant Dieu il ne connoissoit d'autre Souverain que Ferdinand VII., et non les Cortes ; qu'il avoit juré celui-là, et ne le feroit point à tout autre. Il fut chassé de la Régence, et, sans cause ni procès, démis de son Évêché, persécuté, cherché partout, condamné à peine capitale, qu'il auroit peut-être souffert, s'il ne s'étoit évadé en Portugal, aidé par ses fidèles ouailles. Point de procès, point de défenseur, sinon les écrits, qu'il publia lui-même sur ses opinions à ce sujet, fondées dans ses principes religieux. À la rentrée du Roy, il revint à son Évêché. Le Roy voulut lui récompenser son zèle, en lui accordant le plus grand d'Espagne, celui de Séville. Il le refusa et garde celui qu'il avoit depuis près de 40 ans—celui d'Orense.

Le Nonce du Saint Père, pour avoir fait une protestation contre la suppression du tribunal de l'Inquisition, comme manque de respect du aux droits du Pape, comme Chef de l'Église, fut chassé d'Espagne ; on lui supprima la pension ecclésiastique dont il jouissoit, et un bâtiment étoit prêt à le faire enlever de Cadiz dans les 24 heures, si lui-même n'étoit parti pour Portugal.

Voici des faits connus de tous. Les Cortes et la Régence, ainsi que la Junta Centrale en usèrent arbitrairement. Plusieurs même de ceux que le Roy vient de condamner lui-même, (ce qu'on prenne si fort, oubliant le passé) furent les plus chauffés directeurs des mesures arbitraires que les Cortes usèrent contre Lardizabal, les Conseillers de Castille, l'Évêque d'Orense, et le Nonce. Ces personnes, comprises dans la liste dernière, faisoient partie de ceux que les juges avoient condamnés premièrement, suivant les causes et les motifs qui ont été publiés par ordre du Roy dans la Gazette publique du Gouvernement. Ceux-ci, comme plus compliqués dans les différentes déclarations contre eux, furent réservés pour un examen plus sévère par les juges, qui, à la fin, déclarèrent au

Roy, "qu'il n'y avoit point de loi en Espagne qui eut prévu leur cas, et par conséquent qu'ils ne pouvoient prononcer contre eux."

Cette réponse fera honneur aux juges, et à l'exactitude dans leur devoir, n'étant point étonnant qu'on ne put prévoir dans la sage legislature ou Code d'Espagne, que les temps dussent changer à tel point, qu'on prétend d'admettre de fait la souveraineté du peuple dans un royaume où la loi suprème est le Souverain légitime, et où il y a eu de tous les temps des abus de ce pouvoir; mais personne n'a osé le disputer, et beaucoup moins l'accorder au peuple, comme le firent, dans les Cortes, ces mêmes individus, seulement guidés par leurs principes de liberté révolutionnaires, et non aucunement du consentement de la même nation.

Le Roy donc, avec ces causes dans la main, ou auroit du absoudre ceux qui furent condamnés avant à des prisons, ou amendés par ces mêmes juges, ou impliquer quelques châtimens à ceux-ci qui étoient les principaux, formant la dernière liste. Il le fit donc par lui seul. Mais il est clair que son cœur n'est point porté au sang, ni à la cruauté, quand aucun n'a été sententié à peine capitale, comme d'autres Roys d'Espagne ont fait dans des temps de révolte, qui sont trop connus dans les règnes précédents.

Le règne de Charles III. est cité en Espagne, et connu pour le plus sage, le plus modéré, et le plus tranquille. L'Europe ne l'ignore point, et la considération dans laquelle il eut fait regarder l'Espagne par les autres puissances tant par terre que par mer n'a point besoin d'être recordé. Cependant il exiloit et renvoyoit dans les prisons, ou dans les provinces, sans jugement ni autre formule qu'un ordre signé du Ministre les Grands d'Espagne, employés civils et militaires, et toute espèce de personne qu'il jugeoit à propos, sans que cela fit le moindre effet contre la sûreté publique. Ceux qui connoissent l'histoire savent bien qu'il avoit crée un Ministère de Police, aux ordres immédiats d'un nommé Cantaro, qui agissoit despotiquement, il est vrai, mais la nation n'en souffroit le moindre effet, et

beaucoup moins les Gouvernemens étrangers ni les peuples différents de l'Europe se mêloient d'attaquer des mesures qui regardent l'intérieur du système établi.

Je ne rappelerai point l'époque de Charles IV. puisqu'on pourroit croire l'exemple pas favorable pour le moment; mais je dirai seulement qu'il n'y eut point de Grand d'Espagne qui n'eut souffert quelque exil. La cause formée à la suite de la prison à l'Escurial du Prince des Asturies fut faite par le Conseil de Castille avec le plus grand soin et attention. Ils la présentèrent au Roy, déclarèrent tous les individus innocens, et dignes de la considération et estime de S. M.: ils furent cependant tous exilés de la Cour, et envoyés dans les provinces avec vigilance de la police; et ils sont restés ainsi jusqu'à l'avènement au trône de Ferdinand.

Il n'y a personne en Espagne qui ignore que quelques uns de ceux qui viennent d'être condamné en exil par le Roy, et étoient les têtes chaudes du parti Libéral, proposoient que si le Roy ne juroit pas la constitution qu'ils avoient formé à Cadiz, il fut dénué de la couronne. Ceci même fut porte en décret, et l'enthousiasme avec lequel S. M. a été reçu en Espagne, dans les royaumes de Valence, Aragon, &c., par où il est entré, sans troupe ni civil pouvoir, puisqu'il venoit seul de France, prouva bien qu'on le vouloit à lui et non à l'acte constitutionnel, qui avoit seul la sanction et approbation dans les personnes qui l'avoient crée, et se trouvoient renfermé dans un certain nombre dans les Cortes, et les adhérens partiels de cette faction. Si la volonté du peuple eut été en faveur de ce parti, le Roy n'auroit jamais pu se remettre sur le trône dans les termes où l'ont été tous les Roys ses prédécesseurs: et comme il se trouve par le présent, l'amour et l'attachement qu'on a eu pour lui dès son enfance, augmentés par la haine que sa mère lui portoit, furent les uniques et véritables causes des sentimens constants, vigoureux, et vraiment uniques qui s'ont fait voir en Espagne généralement pendant les six années de guerre qui ont servi d'exemple à l'Europe; et ce n'est point

l'envie de liberté philosophique, ni de principes nouveaux, qui a porté ce peuple héroïque à tant de sacrifices, mais seulement l'amour personnel au Souverain actuel, à l'*individu*, la conservation de nos coutumes, de nos préjugés peut-être, des institutions religieuses que le peuple a connu de tout temps et qu'il respecte: ils revoient le même Souverain, le même objet de leurs demandes; ils connoissent en lui les sentimens religieux qu'ils virent détruits par les Cortes; et il n'est point étonnant que la cause qui les fit mouvoir dans l'attaque injuste de la France ne le fasse faire le même effort contre les malveillans qui voudroient troubler l'ordre, comme il est arrivé dans l'affaire de Porlier. L'Espagnol aime Ferdinand, et il l'aime de même, quoique en veuillent dire ceux qui ne connoissent point les préjugés et l'ignorance qui existent encore dans la classe du peuple, et l'attachement qu'il a pour les anciennes habitudes qui l'ont toujours dirigé.

Si on veut des exemples dans l'histoire plus ancienne, je citerai l'année 1520: au mois de Mai, les Cortes de Galice votèrent un donatif au Roy Charles V. Les villes de Castille s'y opposèrent et formèrent une Junta sous le nom de Communidades de Castille, dont le Président étoit Don Juan Padilla, fils du Commandeur de Castille, qui jouissoit de la plus grande réputation: et voyant que le Roy ne vouloit entrer dans aucun arrangement, il assembla des troupes et procura par les armes obtenir ce qu'il n'avoit pu (pour la Castille) par les réclamations et remontrances: et parce qu'il comptoit comme occasion favorable l'absence de l'Empereur Charles V. et le manque d'argent dans lequel il se trouvoit. Mais les troupes des Communidades furent battues à Villalar par celles de la Régence, qui commandoit au nom de l'Empereur, Juan de Padilla fait prisonnier, et on lui trancha la tête *sans procès*, le jour suivant, ainsi qu'à Don Juan Bravo, chef des Ségoviens, et Don Francisco Maldonado, de celles de Salamanca. Le même sort eurent 25 autres personnes, qu'on crut être les principaux dans cette affaire, sans qu'il y eut de sentence prononcée;

et même au retour de Charles V. en Espagne, on voulut augmenter le nombre des victimes.

Dans l'année 1521 à Valence, après que furent battus ceux qui avoient formé une autre réunion, sous le nom de Hermandada, les principaux chefs furent exécutés sans forme de procès; et depuis ce temps l'autorité royale a suivi le même système arbitraire, comme du temps de Philippe II. qui chassoit de la cour les Grands d'Espagne et autres individus sans forme de procès ni cause connu, en sorte qui le peuple, auquel ces mesures n'arrivoient point, les voyoit sans la moindre sensation, ne s'en étonnoit point, les croyoit salutaires à l'autorité et tranquillité publique, et étoit bien loin de s'en scandaliser ni de les réprouver.

Voilà les faits; on pourrait en citer beaucoup d'autres; mais ceux-ci suffiront pour prouver que c'est de mesures usées long-temps, sans le moindre danger pour la tranquillité de l'Espagne, ni qui peuvent en rien influer sur l'amour du Souverain, pour qui il est toujours le même dès que le peuple n'est point contrarié, ni dans ses anciennes habitudes, ni les coutumes qu'il a connu, et auxquelles il est fait.

Enfin, rien ne seroit plus favorable pour le sort même des personnes exilés, et de celles qui se sont échappées dans les royaumes étrangers qu'un oubli momentané de leur existence, et que personne ne prenne leur parti, ni défense, ni protection; alors, par la suite des temps, tout s'oublit, et ils retourneroient dans leurs foyers sans le moindre danger: mais, par le contraire, l'intérêt qu'on y a pris dans les gazettes étrangères, et l'opinion, qui les fait en certaine manière briller par leurs souffrances, fait qu'on les regarde en Espagne comme moteurs de partis, comme faisant agir ces fausses idées contre le Souverain, et par conséquent les éloigne d'un pardon ou commisération, qu'ils auroient pu obtenir par la voie de la tranquillité puisqu'on les soupçonne en outre comme les instigateurs des troubles d'Amérique.

1817.

AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF SPAIN —NEGOCIATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Mr. Charles Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, January 7, 1817.

My dear Lord—The information which this letter contains was given me by M. de Kantzow, the Swedish Minister. I have not the means of ascertaining how far it is correct, but I nevertheless think it right to put your lordship in possession of it.

I am told that the differences between this country and Spain are upon the eve of being adjusted by the sale of the Floridas to the United States; that, several months ago, instructions were sent to Mr. Erving, the American Minister at Madrid, directing him to renew the claim which this country pretends to have against Spain for spoliations upon her commerce, and on other accounts, to the amount of three millions of dollars; that, in the event of Spain refusing to satisfy this claim, (which, by late arrivals, is said to be the case) Mr. Erving was instructed to offer to abandon the whole claim, upon being permitted to purchase the Floridas for five millions of dollars. Mr. Onis, the Spanish Minister in this country, is said to be ignorant of this negociation.

I repeat to your lordship that, deriving this information from one source only, I can form no judgment as to its accuracy; but the distressed state of the Spanish finances makes it not improbable that this Government should have thought

it worth while to make such an offer; and it is certain that the high tone which was held some months ago by this Government against Spain, and which had all the appearance of being given for the purpose of preparing the people for a war between the two countries, has suddenly and greatly subsided.

The Russian Minister has not been at Washington. He intends to remain at Philadelphia. I am told that Mr. Pinckney is instructed to make any reparation which the Emperor of Russia may require for the proceedings against the Russian Consul-General, of which I transmitted to your lordship an account in my despatches of last November, and that Mr. Harris has been in the mean time recalled from St. Petersburgh, ostensibly in disgrace, for not having properly explained to the Emperor the difference between the general laws and those of the State of Pennsylvania; that it is intended to sacrifice Mr. Harris, and to appoint Mr. Coles, who was sent specially to St. Petersburgh to explain this matter, as his successor. It is, however, still doubted whether Mr. Pinckney himself will be received.

General Toledo, respecting whom I wrote to your lordship in October last, is still in the United States; but he has certainly abandoned the cause of the Mexican insurgents, and has made his peace with the Spanish Government through the Spanish Minister here.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Mr. Charles Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, March 11, 1817.

My dear Lord—The Session of Congress has closed, without any notice being taken of the late negociation respecting the Fisheries, or any intimation being given by the Government to either House that such a negociation had existed. This silence is very remarkable, and has either been occasioned by the fear of making public the refutation given in the correspondence between Lord Bathurst and Mr. Adams, of the

arguments urged by the latter in support of the American pretension of right; or by the desire of making any measures which the Admiral on the Halifax station may think proper to take, in the ensuing season, in regard to American fishing-vessels, appear vexatious and odious in the eyes of the Federal States to the eastward.

An apprehension of being thought to have intrigued with the Federal Members of Congress against the Government prevented me from acquainting any of them with the negociation. But, some days before the Congress rose, an opportunity was afforded me of speaking upon the subject to one of the principal gentlemen of Boston, not a Member of Congress, who happened to be accidentally in Washington. From him I learnt that no idea existed, either in the Eastern States or amongst the Members of Congress, that any negociation respecting the Fisheries had ever taken place since the Treaty of Peace; that they lamented the policy of Great Britain which had led to the measure; but that they conceived themselves to be peremptorily excluded from our shores.

Under these circumstances, I would take the liberty of submitting to your lordship's consideration, whether it might not have a good effect, if, in some manner, publicity could be given to the negociation in England, so that it might become known in this country before the fishing season commences. I believe that the Eastern States, now a little out of humour with us, on account of the advantages which they conceive to have been taken of them in the commercial Convention, might be thus satisfied that it is not the intention nor the policy of the British Government to act in any unfriendly or illiberal manner towards them. It might also have the effect of preventing some of the American fishermen from equipping their vessels for the approaching season; or, if it did not do so, it would, at all events, apprise them of the risk which they incurred.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1817.

My dear Lord—I deem it material to put you in possession of a confidential communication of much importance, which has been received within these few days from the Russian Ambassador. I also send the copy of a despatch from Lord Cathcart, with reference to the communication in question, and for your information copy of a private letter, which I have thought it right to address to Sir Charles Stuart, with reference to the intercourse which the Duke of Orleans is supposed to have had with the refugees in the Low Countries and also with Lord Kinnaird. I have not deemed it necessary to quote my authority, but the evidence upon which your report rested appeared to me so much deserving of attention as to require some step to be taken to probe the truth of these reports.

It is possible, or rather, I should say, probable, that the King of the Netherlands has received a copy of the principal of these papers from St. Petersburgh, but, at any rate, I think you may, *in strict confidence*, confer upon its contents both with his Majesty and with M. de Nagell. This document cannot fail additionally to awaken the King to a sense of the dangerous complications to which his immediate interests, as well as those of all Europe, may be exposed, if the Low Countries are suffered to continue the scene of intrigues against the settlement under which his Majesty's title to his crown is derived. It is not less due to the character of the Prince of Orange that all possibility of misconception of his views should be obviated. However pure, as we can have no doubt, his intentions are, it is disadvantageous that any portion of the Jacobin party in France should be suffered so far to delude themselves as to speculate for a moment upon making him their instrument.

When you have conversed with the King and M. de Nagell, on the Russian despatch, I shall be glad to hear from you.

It may be as well not, for the present, to mention to him my letter to Sir Charles Stuart. It is time enough when we know whether it has given occasion to any and what result at Paris.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Cray Farm, Sunday, April 20, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—The enclosed Protocol reached me yesterday from Paris: I think it right to send it to you in a private letter, and wish the evils it contemplates could be managed by private communication. Public representations on such subjects are much to be deprecated.

I send you copies of correspondence with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Liverpool, relative to fortification expenditure. The estimated expenditure for 1817, you observe, is about £1,400,000: this appears a very large sum to lay out in one year. If you can manage with the Netherlands Government to postpone a part of our payment, it will be a convenience. May we not, at all events, make the subsidy money and the frigates a set-off?

Has the King any desire to purchase Ordnance stores cheap? Our arsenals are overloaded, and we wish to sell to a friendly Power. You may offer muskets, cannon for fortresses, and gunpowder, all of the best quality, 20 per cent. under what this Government paid for them.

I have been talking over with Cooke here your private letter of the 11th. He states, and I believe he is right, that, in the case of an insult offered to a foreign Minister, it is the duty of the Court to which he is accredited to proceed against the offender, without waiting for any complaint from him or his Court; and that all foreign Ministers are bound to concur, if called upon, in seeing a colleague protected. If the libel is against the Court itself, a complaint is usual; but, against the individual, it is the province of the local Government sponta-

neously to repress any infraction of the law of nations. The French Government perhaps, in prudence, might have gone more softly; but, where the act was not insulated, but a part of a long prevailing system, it is not extraordinary that they should have taken the question as high as doctrine would justify.

Ever yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Extracts from a Report received from Sir Charles Stuart.

Paris, 20 Avril, 1817.

Le procès de M. de Maubreuil va être probablement l'occasion d'un grand scandale. Voici quelques détails qui ne sont pas connus, et qui feront mieux entendre la suite de cette affaire.

Avant que le Roi fut arrivé à Paris, en 1814, lorsque Bonaparte était encore à Fontainebleau avec 30 mille hommes de sa garde, on put craindre qu'il ne se retirât dans les provinces de l'Est ou du Midi, ne s'y défendit, et n'y entretint une guerre civile. Un M. Laborie, secrétaire de M. Talleyrand, imagina de former une espèce de bataillon d'hommes déterminés, qui, dans les chances de la guerre, n'aurait d'autre destination que de viser à Bonaparte et de le tuer. Maubreuil et un nommé Dasy furent proposés pour commander et former ce bataillon, et ne furent pas refusés. Mais Bonaparte ayant traité, et partant pour l'île d'Elbe, il n'en fut plus question.

Maubreuil alors répandit que la Reine de Westphalie emportait des millions et les diamants de la couronne; et, dans le désordre de ce moment, obtint de Monsieur et du Gouvernement provisoire des ordres qui l'autorisaient à requérir dans les provinces l'autorité civile et la force armée, pour remplir une mission non spécifiée dans ses ordres. Or, son procès roule sur ce qu'accompagné de gens armés par lui il a dépouillé la Reine de Westphalie de ses diamants personnels et d'une cassette contenant 84 mille francs; sur ce qu'il n'est point revenu remettre sa proie au Gouvernement, l'a déposé à

Versailles, chez un M. Venis ancient fournisseur de Bonaparte, aujourd'hui Royaliste ultra, a substitué 4,000 en pièces de deux francs d'argent aux 84 mille francs en doubles Napoléons d'or. Quant aux diamants, il les avait fait jeter dans la Seine pour les cacher par un pêcheur qui avait une maîtresse qui s'est brouillée avec lui, a denoncé le fait à la Police, qui a fait repêcher les diamants.

Ce Maubreuil, gentilhomme Breton, est proche parent de M. de Sesmaisons, gendre de M. d'Ambray, Chancelier, et beau-frère de M. de la Roche Jacquelin. Pendant les 100 jours, Bonaparte le trouva dans les prisons de Paris ; il l'en fit non pas sortir, mais chasser avec mépris. Il s'enfuit à Gand, où on craignit qu'il ne vint gagné, par Bonaparte, pour assassiner le Roi. Il y fut arrêté, conduit en prison à Bruxelles, de là à Wesel, d'où le credit de M. de la Roche Jacquelin et de M. d'Ambray le firent sortir. Arrivé à Paris, il y a été arrêté de nouveau, parce qu'en effet de grands personnages peuvent avoir intérêt à ce qu'il ne reste pas établi qu'on ait voulu faire arrêter et voler la Reine de Westphalie. Il était depuis un an au secret lorsqu'il a été mis en jugement. Ses complices ont été écartés et on voudrait donner à cette affaire le caractère d'un simple vol d'un particulier, et même d'une simple escroquerie, susceptible d'être jugée à la Police correctionnelle, et dans le vrai ce n'est pas autre chose. Mais Maubreuil, audacieux et déterminé, ne l'entend pas ainsi. Il veut que le Gouvernement le fasse évader avec cinq ou six cent mille francs, ou il veut présenter les pouvoirs et les ordres en blanc qu'il avait du Gouvernement provisoire, et, dit-on, de Monsieur, comme une commission d'aller assassiner Bonaparte. On est convenu que cela ne le sauverait pas, et ne l'empêcherait d'être condamné à mort, si son procès va aux assises, mais il veut courir la chance de la mort ou de la fortune, et croit que le Gouvernement fera sa fortune plutôt que de s'exposer au scandale de l'instruction publique de ce procès.

Le Gouvernement y est fort embarrassé, attendu l'éclat qu'a

fait la première séance au tribunal de la Police correctionnelle, où Maubreuil a déclaré hautement qu'il avait éte envoyé pour assassiner Bonaparte. On ne l'a pas laissé continuer, et les journaux ont en défense de rapporter ces détails. Voilà où en est l'affaire. Si comme on le craint le tribunal de Police correctionnelle se déclare incompétent, ou l'affaire ira aux assises, ou il faut faire évader Maubreuil, et même il est déjà bien tard.

Paris 4 Mai, 1817.

Il a transpiré de Londres ici, il y a déjà quelque tems, une espèce de mémoire de Ste. Hélène. On l'a lu avec une grande avidité. Je suis, si non convaincu, du moins persuadé, qu'il a été écrit sous la dictée ou la direction de B. Malgré les anachronismes, il y a son style, son orgueil, son despotisme, sa vigueur, son ambition sans limites et sans un but fixe, son absence de toute espèce de bonté de cœur. On soutenait devant la Marquise de Coigny que ce mémoire n'étoit pas de Bonaparte. "Il y en a donc deux," répondit-elle. Au surplus, ce mémoire, que le Roi a lu trois fois, a plutôt diminué qu'augmenté ici les amis de B.—les constitutionnels surtout sont indignés des principes qui y regnent.

8 Mai, 1817.

M. Patrault, domicilié a Villemontiers, arrondissement de Montargis, est décédé le 29 Avril dernier dans une maison de campagne qu'il possédait dans cette commune. Il fut le précepteur de Bonaparte à Brienne, puis son secrétaire intime pendant ses campagnes d'Italie, et l'accompagna même en cette qualité en Égypte. Son opinion toute républicaine le brouilla avec son élève; lorsque celui-ci se couvrit de la pourpre consulaire pour usurper la dictature à vie, il rompit avec lui et se retira modestement à Villemontiers. Il était bienfaisant, et ses manières obligeantes lui conciliaient les affections de toutes les personnes qui le connaissaient.

M. Patrault avait beaucoup d'esprit. Il est à croire qu'il a

laissé des notes intéressantes sur ses relations avec l'homme extraordinaire, dont il a suivi quelque tems et peut-être préparé la fortune.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, May 19, 1817.

My dear Lord—The return of the messenger Littlewood from Madrid having put me in possession of your lordship's private letter, dated the [blank] of April, I lost no time in conferring with the Russian Minister upon the subject of its contents. General Pozzo di Borgo, at my request, communicated the accompanying Memorial and its enclosures from his Court, which adverts to the machinations of the refugee French in Brussels, and in the different countries where they have sought an asylum, remarking that the projected journey of M. de Viel Castel from the Low Countries to England, for the purpose of conveying the correspondence of his associates to their friends in America, had principally drawn his Imperial Majesty's attention to the subject.

We agreed that it would be expedient to avail ourselves of an early opportunity to mention confidentially to the Duke de Richelieu the statement contained in your lordship's letter respecting the assistance the Duke of Orleans has conveyed to persons of this description in the Low Countries, before we should notice the subject in our conversation with his Serene Highness.

We severally saw the Duke de Richelieu afterwards, and his Excellency assured me that he had commented upon the dangerous tendency of this proceeding in his first meeting with the Duke of Orleans, after his Serene Highness arrived from England, stating that he was desirous of receiving a direct explanation, which might be conveyed to the King, and thus prevent the mischief likely to arise, if either party should manifest an appearance of reserve, or a desire to avoid meeting so delicate a subject.

His Serene Highness, he assured me, admitted that the solicitations of his Royal Highness the Duke of K—— had induced him, about a year or fifteen months ago, to entrust to that prince a sum of £200, for the relief of the distressed French refugees in the Low Countries, under an express condition that, in appropriating this money to their use, they should not know from what source it had been derived; that he had heard with infinite surprise that the condition had not been observed; and that the money had passed through the hands of Lord K——, who had brought forward his Serene Highness's name, in announcing the donation, under circumstances which rendered him anxious to have an opportunity of justifying his intentions by the unreserved statement of the whole truth, especially as he knew that an erroneous notion prevailed that this transaction had led to subsequent intercourse between his Serene Highness and those persons.

These details were afterwards repeated to me at Neuilly by the Duke of Orleans himself, who informed me that the King was perfectly aware of everything that had passed; and he added that, far from having perceived any change of sentiment on the part of his Majesty, on this occasion, he felt particularly gratified by the liberal manner a transaction (to say the least, very liable to misinterpretation) had been viewed by the King and his Ministers.

Believe me, my dear Lord, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Mr. Charles Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, June 3, 1817.

My dear Lord—I received, on the 8th of last month, your lordship's letter of the 21st of March, and I must be allowed to trouble you with a few lines to thank you for it, and to say how much it has flattered and gratified me. The manner in which you have been good enough to speak of my services here has, I assure you, relieved my mind of no small share of

anxiety, and it has operated as the best encouragement which I could have to persevere in my endeavours.

I have but little to communicate to your lordship by this mail. You will no doubt be a good deal surprised at learning by my despatches that, after all that was said last year by Mr. Monroe, the American Government is not prepared to make their proposition respecting the Fisheries, or rather that they are not willing to bring it forward at this moment. It is certainly possible that Mr. Monroe had, in fact, no settled proposition to make last year, and that his request to be permitted to make one was only an attempt to prolong the negociation, and with it the suspension of our measures against their fishing-vessels: but I believe that I have assigned in my despatches the true reason for the delay which is now proposed, and that the President wants to avail himself of the opportunity which he thinks is afforded him of propitiating the people of Boston during his intended visit to them, by affecting to consult their wishes and be governed by their advice upon the subject.

I think that the business is now certainly postponed till the autumn: in the mean while, I have given Mr. Rush clearly to understand that the orders for the exclusion of American fishing-vessels from our coasts are in full force, and will continue to be acted upon.

I have been much embarrassed by the letter of the Portuguese Minister to me, upon the revolution in Pernambuco. Fortunately for me, his application was obviously premature, and I was enabled to parry it by telling him so.

I believe Mr. Rush has not yet made up his mind whether he will accept the mission to England or not. The narrowness of his private circumstances, and the very insufficient appointments of the situation, are the grounds of his hesitation, but I think that he will finally determine to take it.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, July 21, 1817.

My dear Lord—An extraordinary circumstance occurred when the Infant of Spain, Don Francisco, visited the Court of the Tuileries last week. His Royal Highness, accompanied by the Spanish Ambassador, was introduced into the King's cabinet in the usual form, and, after some general conversation, took a letter out of his pocket, which he delivered to his Majesty, who expressed the intention to take into consideration the subject of its contents. On the way home, Count Fernan Nuñez observed to the Infant that it was not customary to present letters to any Sovereign in the presence of the Ambassador accredited to his person, without previously showing the communication to that functionary.

Under the conviction that the omission of this formality could only be attributed to inadvertence, Count Fernan Nuñez expressed a hope that his Royal Highness would give him a proof that he had not been the channel of any communication from Charles IV., by stating the subject of the letter which had been delivered to the King. The Infant, with many apologies, answered M. de Fernan Nuñez that, in compliance with the request of a canon of the cathedral of Lyons, to whom he was indebted for civilities during his residence in that city, he had presented a petition to his Most Christian Majesty, demanding a benefice in the Church.

A subsequent reference to the gentlemen in the Infant's household did not confirm this statement, but proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the letter contained a recommendation in behalf of two officers attached to the suite of his Royal Highness, who desire to obtain the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Some coolness has taken place between the Infant and the Spanish Ambassador since this discovery, and I understand the latter has declined to accompany his Royal Highness in his visits to the royal family. I do not,

however, understand that the day of the Infant's departure for Vienna has yet been fixed.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Bruxelles, July 25, 1817.

My dear Lord—I send you herewith enclosed copies of the Duke of Wellington's letter to me of the 18th, and of my answer to it of the 20th instant. I also send you a copy of my most secret and confidential letter to his Grace, of yesterday's date, upon the subject of a most wretched job, which the demon of bad taste, in the shape, as I should suspect, of M. de Falck, has induced his Majesty to undertake. I shall only add to what you will there find, that I have taken no part in pressing the exception of M. de Lobau on the King, because M. de Nagell thought it better that, charged with it by the Duke, he alone should endeavour to carry the matter through.

Mehée de la Touche was taken here, several days ago: he has, however, had the good fortune to escape, through the ingenuity of a woman, whom he gave out to be his daughter, but who is in fact his mistress. This lady is in custody, and Mehée's papers in the hands of the police. This Mehée is one of those proscribed in the King of France's list of July, 1815. His object in coming here was to replace Le Maire and Guyet, the editors of the *Vrai Liberal,* lately banished from this kingdom: and accordingly, the date of his arrival and the date of his arrest can, without other assistance, be determined by the multitude and acrimony of the libels which filled the columns of that periodical during the intermediate space. The Minister of Police is still sanguine in his hopes of re-seizing this fellow.

Another of those marked on the list of July, 1815, and a most diabolical miscreant, Felix Le Pelletier, was arrested here on the 22nd. He has not been quite so fortunate as

Mehée; but, notwithstanding some canting whinings on hu manity by M. de Falck, has been sent off under good escor to Aix-la-Chapelle, to be delivered over to Prussian autho rity. In the arrest of these persons, and in ordering inquiry, with a view to the exemplary punishment of those through whose carelessness Mehée was suffered to escape, the King has acted as he ought.

Is it not strange, then, that, while thus acting with regard to one part of the proscribed French, he should at the same time endeavour to push inadmissible exceptions in favour of others? Nay, is it not more than strange that, while apparently endeavouring to render himself popular with the *soi-disant* liberal party, of which the French refugees are composed, by seeking favour for such men as Hullin, (the murderer of the Duc d'Enghien) La Marque, Du Fermont, and Merlin, he should, from himself, act in the manner I am going to state? The matter has been most secretly and confidentially confided to me by a person who was present, and I have no doubt of its truth.

It seems that the refugees here have thought proper to engage a set of actors at Paris, to whom they have engaged to pay a certain sum; and subscriptions have been opened and filled among them for this purpose. The little theatre opposite to my house in the Park has been opened within these few days, and pieces are there acted calculated to keep the public mind afloat, which seems to be the principal object of the establishment. Allusions are made to revolutionary times, *the gloire des Français*, the hope of the party, which sufficiently prove the views of the undertakers. The surplus receipts beyond the sum engaged to the actors are not, as I understand, to be given to the prisoners, but will probably form a fund for further treasons. These plays are not to be confined to Brux elles, but, having accomplished their object here, the company is then to become a strolling one, and to go through the principal towns of the southern provinces, with the same view and for

the same purpose. Having thus premised, now to the fact communicated.

At the Council the day before yesterday, (the 23rd) the King, having gone round the table, demanding of each whether he had anything to propose, and all being silent, stated that he had two propositions to make; and having opened pretty nearly to the effect above detailed, the object of opening the theatre, and the views of the subscribers, alleged that he would not permit such a perversion of the public mind. He therefore suggested the propriety of immediately inquiring into the patent rights of the theatre in question, with a view to stop the representations projected—a suggestion which was adopted by all, and orders given for the investigation and early report thereon.

The King then took up the affair of the *Caisses de Sustentation*, communicating that information had reached him that these, particularly that at Antwerp, amounted to considerable sums, and were employed for improper purposes; that, therefore, it would be well to direct the Ministers of the Interior and of Police thoroughly to investigate the subject forthwith, and to report the result of their information as early as possible to the Council.

In addition to the question on the Duchy of Bouillon, stated in my despatch of the 18th, it appears that the parties cannot agree either on the quantum or the mode of payment of the indemnity, so that this subject will probably be referred to the decision of the Allies. The principal point of difficulty seems to be as to the mode of payment; the King contending that this should arise as a rent out of the Duchy, so that hereafter, if he should be deprived of the Duchy, the onus of indemnity should follow the premises, and not remain a weight upon his shoulders. This appears to me to be fair. The Prince Charles de Rohan, however, contends that he has a right to be indemnified from the general resources of the Netherlands, to which the King answers that his States-General will never consent to

this, and that he does not conceive that it would be either just or equitable to make the demand. I have kept myself quite clear from entering into this subject, and only hear of these differences from Baron Binder and Prince Hatzfeld; both of whom, but principally the first, act much more with the zeal of advocates than as Ministers in favour of Prince Charles.

The King sets out on Sunday for Zealand; thence he proceeds to the Hague, and to Haarlem on the 7th, for the Princess Dowager's birthday. He will return here on the 9th of August, before which date I should hope you will be enabled to return me the Memoire upon the Press, with your corrections and additions.

Adieu—yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Clancarty.

Mont St. Martin, July 18, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—I have perused your Memoire on the Netherlands press, and I have but little to observe upon it. It is most important to obtain some better definition of what is calumny and libel than is given in the Code Penale. I recollect an instance in Paris of a fellow having in a letter accused a British officer of unnatural practices. The officer had marched from Paris, and I made him return, that I might have the charge inquired into, and, upon the inquiry, it was made clear that not only there was no foundation whatever for the charge, but that the man who accused the officer to me, his commanding officer, knew that the charge was false when he made it. I wanted to prosecute him for calumny, but it appeared that, according to the law, what he had done was not calumny, and there the matter dropped.

I have not got by me the Code Penale, but it is necessary that you should examine it very closely, and take care to have a good definition of what calumny is. I concur entirely with you that the amendment of the law ought not to be directed

solely to protect foreign Sovereigns and Governments, and even their diplomatic agents, but the Government of the country itself, and the people of the country, and individuals of all descriptions. I think you will experience some difficulty in prevailing upon the King to adopt this principle. He is not disposed to admit that abuse in print is a provocation to a breach of the peace at least equal to abuse by word of mouth; and he will not see that the consequences of permitting the former must be that those upon whom this licentiousness of the press is exercised, will end by committing breaches of the peace, or, in other words, by horsewhipping authors, editors, and printers. I have been witness to this result of the licentiousness of the press in Spain, and I think we are coming fast to it in England; and then it will be seen how necessary it is to protect individuals effectually from this evil. What would be said of a law in any country which should permit one individual to say what he pleased of another, either before his face or behind his back? Yet what is more preposterous in such a law than in having such an absence of law to prevent the licentiousness of the press, as that any man may, with impunity, print what he pleases of any individual?

But it is important that the Government and individuals should be protected from this licentiousness, not only for their own sakes, but for the general interest of Europe. Foreign Sovereigns and Governments don't like to meet an author or a printer in a Court of Justice, and they would prefer to pass unnoticed many libels, rather than come forward to prosecute. But it must not be supposed that, because these libels are not prosecuted, they do not give offence, and indispose the Sovereigns and Governments who are the objects of them towards the King of the Netherlands and his country.

That, then, to which the King and his Government should direct their attention, and should make the object of their legislation, should be to put down the spirit of libelling, and to get rid of the nest of libellers who have established themselves

in this country; and it appears to me that one of the bes modes of effecting this object is to attack libels of all descrip tions, whether directed against foreigners or subjects, agains foreign Governments or that of the King himself.

I concur with you also entirely in thinking that it is de sirable to make all persons responsible concerned in the publi cation of a libel, whether editors, publishers, printers, hawkers, &c. I enclose Benjamin Constant's last pamphlet on the press in France, in which you will see the effect produced at Paris, by a return of the Procureur du Roi against printers. All will tend to the same good end of checking the spirit of libel, which is the great desideratum in the Netherlands.

I don't think your Memoire explains sufficiently clearly your principle on confinement, as well as fine. You mean that every convict of a libel should be both confined and fined, according to the discretion of the Court, within certain limits, to be guided by the nature and degree of the offence, and the latter by the situation of the party. For instance, you don't mean that a man fined 50,000 florins should be confined only a month, or a man fined 50 florins should be confined for five years. I should confine them all, according to the nature of the offence, and fine them besides, according to their means of paying.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Clancarty to the Duke of Wellington.

Bruxelles, July 20, 1817.

My dear Duke—I have received yours of the 26th, [18th ?] it reached me only last night. I very well feel all you say on the advantage of well defining libel. The great difficulty is, however, in what manner to do so. If a definition, especially in a final law, is too precise, it necessarily excludes from the operation of the act all that does not fall within it. Of necessity, therefore, it seems to me that the description of the offence, whatever it may be, should be general: the definition

adopted in the Memoire (with which, I will admit, I am not well satisfied) is taken from that used in our law for the description of the same offence, but somewhat extended, in order to embrace more than our law does. I shall not fail to look into the Code Penale, as you have recommended, a copy of which will be on my table this morning, but not early enough to comment upon it by your messenger. I, however, must more rely on your assistance in furnishing me with a proper definition, than on my own labours, which, after much employment, have only produced the unsatisfactory one appearing on the face of the Memoire.

I am well aware that considerable difficulty will occur in prevailing upon the King to adopt even the principles and the practicable remedies recommended in the Memoire: at no time very *coulant*, he is particularly wayward at the present moment. As nothing, however, appears in the paper but what is essentially connected with the advancement of the general cause, with his own interests and tranquillity, whenever the work shall have received the finishing stroke, by the receipt of your final observations upon it, and those which I have also canvassed for from our own Government and from Sir Charles Stuart, I shall deliver it in, and urge its maxims and recommendations to the utmost of my power, and the reasoning of your letter will very much fortify me in pressing them.

Upon the subject of fine and imprisonment for libel, as proposed in the Memoire, it had been my intention to have left the quantum of each altogether at the discretion of the Court, and this even to the full extent of the cases you put, of 50,000 florins and three months' imprisonment, or 50 florins fine and five years' imprisonment, as I can well foresee circumstances which, in certain cases, might require even such an extent. I should, however, be disposed, on this, as on all other matters connected with the subject, to forego my own, in favour of your opinions, if, on reconsideration, such shall be your opinion.

The French Chargé d'Affaires here has announced that the King of France's protection is withdrawn from ten individuals contained in a list, a copy of which was furnished me by Sir C. Stuart, and reached me last night with yours. The subject has, therefore, been before the King, without the interference of any person whatever, and I do not believe the slightest difficulty will exist in expelling all these persons from these territories, with the exception of Chambrin, to whom you already know that the King incautiously gave letters of naturalization during the first days of his reign. I have recommended M. de Nagell to communicate privately, through R. Fagel, with the Duc de Richelieu, on the subject of this person, representing the difficulty in which the King is placed on this point, and seeking to be released from the same by having Chambrin excepted, who will, I hope, however, be placed under surveillance.

After various disguises, feigned names, &c., M. Mehée de la Touche was at length seized here yesterday, and is now in durance vile, and will be sent off under the Protocol of August, 1815. Nagell will probably settle with the King on Monday respecting Lobau, and, I have no doubt, in the manner you wish. Whenever this takes place, I will send you word of it immediately by one of my messengers. I wish you had mentioned the probable length of your stay at Mont St. Martin prior to your journey to Paris.

I have spoken to M. de Nagell about deserters, and he will speak to the King on the subject to-morrow, and orders will probably be sent to the Mayor at Ostend, in conformity with your desires. If your Grace gets into correspondence with Mr. Rochfort, it may not be so easy to get out of it. I have long since been obliged to insist upon this gentleman's finding his way to me, except in pressing cases, only through the Consul-General.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

Did you ever hint to M. de Salles, the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires here, and who attended your Grace in the battle of

Waterloo, that he might possibly be entitled to a medal? He suggested as much to me a few days since, with a view, I doubt not, though not stated, of having his wish conveyed to you. From me he received no answer whatever.

Lord Clancarty to the Duke of Wellington.

Bruxelles, July 24, 1817.

My dear Duke—Your Grace's letter to M. de Nagell, respecting the exception of banishment from this kingdom of M. de Lobau, would long since have been answered, if it could either have been answered decidedly or satisfactorily. M. de Nagell has constantly communicated to me every step he has taken to obtain this exception *pure et simple*, and with the grace which should accompany it from the King; and, from the commencement, neither he nor I have doubted that it would—neither do we now doubt that it ultimately will—be accorded by his Majesty. With this view, immediately upon the receipt of your letter, M. de Nagell prepared a suitable answer, notifying his having received orders to convey to your Grace his Majesty's gracious accession to your request. This was accordingly laid before the King, and for several days detained by him; not, as it appears, that the King has any objection to M. de Lobau's remaining here—he neither has nor pretends to have anything to allege against his person—but it seems there is a job at the bottom of this business, and that his Majesty is desirous (setting his dignity and real interests aside) to work this out through the medium of your Grace, as the price of his acquiescence in your request.

M. de Nagell, finding this matter hung up, and fearful that you might conceive him lukewarm in urging compliance with a most reasonable request, in accordance with the opinions of all the Allies, moved the King some time back upon the subject, when his Majesty stated the hardship of being called upon to make exceptions, without being allowed the power of interposing in favour of those proscribed French, who, he

might think, should equally with M. de Lobau be excepted from the operation of the Protocols and his own orders thereon. He therefore proposed that four persons, named in the King of France's list, should be excepted from the decree of banishment, and that your Grace should be acquainted by M. de Nagell that the allowance of exceptions in favour of these persons would be the price of M. de Lobau's permission to remain in this kingdom. The persons named by the King were—Du Fermont and La Marque, Merlin de Douai, and Hullin.

Of Du Fermont and La Marque I know nothing, but Hullin was, I believe, the very person who murdered the Duc d'Enghien; and though Merlin has, as I understand, conducted himself peaceably at Haarlem, yet he is a person too much marked in the blackest annals of the French revolution to be perhaps selected as one of the few exceptions to a general measure.

M. de Nagell strongly remonstrated against the King's proposal, as undignified in itself, as contrary to his interest, as of certain unsuccess, and as depriving his Majesty of an opportunity of answering with grace a request made by you, to whom he could never sufficiently show his gratitude. The King was proof, however, against this reasoning, and conducted himself with his usual steadiness. After various debates, the matter was to have been decided on Monday last, when, upon M. de Nagell waiting upon him, to take his royal pleasure, the King presented him with a letter to you to sign containing the very proposition against which M. de Nagell had so strongly combated. M. de Nagell positively refused to sign; high words arose, in the course of which the King stated that he had the right to order his Minister for Foreign Affairs to sign whatever paper he thought requisite for his service, and therefore ordered M. de Nagell to sign the letter immediately. M. de Nagell allowed the right, as stated by his Majesty, over his Minister for Foreign Affairs, but claimed

an equal right to cease to be Minister, when pressed to do such things as he, in his conscience, believed hostile to the King's interests; and therefore, if his Majesty persevered in pressing him to sign the letter, he desired that, from that moment, he should be considered as no longer in office; and therefore he left him, leaving the draft of the letter unsigned, as he had found it.

He has subsequently had three interviews with the King, in which he has been treated with great conciliation and deference by his Majesty; but the King has not again touched upon the subject of Lobau or his exceptions. M. de Nagell, therefore, thinks it possible that his Majesty may himself address you upon this subject; and I think it advisable that you should be acquainted with the whole of this wretched affair, as far as it is capable of being conveyed by letter, in order that you may be prepared with such answer as you may think it advisable to give. Neither M. de Nagell nor I think that any doubt need be entertained of compliance with the joint wishes of the Allies in favour of Lobau, whatever your answer may be.

CLANCARTY.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, July 28, 1817.

My dear Lord—I have been honoured with your lordship's private letter, dated the [blank], directing me to avoid taking any part in any measure which may be suggested in the Conferences at Paris, respecting the questions of Spanish Mediation and European Police. My despatches, I presume, will have shown that I was aware of the inconvenience which would arise from the turn our discussions are taking in the Conference, and that I expected this instruction. I must regret, however, that it has come too late to prevent the signature of the papers transmitted to England last mail.

Your lordship will observe that I have taken care to separate the Portuguese mediation from the other questions Count

Fernan Nuñez has brought before us in the answer, stating that his several notes have been forwarded to our Courts.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, August 4, 1817.

My dear Lord—During the conversation which took place on Saturday last, respecting the continued endeavours of the Court of Spain to bring the affairs of South America under the consideration of the Conference, I mentioned that my hesitation to sign the note, of which a draft was sent home in my despatch, No. —, had met with the approbation of his Majesty's Government, because it contained a reference to questions which do not come within the limit chalked out for our deliberations; and that, under this conviction, I thought it very probable I should receive shortly an instruction from your lordship, recalling to mind the letter of the four Cabinet Ministers, which originally defined the duties of the Conference.

Though this declaration was evidently unpalatable to the Russian Plenipotentiary, he did not answer me; but, after the conclusion of the Conference, in his passage through the outer room, he said to his colleagues, in a tone of voice sufficiently elevated to be heard by me, "Vous allez voir que Milord Castlereagh veut diriger la Conférence." I did not think it my duty to notice this observation, although I cannot omit to repeat it to your lordship.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Foreign Office, August 7, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—I am going on very well, as far as health and ultimate prospects of sound fingers and perfect re-establishment are concerned, (six out of eight wounds being healed, and the others in progress) but, for the present, I have the use of neither hand, and therefore must write to you by deputy.

Accept my best thanks for your many and voluminous private letters, which have left me nothing to wish for, as far as your exertions are concerned, and little to say upon the important subjects to which they relate, so fully and fairly are the bearings of them examined in your correspondence with the Duke of Wellington.

Assuming that the King of the Netherlands must, according to the principles of the constitution of his kingdom, remain exposed to the dangers of a free press, which may prove to him hereafter most serious, I do not see what better course can be taken to keep this mischief in some degree within bounds, than that which you are about to suggest; and I have myself nothing to offer, in improvement of the *projet* you have transmitted for the amelioration of the law of libel.

With respect to your suggestion of calling upon the Netherlands' Government to institute prosecutions against the libellous publications which are daily levelled in the Belgic newspapers against this country, we think it, upon the whole, inexpedient, considering our own helplessness in protecting other States against the abuses of the daily press of this country. In truth, our whole interference with his Majesty is made with rather a bad grace, in matters of libel, when the inefficiency of our own laws to repress the evil is considered; and nothing could justify us, in point of consistency, in so interfering, but a sincere conviction that, whilst the license of the press embarrasses Government in this country, it may bring upon his Majesty's kingdom actual hostilities from some of his powerful neighbours; and this is a distinction between the situation and policy of the two countries, of which the Sovereign of the Netherlands should, in prudence, never lose sight.

With respect to the libellers in question, perhaps it may be more expedient to oppose them a little with their own weapons, if you can find any intelligent writer who can now and then fight our battle. If so, you may consider yourself authorized to apply a limited amount of secret service money to such an

object. If you cannot manage this, take such measures for co lecting the principal specimens of this species of detraction no circulating in Germany, and I will endeavour to prevail upo our friend Gentz, as he has done on former occasions, in one his popular pamphlets to sweep away all these cobwebs togethe

I am the more disposed to think this is the prudent cours to take, as I am not very apprehensive that the principle commercial exclusion is likely to be turned seriously agains us. I do not believe such a system will be attempted; and, it is, we know from experience how futile the attempt ha always proved, even when backed by military cordons, confis cations, and burnings.

I am sorry the King should have been induced to interpos in favour of the four French refugees whose names you men tion. Perhaps the original exception in favour of Loban which appears to have given rise to the others, might hav been as well omitted; for, however distinguishable his cas might be, acts of personal indulgence are always embarrassing and open to abuse; and where a number of Powers cease t act upon a general principle, they are sure to entangle them selves in difficulties.

The whole management of this Police question will requir great delicacy, and we must have no more circular letters fro our Ministers at Paris, which cannot fail to disgust the Power to whom they are addressed, and, in fact, to diminish ou means of managing by negociation what the common interest require. With respect to the French refugees who may b ordered to retire from the Low Countries, you will declin giving them passports to come to this country, notifying th same to me; that any attempt on their part to settle here may be watched. There can be no necessity for their seeking an asylum in Great Britain, as the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian dominions are open to them, and as, if their objec should be to proceed to America, they may embark with equal facility in one of the ports of Holland or of the Baltic.

I have left my despatches and private letters to Mr. Gordon

open, for your perusal, that you may be fully apprised of what is passing upon a question not only of great importance in itself, but particularly affecting the interests of the country in which you reside. Perhaps, until the negociations of the four Powers on this subject are more advanced, it may be prudent not to agitate the question at the Hague: but I leave entirely to your discretion to use confidentially, as you may think best, the information contained in these letters, of which you may preserve copies.

You will have no difficulty, I should think, when the proper moment arrives, in convincing the King that some compromise on this subject is indispensable, and that, to abstain from all concession on the part of the Allies would be the surest course not only to deprive themselves of all reasonable prospect of realizing even a portion of these claims, but must terminate in involving them in endless discussions, and possibly in warfare with France.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Count Münster to Lord Castlereagh.

Grosvenor Place, August 18, 1817.

My Lord—Enclosed I have the honour to send your lordship a copy of the paper stating the claims made against France. Those from Spain, omitted in this list, are said to amount to 400 millions of livres.

I was unfortunately detained too late at Carleton House, the other day, to read to your lordship the account about the Russian army. I suppose Prince Esterhazy will have mentioned its contents.

Our secret bureau has discovered one more cipher. Rosenkrantz writes to Waltersdorf, that Alopeus reported to his Government that there existed at Berlin a secret society, at the head of which stood the Prince Royal, and whose object was the conquest of Hanover and of Saxony!

I have the honour to be, &c., MÜNSTER.

[Enclosures.]

Statement of Claims on France.

RESUMÉ GÉNÉRAL.

	Affaires presentées.		Affaires liquidées, ou terminées avant le 30 Avril, 1817.	
	Francs	Cents	Francs	Cents
Autriche . . .	189,383,506	67	2,295,848	44
Prusse . . .	132,411,914	57	17,896,773	44
Pays Bas . . .	119,875,359	79	27,242,489	23
Sardaigne . . .	79,776,595	2	6,068,088	52
Grand Duché de Toscane	9,264,876	30	4,508,370	16
Duchés de Parme . .	3,032,103		735,957	
Ville de Hambourg .	77,693,196	35	6,685,336	60
Ville de Brème . .	3,683,491	28	540,439	68
Ville de Lubeck . .	5,319,621	56	817,954	22
Grand Duché de Bade .	1,444,559	41	117,007	40
Hanovre . . .	32,484,715	72	7,144,584	62
Hesse Cassel . .	1,756,213	28	85,118	18
Mecklenbourg-Strelitz, Grand Duchés de Hesse, d'Oldenbourg, et de Saxe-Weimar	21,135,818	5	943,810	73
Mecklenbourg-Schwerin	1,200,000		86,969	11
Dannemark . .	19,120,719	55	2,707,941	85
Les Etats de Rome .	30,098,568	99	940,237	59
La Bavière . . .	72,311,000		575,000	
Francfort sur Main .	3,323,947	2		
Saxe	15,624,653		563,478	4
Saxe et Prusse . .	5,624,945			
Totaux .	824,565,404	56	79,956,604	81

The Prussian Military Establishment, 1817.

INFANTRY.

38 Regiments, inclusive of Guards and Grenadiers. These regiments form 114 Battalions.

3 Battalions of Jägers.

3 Battalions of Sharpshooters.

34 Garrison Battalions.

CAVALRY.

5 Regiments of Cuirassiers
9 ——— Dragoons
9 ——— Uhlans
13 ——— Hussars
} including Cavalry of the Guards.

1 Corps of Mounted Chasseurs.
9 Brigades of Artillery.
9 Divisions of Pioneers.

LANDWEHR.

4 Landwehr Battalions of the Guards.
4 ——— Grenadiers.

136 Battalions of Landwehr
136 Squadrons Landwehr Cavalry
} first levée.

136 Battalions of Landwehr
136 Squadrons Landwehr Cavalry
} second levée.

INVALIDS.

2 Battalions of Invalids.
19 Companies of Invalids.

Prussia, in case of war, would furnish—

1. Standing Army, with the Reserve, which would then join, and the Landwehr of the first levée, 298,187 men, with 40,587 horses.

2. Landwehr of the second levée, 180,000 men.

This force exceeds that of 1805 by 238,587 men.

The expense amounts, including bread and forage, to 21,000,000 dollars, about £2,500,000.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, August 21, 1817.

My dear Lord—The language which M. de Richelieu has held to the Duke of Wellington upon the subject of a change in the French Ministry, to which I had the honour to advert

in my private letter last post, induces me to believe that h Excellency does not support the party who are desirous t remove the Duke de Feltre from office; and, consequentl although it is possible that the change may take place aft the meeting of the Chambers, it is by no means so certain a my information gave me reason to expect.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Cray Farm, September 5, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—My official letter of this date wi enable you to bring the question of the reclamations under th consideration of the Netherlands' Government. The mor quietly it is done the better. My former letters, public an private, to Gordon, of which, if I recollect right, on thei passing through Brussels, you took copies, together with th letter which I now address to him, and which you will als copy, contain the general reasoning upon this subject, as far a it has hitherto developed itself. As there are some parts o the private letters not intended for communication, perhaps th better way would be either to prepare a Memorandum Rai sonné upon the whole, or make extracts as you may deem best

You will find I have stated to Gordon the objections tha occurred to me to his idea of a protracted liquidation. I als cannot but entertain very considerable doubts of the policy o any arrangement that would require an occupation of cau tionary towns for its execution. Such a system is alway invidious. The expense of the garrisons would not be throw upon France. I doubt the Powers of Europe undertaking t supply garrisons at their own expense. Is, then, the whol charge to fall upon the King of the Netherlands? I presum that his Majesty would decline such an encumbrance; an perhaps it might not be wise in him to make himself promi nent in such a measure. It certainly would tend to kee alive in France a spirit of resentment of his late acquisition.

I beg that you will not understand that my mind is conclusively made up against the principle of cautionary fortresses for the period that might be necessary to complete the defence of the Low Countries. I only wish you not to give too much encouragement at present to such a plan, as I know the avidity with which the idea of occupying any part of the French frontier is always caught at by the Government of the Netherlands.

I have left, under flying seal, for your perusal, my despatches to Vienna, on the subject of the mediation. This is a most entangled and difficult subject; but I don't know that we could have placed ourselves upon more creditable or less inconvenient ground—I rather hope that we shall conclude a treaty with Spain on the subject of the Slave Trade which will be one embarrassment at least out of the way.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Should Lamb be at Frankfort, you may direct the Messenger to take that route, and you may then forward Gordon's despatches under flying seal for Lamb's perusal. Should Lamb, however, not be at Frankfort, I do not wish the messenger to go out of the straight line to Vienna.

C.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Cray Farm, September 13, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—In sending you the enclosed copy of a despatch from Sir Charles Stuart, dated the 4th instant, and the Duke of Wellington's observations upon the manner in which the Ministers at Paris have acted respecting the anonymous Proclamation to the French People, I do not mean to be considered as giving you any instructions upon the subject, or wishing you at present to take any steps whatever upon it. I merely send them to you, for the purpose of keeping you *au fait* of all that is doing upon this subject, and, at the same time, I beg you to report to me, with as little delay as possible,

how far the King of the Netherlands has actually proceeded in executing the engagements he has taken with the French Government respecting the residence of the obnoxious French within his dominions.

I observe that the Ministers at Paris have come to a resolution to communicate with the Duke of Richelieu on the immediate execution of the measures recommended in their Protocols, and it is material that we should be previously informed of what has been done, and what remains to be done, on this head.

You will, of course, perceive that Stuart has misconceived the purpose for which the Duke of Wellington communicated to him the Proclamation in question. The Duke's view of the subject is perfectly correct; and certainly it was not necessary to treat in such a grave manner a paper which may, after all, have little or no circulation, and upon which it is impossible to say whether it issued from the Netherlands' frontier or from the territories of France herself.

However, all I wish you to do at present upon this subject is, to let me know how much of the expression implied in the engagements of the Netherlands' Government still remains unexecuted.

C.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 15, 1817.

My dear Lord—Though repeated statements have reached me upon different occasions respecting the undue interference and influence exercised by the Russian Envoy over the present Ministry of this country, I have been very unwilling to advert to the subject, until I could be quite sure that the facts which had been represented to me were correct.

It is currently believed that the Duke de Feltre gave in his resignation, with a view to avoid the animadversion to which an excess of seventy millions in the expenditure of the War

department, during the present year, is likely to give rise, and the terms of the Ordonnance announcing the appointment of M. de St. Cyr fully justify this notion. I have been assured, however, in the strictest confidence, by a person whose authority I have invariably found to be correct, and whom, in the present instance, I fully believe, that the sudden removal of the Duke de Feltre from his situation under the Government is the result of a direct interference on the part of the General Pozzo di Borgo, who, both alone and in combination with M. de Molé, has unremittingly pressed the measure in daily meetings with the Duke de Richelieu during the whole of the present week.

The success of his endeavours is the more remarkable since, but a short time since, the Duke de Richelieu expressed his sense of the inconvenience menaced by every change which is likely to alienate the Princes from the Government, and create a division in the royal family. Under the irritation created by this measure, and by the establishment of the Majorat in the Chamber of Peers, it is much to be feared that the Ultra-Royalists will injure their own cause, as well as the Government, by supporting the most dangerous individuals of the Jacobin faction who are among the candidates during the next election.

Though I shall keep attentive to these matters, your lordship will, I presume, see the expediency of maintaining the utmost reserve respecting the source from whence I have derived this information.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 18, 1817.

My dear Lord—The admission of M. de Molé into the Cabinet has created a stronger impression on the public mind than the removal of the Minister of War; and the importance which is attached to the change induces me to think that this

gentleman will very shortly acquire an ascendency perhaps more decisive than those persons who have principally contributed to his elevation may desire.

In case ill-health or other causes should induce M. Lainé to retire, the general opinion already designates M. de Molé as his successor; and, should M. de Corvetto, as is expected, give up the Finances, M. de Barante, the creature and the near relation of M. de Molé, will probably be placed, through his influence, at the head of that department; in either of which cases, four seats in the Cabinet will be disposed of in favour of the same interest, as the opinions of M. de Cazes and M. Pasquier are identified with those of M. de Molé.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Sudbourne, September 28, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—Your private letter of the 22nd has been forwarded to me at this place, and I am sorry to find from its contents that there are but too good grounds for the reproaches which you will find have been cast at Paris, both by the French and Russian Ministers, upon the King of the Netherlands, for the non-fulfilment of his engagements relative to the French refugees.

I have directed Planta to send you a copy of Sir Charles Stuart's last despatch on this subject, by which you will see the very unpleasant consequences to which the hesitating spirit of the Government of the Netherlands on this subject is likely to give occasion. It is impossible this Government should not unite its public representations with the other Courts, if the King of the Netherlands' Government shall continue to expose itself to a perpetual charge of inattention in the execution of their own declared purpose.

I wish you, therefore, to make the necessary representations upon this subject; and, as this inconvenience has now so frequently arisen to disturb the common interest, notwithstanding

the delicacy you have so properly endeavoured to observe towards the Government of the Netherlands, I can no longer wish you to conceal from your colleagues a knowledge of the disappointment with which this system has been observed on the part of your Court, which, if not decisively checked, cannot fail to lead to the consequences against which it has been so much the Prince Regent's object to protect his Netherlands' Majesty.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 29, 1817.

My dear Lord—I think it my duty to acquaint your lordship that a circumstance has created much bad blood among the principal members of the royal family. Some days since, the King met the Duke and Duchess of Orleans in a curricle, during his morning drive. In a conversation which took place with the Duchess de Berry in the evening, her Royal Highness observed that she expected much gratification from a similar excursion, as the Duke de Berry had promised to drive her out in a new curricle, which would be ready in the course of a few days. The King expressed his disapprobation of this intention, saying, "Il m'est bien égal que le Duc et la Duchesse d'Orleans se cassent le cou, mais je vous ordonne de ne pas vous aventurer en pareille équipage."

I am sorry to say that the indiscreet repetition of this conversation on the part of the Duchess to her aunt, on the following morning, has renewed the jealousies which had apparently subsided during the last three months.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, October 6, 1817.

My dear Lord—I have nothing material to add to the public despatch which I send by this mail, upon the subject of

the French Minister's communications to me. Mr. Adams cannot but know that I have been made acquainted with the whole affair, but nothing has yet passed between us upon the subject; and it does not seem necessary that I should seek an opportunity of adverting to it.

I have no doubt that the American Government is a good deal embarrassed. I do not think that they will venture to resort to vigorous measures: but they must be sensible that, if they do not interfere, they will give such cause of complaint to Spain, at least, as, in the present state of their negociations with that country, they will hardly like to do. It is not improbable that they may publish the intercepted papers, in the hope of defeating the undertaking, which, to a certain degree, it would do. They much wished that M. de Neuville would officially require them to take this step; but he was not to be induced to require them to take any precise course of proceeding, in which I must think that he judged very wisely.

It is a curious circumstance, and one which is worth mentioning, that the whole design was nearly being betrayed some months ago by Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely. I believe I omitted to tell your lordship that early in the summer he went mad. Some time after he was known to be so, he gave an order to a hatter in Philadelphia to furnish him with 1,100 hats; and he was proceeding to give orders for other equipments in the same proportion, when he was suddenly put on board a vessel, by Joseph Buonaparte's orders, and immediately sent at his expense to Antwerp, where, I believe, he now is.

I must not omit to acquaint your lordship that I have received some information from M. de Neuville, upon another subject, which, if it is correct, may be thought of considerable importance, but which is not fit matter for a despatch. M. de Neuville informs me that two persons, of the names of Rousseau and Archambaud, (the latter a servant of some inferior description) left the island of St. Helena with M. Santini. He says

that they parted with M. Santini at Brussels, and arrived at Philadelphia; that Rousseau passed about a fortnight with Joseph Buonaparte, and that he then went to Long Island, where he has resided ever since, in the house of Cobbet, who, as your lordship probably knows, settled there, after his flight from England.

M. de Neuville assures me that he knows that Cobbet is a principal agent in the plan which is in agitation for effecting the escape of Buonaparte from St. Helena, and that he is the channel of communication for such of the English as are privy to the design. He says that Lord Cochrane and Sir Robert Wilson are both deeply engaged in it, and that a correspondence is carried on upon the subject with some persons in France, through the means of a female relation (he thinks a sister) of Sir Robert Wilson's, who resides at Brussels. He says that Lord Cochrane's intended voyage to South America was connected with this design, and that there was to be a general rendezvous of all the agents of the plot at the island of Fernando de Noronha, which is a small island off the coast of Pernambuco, and which is used by the Portuguese as a place of banishment for criminals.

Your lordship will have the best means of judging how far this information is likely to be well founded. I have no means of investigating it properly in this country. M. de Neuville speaks confidently upon the subject: but he may be deceived; and I know that he has *la tête un peu exaltée*—but I have nevertheless thought it my duty to communicate his intelligence confidentially to your lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES BAGOT.

PS. Since my despatches were sealed, I have learnt that Joseph Buonaparte is returned from Niagara, and arrived at Philadelphia on the evening of the 1st instant.

C. B.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, November 10, 1817.

My dear Lord—Since sending off my despatches, under date the 8th instant, M. de Pizarro has informed me that he has heard of Count Palmella's note having been received by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers at Paris, and that he expects that Spain will be invited to send a Plenipotentiary to treat with Count Palmella. He said that he could not possibly comply with such an invitation; that the engagement for the restoration of the territory to Spain, whenever the conditions of it were such as could be agreed to by this Court, must be signed by him and by Count Palmella, after which he would be ready to send a Plenipotentiary to treat upon any other points which might require to be arranged between the two Courts.

I think that M. de Pizarro is extremely desirous of settling this business, but he wishes to have the credit of settling it himself. The great difficulty rests upon the time and mode of restoring the territory, upon which this Government is extremely obstinate. I should hope, however, that something might be conceded by both parties upon this point: and I really believe that an amicable arrangement might then be effected.

No intelligence has yet been received of the Russian squadron. The Russian Minister is at Cadiz. I send this letter by a courier which M. de Souza, who has received from M. de Pizarro a copy of the conditions which I transmitted to your lordship on the 8th instant, proposes to forward to-day to Count Palmella.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

St. James's Square, November 11, 1817.

My dear Clancarty—I have only time to write two lines, to say that you will receive by this mail all we can say or think

on the important subject of reclamations, which you will communicate confidentially to M. de Nagell.

I have talked over with Lord Liverpool and the Duke of Wellington the request transmitted by you of money for the fortifications. The Duke, on his return, will enter upon the details on this subject, and report to us what he thinks will be absolutely wanting for next year. On his report the arrangements here will be made, and you may assure M. de Nagell that the same spirit of accommodation, which is the invariable rule of our policy in our intercourse with the Government of his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, will prompt us to do everything we can to meet their wishes on this occasion; and I have every reason to hope we shall be enabled to settle the business to our mutual satisfaction.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 20, 1817.

My dear Lord—The suggestions in your lordship's letter of the 11th of November were the subject of direct communications on the part of my three colleagues to the Conference, by special couriers sent off in the beginning of this week.

Messieurs Rothschild called here, some days since, for the purpose of ascertaining if his Majesty's Government object to the intervention of their house for the purpose of effecting a settlement of all the claims against France which are brought forward, under the Convention of the 20th November, 1815, by the Powers whose Ministers do not take a part in the deliberations of the Conference. Though they assured me that the propositions they had already received and the good will of the Court of Prussia leave very little doubt in their minds of the practicability of this arrangement, the political consequences which may result from the separation of interests, to be feared in case such a plan should be carried into execution, induced me to recommend those gentlemen to suspend any

negociation which they may have commenced upon this subject until the communications of their correspondents in England with his Majesty's Ministers should have given them a thorough knowledge of the opinions of my Government. It may, therefore, be expedient that I should hear from your lordship everything which passes upon the subject.

The Count de Goltz, in the Conference yesterday, mentioned that he had received intelligence, through one of the persons employed in his mission, that M. Oerthling, Chargé d'Affaires of the Duke of Mecklenburg, has obtained copies of all the Protocols of the Conference at Paris; and that there is reason to fear that gentleman, or some of his friends, propose to send them to England for the purpose of publication. Although this statement appears extremely vague, it has created considerable alarm in the Chanceries of the different missions; and they have joined in requesting me to seek, through his Majesty's Government, all the information it may be possible to obtain upon the subject.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Extrait d'une Note de S. A. le Prince Chancelier d'État au Chargé d'Affaires d'Espagne à Berlin, Chevalier de Landaburru, en date de Gleinicke, le 20 *Novembre*, 1817.

Le soussigné Chancelier d'État a reçu le mémoire que M. le Chevalier de Landaburru lui a transmis sur la manière dont l'Espagne envisage la médiation qu'elle a demandée à la Prusse, comme à l'Autriche, la Russie, l'Angleterre, et la France, dans ses démèlés avec ses Colonies d'Amérique. Sans entrer dans les raisonnemens auxquels le mémoire peut donner lieu le soussigné se contente de déclarer au chevalier de Landaburru qu'en acceptant la médiation difficile mais importante que l'Espagne lui a demandée, sa Majesté a chargé en même tems ses ministres près des Cours Alliées, et particulièrement son ministre à Paris, de faire connoître aux intéressés ses idées

sur l'objet, la nature, et les moyens de cette médiation. En développant par ordre du Roi les principes qui guideront la Prusse, le soussigné est parti du point de vue, que l'Espagne, de concert avec les Alliés, veut offrir aux colonies comme base de la négociation un système de commerce et d'administration aussi libéral que juste, qu'une médiation impartiale et pacifique est la seule qui puisse mener au but, et que la situation des Puissances médiatrices puisse admettre; enfin que l'Espagne, fidèle à la marche qu'elle a suivie jusqu'ici, se prêtera à toutes les mesures préalables qui pourront assurer le succès de cette entreprise, et, traitant paternellement ses enfants égarés, ne placera sa dignité que dans ses efforts, pour faire cesser le plutôt possible les horreurs de la guerre, et amener une réconciliation durable.

Le Prince d'Hardenberg, Chancelier d'État, à M. d'Alopéus.

Gleinicke, Novembre 22, 1817.

Le soussigné, Chancelier d'Etat, a reçu les communications intéressantes que M. d'Alopéus lui a faites, relativement à la médiation demandée par l'Espagne à la Russie et à ses Alliés, dans la guerre qu'elle soutient en Amérique contre ses colonies insurgées.

Ces dépêches prouvent que S. M. l'Empereur de Russie envisage cette grande et importante question, de laquelle dépend le maintien des vrais principes et la tranquillité des deux hémisphères, comme on pouvait l'attendre de la politique juste, généreuse et éclairée de la Russie.

L'Empereur reconnait que les malheurs et les crimes qui ensanglantent aujourd'hui l'Amérique sont en partie le rélsultat du système étroit et exclusif, et des maximes d'administration oppressives que l'Espagne a suivies jusqu'ici dans ses colonies; que le seul moyen d'y pacifier les troubles, et d'y rétablir l'ordre social sur ses véritables bases, est de substituer des principes d'une liberté sage et raisonnable aux principes opposés qui n'ont prévalus que trop longtemps; que c'est sur des bases

pareilles que l'on peut asseoir l'espérance de voir l'Amérique accepter la médiation, et que d'autres bases conviendraient aussi peu aux Alliés qu'à l'Espagne et à l'Amérique, et répondraient mal à l'esprit libéral et juste de la politique actuelle de l'Europe.

On peut se flatter que le Roi d'Espagne sera d'autant plus frappé de ce langage, que c'est un Souverain qu'il regarde comme son ami particulier, qui le lui tient avec tout l'ascendant de la puissance et de la justice.

En acceptant la médiation invoquée par l'Espagne, le Roi s'est expliqué de la manière la plus positive dans le même sens, et a chargé le soussigné de déclarer, que la Prusse, également jalouse de rendre à l'Espagne ses droits sur ces colonies et d'assurer à ces colonies elles-mêmes des droits qu'elles réclament à juste titre, désirant d'y appuyer l'une sur l'autre l'autorité et la liberté, ne pouvait accorder son intervention, ni en attendre du succès, qu'à condition que l'Espagne commençât par offrir un armistice, promettant l'amnistie aux insurgés, et leur annonçât un système de commerce et d'administration assorti à leurs besoins, et conforme à leurs vœux.

Le soussigné a donné, en conséquence, aux ministres du roi près des Cours Alliées l'ordre de parler et d'agir dans ce sens, et de communiquer à tous les intéressés dans cette grande affaire le point de vue sous lequel sa Majesté l'envisage.

Le roi a été charmé de voir que dans cette occasion, comme dans tant d'autres, sa pensée a rencontré celle de l'Empereur— concordance heureuse à laquelle il est trop accoûtumé pour en être surpris, mais dont les preuves lui causent toujours un nouveau plaisir.

Il n'y a qu'un point sur lequel le roi ne saurait partager les idées de son auguste allié. Il parait, que dans le cas où les colonies Espagnoles refuseraient la médiation, ou les conditions raisonnables que les médiateurs leurs proposeront sa Majesté l'Empereur ne serait pas éloignée d'employer la force, pour faire triompher le droit en Amérique, et d'assurer à l'Espagne

une cooperation active. La puissance maritime de l'Empereur, comme son amitié particulière pour le roi d'Espagne, expliquent cette générosité.

Mais dans aucun cas, la Prusse ni peut, ni ne doit, s'engager à quelque chose de pareil. Elle ne peut offrir, que des bons offices. Non seulement le roi est convaincu que ses forces et ses devoirs ne lui permettraient pas d'étendre les services qu'il veut rendre à l'Espagne au-delà des bornes d'une intervention amicale, mais sa Majesté est persuadée, que l'opinion publique se prononceraient partout avec la plus grande force contre la part qu'elle pourrait prendre à une pareille guerre.

Tels sont les principes du roi dans cette transaction importante : il se flatte que l'Empereur de Russie les approuvera.

(Signé) Le Prince d'HARDENBURG.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 24, 1817.

My dear Lord—The Duc de Richelieu adverted to-day so strongly to the embarrassments which must be occasioned by any reference in the Chamber of Deputies to the repayment of money issued by his Majesty's Government on account of emigrants in the year 1815, that I cannnot but think it was his intention to request his Majesty's Government to abandon the demand altogether.

This intimation, after the assurances contained in the note I had the honour to forward to your lordship on the 17th inst., I have reason to believe, may be traced to the counsels of M. d'Osmond, who appears desirous to arrogate to himself merit on both sides, by inducing his most Christian Majesty to repay the £200,000 due on his own private account, under the condition that the public debt for the support of emigrants in 1815 should be given up.

The obvious impropriety of such a compromise, and the necessity of supporting the representations I have been entrusted to bring forward upon these subjects, induce me

to hope that your lordship will not allow either pretension to be abandoned.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 1, 1817.

My dear Lord—I have received your lordship's private letter, making known to me the wish of his Majesty's Government to grant every facility which may be required to enable his most Christian Majesty to repay the money advanced when he returned to his kingdom. Arrangements have already been concluded between the Count de Pradel and the house of Rothschild to carry into effect the payment of the capital and the interest which is due on this account, and I have every reason to believe that the transaction will be concluded this day, if the information respecting your lordship's instructions to me, which, I hear, has been received through M. de Caraman, shall not occasion some delay.

I cannot, therefore, under these circumstances, avoid requesting your lordship to suspend communications to the French embassy in London upon pecuniary subjects, until I have been enabled to carry my instructions into execution. As I have pressed the payment of the small sum which is due on the yearly public account for the maintenance of emigrants in 1815, I venture at the same time to express a hope that your lordship will not admit the reasons which the Duc de Richelieu and M. d'Osmond are desirous to bring forward, with a view to induce his Majesty's Government to abandon that claim.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, December 3, 1817.

My dear Lord—Notwithstanding that the President has said, in his Message to the Congress, that the arrangement respecting the Fisheries is still in negociation, I have never

been able to obtain the propositions of the American Government, which I invited in my note of the 27th of last May. I this morning called upon Mr. Adams, for the purpose of making this observation to him; and I think that I have succeeded in obtaining what is nearly a promise from him that by the next mail I shall be enabled to send them to your lordship.

Mr. Adams protests that the delay has solely arisen from the mass of business which presses upon the President; but I cannot help thinking that there has been an object in it, and that, by deferring to make the proposition, which they know must be transmitted home for consideration, the American Government has hoped to carry the negociation into the next summer, and thus get a fair ground for asking a renewal of the suspension of the orders against their fishing-vessels until the matter is arranged.

I have very little to add to my public despatches by this mail. The affair of the Ontario appears to me to be a most extraordinary one; but your lordship need not be under any apprehension that I shall involve the Government in a second Nootka Sound business. I have thought it absolutely necessary to demand (though very temperately) explanation upon the subject; but, having received that explanation, I shall then take no further steps, until I can have received your lordship's instructions.

The Spanish Minister has informed me that I am to receive your lordship's instructions to offer to the American Government the mediation of England in the adjustment of their differences with Spain.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 4, 1817.

My dear Lord—The public opinion of this city has manifestly changed since the assembly of the Chambers, and I regret to acquaint your lordship that the change is by no

means favourable to the Government. The Ministers are so far sensible of this change that, upon several occasions, they have by indirect overtures endeavoured to conciliate the Ultra-Royalist party, and, in consequence of the failure of these attempts, they lately came to the resolution of persuading Monsieur, as the principal supporter of their opponents, to undertake the mission to which I alluded in a former letter. The failure of this suggestion has created a natural irritation, which is the more prejudicial, as many questions are just now under the consideration of the Chambers, upon which the difference of opinion is very decisive.

Under these circumstances, the Ministers have contemplated the possibility of strengthening the Government by partial changes, and, though nothing has been hitherto definitively settled, the following are the heads of the arrangement which I have heard mentioned:—the suppression of the Ministry of the Police, or rather the union of that office with the department of the Interior—the Minister of the Interior to be M. de Molé, instead of M. Lainé, who has tendered his resignation—the Minister of the Household, M. de Cazes—the Minister of the Marine, M. Barante, in case the retreat of M. de Corvetto should not place the latter in the department of Finance.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 8, 1817.

My dear Lord—It is with great regret that I feel myself compelled to announce to your lordship the failure of the negociation which has been entrusted to me, for the recovery of the moneys advanced by his Majesty's Government for the private use of the King of France in the year 1814, and the sums appropriated to the maintenance of French emigrants in 1815. With a view to facilitate the former payment, I had consented not to claim the sum of £48,000 paid to the emigrants in

1815, before the Chambers are finally called upon to vote the money which remains due on account of the liquidation.

This concession had induced the French Government to enter into an arrangement with the house of Rothschild, who agreed to advance the whole capital of £200,000 which are due to his Majesty's Government, upon receiving bonds signed by his most Christian Majesty for their reimbursement, payable in terms of six, twelve, and eighteen months; besides the sum of £45,000, forming the interest which will have accumulated from the period of the original payment in April, 1814. The accompanying agreement was accordingly drawn up, and it was determined that the bonds should be framed according to the model I likewise enclose.

The period had been fixed for the signature of the agreement and the delivery of the bonds, when M. de Richelieu informed me that the Marquis d'Osmond had called upon him, for the purpose of stating that he had received advices from M. de Caraman, the French Chargé d'Affaires in London, announcing, in consequence of the representations he had thought it his duty to address directly to the Treasury, that Mr. Vansittart had consented to limit his present demand to the sum of £100,000, to defer the payment of the remaining £100,000 until December, 1818, and to wave the claim for the interest, which M. de Pradel had admitted to be due.

I confess that I was somewhat startled at this information, which tallies so little with the several instructions I have received from your lordship; and expressing with some warmth my sense of the inconvenience which must result to both Courts, if our respective diplomatic agents are allowed to counteract each other by double negociation, I told M. de Richelieu that I should do nothing further, until I had referred the subject once more to your lordship. Whatever may be the determination of his Majesty's Government, as a payment which in the aggregate would have amounted to £293,000 is thus reduced to £100,000, I cannot refrain

from again manifesting my earnest hope that the future instructions I may receive upon pecuniary subjects may not be communicated to the French diplomatic agents in London, before I have had an opportunity of executing the commands of his Majesty's Government.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 22, 1817.

My dear Lord—The unfavourable manifestation of public opinion in the late discussions of the Chamber has compelled the Ministers to abandon, for the present, all the arrangements which I stated some time since to be contemplated for the consolidation of the present Government, and to look forward rather to the possibility of changes which may give a decided colour to the Administration, and render the King's advisers the representatives of one of the great parties which divide the public opinion of this country. There is no doubt that, although this change will be delayed until it is absolutely forced upon the Government by the circumstances of the times, and that nothing less than successive defeats on several important questions can bring it about, considerable difference of opinion prevails among the King's Ministers concerning the mode in which it is desirable to attain such a result.

The well-known predilections of M. de Cazes will naturally induce him to remodel the Administration, by giving offices to the Members of the Council of State who have abandoned the cause of the present Government, and to the most moderate among the revolutionary party; while the leaders of the Ultra-Royalists, namely, M. de Villèle, Corbières, and Bonald, will probably be supported by M. de Richelieu.

Though hints have been thrown out to me that a knowledge of the decisive opinion of his Majesty's Government may very materially influence the course which is pursued upon this occasion, upon the principle of the instructions I have

repeatedly received from your lordship, I have thought it my duty to abstain from interference, and to avoid even the expression of an opinion upon the subject. It is, perhaps, to be wished that all my colleagues had maintained the same reserve.

Believe me, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 23, 1817.

My dear Lord—All seems tending towards a thorough reconciliation between the King and the Prince: they have dined each with the other; visitings and embracings have followed; and both seem again more pleased and in higher spirits than either could boast on the arrival of his Royal Highness at the Hague.

So far all is well—negociations are, however, briskly going on between them; on the Prince's side, no doubt for the purpose of being reinstated unconditionally in his superintendence of the army as Minister of War. I sincerely hope his Majesty will not be weak enough to give way upon this point. If he should, a complete triumph, at the expense of the royal authority, will be afforded to the Jacobinical crew at Bruxelles, who have already exerted more influence over his Royal Highness than is either consistent with his real interests or with good government.

I should be very sorry that, after what has passed, his Royal Highness should again be reinstated on any terms in the War Department. That there is, however, an intention of employing him somewhere I have no doubt: the Admiralty Department has been talked of, and in this he would, perhaps, be capable of doing less mischief than elsewhere; but, though I do not take it upon me to offer my opinions to his Majesty upon a point so delicate, yet, if I were to advise, it would be that, for some time at least, the Prince should be left altogether unemployed. Except dining with the King, and yesterday

with me, his Royal Highness has been out nowhere since his arrival.

Yours, my dear lord, very faithfully,

CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, December 26, 1817.

My dear Lord—A fact stated to me by M. de Nagell may perhaps throw some light upon the motives of the Prince's conduct in the late reconciliation. I can have no doubt that both he and his advisers conceived that Goltz would never stand against them, and that, on his removal, the Prince would become entire and unshackled master of the whole military department of this kingdom. Notwithstanding, therefore, that, at the very outset, Goltz had in a detailed letter to the Prince explained the whole of the circumstances of his conduct with reference to the orders issued for the employment of certain officers at Batavia as proceeding from the King, the whole artillery of his Royal Highness's advisers was levelled at M. de Goltz, as if he alone had opposed himself to the Prince's views.

As his Royal Highness joined, or rather led, in this attack, I strongly suspect, from the fact mentioned by M. de Nagell, that the Prince has concealed the real state of things, and most particularly Goltz's letter, from his sage advisers; and, though well aware from the very outset, that the order for the employment of the officers at Batavia proceeded from the King, and the King only, he is now desirous of endeavouring to account to his associates for his resumption of office by pretending now to learn this circumstance for the first time.

The fact stated by M. de Nagell is that the only condition formally insisted upon by the Prince was that the Comte de Goltz should write him a letter, explaining his conduct with reference to the officers, as having proceeded from the orders of his Majesty. In consequence of this, the King sent for

M. de Goltz, and made the proposal to him in Nagell's presence. M. de Goltz stated that, having already, at the very outset, done what was now required, he could not again write a letter of this sort to the Prince as an original piece, without apparently, and contrary to the fact, laying himself open to the charges which such a letter, uncoupled with his former correspondence, would seem to substantiate, of having before failed in duty to the Prince, by concealing from him, his superior, matters of interest relating to his department.

Nevertheless, as the King seemed extremely anxious upon this subject, upon two conditions, he would forego his objections: the first was that his Majesty would permit him to state, in his letter to the Prince, that it was written by the express command of the King; and secondly, that, as in fact would be the case, it should profess to repeat and specifically allude to the former explanation of the motives of his conduct afforded by M. de Goltz at the commencement to his Royal Highness. The King having complied with these, the letter was written, and the Prince has been obliged to appear satisfied with the redaction, although it will scarcely fulfil *all* his Royal Highness's expectations.

Though the Prince will not be able to show up this letter, as accounting to his Bruxelles' associates for his resumption of office, he will still be able to state his having received a letter from M. de Goltz of the particular date, explanatory of his conduct, and thus endeavour to account for his own: and this will afford too great a triumph to those by whom his Royal Highness has had the misfortune of being surrounded.

The King appears in high spirits at the termination of this business. Not so the Prince, who, though necessarily accepting the felicitations offered on the occasion, seems far from being at his ease. At the great dinner at Court, on the Emperor of Russia's birthday, he had the want of tact to leave M. de Goltz totally unnoticed by him, although he addressed every other person in the room.

The reconciliation, such as it is, doubtless has its advantages with reference to the impression made upon the public; but I must own that, besides the apprehension of its not being likely to be sincere and permanent, I should have conceived it much better, both for the future interests of the King and of his Royal Highness, to have left the latter, for the present, unemployed.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

1818.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL —NEGOCIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 16, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have heard nothing further of the manner in which General Phull [Pfühl] may have executed his instructions *vis-à-vis* the Prince of Orange, or of the contents of those instructions, beyond the sketch given in my despatch No. 2, of the 13th instant. You are probably by this time better informed upon this subject than I am, inasmuch as M. Verstolk, in his despatch to Nagell, states that copies of the instructions to General Phull were sent by the same conveyance to Count Lieven, to be, under his Excellency's discretion, communicated to you—a discretion which I should conceive his Excellency is not likely to execute by withholding them.

This Court seem perfectly satisfied with the communications from Russia on this subject. Indeed, they have already been attended with a considerable alteration of conduct in the Princess, who, since her residence here till their arrival, has seen nobody; but now, though with child and sick, she begins to force herself to see people. On Monday next, her birthday, the whole Court dine with the Prince and Princess.

The projected trip to Amsterdam is postponed till after the passing of the Budget; not that, as I learn, there will be any serious opposition to its enactment, but that such information as is constantly called for by the sections of the

Chambers may, previously to its being given, be submitted to the King.

The sections of the second Chamber have not yet reported upon the petition of the banished French refugee journalists; I however learn that some of them (and it is added that this will be the result of their united opinion) have come to the resolution that there appears no foundation whatever for the complaint of the petitioners.

My boys return by this conveyance to Eton, after having passed the vacation with me here.

Adieu, my dear lord, yours ever affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, January 23, 1818.

My dear Lord—Your lordship will see, by my despatch No. 12, the unpleasant turn which the Portuguese question has taken here. The language of M. de Pizarro, whom I happened to meet last night, is extremely hostile. The Duke of Fernan-Nuñez has written to say that Count Palmella has declared to him privately that, unless the Spanish Government gives an answer to the Portuguese Minister on the subject of Olivenza, he will give none respecting the territory occupied by the Portuguese. M. de Pizarro has, in consequence, directed the Spanish Ambassador at Paris never to converse *privately* with Count Palmella upon the subjects under discussion.

The King is said to be much incensed at the answer given to Count Casa Flores at Rio Janeiro. The only hope which remains of an amicable arrangement is through the interference of the mediating Powers. Should they fail in effecting this desirable object, I trust, at least, that they will not suffer the tranquillity of Europe to be disturbed.

It is confidently reported here that a decree will soon appear, granting an amnesty to those Spaniards who retired with

Joseph Bonaparte, and have since resided in France, with the exception of those who held the offices of Minister and Prefet, and the higher appointments in the Church and the army. Those who choose to return under the amnesty are not to reside within twenty leagues of the capital. I understand that several persons have already returned to Spain, under assurances that they should not be molested, and that the decree would soon appear. I do not hear of any measure favourable to the Liberales being in contemplation.

M. de Pizarro told me last night that the Duke of San Carlos expected to be summoned to the Conferences held in London, on the subject of the piracies of the Barbary Powers, and of the African Slave Trade; and that, having written for instructions, he had been directed to attend the Conferences—that, with respect to the Slave Trade, his Catholic Majesty, after the treaty he had concluded with the Prince Regent, was determined to join cordially in all the measures of the British Government for its suppression, and had instructed the Duke of San Carlos to give these assurances to your lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Baron Humboldt to Lord Castlereagh.

26 Janvier, 1818.

Mylord—Comme Votre Excellence m'a demande dernièrement si ma Cour avoit fait connoître à l'Espagne ses sentimens sur l'affaire des Colonies, j'ai l'honneur de lui communiquer une Note du Prince de Hardenberg à ce sujet. Elle est la réponse au ministre Espagnol, que Votre Excellence m'a dit de connoître et qui est presqu' inintelligible dans la forme dans laquelle nous l'avons reçu. Il resulta de la Note ci-jointe que le Comte de Goltz aura fait, sur le même sujet, des ouvertures plus détaillées au Comte de Fernan-Nuñez. Mais je ne négligerai pas, malgré cela, de marquer au Prince de Hardenberg l'intérêt que vous attachez, Mylord, à ce que la Cour de

Madrid connoisse pleinement et exactement les intentions d Roi, et les vues de ses Ministres à ce sujet.

Les journaux parlent d'une augmentation de 25 p. c. pou les droits sur le bois de charpente venant de la Baltique. J crois que cette nouvelle est dénuée de fondement puisqu'un telle augmentation anéantiroit tout commerce avec cet articl et par là tout revenu que le Gouvernement en retire à présen J'ose néanmoins rappeller à Votre Excellence sa promesse d s'informer plus particulièrement de la situation présente de cett affaire, et de m'en donner connoissance autant que les circon stances permettent.

Veuillez agréer, Mylord, l'assurance réitérée de ma haut considération et de mon attachement sincère.

HUMBOLDT.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 27, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have nothing of interest to send you fro hence, and so much the better, desirous as I am to spare yo as much as possible during the species of Cossack warfare yo are about to encounter during the present session of Parliamen

The lecture from Moscow (though I have not learnt ho delivered) to the sister and brother-in-law have some effect Both their Royal Highnesses now go out everywhere, an appear gracious, even to the Dutch. The whole Royal famil are apparently well united. The Ministry are well satisfie that the power rests with the Crown of sending away obnoxiou foreigners, and prepared to advise its exercise whenever neces sary, notwithstanding the defeat of Kemper's motion: an the hopes amount almost to a certainty of passing the Budge laws, which come on for debate to-morrow. After this ques tion shall have been disposed of, the promised *projet* of law for checking the license of the press with respect to foreig friendly States, is to be brought forward.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, January 27, evening, 1818.

My dear Lord—Since writing to you this morning, Nagell has communicated to me in confidence the substance of a curious correspondence which has passed between him and his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange. The day before yesterday his Royal Highness wrote to him, stating that he was sorry that he (M. de Nagell) should have taken part against him; that it was hard that complaints (*des plaintes*) should have been sent against him and the Princess to Moscow without having afforded to them, by a communication of their nature, the means of answering these complaints. (N.B. Pretty good proof this that their Royal Highnesses have received some smart and salutary advice from their Imperial brother.) His Royal Highness desires, therefore, to have the despatches upon this subject forwarded by this Government to Moscow communicated to him, and adds that he has no objection to have this request made known to the King.

Nagell's answer to this was, that "he had received his Royal Highness's letter, which he had immediately sent to the King for his Majesty's commands." The King sent forthwith for Nagell, and desired to have the despatches to M. Verstolk and the answer of this Minister from Moscow laid before him, in order that he might have the means of refreshing his memory upon them, and judging whether the Prince's request should be complied with. Having read them over, the King observed that he saw nothing to prevent the communication sought, and directed Nagell to acquaint the Prince that whenever (except when engaged with his Ministers) the Prince would call upon the King, his Majesty would read these despatches to him. This Nagell did accordingly, without saying a word more or less than he was directed, and yesterday received from the Prince a reply, stating "the receipt of Nagell's note, which, from the extreme delicacy of reverting to

such a subject with the King, his Royal Highness looked u as nothing short of a positive refusal to comply with his j request; that, the communication sought being thus refus the Princess and he must wait in patience till he sho receive an answer to a similar application that he was t compelled to make to the Emperor of Russia, on whose just he relied to make known to them the nature of the complai alleged against them, in order that they might have the me of justifying themselves." Nagell, having shown this let to the King, his Majesty agreed with him in thinking t there was no need of further prolonging the correspondence

I make no comment on the above, but, heartily wishing t his Royal Highness had a better head and better advise remain most affectionately yours,

C.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 3, 1818

My dear Lord—The Budget passed the second Chamber the night of the 28th ult., and it is now before the fi Chamber, in which it has been referred to the sections, t discussions on whose Report will terminate this business, pr bably towards the close of the present or early in the ensui week. This matter has been very much litigated in t second Chamber; and, though ultimately carried by a suf cient majority, the Government were, at one moment, in son fear of its failure; and, although no very serious apprehe sions are entertained of its being thrown out in the fir Chamber, yet it is not fully ascertained to what extent t opposition may be carried.

With a view to operate a decision favourable to his viev in some of the Members of the first Chamber, the King h been induced to take a step, which, though of little appare consequence, I cannot think either wise in itself or quite con patible with his Majesty's desire to avoid the formation of

regular Opposition in his States-General. Several of the Members of both Chambers occupy the honorary situation of Chamberlains in the King's household. Four of these, Messrs. Vilain XIV., Varnewych, Cornet de Gretz, and another, Members of the second Chamber, voted against the principal Budget laws. A ball was given by the Queen on Saturday last, to which every person who had been presented was invited, with the exception of these four persons; and, they were avowedly excluded upon the ground that, belonging to his Majesty's household, it did not become them to act counter to the views of his Government.

This has become a theme of general conversation and criticism here; and I must own that, besides giving to the persons excluded a degree of consequence to which otherwise they are in no degree entitled, I should fear the example will rather tend to excite some of the Belgic Chamberlains in the first Chamber to resist the Budget law, in the hopes of acquiring to themselves some character as marked and oppressed men by the Court, than induce their pliancy to the views of Government.

A *projet* of law to restrain the license of the press in favour of foreign Powers and the acts or intentions of their Governments will be presented to-day, by the Minister of Justice, to the second Chamber, and I have taken measures (I should hope successfully) to procure a copy of this document, which, if it shall reach me in time, will form an enclosure in this letter. A more efficient law upon this subject has been strongly solicited by several of my colleagues at this Court, and, aware of this circumstance, I have endeavoured, but ineffectually, to learn the proposed details. It is, indeed, strange, and marks the want of unity in this Government, that, conversing only yesterday with M. de Nagell upon the rumour of such a *projet* being to be brought forward to-day, he solemnly assured me that he had never seen it, nor had its provisions been ever communicated to him; and that, notwithstanding its peculiar

reference to his department, he had not been consulted as to its redaction, but that the whole had been arranged, exclusively of others, between the King and the Minister of Justice.

I have written you a despatch relative to a Tunisian vessel bound from Tunis to Rotterdam, with despatches upon the subject of the Barbary corsairs. This Government seems very anxious for an early and general alliance of the Powers of Europe against them.

Yours, my dear lord, ever faithfully,

CLANCARTY.

I send the *projet* of law.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, February 8, 1818.

My dear Lord—Exactly as your lordship foresaw, this Government has declined, though very civilly, to accept of our mediation in their differences with Spain. I have reported at great length in my despatch the substance of the conversations which have passed upon the subject between Mr Adams and myself, and I have perhaps very little to add to that report.

It is impossible to say whether the reasons which the President has assigned for declining our offer are the only reasons which have influenced him: but there is certainly truth in much of what he says, as to the effect which our intervention might have upon the public temper here, as it respects ourselves.

The President has assured me distinctly that the United States have no intention whatever of going to war for any of the points in dispute—that their claims upon Spain for spoliations, &c., do not amount to much more than five millions of dollars—and that, as to the territories, they have been the subject of claim, and dispute, and complicated negociation for fifteen or twenty years; and that they may well continue to be so for fifteen or twenty years longer, without leading to any

hostilities between the two countries. The Spanish Minister, however, thinks that the result will be that they will be taken possession of without any declaration of war whatever. This apprehension may certainly be well founded, so far as relates to the Floridas: but I think that the United States are really indifferent at the present moment upon the subject of the territory to the westward of the Mississipi, being persuaded that it is not with old Spain that they shall finally have to settle that question.

M. de Onis was certainly not at all surprised at the refusal of the American Government to accept our proposal. He tells me that he shall return to Spain in the course of the spring, and that he then hopes that all the Powers of Europe will be induced to make a joint effort of their intervention in the business.

The President and Mr. Adams have both received with evident pleasure the assurance, which I was authorized by your lordship's private and confidential letter of the 10th of November to give them, of the principles upon which Great Britain would act in respect to the commerce of the Spanish settlements of South America, in the event of her being employed to mediate between them and Spain. They have both repeatedly expressed to me their satisfaction at the remarkable coincidence of sentiment in the two Governments upon this question, as well as upon that of the contest in South America. Your lordship's assurance that Great Britain would not seek any exclusive advantages of commerce is observed to correspond exactly with the assurance given upon that subject in the President's Message; and the Prince Regent's Proclamation of the 27th of November is thought to correspond as exactly with that part of the Message which speaks of the character of the warfare between Spain and her colonies.

Mr. Adams and the President have taken great pains to assure me that there is nothing which they so much desire as that the two countries should act in unison upon the whole of

the great question of South America. I believe that they are sincere in this wish, and I believe it the more, because they would certainly derive from such unison considerable strength to their own administration in resisting the great endeavours which are to be made in the course of the present session of Congress by the Western States to force them into an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment of the independence of all the South American provinces—a course which I now think (though I lately entertained a different opinion) that the President is not yet prepared to take, and which Mr. Adams certainly is not.

Mr. Adams, however, appears to think that it is somewhat doubtful whether there is, in fact, any room for mediation between them and the mother country; as he conceives (if I understand him rightly) that a free trade, once given (as it must and will be) to the colonies, Spain has nothing left which she can offer to them in return for even the slightest allegiance. He is, however, of opinion, that there is one point upon which Great Britain might most powerfully interfere, in concert with the other Governments of the world, and that is in the immediate and effectual suppression of the piracies and abuses of every kind, which are carried on against the commerce of the whole world, under the revolutionary flags of these provinces. Upon this subject he speaks loudly, and is, I really believe, fully prepared to carry his power to its utmost extent in assisting in this object.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES BAGOT.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 10, 1818.

My dear Lord—Upon my opening the demand of the first three items of the Treasury account, conveyed in your despatch No. 2 to M. de Nagell, he seemed surprised and much embarrassed; and he states to me that the mention of this matter

to him has had the same effect upon the King. Both evidently considered these advances as a grant, and complain that the matter was not (if otherwise considered) brought forward before, and of the very awkward situation in which the Government is now placed, after having professed to state in their late Budget (with such difficulty passed through the States-General) every article of arrear, and brought prominently forward the £2,000,000 due from Great Britain as a relief to the nation in their charges for fortifications. In having so large a sum still in arrear as £687,700 to produce for provision at a future period, they state the fears they entertain that the good faith of the King in his late communications with his States-General will be compromised, and that these will naturally suspect that so large an arrear has been intentionally kept back from their notice.

Under the apprehension of this, M. de Nagell has requested me to solicit that, till some arrangement can be thought of, whereby this evil may be obviated, you will endeavour to prevent this matter from being noticed in our debates in Parliament, lest it should transpire here, and raise an outcry in the States-General and in the country.

M. de Nagell pressed much that every inclination should be formed on the part of the British Government to afford to this every possible degree of acccommodation in such arrangements as they may hereafter be enabled to propose upon this subject. For a long time he argued the matter as bearing upon the provisions required for the charges of this country for the present year, 1818, stating the utter impossibility of making any arrangement whereby the sum of £1,000,000, proposed to be advanced by Great Britain for these fortifications, could be otherwise diminished than by the sums due for the frigates and Hanoverian subsidy; and, upon my assuring him that it did not enter into your intention further to diminish this sum than under their own proposal, he then applied the same arguments to the subject of the charges for fortification, and

advance of a million by Great Britain, as referable to the expenditure of 1819.

In the course of the argument, he stated that it was not now the time particularly to examine the precise amount of the items, but that these he believed [not?] to go beyond the quantum of arms and clothing actually furnished for the immediate service of the King. He also mentioned that, under the second secret Article of the Convention of August 13, 1814 his Majesty would have some—he did not pretend to say very large—demand to make upon Great Britain in the settlement of this account for the revenues of Bernagore [?]. The amount of these I should conceive to be very trifling; however it may be possible (though I very carefully avoided even hinting the subject to M. de Nagell) that some accommodation to this Government, though certainly to no very considerable extent, might be found in the absolute purchase of these revenues in fee simple by Great Britain. You will know best what value to place on this suggestion.

On the matter of the Slave Trade, M. de Nagell stated to me that he did not entertain a doubt of the King's willingness to enter into the Convention you require; and he strongly recommended, by way of saving time, that I should write for the immediate expedition of the full powers to me requisite for the commencement and prosecution of this negociation. I give you the recommendation as I received it. I cannot, however, (though from nothing which transpired in my conversations with M. de Nagell) avoid suspecting the possibility that, in my audience with the King, his Majesty, perceiving the sums paid to both in the Conventions with Spain and Portugal, may endeavour, though without possessing the same foundation, to attach some conditions connected with the money demands upon his compliance with your object relative to the trade in slaves. If he should do so, as the best mode, in my judgment, of managing both questions, I shall put a direct negative to any such pretension; and, if you shall disapprove

of the effect resulting from this step, it will be very easy for you to disavow me, and I shall not complain of your doing so.

I am sorry to state that the Prince of Orange, though not to the same public extent, has again taken up the cause of the Belgic half-pay officers ordered to Batavia. It appears that, to excuse themselves from this service, several of them, among whom is Colonel de Wastine, a Frenchman, and, till a late period, in that service, pleaded the want of sufficient health. Medical officers were accordingly sent by the King to establish the fact, and M. de Wastine particularly refused to submit to the required inspection, and actually directed the medical officers to be turned out of his lodgings. On this being reported to the King, his Majesty struck his name out of his army.

The Prince of Orange has represented to the King that he is compromised by this act, and has again tendered his resignation; but, though this happened, I believe, on Thursday last, I have not yet heard that the resignation has been accepted. The matter is still a secret here, though his Royal Highness, with sufficient imprudence, confided the fact to M. le Comte de Vilain XIV., one of the Belgic Deputies to the Second Chamber, who has been in uniform opposition to Government, one of the four Chamberlains excluded from the Queen's ball, (as I acquainted you in a former letter) and who waited on the Prince on Friday to take leave, prior to his return to the southern provinces.

Yours, my dear lord, &c.,

CLANCARTY.

PS. A despatch has just been received by this Government from their Admiral in the Mediterranean, stating that four Tunisian vessels, of twenty guns each, (one of them probably that spoken of in the letter formerly noticed, from the Consul at Alicante) were then at Port Mahon, one bound to Rotterdam, the three others for the Thames, under the alleged

pretence of seeking reimbursement for the loss sustained by the recapture of the Hamburgh, &c., vessels taken from them by us. This appears great stuff. I have thought it right, however, to furnish you with the fact as it has reached me by a verbal communication from M. de Nagell.

C.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 6, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have nothing of an official nature worthy of conveyance by the present occasion. The Reports of the Procureur-General at Bruxelles to the Minister of Justice here I no longer send in gross; with the exception, perhaps, of the enclosed extracts from those of the 1st of March, they cease to be of interest. These present two facts; 1st, the cautious delicacy which induced M. le Comte de Merci d'Argenteau, Civil Governor of Bruxelles, to warn Lord K—— against making the very limited discovery conveyed in his letter to Sir George Murray, of the existence of a premeditated plan to murder the Duke of Wellington; and secondly, that my Lord K—— is in the habit of advancing moneys in support of sedition, other than those sums which, by his intervention, we already know to have been paid to the *caisse de sustentation* at Antwerp, on account of the Duke of Orleans.

I am in great hopes, however, that the slight information hitherto afforded by his lordship will prove sufficient, if not for the success of further discovery, at least to set him at variance with his worthy coadjutors among the proscribed French at Bruxelles, and that he may consequently be thus induced altogether to withdraw his residence from this kingdom. Already the Jacobin journals have commenced somewhat covered hostilities against him, which, I trust, will soon grow into undisguised war and direct attack. An open house, tolerable manners, a command of money, and abundant good-will to a bad cause, have enabled his lordship to do considerable mis-

chief: happily, however, these have been somewhat counterbalanced by very restricted powers of judgment and a temper not always at command.

The Sessions of the States-General here are drawing towards a close: it is thought they will terminate on Thursday next. The King has found these gentry more difficult of late than he had expected. The law respecting libel on foreign Sovereigns, &c., I have already acquainted you, was lost by a majority of three. I did not, however, then state, because I was then ignorant of the fact, that the ill-success of this *projet* is attributed to the exertions of his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, who is supposed not only to have encouraged opposition to it, but to have had sufficient influence to turn the scale against it in the Second Chamber. A *projet* of law respecting *le Droit de Chasse* has subsequently been ousted by a considerable majority, and against the success of this also the Prince of Orange is stated to have exerted himself.

It being hoped that the States-General will be adjourned on Thursday next, the Court intends, immediately after Passion week, to repair for some time (probably a week or ten days) to Amsterdam. Thither, if invited, I shall conceive it my duty to accompany them, unless I shall receive directions from you to the contrary.

The despatch from Lamb, which you will receive by this conveyance, reached me yesterday evening under flying seal. I must own that, to reconcile the instructions from Prince Metternich of the 11th December to his Minister at Munich, with those to the Comte de Buol of the 21st January, is beyond my limited capacity—that they should, however, though in direct opposition, flow from the head that devised them appears to me quite natural. *His Highness* would have done well to have recollected that there is no secrecy among the Plenipotentiaries at Frankfort; and, consequently, that the chances were strong in favour of both instructions becoming public. But his greatness of soul and perfect master-

ship of the diplomatic art, no doubt, despise such paltry considerations.

Ever most sincerely yours, CLANCARTY.

[Enclosures.]

Extrait d'une Lettre confidentielle de M. Vanderfosse, Procureur-Général au Ministre de la Justice.

Bruxelles, 1 Mars, 1818.

J'ai pensé que son Altesse le Prince de Waterloo seroit charmé de connoître une circonstance que je n'ai apprise qu'hier: c'est que Lord K—— payoit à Arnheim, par l'entremise de la maison Stappaerts et à l'un de leurs correspondants, la pension de deux auteurs, (Guyet et Cauchois le Maire, sans doute) et que Collignon, non plus que Brice, avoient disparu de Bruxelles.

Extrait d'une Lettre confidentielle de M. Vanderfosse, Procureur-Général au Ministre de la Justice.

Bruxelles, 1 Mars, 1818.

On va presqu'à prétendre savoir avec certitude, que le 31 Janvier dernier, Lord K—— fit confidence de sa lettre de la veille à M. le Gouverneur du Brabant, Merid, lequel lui auroit répondu de prendre bien garde à la part qu'il auroit l'imprudence de prendre à cette affaire.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 13, 1818.

My dear Lord—On M. de La Tour du Pin's return here from Bruxelles, he was very sanguine in his expectation that both M. Collignon and Brice would be arrested. The Procureur-General at Bruxelles had also hopes of success, but not so strong, on this subject. These, as they respect Collignon, are now at an end. The information on which the Procureur-General and La Tour du Pin have been proceeding, has been

found incorrect; the party has not been at Bruxelles since August last. Hopes are still the same of being able to lay hold of Brice.

Another source of information has presented itself to the Procureur-General of Bruxelles, which he is endeavouring to investigate. According to the information thus derived, (whether true or false remains to be discovered) the plot for the murder of the Duke was contrived at Bruxelles. Among those those who had a knowledge of it were Comte Victor de Croquembourg, now in the Conciergerie at Paris, Nicole, or Martinet, also confined there, Guyet and his wife, Cauchois le Maire and his wife, (the last of which is also a prisoner at Paris) and all the writers of the former *Nain Jaune.* Their meetings were held at the house of a *grande dame,* the position of which has been pointed out, and with such precision, to the Procureur-General, that he doubts not thus to establish the name of the owner thereof, who, he strongly suspects, is Madame Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely.

M. de Croquembourg is a Belgian of known disaffected principles: his brother, against whom, however, I am not aware of there being any imputation, is one of the Prince of Orange's aides-de-camp. Madame Regnault is very intimate with Madame de Berenger, one of the leading characters among that respectable body of elderly ladies at Bruxelles who used to surround the Prince, in whose society he took so much delight, and who were styled *la vielle garde.* Madame de Berenger has always been supposed to be much attached to the cause of Bonaparte.

A circumstance has occurred here, which, though of evil influence for the present, may possibly, by tending to open the mind of the King to the false principles on which his laws of libel are founded, operate some future good. In my despatch of the 5th December, 1817, I sent you two libellous pamphlets containing the petitions of Messieurs Cauchois le Maire and Guyet, who had been banished hence by the King for their

endeavours to poison the public mind. The printer of these, named Walley, who had then recently been set up at the Hague with complete printing-presses, &c., by the disaffected, was imprisoned for printing these libels, and has been confined ever since, with a view to being brought to trial. Latterly, however, such is the excellence of the police of this kingdom, that M. Cauchois le Maire, although banished, found his way to Antwerp, and there, about a month since, declared, in all due form, before a Notary of that place, that he alone was the author, and he alone ought to be considered as responsible for these pamphlets. The cause of M. Walley came on here on Wednesday last, when, in consequence of this declaration, seven judges against five were of opinion that there existed no ground of charge against the printer!

This judgment has filled the Minister of Justice here with dismay, and, I should hope, will operate the good effect with the King to induce the adoption by his Majesty of some better principles on which to found his laws of libel than those he has hitherto adopted. The amendment, however, whenever introduced, will now be late: much evil has been done; in fact, the disaffected have completely triumphed over the Allies in one respect, inasmuch as, instead of the public opinion being improved during the continuation of the Army of Occupation in France, it will be found to have been extensively deteriorated during that period, and this through the active and persevering efforts of those whose influence is incompatible with the tranquillity of Europe.

Yours, my dear lord, most sincerely, CLANCARTY.

Count Münster to Lord Castlereagh.

Grosvenor Place, March 23, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have the honour to return herewith, with many thanks, Mr. Lamb's despatches relating to the conduct of the Austrian Cabinet concerning the question of represen-

tative governments in Germany, and to the claims of the Jews in Frankfort.

As to the first point, Mr. Lamb's observation is unfortunately too well founded. Prince Metternich has communicated to me, through C[ount] Hardenberg, his despatch to B[aron] Rhubia at Munich, and has endeavoured to explain his deviation from the principles he has publicly professed in other instances, by stating that he had intended to induce Bavaria to a more cordial support of the union.

Hardenberg observes that Metternich, on the question of a representative system, has himself a great opposition to conquer at home. I am sorry to say that the principles he had agreed upon with M. Jurdan, at their recent interview at Vienna, are more in the sense of the despatch intended for the Court of Bavaria, than of the sounder principles expressed in the other, directed to Count Buol Schauenstein. The Prussian vote on this subject having proved afterwards to turn out as could have been wished, the letter of Prince Metternich to H—— (but too well known in Germany) has produced a very unfavourable impression, which is still increased by the alterations Metternich has been induced to admit into the plan for the military organization of the confederacy.

As to Mr. Lamb's Note respecting the Jews, I should be wanting in sincerity if I did not avow that I regret its having been delivered; for, in my humble opinion, the principle on which the Note is founded cannot be maintained, and I cannot convince myself that the mere circumstance of the matter having been mentioned in the Act of the Congress of Vienna could warrant the interference of foreign Powers, after the question has been actually brought before the Germanic Diet. This is, as Martens informs me, in a letter dated the 8th March, the impression produced at Frankfort. Of course a civil answer has been given to the Note.

I have the honour to be, &c., MÜNSTER.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, March 24, 1818.

My dear Lord—Several changes have, within these two days, taken place in the Administration of this country, the object of which is partially to obtain greater efficiency, but principally to produce economical savings to the public purse. With this latter view, two departments, as substantive departments in themselves, are suppressed, and their functions consigned to others. These are, first, the Ministry of Police for the southern provinces, the duties of which are hereafter to be discharged by the Procureur-General at Bruxelles, under the superintendence of the Minister of Justice; secondly, the Ministry of Public Instruction and Worship—the functions of this department, as far as relate to Public Instruction, are in future to be annexed to the department of the Colonies, and that part of them relating to the Protestant clergy are hereafter to be discharged by the Director-General of the Posts.

It must be confessed there appears something fanciful in the arrangement for the future performance of some of these duties; they have, however, been so appropriated as, I understand, not as having any coincidence with the departments to which they are now annexed, but because these departments are more open to the performance of new and increased duties.

M. le Comte de Thiennes, who filled the first of these now abolished departments, and M. de Ripelaer, who filled the latter, are both to retain the rank of Minister, and also to receive their former salaries. How the States-General may relish this latter part of the arrangement will hereafter be proved: economy will, however, upon the whole, result from the measure, by putting down the far greater part of two great establishments and the two great houses hired for their accommodation.

M. de Falck, late Secretary of State, is now transferred to

the Ministry of Commerce and the Colonies, increased further in its duties by the annexation of those relating to Public Instruction, as above stated; and to replace him, M. de May, the King's private secretary, without any additional salary, has been raised to the rank of *Conseiller d'État, faisant les fonctions de Secrétaire Géneral d'État.*

In addition to the above, the resignation of M. Merçy d'Argenteau, as Governor of South Brabant, has been accepted, and he is to be succeeded in this office by the Comte d'Arschott. Abstracted from the economical object, some of these arrangements may be pronounced to be good, while others may be considered of doubtful advantage.

Though M. le Comte de Thiennes is a man of talent, good principles, and zeal, yet such was the composition of his Office, such the suspected disaffection of his inferior agents, and particularly of the Secretary, in whom he placed too much confidence, that little real benefit, and at critical times much detriment, was reaped by the public from this department. These persons will now be either pensioned off on small pensions, or employed where they can do no mischief; while, with some little additional assistance, it is hoped that the zeal of the Procureur-General will enable him to render the Police of the Southern Provinces an efficient aid to the march of Government.

The placing the Public Instruction under the superintendence of the new Minister of Commerce and the Colonies, is a measure the benefit of which may be doubted. Not so the removal of M. Merey d'Argentçau from the Government of South Brabant—a person little qualified to serve in any efficient office; while it may reasonably become a question whether the choice of M. d'Arschott as his successor was exactly the best that could have been formed.

The Court go to Amsterdam on Thursday: hitherto, no invitation has been announced to the corps diplomatique to accompany them: should none be sent, (as now appears likely) I shall remain at the Hague.

We hear pretty regularly from Paris respecting the proceedings for the detection of the assassination plot. M. de Cazes is in direct correspondence with the Procureur-General at Bruxelles on this subject, and the latter, under the direction of the Minister of Justice here, is, and zealously, exerting himself to the utmost to co-operate with the French Police on this subject. Through the means of this correspondence, we have received a copy of Cantillon's examination in full, which, coupled with extracts from that of La Demoiselle Fremont and her companion, conveyed by the same means and in letters to La Tour du Pin from M. de Cazes, and from the Duke of Wellington to me, renders it, in my mind, morally certain that this Cantillon was the person who actually fired the shot. By continuing to act, as has hitherto been the case, entirely in the sense of M. de Cazes, I have some hopes that the exertions of the Procureur-General at Bruxelles may now prove successful in aiding to discover the authors, and ultimately to supply legal proofs against those concerned in the late atrocious attempt.

M. de la Tour du Pin has, after consulting with the Minister of Justice and me, sent M. de Caux, his Secretary of Legation, to Bruxelles, for the purpose of aiding the Procureur-General as a special Secretary in this business, and also further to facilitate the correspondence with M. de Cazes.

Yours, my dear Lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

[Endorsed—"In Lord Clancarty's Private of March 31, 1818."]

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Clancarty.

Paris, March 24, 1818.

My dear Clancarty—I have already informed you that the Government and Police here are loud in their complaints of the Government and police of the Netherlands, for their want of activity and energy in the investigation of the circumstances attending the attempt against me, particularly since the discovery of Cantillon; and the Duc de Richelieu, who writes

this day to M. de la Tour du Pin, upon the subject, has requested me to write to you.

These complaints are founded, first, upon their having suffered Bastide to be at large after examination, the Procureur-General having been informed that he, Bastide, had stated that Cantillon had fired upon me; secondly, upon their having omitted to arrest and examine Raymy, he having stated the same thing; thirdly, upon their having suffered to be at large Cauchois le Maire, Guyet, Madame Guyet, Madame Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Sausset, Brice, all of whom are more or less implicated in the conspiracy, as appears by their letters, by the examination of other persons, by reports, &c.; fourthly, in having omitted to seize and examine the papers of Marinet, in his lodgings, Rue de la Musée, at Bruxelles, and in having called upon the Minister of Police at Paris to send a procuration from the said Marinet to authorize such examination.

I am very little disposed to listen to this kind of reciprocal accusation of apathy and neglect; but I must say that there is something extraordinary in the conduct of the police in the Netherlands on this subject, more particularly when it is connected with the fact that M. de Thiennes, and even the King himself, state that they believe the whole plot was one for Lord K—— to get to Paris, and that the former went so far as to send to M. de Cazes a message by telegraph from Lisle to that purport.

In bringing this subject under your consideration, I beg you just to reflect a little upon what grounds the King will stand in this affair. For years the French Ministers, and the Ministers of the Allied Powers at Paris, and the Allied Sovereigns themselves, have pointed out to the King the inconveniences and dangers resulting from his allowing those proscribed by the united opinion of all Europe, and the criminals who escaped from the vengeance of the laws in this country, to resort to his dominions, there to receive the

encouragement which his Majesty has afforded them. The mischief foretold has occurred; a plot has been formed in the Netherlands by these very people to assassinate me; not, I presume, because they did not like my face, or my manners, or the colour of my coat, but because I was the General of the Allies, and the main support of the system of tranquillity and order, which it is wished to establish in the world—and then the Ministers and agents of the Government of the King of the Netherlands, instead of their doing everything in their power to aid those of this country in bringing to light this transaction, and to justice those concerned in the plot, appear to exert every nerve and to make use of every chicane which the law can admit, to prevent the seizing and to screen and save the criminals!

Why are not all the French men and women, named as being concerned in this affair, seized and sent into France, to be dealt with according to law? They are in the Netherlands, in spite of the King's engagements and his orders to the contrary; and surely there could be nothing unjustifiable in making an exertion to hand them over to the tribunals which can and will make them speak out and punish them.

I beg you to speak seriously to M. de Nagell upon this subject, and tell him I write to you for the sake of public justice and of the King's reputation. I consider my own safety to be quite out of the question: if it was involved in the decision of it, I should, perhaps, scruple to write so strongly upon the subject; but, as it is, I have these motives alone for troubling you

Yours, &c., WELLINGTON.

[Endorsed—"In Lord Clancarty's Private of March 31, 1818."]

Lord Clancarty to the Duke of Wellington.

The Hague, March 28, 1818.

My dear Duke—I received your letter of the 24th yesterday at 11 A.M. I was not before aware that the proceedings taken here for the investigation of the foul conspiracy against your

person and the peace of Europe had afforded ground of complaint to the Government and Police Department in France. This intelligence was, on the contrary, received by me with surprise; for I had imagined, not that the Police Department here had done or was capable of doing its duty — the King is, indeed, so fully in unison with all that can be said by the French Government upon this subject, that he has altogether abolished it as a department, and turned its functions over to those who he thinks may be more capable of discharging them with efficiency—but that the Procureur-General at Bruxelles, to whom, prior to the cessation of the Police Department, we had been driven to resort, had not only acted with all the energy which his powers enabled him to exert, but that this was felt to be the case by the French Government and M. de Cazes; and on this ground it was that, for the purpose of encouraging further exertion, I lately solicited and obtained the expression of your satisfaction at the conduct of M. Vanderfosse and of the Minister of Justice here, under whose orders he acts.

The complaints stated in your letter under four distinct heads may, for the purpose of action and explanation, be reduced to two, viz.:

1st. The not having arrested and sent to Paris the ten persons whose names are Brice, Sausset, Cauchois le Maire, Guyet, Alexandre Bastide, Raymy, Dublar, Madame Regnault, Madame Guyet; and

2ndly. The non-examination of Marinet's papers in the first instance, and the demand made for a procuration for this purpose.

The best comment which can perhaps be made on the first of these complaints will be found in the following statement of what has been done in consequence of the arrival of the courier from Paris, and what the nature of the instructions of which he was the bearer. Your wishes were clearly expressed on the subject; these persons were, if possible, to be arrested and

sent to Paris, and I was to support M. de la Tour du Pin in effecting this object.

Immediately upon the arrival of your letter, I went to M. de Nagell, and, in the strongest terms, represented to him the necessity of vigorous action in an investigation in which the whole of Europe was concerned, the King's own interest and his reputation particularly involved, and the detriment which must accrue to his affairs from any backwardness on his part, which could not fail to render him obnoxious to every one of his Allies. Though I did not conceive this lecture at all applicable to M. de Nagell, and as little to his royal master, whom, from the beginning, I have found as anxious for the discovery of the conspirators and as willing to lend himself to anything practicable for this purpose as could be wished, and though I totally disbelieve the fact of the King having ever been disposed to entertain the notion of the "whole plot having been framed for the purpose of enabling Lord K—— to get to Paris," or that it was otherwise than an atrocious conspiracy for the most damnable object, and only defeated in its execution by the beneficent providence of God—yet my tone, manner, and words to M. de Nagell were as serious as if my sentiments had been of a very different description. His answer to me was that he fully agreed in every word I had uttered, but asked to what all this led, and what I now required at the King's hands. I replied, the immediate arrest and transmission to Paris of the ten persons already named in this letter, and mentioned their being still at large as an instance of the slowness of this Government in aiding the inquiry instituted for the discovery of the authors of this hellish conspiracy.

M. de Nagell observed that the persons named to him were to be differently considered: two of them, Sausset and Brice, were among the numbers contained in M. de Caux's list; two others, Cauchois le Maire and Guyet, had rendered themselves immediately obnoxious to this Government, and against all the

four every effort of what he acknowledged to be a very inefficient police had long been used for their arrest. Of the other six, one (Alexandre) was believed to have sailed for America in August last; but, however this might be both as to him and as to the other five, a formal ground of accusation, or some application, stating the pendency of a judicial proceeding in France, in which they were judicially implicated, would be necessary to authorize their arrest here, still more to cover the proceeding of handing them over to the French authorities; for that persons (and allow me to say this is too little attended to by those at Paris when they allow themselves to judge of proceedings here) could not, though foreigners, be arrested and detained *ad libitum* in this country.

In answer to those observations, I told M. de Nagell that it did not appear to be requisite that either a formal accusation, or an application stating the existence of a judicial proceeding at Paris, as mentioned by him, was necessary for the arrest and transmission of these people; that the King had undertaken to send from his dominions all those French from whom his Majesty the King of France had withdrawn his protection; that these persons were all French, and it did not appear to me too much, under the circumstances of the late conspiracy, to ask that they should be taken and sent as persons implicated in it to France, there to be dealt with according to the laws of that country.

To this M. de Nagell assented, but said it would be necessary to have an application to this effect made by the French Minister, and, if made at my request, he promised to forward it, with a strong letter in its favour, to the King (now at Amsterdam) by the courier which would be despatched at four o'clock. I told him I had reason to believe M. de la Tour du Pin had received instructions to make such an application, and that I had little doubt of obtaining their immediate execution from him. I was then leaving him, for the purpose of receiving the French Minister, when he added that he believed I would

find it a more difficult matter than I thought to obtain any application from any diplomatic agent of the French Government for the transmission of these persons to France; but that, in every event, I might be sure of his best co-operation, in making use of whatever means this Government could put forth for the investigation of this subject.

M. de la Tour du Pin called upon me at about one o'clock, to read me his instructions, if such they can be called. They consisted of a letter from the Duc de Richelieu, enclosing a copy of one addressed by M. de Cazes to the Procureur-General at Bruxelles. Judge of my astonishment and dismay, when I found scarcely any mention of the arrest of some of these persons, that of others very vaguely noticed; no direct instruction to make any application whatever, and not a single word upon the transmission of these persons, or of any of them, to Paris!

Having finished the reading, M. de la Tour du Pin asked me what I thought should be done. Putting the best face I could upon the matter, I told him it appeared to me pretty clear that the object of his Government was that the ten persons above-named, and whose names I had noted down while he was reading, should be seized as soon as they could be caught here, and transmitted at the earliest period to Paris; and, upon his expressing a doubt upon the subject, and asserting that his instructions went far short of this length, I added that, if any doubt could be entertained from M. de Richelieu's letter, this was fully cleared up by yours to me, written as it was by the Duc de Richelieu's express desire, and that in this the desire was so clearly expressed as to render it impossible to mistake; and therefore urged him immediately to write an official note, withdrawing his royal master's protection from these ten persons, and requiring their immediate arrest and transmission to France. He objected to this, saying that your letter to me was no authority to him. However, after much persuasion, he agreed to frame such a note; and it was arranged

that, when performed, he should call upon me, and that we should both go together to M. de Nagell (of my early visit to whom he was ignorant) for the purpose of presenting and enforcing its contents.

He did not return to me till near four o'clock; it was then too late to read the note over to me, and he referred the lecture till our arrival at the Foreign Office. When read there, however, it turned out far short of what he had undertaken to make it. In the first place, it is utterly silent upon any demand for even the arrest or interrogation of Mesdames Regnault and Guyet; and, in the second, it makes no mention of the transmission of the other eight to France, but seeks their arrest and detention till further orders shall be received from Paris, thus making this King an officer of French police, to serve under the supreme direction of M. de Cazes. Happily, this did not strike Nagell, and the note was immediately, in our presence, despatched to the King, with a strong recommendatory letter from his Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Such is a tolerably circumstantial detail of this transaction, and I ask you by what right or show of equity it is that the French authorities presume to vomit forth their filthy venom against those who are heartily desirous of co-operating with them in the investigation of this black conspiracy; while they who have the means and ought to set the example are terribly, and I believe wilfully, defective in the discharge of their duties?

Both the Duc de Richelieu and M. de Cazes must know that the hands of this Government are much confined; that it does not possess the advantage of being able to execute the functions of *haute* police; that some foundation for arrests, &c., even of foreigners, is requisite; and it surely is for them (and they have the means) to endeavour to lay such ground as will cover this Crown and its officers, before their own people, from charges of having made arbitrary and unconstitutional arrests. Two modes lie open to them, and the Minister of Justice, with whom I have conversed on this subject, assures me that he

would have recommended compliance by this Court with applications from that of France founded on either—the one, to have, in the first instance, commenced a judicial proceeding on this subject at Paris, and applied to this Government to back its *mandats d'amener* against French subjects, founded on such proceeding—the other, the same that I endeavoured to obtain the adoption of by La Tour du Pin, in the present instance, founded on the undertaking of the King.

The French authorities, however, adopted neither; and I cannot but suspect that they have reasons for it, and that they would rather keep alive, and even invent, causes of quarrel with this State, than lend their aid, as it is their duty, to the best means of obtaining a thorough elucidation of the dark plot against your person. If they mean fairly, in the name of God, let them act fairly, and instead of coarsely abusing this Government for weakness, which it does not rest with it to counteract, rather lend a helping hand to avoid the difficulties of their situation, and which could have been done, in the present instance without trouble or expense.

So much for the first complaint of the ten persons comprised within it, against every one of which, with the exception of Madame Regnault, as we learn from Bruxelles, *mandats d'amener* have been issued; so that the authorities of the King at Bruxelles have gone further even than the authorities of the French Government in this country under their direction have dared to go, in following up this business with vigour.

Upon the second point, viz., the procuration sought for the examination of Marinet's papers—although I should have gone a shorter way to work, and so, I have good reason to believe, would the Minister of Justice, yet, upon reflection, the mode adopted was the preferable mode of proceeding. Here you are to be informed that the proceeding at Bruxelles has been from the commencement a judicial one. All the interrogatories have been taken before the Juge d'Instruction, and all form complete evidence in a court of justice. If the papers

had been opened by summary process, and anything of consequence found among them, it would have been open to the accused to have alleged—and, in a corrupt country, the proof of such allegation might not have been difficult—that such and such particular papers formed no part of his, but were placed among them by his accusers. The procuration obviates such an attempt, and occasions no risk or inconvenience but that of a short delay, as, during the whole time of its being sought, the papers were under seal.

I know not whether with sufficient reason, but it is much regretted here that the inquiry at Paris has not been rendered judicial: it is urged in support of this, that the interrogatory of Cantillon, and all others that have been taken by the Police, are, with reference to any future trial, but so much waste paper; that they cannot be given in evidence; and that Cantillon, Lord K——, Marinet, &c., may deny every word that they have formerly deposed, when interrogated anew in any judicial proceeding.

I had forgot to state that, after our return yesterday from M. de Nagell's, I spoke in strong terms to La Tour du Pin of the conduct of his Government in the issue of such imperfect instructions to him as those under which he had just been acting, and I hope he will express the same to the Duc de Richelieu. While writing the above, I have seen M. de Nagell, who tells me he has received a most favourable answer from the King to his letter, conveying M. de la Tour du Pin's note; that this is now in the hands of the Minister of Justice, and, when returned, he shall frame a note to the French Minister upon it; he, I know, will wait for this, in order to convey a copy of it by this courier, so that M. de Richelieu will put you in possession of its contents.

Adieu! I am afraid you will be tired of reading, I am thoroughly of writing, this letter.

Yours, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 3, 1818.

My dear Lord—Your private letter, with the copy of that marked Private and Confidential, to Lord Cathcart, both bearing date the 27th of March, were received by me early on the morning of the 1st, by messenger Robinson, who was on the same day, at two o'clock, P.M., despatched forward on his way to St. Petersburgh.

In a private conference had yesterday with the King for this purpose, I opened to him the substance of the letter to Lord Cathcart, directing his attention principally to the necessity of considering the means of effectually guarding against the apprehension of any sudden attack from France, in the event of the Occupation armies of the Allies being withdrawn from that country, and under the not improbable supposition of the boiling spirit of French profligacy and disaffection venting itself in war, or being directed for evaporation to the invasion of neighbouring territories.

I requested the King to advert to the state and composition of his military means, the still incomplete state of his fortifications, and begged him to weigh well the consequences of a sudden attack to him particularly, as occupying the honourable but dangerous position of the advanced post of Europe, and the means by which any apprehension from such an attack could be best obviated; stating that he could not be ignorant of the interest which the Prince Regent must necessarily take upon this subject, or of the sincere friendship which dictated this communication; and that I was perfectly sure his Majesty would sensibly feel the same, and be disposed, in the same spirit of confidence in which this communication was made, to make known to his Royal Highness, through his Ambassador at this Court, fully and without reserve, whatever reflections or conclusions might occur to his Majesty thereon.

In short, I went through the whole of what you had taught

me to say in this occasion, cautiously avoiding, however, in the first instance, (as well knowing the King's sentiments upon the subject) the mention of introducing foreign troops into his kingdom. In going over the letter, however, the allusion to a system of the barrier description immediately struck him, and he said that, if this was to bring about the introduction of foreign troops into his garrisons or kingdom, he could never admit it, making use of these words: "Il faut que mes sujets mangent et qu'ils ne soient pas mangés." Certain that the present confirmation of the idea in the King's mind that such was the object in view would work more evil than good, without pretending to observe what was said, I proceeded to the further parts of the letter, and have subsequently, in strict confidence, furnished him with a copy of it. The King took the communication with all the kindness which I could have expected, and assured me he would well consider the matter, with the view to which his attention had been principally directed, and should have pleasure in fully and confidentially communicating his sentiments to the Prince Regent upon it through me.

I fear it will be a difficult matter to bring his Majesty to the admission of foreign troops; but if the proposal should be for the admission of *Prussian* troops, I should hold the object of impossible attainment, with the consent either of the King or of his people. One of three things must, however, be done: either all the nations of Europe must consent to a proportionate and reasonable reduction of their armies; or this King must raise his to a number sufficient to withstand the first efforts of any sudden attack from France; or his Majesty must be brought to the admission of foreign troops for a time, at least, into his territories. How far the first may be practicable it is impossible for me to say. Though something further might perhaps be done upon the second, yet, to the extent pressed by the Duke of Wellington of fifty thousand regular infantry, as a peace establishment, with the finances of this country, and

under the system of voluntary enrolment established in it, I should hold the matter absolutely impossible. Upon the third, if the troops to be proposed should *not* be Prussian, and arrangements shall be made for placing them in reasonable dependence upon the King, though the object would still be most difficult, I should not utterly despair of its accomplishment.

It was at this conference with the King, at which the pending matter of the Slave Trade Treaty was touched upon, as noticed in my despatch of this date, No. 24, the King manifestly seemed embarrassed on the subject, and as if labouring to say something to qualify his former assurances. He did not, however, produce anything further than that constitutional difficulties had been started, which he was bound to consider and avoid, and ended by apologizing for the time which had been occupied, stating that I knew the Dutch well enough to have observed that they were slow in their proceedings, and must therefore excuse it as part of their nature. I cannot, however, say that I am quite easy upon this point, or can well predict the line either the King or his Ministers will now adopt upon it. They certainly appear to me to feel that his Majesty has committed himself upon it; and I hardly think they will again venture to controvert this fact—indeed, Nagell's reluctance to answer my note of the 1st pretty well proves this—but then the details are open to them, and if they are now really averse to enter into this treaty, they may in the negociation so clog these, and raise such difficulties to the adoption by them of any precautionary measures which may be discussed respecting the right of search, as to render assent to the principle nugatory. On Tuesday, I hope to be able to furnish you with more light upon this subject than it is within my power at present to convey.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, April 7, 1818.

My dear Lord—You will receive by this mail a despatch from me respecting the Fisheries, in which I refer to a conversation which I had had upon the subject with Mr. Adams, when I communicated to him the orders which Sir David Milne proposed to give to the ships under his command, in regard to the American vessels found fishing upon our coast during the present season. I have thought it better not to mention in this despatch, but to reserve for a private letter, some part of the conversation which then passed between us, and which was not a little remarkable.

I met Mr. Adams accidentally in the street, and when I told him of the letter which I had received from Sir David Milne, he showed some surprise, but certainly no irritation. In the course, however, of our conversation, which lasted about ten minutes, he said, not with a tone of anger, but with the ordinary tone of earnestness with which he usually speaks upon business, that, after all, "he believed that they should have to fight about it, and that his opinion was, that they ought to do so."

I deprecated in some common-place phrase a resort to such an extremity, when he proceeded to say that, "holding as he did the right of participation in the United States to be unequivocal, undeniable, and absolute, it was a matter only to be settled by agreement or by force; and, all arrangement by assignment of coast being out of the question, he did not see distinctly what proposition of arrangement could be made, which would promise a satisfactory result."

He then said that "we could have no right to seize their ships; that all the lawyers in England with whom he had spoken upon the subject were of that opinion; that our own judge had last year released the vessels which had been captured by the Dee, and that, without an Act of Parliament for

the purpose, they could not be taken; or, if they were taken, the American Government would have a claim upon Great Britain for full indemnity for them."

The more I have reflected upon this conversation, the more extraordinary I have thought it. Mr. Adams is, I presume, much too cautious a man to have suffered himself, in his official situation, to be betrayed by mere temper into the use of such expressions to me. On the other hand, I equally presume that he cannot seriously believe that the point itself is a ground of war for this country; or, even if it were, that this country could now be excited to a war with Great Britain upon a point in which two States at the utmost have any immediate interest whatever. The only explanation which I can conceive of his conversation is either that, being himself of the State of Massachusetts, the only State which is deeply interested in the question, he is anxious to hold a very high tone upon the subject; or that it is the policy of the Government not to let the matter be brought to any arrangement, but to reserve it as a grievance, to be used as it may hereafter be wanted. Whatever may have been the motive which prompted Mr. Adams's expressions, they are, as coming from him, somewhat extraordinary, and it is certainly my duty to report them to your lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c. CHARLES BAGOT.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 7, 1818.

My dear Lord—I received your letter marked Private, of the 4th inst., yesterday. You will see by my despatch of this date, whereabout we are in our negociations on the Slave Trade. The agreement of this King in your views for the establishment of the mixed commission appears to me essential; and the objection of the Minister of Justice, if admitted, would have been absolutely destructive of all our hopes of

concluding a Convention by which the right of search could ever have been rendered efficient.

The matter is not quite so simple a one, to combat any question here, in which a constitutional question may be supposed to be, however remotely, involved, as it would be in England. There the King, Lords, and Commons, are supreme, and can dispose of all questions: but here, to work a change in any principle laid down by the *Loi fondamentale*, the measure for this purpose must be sent to the provincial States. These add a double number of representatives to the second Chamber of the States-General. The measure must be submitted to this body, and receive the assent not of a simple majority, but of a majority consisting of three-fourths of those present; and two-thirds of this double representation are the least which form the quorum.

To have encountered such a process would have been impossible for our Slave Trade Treaty: it therefore became essential that the fallacy of the position of the Minister of Justice should be, in the first instance, clearly demonstrated. This, I hope, (though I cannot yet state absolutely) has been done; and, the constitutional difficulty removed, we shall, as we had before intended, proceed precisely as you have recommended, viz., by concluding our treaty, and submitting the same hereafter to the States-General, for the purpose of obtaining from them the requisite legal enactments.

Nagell has formally renounced the constitutional difficulty opposed to us relative to confiscation, so that we have now only that of the jurisdiction of a mixed commission to struggle with, as alleged to be unconstitutional. In my conversation with M. de Nagell on Saturday, he told me that the King had read with much attention your private letter to Lord Cathcart; that it had made considerable impression upon him; and that he believed it would probably have the effect of inducing him to enter into a contract with the Elector of Hesse for ten thousand additional men. I recommended that the King

should communicate freely through me with my Government, as the Prince Regent had suggested, upon whatever measure he might have it in contemplation to adopt, with the view to the defence of this country. Perhaps it would be well to suggest to me more precisely the wishes of our Government upon this subject, in order that I may endeavour to lead this Court towards them, and to check any measure hostile to their views, as far as I may be able, prior to its taking root. You will much oblige me by losing no time in shortly furnishing me with your instruction on this concluding part of my despatch of this date.

Ever yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, April 17, 1818.

My dear Lord—No answer having reached M. de Nagell from the King to the letter written to his Majesty on Sunday last, I thought it right yesterday to speak in rather strong terms to his Excellency, and to urge an answer by which we might know precisely where we were respecting the proposed treaty for a mutual right of visit. This has produced the result stated in my despatch of this date, marked No. 38.

The King told M. de Nagell that he had laughed very heartily at my paper, and felt fully the weight generally of all the reasoning; but that the provisions, to which, by becoming an acceding party to the arrangements for the Rhine navigation in the Act of Congress, he had already assented, appeared to him totally to overturn the construction which the Minister of Justice had put upon the *Loi fondamentale*, if any regard was to be paid to consistency.

We have at length advanced one step: what difficulties we may hereafter have to encounter it is impossible to foresee, till we shall know with what mind M. Van Maanen shall enter upon the discussion. One thing, with respect to this, is in our

favour, and that is that the party will be much flattered by his employment as a Plenipotentiary; and, as his honour is saved by being overruled upon the principle, he will probably be desirous (perhaps for more reasons than one) of placing his name and seal to any treaty, and especially to one with us.

The latitude question, I fear, will be urged strongly, and therefore request as much *latitude* upon it as you can conveniently give, assuring you that I shall use it with the utmost caution, and (if at all to be admitted) allow of as little exception to the operation of the Treaty as will be consistent with hopes of success in the main object.

M. de Nagell acquainted me confidentially with a circumstance which he rightly said he knew would afford me pleasure, as marking that the Prince of Orange now felt the inconvenience of having admitted (as, when resident at Brussels, he had done) the refugee French into his society, and properly applied to his father for his advice under the disagreeable pressure which he now suffered from his own imprudence. On the late excursion of the King and Prince to that town, General Fagel was directed to meet them there from Paris. The Prince, early after their arrival, took the General aside, and, acknowledging his folly in having associated with such persons, asked him whether, in the late examinations into the attempt made against the Duke of Wellington, his name had transpired; whether in any way he appeared at all implicated or connected with any of the persons apprehended. R. Fagel answered frankly, that his Royal Highness's name had transpired and been used in a manner which had given him very considerable pain. The Prince was much agitated, wept much, accused his own imprudence, and avowed feeling all the discredit of having his name coupled with that of those who had been base enough to conspire against the life of his best friend. He then went immediately to the King, when he acquainted his Majesty with his conversation with General Fagel, reprobated his own conduct, as having given rise to the supposition

of his having been the protector of a set of miserable assassins, and threw himself upon his father for his advice. The result is that he has written to the Duke of Wellington, by R. Fagel, in the same sense, and proposed, as soon as his Grace should return to Cambray, to visit him there, when he shall be able more fully to lay before him the whole of his conduct. I trust this will be a wholesome lesson to the young man, and what he now feels will lead him as well to be more guarded as also to a better selection of his friends in future.

The King and Prince are now the closest friends. The latter has desired to see all the interrogatories in the possession of this Government, and called upon the King this morning to solicit his permission for this purpose, which has been granted, and they are now in his Royal Highness's possession.

Nagell tells me his advices yesterday from Paris contained a report of the King of Portugal's death. You will probably know, before this shall reach you, what faith is to be placed in this rumour. Farewell.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 5, 1818.

My dear Lord—I hope you will approve of our Treaty: it is a better one in substance than, during part of its negociation, I could have expected to obtain. Its redaction, I know, might have been amended; but I was loth to keep the matter open on points of style, and thereby to risk fresh impediments on points of substance.

I again solicit you on the subject of *presents*: either by the means I proposed, or by some other, I conjure you not to lose this opportunity of conciliating Van Maanen, and, at the same time, of keeping Nagell firm to our interests. An exception might well be made to your rule, on the ground of sacrificing to humanity, in all treaties where such a concession is made

as that of a right of visit for the prevention of the traffic in slaves—at all events, when Brougham has declared that this concession was cheaply purchased from Spain by £400,000, you are not likely to be much quarrelled with for a single £1,000 for a snuff-box.

I send you a copy of Lord K——'s Memoire to the French Chamber of Peers. A more thorough pattern of impudent falsehood and Jacobinical mystification has seldom been presented. Even his very Apology is a falsehood; for he no more wrote the French in which this work is composed than I did. A plain, simple statement of the real facts, conveyed in a letter from the Duke of Wellington to M. de Cazes, and by him communicated to the Committee of Petitions, has completely overturned this composition, so worthy of his lordship's signature, and elicited a very proper Report from the Committee to the Chamber. Of this Report, as well as of the Duke's letter, you are probably already possessed, through more direct sources than through me: I would otherwise endeavour to obtain and send them: they were read to me with much exultation by the Minister of Justice here, with whose sentiments they thoroughly coincide.

The Envoy from the United States to this Court is about to return in ill health through England to America, accompanied by his wife. His name is Eustis; he will be much regretted here: his lady, though not handsome, is a very worthy and amiable person. Any kindness you may be enabled to show them in their passage through London will oblige me. They are the only tolerable Yankees I ever knew. Farewell, my dear lord.

Believe me, &c., CLANCARTY.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, May 25, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have little to add to my despatches of this day's date, excepting the expression of my concern at

being obliged to trouble your lordship with my disputes with M. de Pizarro, arising entirely from his ungovernable temper, of which I have frequently had reason to complain. I have of late had no personal communication with him, but shall resume it in consequence of his last note, which I am willing to consider as a sort of apology for the intemperance of his former one.

I have been particular in stating what has passed upon Mr. Macdermott's case, because the royal order for setting Mr. Meale at liberty will probably make some noise in England, and your lordship may possibly not object to stating the sentiments of the Prince Regent's Government upon the whole subject to the Duke of San Carlos, in order that they may be conveyed to M. de Pizarro.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 26, 1818.

My dear Lord—You will receive the ratifications by this conveyance. I wish I could have sent them in a more complete state, by transmitting the Declaration of this Government as to the place of residence of its mixed court of justice along with them. On meeting for the exchange, however, I found this could not be the case. Nothing formal is done here without the previous decree of the King: the King is at Loo, and, by some neglect somewhere, this decree authorizing the Declaration is not yet arrived. Upon the assurance, however, from M. de Nagell that it would be ready before the next mail day; that the Declaration should bear date the 25th instant, the day of the exchange: that the place would be Surinam; and that, if necessary, before its receipt, you might consider and act upon it as such, I thought it better to conclude the business, so as to expedite the despatch of the ratifications of this Court to England, in order that they might arrive sufficiently early to admit of the treaty being laid before Parliament

and acted upon prior to the termination of the session. I was the more led to this course, because the formal Declarations of the places of residence of the courts of justice do not appear to me of a nature necessary to be laid before the Houses.

Under the assurances I have received respecting the delivery to me of this document, I have ventured to state it as forming actually an enclosure to my despatch of this date, No. 50, for the purpose of rendering the whole complete. Of this I should hope you will approve; it can easily be added to that despatch a few days later, upon its receipt in London.

There is nothing of interest to acquaint you with from hence. The Court is at Loo, the Prince at Zoosdyke. The Duke of Wellington has written to express his wish for the renewal of our former weekly communications, which will afford me equal satisfaction, and, I flatter myself, sufficient advantage to the public to warrant the expense of a weekly journey of a messenger between this and Valenciennes.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 29, 1818.

My dear Lord—I send you herewith enclosed the original Declaration of the Netherlands' Plenipotentiaries, declaring Surinam to be the place where the mixed court of justice to be situated in their colonial possessions is to reside. This ought to have formed (and was noticed as having formed) an enclosure in my despatch No. 50, of the 26th instant, which accompanied the ratifications of the treaty lately concluded with this Court for the repression of the Slave Trade; and it bears date the 25th instant, the day of the exchange. I have to request, therefore, that you will have it placed among the records, as having formed an enclosure to the above mentioned despatch.

I have no intelligence to send you from hence, and we are without any recent arrival from England, the mails of Tuesday

last not having yet reached us. The last from London brought us Lord K——'s letter to the Duke of Wellington, than which there has seldom been edited a more flimsy composition. This is unpardonable in the noble lord, because, unfettered as he has shown himself by the real state of facts, he had the field open before him, and might consequently have manufactured a better case for himself. If it was worth while, which I am far from thinking is the case, how easily could the whole of this piece of mystification be overturned!

A judgment has been recently affirmed by the Court of Cassation at Bruxelles, which has afforded great satisfaction to this Court. It was against a lawyer of the name of Douey, who wrote and printed an infamous libel against the King, in the form of a petition of claim for certain demands of M. Crawford, of Rotterdam. He appealed from this to the Court of Cassation; his appeal has been disallowed, and he will pass three years in prison, and be fined three thousand francs, &c., in pursuance of the original judgment.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, June 2, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have not been able to obtain any further information respecting the proceedings of the French officers in the Province of Texas, of which I gave your lordship some account in my despatch No. 38, by the last mail; but the enclosed copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Robertson, the Consul at Philadelphia, contains some intelligence connected with this subject.

I am perfectly aware that there has been some exaggeration in many of the accounts which have been given of the designs and projects of the adherents of the Buonaparte family in this country, but your lordship may be assured that they are not without a large foundation of truth.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Gilbert Robertson to Mr. C. Bagot.

Philadelphia, May 28, 1818.

My dear Sir—It will not have escaped your memory what I had written to you on the 16th of December last, in regard to a schooner that had sailed from this with French passengers for Mobile. A young man who was one of the navigators on board said schooner has returned, and has given me very particular details of the voyage. He states that, while at anchor at Reedy Island the night before they sailed, a boat came alongside, and delivered 60 kegs of gunpowder, and 196 United States' muskets on board. Some misunderstanding had taken place among the passengers, and an Italian, who threatened to divulge their secret, was run through the heart and killed. They took their departure next day, and the muskets, bayonets, canteens, &c., were distributed among the passengers. There was also a quantity of bar-lead put on board to be run into bullets. The voyage was continued until they got into the latitude of Havana, when the command was given to one of the passengers, an Irishman of the name of Stevens. The master and crew were informed that, if they did not acquiesce in this arrangement, and work the vessel as heretofore, they would all be thrown overboard.

The new commander shaped her course for Galveztown, where having arrived, they landed and erected their tents. They found at Galveztown the celebrated Lafitte the pirate, with several prizes taken from the Spaniards; he had with him upwards of 100 men, principally St. Domingo negroes. Rigaud was the commander of the French, and Joimetre his aide. During the stay of my informant, he states that he learnt that this party expected to be joined by various others, who had been collected in the United States for the object, and would, when collected, amount to 10,000 men; that their first object was to make a dash at La Vera Cruz, to plunder that city, by which they would obtain sufficient booty to execute

their grand scheme, which was the release of Bonaparte; that vessels were constructing for them in the United States, of which two were at New York, each to carry thirty-two guns.

From the non-arrival of the reinforcements expected, a good deal of discontent appeared among them, and that several duels had been fought, three of them fatal, and six or seven wounded. Their resources were getting low, and that in order to support themselves, they were selling off their clothes and gold watches. Some of them declared they were inveigled away, and that their view was the settlement in the Alabama country; that the deception practised upon them was abominable, as, in order to deceive them, certain implements of husbandry accompanied them; however, the majority appeared to be well aware of the real intention; that their songs, &c., were all the popular airs of the times of Bonaparte's successful days, and that they hoisted the tri-coloured flag in honour to him.

Allemand (the younger I believe) arrived from New Orleans, and was received and hailed as a superior among them; that he appeared quite disconcerted at the non-appearance of the expected force; and that he has now come to the States to find out the causes of the failure. The foregoing is pretty nearly what has been detailed to me by the young man mentioned above, who is very intelligent.

There can be no doubt as to the intention, corroborated by so many facts as we know: however, it seems to me that the scheme is now frustrated, unless they can rally again by the force of money. Perhaps I may receive some more information through the same channel; if I do, I shall not fail to advise you.

I remain, &c., GILBERT ROBERTSON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 2, 1818.

My dear Lord—In my letter of the 22nd, I acquainted you with Prince Hatzfeldt's intelligence, as communicated to

me, of Teste, Cauchois le Maire, and Guyet being in England, with the view of establishing a periodical publication there, for the edification of the Continent. From subsequent inquiry, I am led to believe that Teste is returned to the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle and Liege, and that Prince Hatzfeldt has been misinformed relative to Cauchois le Maire, who, it should seem, has not been in England at all. I have, however, little doubt of Guyet and Madame Guyet being both there. The latter went over about the same time with Lord K——, and is now there, as I am credibly informed, under his lordship's protection: she is said to have embarked at Ostend. This lady was suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy to assassinate the Duke of Wellington, and was for some time imprisoned at Bruxelles, with a view to examination, but latterly enlarged, on her undertaking to appear when called for: from this she has, however, escaped. Her husband, who does not seem to be over scrupulous, is also, as it is believed, assisted by the noble lord.

The Duke of Wellington writes to me that he received much satisfaction, during his short residence at Bruxelles, from the apparently improved state of the public mind there, which he, and I think justly, attributes principally to three causes: 1stly, the harmony and confidence which at present subsist between the King and Prince; 2ndly, the vigour of those now charged with the maintenance of the police, greatly aided by their discharge of two Jacobinical *commis*, who were formerly *chefs de bureaux*, the one to the Minister of Police, the other to the Civil Governor of Bruxelles; and 3rdly, the strong and persevering efforts made by this Government to discover the parties implicated in the assassination plot and to develop the folds of this mysterious transaction, to which the Duke does ample justice.

Upon this latter subject, the French Minister here seems to entertain no doubt that the evidence now in possession of the French Government is amply sufficient to convict Marinet

and Cantillon. But, in my mind, the apparent amelioration of the public mind in the southern provinces rests principally upon the thorough reconciliation between the King and Prince.

In a former letter, I mentioned to you the good taste with which the Prince had, on his Majesty's last journey thither, proposed to accompany his father to Bruxelles, for the purpose of showing how sincerely they were reconciled. His Royal Highness has latterly sent through me a letter to the Duke of Wellington, the substance of which, as I can learn from his Grace, was to propose a meeting between them, in order that the world should see that they also continued on the most intimate terms; and the Duke has answered this by offering to go to Zoosdyke (a country house where the Prince and Princess now are) at the close of the present month.

M. de Nagell has, some time since, acquainted me with his intention of immediately answering my note on the money question, but his silence on this subject still continues. That they are under considerable embarrassment upon this point I do not doubt. It was their policy to endeavour, during the last session of their States-General, to settle their finances for two years, that is, till the sessions of the States shall be again held here, so as to avoid having any difficult questions of this nature at least to discuss at Bruxelles. Their Budget, therefore, was passed with some difficulty, till the year 1820; and, this demand of payment for arms and clothing furnished in 1814, and to such an amount, coming upon them subsequently to the enactment of their Finance Law, they naturally enough feel embarrassed to discover the mode of disposing of it. They had, as I believe, supposed that, by making an effort to satisfy the £200,000 of money lent, they would thereby have led you to let the subject of indemnification for arms and clothing drop, and thus precluded the necessity of their recurring to their States-General.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 5, 1818.

My dear Lord—The Austrian Envoy, Baron Binder, called upon me yesterday, and stated that he had just received a despatch from Baron Vincent at Paris, respecting the approaching reunion of Sovereigns; that the Russian and Prussian missions here had also received despatches from their respective Ministers at Paris on the same subject; and he asked me whether I had not also received one relative to this matter from Sir Charles Stuart.

Upon my telling him I had not, he then acquainted me with the substance of that received by him. The purport of it is, after announcing the probability of the reunion of certain Sovereigns during the summer, to deprecate its being considered, in any sense, as a Congress; that the meeting is to be confined to the Sovereigns, immediately contracting parties to the treaty of peace with France in November, 1815; and its object will be limited to the consideration, under the 5th Article of that treaty, of the state of France, with a view to the removal or further continuance of the Army of Occupation, and arrangements consequent thereon, without entering into any discussion on other matters, or interfering with the negociations *in esse* at Frankfort or other places.

The despatch therefore recommends this language to be held, especially when conversing with persons in authority under this Government, with a view to prevent its being considered necessary to send accredited Ministers from other Courts than those of the contracting Sovereigns, and particularly from hence, to that meeting. This was the substance of the communication made to me by Baron Binder.

Aware of the wishes of my Government upon this subject, from the despatches which passed through my hands under flying seal, some six or seven weeks since, addressed to Lord Cathcart, I have always acted in conformity with the view

stated by Baron Vincent, by holding it out as my opinion that, though a reunion of the Sovereigns, immediate parties to the Peace of Paris, might possibly occur, such meeting, I was very sure, would be far from assuming the title of a Congress; as its functions, confined probably to the examination stated in the 5th Article of that treaty, would differ much from those which had heretofore acquired that appellation, and which, subsequently to the general settlement at Vienna, could now neither be necessary nor desirable.

I am happy to add that, in all the private conversations I have had with M. de Nagell and others, in any of which the approaching reunion of Sovereigns has been noticed, I have never yet heard the slightest suggestion of a design to accredit any Minister from hence to that meeting.

The packet of Tuesday has just arrived. I will formally acknowledge the receipt of the despatch conveyed by it by the next mail.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

PS. The King, as we hear, has had a regular fit of the gout at Loo.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, June 6, 1818.

My dear Lord—Since my letter of the date of the 2nd of June, I have ascertained indirectly that M. Gallatin is the person who has been selected by the President to act as joint Plenipotentiary with Mr. Rush in the proposed negociation.

I have the honour to be, &c. CHARLES BAGOT.

The Chevalier Guerreiro to Lord Castlereagh.

South Audley Street, ce 8 Juin, 1818.

Mylord—J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Palmella pour votre Excellence. J'ai celui en même tems d'ajouter que les réponses que l'on avait demandées à Lisbonne, relativement aux relations que le Baron

d'Eben pourrait avoir eu ici, sont arrivées, et qu'il résulte de la confession verbale faite par le susdit Baron qu'il a envoyé à l'illustre personnage dont il a été question une copie d'une proclamation révolutionnaire qui a été trouvée entre ses papiers.

Je profite de cette occasion pour présenter à votre Excellence l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

Le Chevalier GUERREIRO.

[Enclosure.]

Count Palmella to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, ce 3 Juin, 1818.

Mylord—J'ose profiter aujourd'hui de la permission que vous avez bien voulu m'accorder de vous écrire, parceque la négociation dont je suis chargé par devant les Plénipotentiaires des Cours médiatrices me parait presque parvenue au point décisif, et que l'appui de votre Cabinet devient à ce que je crois indispensable pour qu'elle puisse se terminer d'une manière satisfaisante.

A mon arrivée ici j'ai trouvé que le Duc de Fernan-Nuñez venait d'adresser à la Conférence une nouvelle Note (datée du 23 Mai) que vous avez sans doute déjà vue, Mylord, et qui n'avance aucun argument nouveau, et place la question à peu près sur le même terrain qu'elle était lorsqu'on l'a entamée. Je n'y ai pas encore répondu parceque sur ces entrefaites je suis tombé malade; mais, sans doute, la réponse que j'y ferai ne pourra pas non plus avancer grande chose: car, excepté le point du *sub spe rati*, sur lequel je ne m'obstinerai pas, si les autres conditions me paraissaient convenables—excepté ce point-là, dis-je—j'ai été, dans les propositions contenues dans mes précédentes Notes, *aussi loin que je puis aller* sans trahir l'idée que je me fais de mon devoir, les intérêts et la sûreté du Brésil, et la confiance que le Roi mon maître a daigné reposer en moi.

Il parait que Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires médiateurs ont

porté sur la dernière Note du Plénipotentiaire Espagnol à peu près le même jugement que moi, et qu'ils ont pensé que, pour amener la négociation à un dénouement, il fallait mettre un terme à cette inutile échange des Notes, et proposer eux-mêmes le projet d'un arrangement final. À cet effet Sir Charles Stuart a rédigé deux cannevas de Conventions (que je n'ai point vu, mais dont on m'a appris la substance) une de ces Conventions devant comprendre tout ce qui a rapport à la remise de Montevideo, avantages à accorder à ses habitants, relations de neutralité à maintenir envers Buenos Ayres; et l'autre à l'arrangement de limites ou cession de territoire que nous demandons, restitution d'Olivença, arrangement mutuel des liquidations; et vous sçavez, Mylord, beaucoup plus exactement que moi ce qui s'est passé à la Conférence où ces deux projets ont été présentés. Quelques uns des Plénipotentiaires ont avancé, à ce qu'il parait, des difficultés sur l'article qui concernerait la neutralité du Brésil dans la guerre entre l'Espagne et ses colonies, aussi que sur l'idée de la remise de la place de Montevideo, par l'intermédiaire de commissaires des Puissances médiatrices. Certainement les objections à ces deux articles, si elles venaient de la part de l'Espagne, indiqueraient évidemment l'idée, que beaucoup de monde lui suppose, de n'avoir pour but principal dans la chaleur avec laquelle elle poussait cette affaire, que celui de nous compromettre dans une guerre contre Buenos Ayres!

Mais la difficulté la plus sérieuse que ces mêmes Plénipotentiaires ont rencontrée dans le projet de Convention consiste dans la cession de Maldonado qui devrait être comprise dans la nouvelle ligne de limites à tracer sur la rive gauche de la Plata. Ce point devient donc le plus essentiel, ou, pour mieux dire, le point décisif de la négociation; car, de mon côté, je ne crois pouvoir venir à aucun arrangement définitif pour la restitution immédiate de Montevideo, à moins que l'on ne nous accorde une ligne de frontière où nos troupes puissent s'établir et garantir dans la crise actuelle la sûreté du royaume du Brésil.

Permettez moi, donc, Mylord, de vous soumettre, nommément sur cette question, quelques observations qui pourront servir à l'éclaircir.—La sûreté du royaume du Brésil a été depuis le commencement de la question le principal objet que j'ai du avoir en vue, et que j'ai toujours mis en avant. Pour garantir la sûreté de ce royaume, l'occupation de Montevideo jusqu'à la pacification de Buenos Ayres me paraissait indispensable, et j'avoue que les arguments qu'on a opposés aux miens sur cette partie de la question ne m'ont jamais paru convainquants. Cependant la nécessité que l'Espagne alléguait avoir de Montevideo, pour entreprendre une expédition quelconque contre Buenos Ayres, et surtout le désir de condescendre, autant qu'il dépendrait de moi à l'opinion énoncée par les Puissances médiatrices, m'ont engagé à renoncer à cette base de négociation que ma Cour m'avait préscrite; mais vous sçavez, Mylord, que je ne l'ai pu faire que *conditionnellement*, et en y substituant d'autres conditions qui, quoique moins propres à garantir la sûreté du Brésil, pourraient, au moins en quelque sorte remplacer, jusqu'à un certain dégré, l'occupation de Montevideo. Or, de toutes les conditions, la cession du petit port de Maldonado à l'embouchure de la Plata est la seule qui me parait importante pour nous, et *c'est la seule* que l'on prétend nous refuser! De manière que nous aurions cédé le premier principe de la négociation, qui est celui *de garantir la sûreté* de la frontière du Brésil.

Il n'est pas douteux que, dans l'état où se trouvent les affaires dans ce pays là, nous ne pouvons remettre Montevideo à l'Espagne, sans qu'un corps de troupes Portugaises demeure stationné, comme en observation, dans le voisinage.

Le Cabinet de Madrid a même plus d'une fois avoué cette nécessité; or, il suffit de jeter les yeux sur la carte du pays, pour s'assurer que lorsque les troupes Portugaises auront évacué Montevideo, si elles doivent occuper une ligne militaire d'observation, il faut absolument que cette ligne comprenne le port de Maldonado, le seul par où ils pourront recevoir des

provisions et des munitions; car la communication par l'intérieur avec les provinces habitées du Brésil ne peut absolument pas fourni des ressources suffisantes. L'inspection de la carte de ce pays-là prouvera en outre évidemment que s'il s'agit de tracer une ligne de limites naturelles entre les possessions Portugaises et Espagnoles, la chaine de montagnes qui commence à Maldonado est la seule indiquée par la configuration du terrain.

On pourra, il est vrai, sans détruire tous les arguments que je viens d'avancer, nous dire que les troupes Portugaises n'ont qu'à occuper *temporairement Maldonado* et que cela nous procurera les mêmes avantages que si nous en obtenions la cession permanente. À cela je réponderai—1°, que l'occupation temporaire ne nous donnera pas la facilité de construire des fortifications et de prendre enfin toutes les mesures couteuses et permanentes de défense que les intérêts du Brésil pourraient exiger —2°., que cette occupation temporaire au moment où nous remettrions Montevideo aux Espagnols nous compromettrait davantage avec les insurgés, et pourrait être interprétée par eux comme un appui prêté aux Espagnols, et comme une réserve destinée à servir de seconde ligne à leurs opérations— 3°, que dans le cas où l'expédition Espagnole aurait une mauvaise réussite, les troupes Portugaises se trouveraient peut-être dans le cas de devoir céder aux insurgés le territoire qu'ils n'occuperaient que temporairement; au lieu qu'elles seraient pleinement en droit de s'y maintenir, si ce territoire leur avait été complètement cédé—4°, que nous avons le droit de réclamer une indemnisation pour les frais et les difficultés d'une expédition que l'Espagne, il est vrai, ne nous a pas demandé d'entreprendre, mais que les circonstances les plus urgentes exigeaient, et dont l'Espagne, au bout du compte, retirera tout l'avantage; sans en encourir la dépense ni les dangers—5°, qu'il faut prendre aussi en considération la différence de l'importance relative de cette ligne de frontière que nous demandons. L'Espagne ne peut mettre à la conserver qu'une espèce de

point d'honneur qui peut céder sans honte et sans inconvénient à tous les motifs que je viens d'alléguer; au lieu que, pour le Brésil, l'avantage de l'acquisition d'une ligne militaire de frontière de ce côté-là est incalculable, et même, peut-on dire, indispensable, dans l'état actuel des affaires de cette partie de l'Amérique—6°, j'ajouterai encore qu'il existe depuis le Traité de 1777 entre l'Espagne et le Portugal toujours des disputes sur l'arrangement des limites de cette partie de l'Amérique; or, si cette dispute doit se terminer une fois pour toutes, le seul moyen sincère d'y parvenir est de nous accorder une ligne de limites naturelles dont nous puissions être satisfaits, et qui ne donne plus lieu, de part ni d'autre, à l'avenir à de nouveaux empiètements.

Pour me résumer, Mylord, je dirai que la sûreté du Brésil devant toujours être mon premier objet, ce n'est que conditionnellement que j'ai renoncé au principe d'occuper Montevideo jusqu'à la pacification de Buenos Ayres. J'y ai substitué, comme un moyen peut-être suffisant, quoique moins efficace, la cession d'une ligne de limites, dont l'extremité devait s'appuyer sur le port et les montagnes de Maldonado. Je crois avoir suffisamment prouvé que l'occupation de cette ligne de défense ne peut nous convenir, si nous ne l'obtenons que temporairement; et il me semble que je puis d'après ces principes poser l'alternative suivante: *que l'Espagne nous laisse occuper Montevideo jusqu'à la paix; à cette époque là nous le lui rendrons, sans demander autre sacrifice de territoire:* si, au contraire, elle veut absolument la possession immédiate de Montevideo, et qu'elle nous force, par conséquent, à nous dessaisir de la garantie la plus sûre que nous puissions avoir pour la sûreté du Brésil, dans ce cas là *qu'elle nous céde une ligne militaire de défense, et qu'elle paye de cette manière le service que nous lui rendrons.* En un mot, si l'occupation de notre ligne de défense ne doit être que temporaire, nous pouvons demander de conserver Montevideo à ce même titre; si, au contraire, on nous fait une cession permanente, cet avantage pourra

compenser en partie les inconvénients qui autrement resulteraient pour nous de la remise de Montevideo aux Espagnols.

Excusez, Mylord, l'étendue que je me vois forcé de donner à toutes ces explications. La chose est pour nous de telle importance que je crois de mon devoir de donner le plus de développement possible à tous les raisonnements. Il me semble qui si le Cabinet de Madrid a un désir sincère de terminer cette affaire il ne se refusera pas au leger sacrifice que nous demandons d'une concession fort importante pour nous et presqu'indifferente pour lui. Si cependant il s'y refuse, les Puissances médiatrices seront pleinement autorisées à croire que le véritable but de ce Cabinet soit de tenir avec le Portugal une querelle ouverte pour en profiter selon les occurrences. J'offre cette conjecture à votre méditation, Mylord, et je suis fâché de dire que les nouvelles les plus récentes que j'ai reçues des dispositions de M. de Pizarro n'y laissent pas d'y ajouter du poids; car il parait que ce Ministre prend un ton plus hautain et devient plus difficile à contenter à mesure que j'ai montré de mon côté plus de condescendance et de désir de determiner la discussion d'une maniere conciliante.

Quels que soient les projets cependant que le Cabinet Espagnol pourrait nourrir à l'égard du Portugal, il est plus que probable qu'il ne trouverait pas à les exécuter les facilités qu'il suppose peut-être; et, de mon côté, cette crainte ne me déciderait jamais à signer un traité que ma conscience me montrerait comme désavantageux, et à consentir à l'évacuation de Montevideo, sans aucune espèce d'indemnisation, et un laissant la frontière du Brésil exposée au renouvellement des mêmes vexations et des mêmes dangers qui ont déjà forcé deux fois à entreprendre à grands frais des expéditions toujours plus ou moins dangereuses.

Songez, Mylord, sous quels funestes auspices j'irais me présenter pour prendre sur moi la responsabilité du Ministère des affaires étrangères après avoir signé en Europe un traité honteux et désavantageux pour le Brésil! Veuillez, je vous en

prie, m'épargner par votre puissante intervention une telle douleur, et soyez bien persuadé que le Ministre Espagnol, malgré ses idées exagérées et malgré ses bravades, ne resistera pas à l'opinion énoncée par les Puissances médiatrices, si elles employent à cette occasion le ton ferme et décisif qui convient.

Daignez agréer, Mylord, l'assurance de mes hommages, et de la parfaite considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

PALMELLA.

Sir H. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, June 21, 1818.

My dear Lord—I have not thought it right to state in an official despatch all that has passed between me and M. de Pizarro, relative to the Portuguese negociation. At the same time, in order that your lordship may be enabled to judge of the probable determination of this Court, it is necessary that you should be apprized of the sentiments and language of the Spanish Minister upon the receipt of the last communications from Paris.

In speaking of the conduct of the Conference, he said that, after the turn which the negociation had taken, he should not require of them to act in a manner consistent with the dignity of their respective Sovereigns; all that he should insist upon (after an acknowledgment that their mediation had failed of success) was that the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal should be left to themselves to settle their differences.

Adverting, then, to the policy of the Prince Regent's Ministers, he said that some of them had been deceived by Count Palmella, but that the proceedings at Paris were much disapproved by others; and that, as to the Duke of Wellington, he was in circumstances which often compelled him to act contrary to his judgment. I replied that, from whatever quarter he received his information with respect to his Majesty's Government, he was grossly deceived; that I could

not allow, even in a confidential conversation, his observation with respect to the Duke of Wellington to pass without serious notice—that the Duke of Wellington had, neither in this nor in any other case, acted contrary to his judgment—that, if the demands of Spain were deemed inadmissible by Portugal, it was the duty of a mediator to endeavour, as the Duke of Wellington had done, to bring matters to an accommodation by mutual concession—that if, however, the Spanish Government were dissatisfied with the conduct of the Duke of Wellington, I would engage for his abstaining in future from taking any concern in their affairs. This drew a sort of explanation from M. de Pizarro, to the purport that he had expressed his sentiments to me in confidence; but that what he had stated was not to be considered as reflecting upon the conduct of any of the persons alluded to. In the course of the conversation, he insinuated that there had been an intrigue here and at Paris for the purpose of removing him from office, which had failed. I do not state all this with a view of recommending that any step should be taken in consequence; but your lordship will easily understand how difficult it is, even in the most ordinary transactions, to deal with a Minister of a temper so hasty and unguarded.

With respect to a connexion between Spain and Russia, as adverted to in Sir Charles Stuart's despatch to your lordship of the 11th May, I have frequently apprised your lordship of its unpopularity in the country. The state of the squadron has contributed to increase this feeling, and the disappointment of the hopes arising from the promises of Russia has completely opened the eyes of this Government as to the little to be expected from that Court. M. de Tatischeff's conferences with the King are less frequent than formerly; and, although his Majesty's behaviour in public is the same, it is easy to perceive that his influence is on the decline. For some time after his return from Cadiz, he appeared to be less intimate than usual with M. de Pizarro; but of late their

conferences have been more frequent; and I should rather judge that M. de Pizarro is of opinion that the Russian Minister has still sufficient influence with the King to make his friendship worth preserving.

It is difficult to believe that M. de Pizarro was entirely ignorant of the negociation which terminated in the purchase of the Russian squadron, although I have reason to believe that it was not carried on in his office. It is certain, however, that, in September last, when the Russian Minister went to the Escurial to announce the sailing of the squadron from Revel, M. de Pizarro approved the purchase, and took upon himself to announce it to the *corps diplomatique*, insisting that the Russian Minister should proceed to Cadiz, without communicating the motive of his journey to his colleagues. He afterwards spoke of the acquisition of this squadron as being highly advantageous to Spain.

In justice to M. de Tatischeff, I cannot but add that he is using every effort to induce this Government to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation with Portugal. He has to-day had a conference with M. de Pizarro upon the subject, and, as the resolutions of this Government are not always to be depended upon, it is not impossible that he may have had better success to-day than I had last night. I asked M. de Pizarro last night whether the negociations between Spain and the United States of America had been removed to Madrid, and he assured me that they had not.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

I omitted to mention that M. Garay and M. de Tatischeff are upon bad terms, and I have no doubt that each would do everything in his power to destroy the influence of the other.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 23, 1818.

My dear Lord—Finding no answer yet returned to my official Note of the 7th of May, relative to the appointment of

a Commissary on each side for the adjustment of the account for arms and clothing furnished by Great Britain to this country in 1814, I have thought it necessary again to mention the subject to M. de Nagell, who tells me that an official answer shall be sent me at an early date upon this subject.

I can easily conceive that this matter has considerably embarrassed them; 1stly, because they had nursed the idea that these stores were advanced as a contribution by Great Britain to the common cause; and 2ndly, from the circumstance of their Budget accounts for this and the next year having been passed, and the States-General actually prorogued prior to my having received final orders to press this matter. I cannot, from any conversation with M. de Nagell or others, form a guess at what the nature of the official answer under the above circumstances is likely to prove. We must therefore wait its receipt.

A determination has been taken in the Prince's family, which, though it would perhaps be too much to say it, had reopened the breach so recently closed between him and his father, has nevertheless very much discomposed the King. All things had been settled for the Princess's *accouchement* here at the beginning of the ensuing month, when his Majesty had arranged that the whole Court should reassemble at this residence. Besides the propriety, if not necessity, of the presence of several of the branches of the royal family, and perhaps of others, on an event of this nature, at the christening and other ceremonies, it was hoped that the birth of one of his children at the Hague, and the advantage which the place itself would derive from the reunion of so many people, for a second portion of a year, would counteract the unpopularity which his Royal Highness's ill-concealed dislike to this residence had occasioned among its inhabitants and those of its neighbourhood.

The Princess has, however, resolved to lie-in at Zoosdyke, a country place of his Royal Highness's beyond Utrecht, where,

though I understand the house is excellent for the Prince's family, there would be little accommodation for that of the King in addition to it; and where a small village, as it is stated to me, would afford but feeble aid for anything like the comfortable disposal of those who may be obliged to give attendance at the birth, christening, &c., of the child. Nevertheless, the Princess's determination is fixed, though it is far from being yet determined how his Majesty and the Queen are to be present on this occasion, or even whether they are to be present at all.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires here has presented an official note, which is probably circular to all the Ministers of that Government at foreign Courts, notifying that all foreigners taken in arms against their authority in their provinces in South America will be treated as native rebels.

M. de Nagell has written to M. the Baron de Fagel to know whether a similar note has not been passed by the Spanish Ambassador in London addressed to you, and what the nature of the answer given by you has been, with a view of following the same course. This has been done by direction of the King, not from any doubt of the right of the King of Spain, or from any desire to controvert it, but with a view of following the example you may adopt in notifying this determination to the subjects of Great Britain in giving similar notice thereof to the subjects of this country. I should hope you will therefore acquaint Fagel with your mode of proceeding in this matter, in order that this Government may adopt the same.

Ever yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Sir H. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, June 25, 1818.

My dear Lord—I write a few lines to say that, since my private letter to your lordship of the 21st instant, I have learnt from M. Tatischeff that his endeavours to prevail upon

M. de Pizarro to accede to Count Palmella's last proposals were not more successful than mine.

I understand, likewise, that the King has expressed his determination not to agree even to a temporary cession of territory.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Mr. C. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, June 29, 1818.

My dear Lord—A few days ago, I had a conversation with Mr. Adams, which arose quite accidentally, upon the subject of the affairs of South America. Mr. Adams had received intelligence of the victory gained by San Martin over the royal arms in Chili, and which he seemed to consider as fatal to the royal cause in that province. This event led him into a discussion of some length upon the whole question of the independence of the Spanish American provinces, and the measures likely to be taken by the European Powers in relation to that great contest.

In the course of his conversation, he said, rather in a tone of complaint, that he had been much disappointed at not having received from your lordship the communication which he had been encouraged to expect, of the course which the British Government proposed to take in this business; at the same time repeating to me that it was the earnest wish of the United States to proceed with them *pari passu*, and, if possible, in the closest concert. He seemed to say that the time was fast approaching when the American Government could no longer avoid taking some positive line, and that, in the meanwhile, they were forced to collect piecemeal, and, as they could, a knowledge of the policy of the European Powers, although it was by that that they wished to regulate their own.

I ventured to assure Mr. Adams that your lordship had by no means forgotten to make the communication to which he

alluded, and that it had only been delayed by a desire to make it as perfect as possible. Mr. Adams then said that he had already obtained from different quarters some documents which had a very important relation to the question, and which were in themselves of considerable interest to him; and he mentioned a note to your lordship from Mr. Rivadavia, the Deputy in London from the United Provinces of La Plata, and the answer sent from St. Petersburgh to a note addressed by your lordship upon the subject to the Court of Russia, of both which papers he was in possession of copies.

Mr. Adams appears to be of opinion that, in the state to which the matter is now brought, no interference of the European Powers will be attended with a favourable result which does not urge upon the Court of Spain the propriety of giving, in the first instance, unconditional independence to the colonies of the southern continent of America; and I believe that he has written in this sense both to M. Gallatin and to Mr. Rush: but your lordship is no doubt perfectly acquainted with all his sentiments upon this subject; and the only object of this letter is to mention that I think I observe some soreness on his part in not having yet received the communication which he professes to expect with so much anxiety.

The Commissioners from this Government to South America are expected to return here in the course of a week or ten days. The Congress frigate was to leave Buenos Ayres early in May.

I have the honour to be, &c., CHARLES BAGOT.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, July 7, 1818.

My dear Lord—There has been some sensation created among the Government here, in consequence of the receipt of intelligence from Surinam and Curaçoa of the capture of certain of their ships by those of the insurgents in South America, under what is styled the independent flag; and this is

not the less felt from the difficulty in which they find themselves of the course which it would be best for them to pursue on this occasion.

The captures thus made by the insurgents are looked upon, and naturally, as a speculation with a double aspect: on the one hand, if no notice shall be taken of spoliations of this sort, the captors derive advantage to the amount of the value seized, subject to little inconvenience or expense to themselves; on the other, if remonstrance shall be made, such remonstrance is, in effect, a kind of acknowledgment of their power.

Note, the Government here are not inclined either to submit to this plunder of their subjects, or being thus compelled to the acknowledgment of a Power unacknowledged by the other States of Europe, and which would place this kingdom in a state of opposition with that of Spain; while they are, at the same time, considerably disinclined to pursue the insurgents as pirates at sea, and thus expose themselves to all the horrors and inconvenience of such a state of warfare.

I have been spoken to by Nagell upon this subject, with the professed view of learning and subsequently adapting their course to that which we may pursue on this matter; and, as I was unable to afford him the information he required, I think it probable that a private instruction will go by this post to their Ambassador in London, suggesting the likelihood of similar captures having been made of British ships by the South American insurgents, and with directions to learn from you the line which the Government of Great Britain may conceive it for her interest to adopt to avert the repetition of this sort of plunder, in order that this Government may follow the same course.

The King is to be here on the 10th instant: his stay will probably not be for many days, as it seems to be finally decided that the Princess is to lie-in at Zoosdyke. It is believed, therefore, that he will return to the Loo till the christening,

about the middle of August. His stay at the Hague is not even then likely to be prolonged many days beyond his birth-day, on the 25th of that month; after which, as was the case last year, the corps diplomatique will, in all probability, be acquainted with his Majesty's wishes that they should act according to their own good pleasure till the second Monday in October, when the session of the States-General will be opened at Bruxelles. Farewell.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, July 10, 1818.

My dear Lord—The King, Queen, &c., arrived here the day before yesterday. The Queen goes to Zoosdyke on Saturday, there to remain till after the Princess's delivery. She then returns here, where, as now settled, his Majesty means to remain till the christening; and then the royal family will return to the Loo, where it is supposed she will continue some time, notwithstanding the occurrence of the King's birthday on the 25th of August.

You will recollect the Paper delivered to me by the King, on his view of the measures to be taken in the event of the evacuation of France by the Allied troops, a copy of which I sent you in my private letter of the 28th of April last. You are aware that no further proceeding has or could have been taken by me in consequence of this communication of the King's opinions on this subject. If those of our Government are similar to those of his Majesty, things will properly rest as they are; but, if the line of policy which the Prince Regent's Council are likely to adopt should differ from that preferred by this Court, I should take the liberty of suggesting the propriety of affording to me the means by which I may be enabled to endeavour, at least, to draw this King's mind to our view of this subject, at an early period. You know the soil, that it is not always easy, sometimes requiring much con-

tinued cultivation, and the difficulty there may be, if opinions are suffered to take strong root within it, of afterwards eradicating them. Enough of this—and, happily for you, I have nothing more to trouble you with.

Ever, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, July 17, 1818.

My dear Lord—My despatches by the last and present mail will put you in possession of the official state of the case upon the Bouillon indemnities. But there is more, and, unless I am grossly deceived, much more, in this case than has been intended by Prince Charles de Rohan to meet the eye. From the first, he has been taken up by the Austrian Minister here, has latterly been seconded by that of Prussia at this Court; and these are now strongly aided by the Ministers of the same Courts at Paris.

It may not now be necessary, or even perhaps proper, to refer to the manner in which this Prince, with what it is conceived by many was far from a clear title, was favoured by the award of the Commissioners at Leipsic. But in the negociations which followed at Bruxelles, during the last year, on the amount and nature of the indemnities, it was impossible to be blind to the arts actively used, to gain and confirm proselytes in his favour, on the part of the Prince de Rohan. I have reason to know that an attempt at bribery was made, and this in the highest quarter, viz., on M. de Nagell himself, by those who, though not direct agents of Prince Charles, made use both of his name and that of M. de Fitte, his negociator, as the persons from whom the remuneration was to proceed.

It is also to be observed that, if the information which has reached me is correct, and I see no reason to doubt it, this M. de Fitte is to be paid for his agency by no less a reward than twenty-five per cent. upon what shall be recovered—a proportion obviously far too great for the remuneration of any fair

man in a fair transaction, and which, in a case (as this is) of very little difficulty, or completely under the Act of Congress, would, if there were none other, give strong grounds for legitimate suspicion that it was intended by other means to seek for much more, on the score of indemnity, than was contemplated by the Treaty of Vienna, under the most liberal construction of its 69th Article, or could be warranted by the rules of justice and equity. I mention these circumstances to show the necessity of care in the selection of the arbitrator, and that, unless the reference shall be placed beyond the reach of intrigue and improper attempts, an equitable result is more than doubtful.

This Prince Charles de Rohan and his family are entitled to a liberal calculation of all the indemnities reserved to them under the Act of Congress, and, in the event of doubtful construction, as the weaker party, a favourable decision should incline rather to his than to the opposite side. To this extent, this Court aver that, pending the negociations, they uniformly showed their disposition, and would be still inclined to go; but beyond it they state themselves to be unable to travel, consistently with their duty towards their own people.

M. de la Tour du Pin mentioned to me, the other day, the wish of his (the French) Court that, upon the evacuation of France by the Allies, our troops should retire upon, march through, and embark at a port in the Netherlands, instead of passing through and embarking at a French port.

We hourly expect the account of the Princess of Orange's delivery from Zoosdyke.

Ever, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, July 21, 1818.

My dear Lord—Having mentioned, in a private letter to the Duke of Wellington, the fact of the French Minister here having in private conversation mentioned to me the wish of

his Court that our army, upon the evacuation of France, should retire upon the Netherlands, march through, and embark from a port in this kingdom, I felt some surprise in learning from his Grace, by a private letter received from him on Sunday, that he was utterly unacquainted with the existence of any desire on the part of the French Government of the nature announced.

I have, consequently, since the receipt of the Duke's letter, made it my business, without giving the matter more importance than it deserved, to investigate the grounds and motives under which M. de la Tour du Pin was induced to make this statement to me, and now find that, when he addressed me, he was not, in fact, aware, nor has he since had any reason to suppose, that such wish existed on the part of his Court. His object seems to have been, however awkwardly and ineffectually attempted, to gain information whether certain rumours afloat here of the design of the Allies after the evacuation to form a cordon of troops on the French frontier were or were not founded.

From a recent conversation with M. de Nagell, I learn that, immediately before La Tour du Pin spoke to me upon the above subject, he had directly put the question to him as to his knowledge of the truth or fallacy of these rumours, and receiving no answer, (as, in truth, none could be given) thought perhaps that, by an indirect approach, he could possibly gain from me the information he sought, and, therefore, as a commencement, stated that as the wish of his Government which has already been communicated to you. No answer having been given to this statement of the French Minister, except that I was unaware of the fact he alleged, there the conversation dropped; and I now conceive it to have been commenced with no other view than that of pumping for information.

It seems, however, somewhat extraordinary that any Minister, though in private conversation, should have presumed to allege any matter as the wish of his Court, without some inti-

mation thereof; and perhaps you may therefore think it still worthy to be kept in mind, for the purpose of considering how any proposal of this sort should be met, in the event of its being in future brought forward.

I have no intelligence to send you hence by this conveyance, except that our expectation still continues of the event of the Princess's delivery.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, July 24, 1818.

My Lord—The King has again had occasion to act upon the opinion of all his Ministers here, that he possesses the full power under the Constitution to send away obnoxious aliens, and has recently issued orders, directing that two persons, named Le Jeune and Armand d'Olfus, Frenchmen, editors of a Jacobin paper at Ghent, should leave the kingdom. It is said that Armand had gone hence prior to the issue of his Majesty's order, and, as the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires (the Envoy Prince Hatzfeldt being absent) asserts, had proceeded to England, under what name and with what passports does not appear.

The same gentleman also states—though it seems extraordinary, if such is the fact, that it should not have been earlier discovered—that the name Armand d'Olfus is merely a *nom de guerre*, and that the person who, during his residence here, was designated by it, is in effect Bory St. Vincent, who, you will recollect, is one of the individuals named in the second list or article of the King of France's ordonnance of 24 July, 1815.

No accounts have yet reached the Hague of the delivery of the Princess of Orange.

Ever, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Mr. Bagot to Lord Castlereagh.

Washington, July 27, 1818.

My dear Lord—I do not know how I can sufficiently thank you for your great kindness and consideration in sending me out the leave of absence which I received by the last mail. Perhaps the very circumstance of knowing that I am in possession of it has already made me feel that I need not use it; and certainly, in the actual state of the public business, and after the gratifying expressions contained in your lordship's despatch, nothing but an absolute necessity will induce me to do so.

I hope, and indeed I fully believe, that there is nothing at present in the state of my health which is likely to create such a necessity. It has certainly been somewhat shaken, and I have suffered by the heats of this climate, but less so, I think, during the present summer (though it is much the hottest which we have had) than in those of 1816 and 1817. Before another arrives, I may perhaps hope that most of the principal points now in discussion between the two Governments will have taken some shape. In that case, I certainly should be glad to avail myself of the leave with which I am furnished, and to return to England after the next session (which is the last of the present Congress) is concluded, and before the heats of another year are set in. If, however, at that time, anything should have arisen which may lead me to think that your lordship might still wish that I should be at my post, you may be assured that I shall not quit it: but, if there should not, I will then, with your lordship's permission, gladly avail myself of his Royal Highness's leave, and seek, in the course of the spring, the benefit of a temperate climate and English air.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES BAGOT.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, August 4, 1818.

My dear Lord—By the accounts received here from Baden, it is stated that the Grand Duke, though not, perhaps, about immediately to die, is nevertheless in such a state of decay as to render his recovery most improbable. How the death of this Prince would operate upon the pending negociations for cessions to Bavaria, you are a far better judge than I can be. As he has no son, the succession will, under present circumstances, go to an unmarried uncle, the Margrave Louis, fifty-five years old, who may therefore marry and have children. Should he die without male issue, the duchy falls upon the Hochberg branch; and the event upon which the Austrian pretension to the reversion depends would occur; and to this branch, as I noticed to you from Frankfort, it was universally believed that the Emperor of Russia had sent assurances of his protection: though, whether these extended to more than the general succession, or referred both to this and to the reversions, I am unable to say.

Sincerely trusting that your reunion at Aix may have the effect of eliciting such instructions from all parts to Frankfort as may at length accomplish the final arrangement of the negociation so long pending there, I have thought it might be acceptable to you to have such circumstances stated and recalled to your recollection, as may occur to me on this subject.

I understand from Brussels that Lord Kinnaird has left that place for Vienna. I should doubt his being suffered to remain there, and still more his being allowed to proceed to and pass the winter in Italy, as he projected.

The Minister of Justice acquaints me that all the original papers and proceedings in the possession of this Government, upon the affair of Marinet and Cantillon, have been written for from Paris; that, previous to their being sent, he has gone through the whole of them, and is of opinion that there is ample evidence to convict, if the disposition to prosecute is

sincere. Upon this M. de la Tour du Pin acquaints me that he has been informed by the Duc de Richelieu that they only waited for the papers hence expected to commence proceedings.

One of the Duke of Wellington's late letters to me having thrown some doubt on the intention of the French Government to proceed, in consequence of their want of sufficient evidence, I have thought it expedient to mention the above circumstances; and, as the Duke is now in England, to spare him the trouble of reading, and myself perhaps that of writing, an additional letter for the purpose, I shall beg of you to acquaint him with them.

The Princess's delivery having now taken place, it is said the christening will be fixed for the 24th, the King's birthday; if so, I shall probably be able to meet and receive you at Bruxelles, but we shall know how this fact stands with greater certainty.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, August 11, 1818.

My dear Lord—The King was at Haarlem from Thursday morning to Saturday evening last; and this has somewhat retarded the progress of the instruction to General Fagel on the Bouillon affair.

My despatches will have acquainted you in what state this business now stands, and that it will probably be referred directly by this to the several Courts, which, I should hope, will agree in having it placed in a fair train of final and equitable arrangement.

It seems his Majesty is not well pleased with the Prince of Orange for not having made any disposition to visit him here, since the birth of the young Prince; nevertheless, when he set out for Haarlem, on Thursday, he had some intention of proceeding himself to Zoosdyke, to see his Royal Highness and the Princess, and his grandchild. He, however, thought

otherwise of it, and returned without doing so. The fact is, there have been of late some bickerings between his Majesty and his Royal Highness, in a correspondence lately carried on between them. You are already aware that the Prince's name had transpired, and not very pleasantly, in the investigation of the affair of the conspiracy against the Duke of Wellington; this has weighed much upon his Royal Highness's mind, and one of the principal objects which induced him, late in May last, to offer to go to see the Duke at Cambray, was the effect which his thus appearing on intimate terms with the Duke would have in weakening at least, if not in effacing, any unpleasant impression, which might have been created in the public mind, in consequence of the appearance of his Royal Highness's name, however remotely, in connexion with such a procedure.

The Duke at that time promised to wait upon the Prince at Zoosdyke before the end of June, which would have had the same effect; but this visit is, and I think unfortunately, still to be paid. The Prince, brooding over all this in retirement at Zoosdyke, and probably not surrounded by the wisest counsellors, has lately addressed a letter to the King, in which he treats the whole conspiracy against the Duke as an absolute French fabrication, the principal object, perhaps, of which was to throw odium upon his name; and that this had been particularly evinced by the delays which have taken place in bringing such of the alleged conspirators as are in custody to trial, whereby the reports hostile to him have been suffered to extend and gather strength. He therefore calls upon the King to insist with the French Government, that if, as they allege, the conspiracy is a real one, they should immediately proceed to trial: if not, that they should issue a declaration calculated to vindicate his Royal Highness from the calumnies which they had suffered to be thrown out against him.

To this the King has answered that it would be quite impossible to take the step desired by his Royal Highness; that

the obvious answer to any such application to the French Government would be, that the affair of the conspirators was proceeding in their courts of law, according to their forms, with which no foreign State could assume any right of interference; and that to such an answer it would be impossible to reply—but that, if his Royal Highness, early in May last, when they were together at Brussels, had taken his Majesty's advice, and gone directly thence to Cambray to the Duke, and laid open his whole mind to his Grace on the subject, his feelings would long since have been relieved; that still communication with the Duke of Wellington must be the only way of affording him relief; and he must therefore wait with patience till he should be enabled to have a personal interview with his Grace.

This correspondence was not, as I understand, conducted in the most gentle terms on either side, and this accounts for the fact of neither party having taken measures for seeing the other since the late delivery of the Princess.

I shall write, by this conveyance, a few words to the Duke of Wellington, whom I suppose still to be in England, urging him, on the above grounds, to endeavour to make this his way to Cambray and Paris. If the present state of the parties towards each other will admit of an accord between father and son upon the subject, the christening of the young Prince will probably take place on the 24th, the anniversary of the King's birth, and thus two matters become discharged at once. If so, whenever else the baptism shall take place, his Majesty purposes to proceed on the next day to the Loo, and dismiss us from attendance till his repair to Bruxelles. I shall, therefore, set out for that place as soon after the baptism as possible, in the hope of meeting you, and taking such directions as you may have to give on your passage to Aix. It would be a great convenience to me to know as nearly as can be the date assigned for your probable arrival there.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, August 25, 1818.

My dear Lord—The young Prince, son of the Prince of Orange, was yesterday baptized by the names of William Alexander Frederick Constantine Nicholas Michael! The ceremony was very grand. There was also a levée and dinner at Court, and grand gala, play, and illumination, in the evening. The whole went off well, and the Court were well received.

The Prince of Orange, who rode here from Zoosdyke yesterday morning, in three hours and twenty minutes, has returned thither this morning, probably at the same rate. The King, Queen, &c., go to the Loo on Thursday, and the corps diplomatique will probably receive to-morrow the annual circular note to dispense with their attendance till the Court shall take up its residence at Bruxelles in October. I therefore purpose proceeding, with my whole family, at the close of this week, to Bruxelles, there to reside during the remainder of this year, and while the Court shall further continue there. This arrangement will give me the pleasure of seeing you on your passage through that place, and entertaining you during your stay there.

An instruction has been prepared, and I believe finally determined on, to enable General Robert Fagel to answer the joint letter of their Excellencies at Paris upon the Bouillon subject. It was read to me, and is not quite what I could wish. Its general purport is, however, as I expected it would be. It civilly tells their Excellencies that they are not known here either as arbitrators or mediators, this Court having had no communication through the ordinary channels of diplomacy, or received intimation from its Allies of their being placed in either of these situations, and, indeed, they themselves have not expressed in which of the two capacities they seek to place themselves. Equally desirous, however, with them that the 69th Article of the Act of Congress should be executed, this

Court will open an immediate and direct intercourse with the Allies, for the purpose of placing this matter in a state of final and equitable arrangement.

The faulty part of this instruction is, that, in one part, it directs General Fagel to say that the King is not aware of anything being said in the Act of Congress of mediation or arbitration, as relating to the case of the Bouillon indemnities, thus apparently placing all mediation or arbitration as of doubtful acceptance by this Court. This I represented to M. de Nagell as both impolitic and absurd, and he agreed with me; but whether the note will have to be altered in this particular, is nevertheless somewhat more than doubtful.

Adieu, my dear lord—what with the enormous work you have given us to do, and the package and removal of our effects, the Embassy papers, &c., we have abundant occupation during the remainder of our stay here.

Yours ever, very faithfully, CLANCARTY.

Mr. E. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Tunbridge Wells, August 28, 1818.

My dear Lord—I write to wish you and Lady Castlereagh a pleasant and successful voyage, and I see not any circumstance which discourages that wish, for the few clouds which are above the horizon will, I think, merely threaten a little, and gradually diminish, if they do not disappear.

I do not expect much from Aix-la-Chapelle, except the admission of France to the confederacy, and the withdrawing the troops from her frontier.

I cannot conceive that you will go further in mediation with Spain than good offices, and possibly guarantees; but can Spain admit foreign Powers to guarantee her treatment of her subjects, and the perpetuation of a system of commerce for the sole benefit of foreign Powers? A mediation by arms is out of the question.